Industrial Relations,Social Dialogue and Pacification of Public Sector Unions in Zambia: Rethinking Trade Union Strategies

Abstract

This article analyses the incorporation of social dialogue in industrial relations and its role in pacifying public sector unions in Zambia. A sample of 19 managers of public institutions and union leaders in Lusaka participated in the research. The research reveals that social dialogue is used to pacify trade unions as governments implement structural adjustment policies, which bring about poor employment conditions. Although the unions have responded to pacification by diversifying and servicing their membership, they are still weak. This finding is significant because it helps us to understand why unions in Southern Africa are weak in the post-independence era.

Keywords

Industrial relations social dialogue trade unions pacification union strategy

‘That element of militancy in the labour movement is somehow weakened. Because it’s about social dialogue and issues of appealing and understanding situations’

Director-Research and Information, Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia

Introduction

Industrial relations (also known as labour relations or employee relations) have traditionally been characterised by high levels of conflict among the key actors in Africa. These actors are trade unions, employers and government. The term ‘industrial relations’ refers to ‘how individuals, groups, organisations and institutions make decisions which shape the employment relationship between management and labour’ (Deery and Plowman, 1985: 3). The decisions that are made by the actors in industrial relations ‘determine rates of pay, hours of work, job descriptions and many other aspects of employment’ (Edwards, 1995: 5). However, the past four decades have seen the intensification of social dialogue as a strategy of regulating industrial relations in Africa. African countries that have adopted this strategy include South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, among others (see Cherry, 2006; Fashoyin, 2002; Khambule and Gerwel-Proches, 2019; Magure, 2008; Plaut, 2010). By social dialogue, we mean ‘all types of negotiation, consultation and exchange of information between or among representatives of governments, employers and workers on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy’ (International Labour Office (ILO), 2018: 3). It emphasises the participation of social partners in policy-making processes. These partners include the government, employers and workers. The adoption of social dialogue is believed to enhance the achievement of social and economic development, including improving the terms and conditions of employment. This is because the social partners are able to negotiate, consult and share information with each other on social and economic issues affecting them (ILO, 2018).

Although social dialogue has been embraced in Zambia, the terms and conditions of employment are still poor. For instance, the average monthly income is around Zambian Kwacha (K) 3,215 (US$270) yet the cost of the basic needs basket for an average household is around K4,011 (US$337) (Central Statistical Office (CSO), 2019; Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR), 2019). This means that an average worker in Zambia is underpaid by 20%. This kind of underpayment of workers occurs even in the public sector where the level of unionisation is high. In sectors such as local government, union density is as high as 97% (Koyi, 2010). This shows that trade unions fail to use social dialogue to negotiate for improved conditions of employment for their members. By trade union, we refer to ‘an organisation of employees which aims to protect and promote their interests in the workplace, mainly by means of collective bargaining and consultation with employers’ (Cole, 2002: 423). The failure by trade unions to negotiate for improved conditions of employment in the midst of social dialogue raises questions: How is social dialogue incorporated in industrial relations and what is its role in the pacification of trade unions? The term pacification is taken to mean ‘the establishment of provisional arrangements among local state and non-state actors that produce local order and suppress conflict’ (Richmond, 2021: 2). It involves the use of prescribed structures to suppress militancy in social settings.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the incorporation of social dialogue in industrial relations and its role in the pacification of public sector unions in Zambia. To achieve its purpose, the article begins by discussing the conceptualisation of social dialogue. It then reviews relevant literature on industrial relations and social dialogue in Africa and elsewhere. This is followed by a presentation of the methodology used to conduct the research. Thereafter, the origin and evolution of social dialogue in Zambia is examined. The article argues that social dialogue has been influenced by three major factors. These are colonial exploitation, high expectations in the post-colonial period and the implementation of structural adjustment policies driven by international financial institutions.

The article then discusses the pacification of public sector unions in the era of structural adjustment. It argues that the implementation of structural adjustment policies in Zambia in the last four decades has promoted the growth of the private sector at the expense of the public sector. This has led to job losses and industrial conflict in the public sector (Madimutsa et al., 2021; Republic of Zambia, 2005). To pacify the unions, social dialogue has been adopted which emphasises diplomacy rather than militancy when dealing with labour matters. The Director of Research and Information at the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) observed that the ‘element of militancy in the labour movement is somehow weakened. Because it is about social dialogue and issues of appealing and understanding situations’. As a senior employee of the CSAWUZ responsible for conducting research on labour issues, the informant has a deep understanding of how trade unions have become susceptible to manipulation under the rubric of economic and administrative reforms. This implies that trade unions are unable to fight against international financial institutions’ conditions which focus on reducing the public service wage bill (Republic of Zambia, 2005).

In response to their inability to raise wages, the unions have adopted an open and expansive approach to unionism, decentralised the collective bargaining structure and offered their members financial and non-financial services. Open and expansive unionism involves recruiting union members from several occupations. It is based on the belief that increased membership strengthens the union (Hyman, 1975). Although trade unions in Zambia in particular and Southern Africa in general have adopted reform strategies, they are still weak. They have failed to meet the needs of workers (Botiveau, 2017; McNamara, 2021). As a result, workers have decided to form splinter unions which have further weakened the labour movement. The significance of this article is that it explains how structural adjustment policies weaken trade unionism in the post-independence era in Zambia in particular and Southern Africa in general. It highlights how closed and restrictive unionism leads to loss of union membership and power during the implementation of neoliberal policies. It also shows how persuasion and intimidation from employers make the strategies of membership diversification, decentralised collective bargaining and service offerings fail to strengthen trade unions in the post-independence era.

Conceptualisation of social dialogue

The concept of social dialogue was coined in 1985 when the first meeting between European social partners and European Commission representatives was held in Brussels. The meeting involved negotiation and consultation between representatives of management and labour at continental level. The meetings became regular ‘and were eventually incorporated as Article 118b in the Maastricht Treaty (later Article 139 in the Amsterdam Treaty)’ (Kip, 2011: 6). The International Labour Office (2018) indicates that social dialogue takes two major forms, namely, tripartite and bipartite social dialogue. Tripartite social dialogue involves the interaction of the representatives of all the three key actors of social dialogue to address issues of common interest. These actors are government, employers and workers. For bipartite social dialogue, it involves the interaction of the representatives of two parties only. Like tripartite social dialogue, the parties in bipartite social dialogue interact to deal with issues of common interest. The processes used in these interactions include collective bargaining and workplace cooperation.

While the concept of social dialogue was coined and used in Europe, trade unions in other continents such as Africa adopted the concept of strategic unionism whose focus was to handle issues of industrial relations in the same way that social dialogue did. Strategic unionism paved the way for a new institutionalised relationship among the three key actors in industrial relations called corporatism. Corporatism allowed trade unions, employers and the government to jointly participate in economic and social policy-making processes. The participation of these actors was done through tripartite decision-making institutions, which institutionalised industrial conflict. This made collective bargaining less antagonistic and allowed the three actors to negotiate common goals (Von Holdt, 1993).

However, the concept of social dialogue has become more popular than corporatism in many continents including Africa. This is because of the efforts made by ILO to promote and strengthen social dialogue in member countries (Fashoyin, 2002). The significance of social dialogue is that it enables the social partners to share information on social and economic issues affecting them, resolve industrial conflict and promote national development. This is important especially when dealing with issues of labour reform in particular and economic reform in general (Fashoyin, 2002; ILO, 2018).

Literature review

The literature shows that the last four decades have witnessed the reorganisation of the industrial relations system across continents. The affected continents include Africa, Europe and North America, among others. The reorganised industrial relations system is characterised by job losses, reduced trade union density, reduced employee rewards, decentralisation of functions and decision making, informalisation of work and outsourcing (Kochan et al., 1994; Madimutsa and Pretorius, 2021; Waddington, 2005). Waddington (2005) argues that the reorganisation of the industrial relations system is due to factors such as globalisation, deregulation and international competition.

In an attempt to deal with issues of common interest emanating from the reorganisation of the industrial relations system, social dialogue has been incorporated in industrial relations in Africa and elsewhere. Koyi (2018) gives an example of social dialogue between trade unions and employers in the construction sector in Zambia which led to improvements in the conditions of employment. In South Africa, an alliance has been established between the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the African National Congress (ANC) government which has enabled COSATU to participate in policy-making processes and helped to upgrade social services that can be accessed by workers. These include clean water, housing, electricity and telephones (Cherry, 2006). Advanced economies have also experienced the benefits of social dialogue. Coats (2006) indicates that social partnerships have enabled trade unions in Europe to build their capacity to effectively participate in decision making as opposed to the traditional collective bargaining process (where negotiations are confined to terms and conditions of employment). Through these partnerships, reciprocal benefits have been provided to employers, trade unions and the broader economy. These include financial savings on the part of employers, protection of jobs and enhanced service delivery (Coats, 2006).

Despite social dialogue providing reciprocal benefits to social partners, it presents challenges to trade unions. Kjellberg (2021) argues that trade unions in Europe have lost their power in social dialogue because of workplace and economic reforms introduced by governments and international organisations. These reforms include reduced union density, reduced importance of collective bargaining, reduced wages and increased flexibility of the labour market. Because of the loss of their bargaining power, trade unions are unable to secure real benefits for their members. Cherry (2006) indicates that although the alliance between COSATU and the ANC government helped to upgrade social services, it could not deal with economic problems facing workers such as unemployment and decreasing incomes. The weakening of trade unions is exacerbated by the tendency of social dialogue to exclude other key actors from joint decision making such as civil society organisations. This is illustrated by the experiences in South Africa where non-governmental actors are excluded from the processes of consultation and negotiation. Because of this exclusionary approach, social dialogue fails to promote sustainable economic development (Khambule and Gerwel-Proches, 2019).

After weakening the unions, employers and governments are able to make union leaders support decisions that are made without their active participation. This has been reported in the United Kingdom where trade unions perceive the partnership model as a method used by employers to get the unions to support restructuring measures (Coats, 2006). The same is the case with Zambia where social partners felt that they had been used to support the implementation of the privatisation and public service reform programmes that were adopted by the government without their inputs (Fashoyin, 2002). Similarly, Magure (2008) asserts that social dialogue failed to resolve socio-economic problems in Zimbabwe because the government and business actors were not sincere in the negotiation process. Co-optation of union leaders has also been witnessed in South Africa where the alliance between COSATU and the ANC government is viewed as a forum to abuse government resources at the expense of the general public (Plaut, 2010).

To address the challenges presented by the reorganised industrial relations system, trade unions have decided to change their strategies. McNamara (2021) asserts that after being disempowered by the liberalisation of the economy, unionists in Zambia’s mining industry have shifted their focus from militancy to offering members financial services and cooperating with management. However, this strategy has not helped the workers but allowed management to continue lowering working conditions. In a related manner, Botiveau (2017) argues that post-apartheid South Africa has seen the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) changing from being militant and democratic to a highly bureaucratic and neo-corporatist union. Furthermore, NUM is seen focusing more on leadership development than meeting workers’ needs. From this literature, it can be noted that trade unions have adapted to the reorganised industrial relations system by cooperating with management at the expense of workers. However, the literature is not comprehensive. It focuses mainly on the experiences of social partners in private companies. It does not explain the experiences of social partners in the public sector especially in Africa where the survival of public sector unions is threatened by the implementation of structural adjustment policies driven by international financial institutions. This is the gap this article attempts to fill by analysing the relationship between social dialogue and the pacification of public sector unions in Zambia.

Research methodology

The research adopted a qualitative approach focusing on the experiences of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) in Lusaka city. The qualitative approach was adopted because it helps to collect detailed information about people’s views on a particular social problem (Creswell, 2014). The CSAWUZ was chosen because of two reasons. First, it is the largest public sector union in Zambia. In 2014, its membership was 17,463 (Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ), 2014a). Second, its membership is drawn from various categories of public institutions in the country (Nyirenda and Shikwe, 2003). The research was conducted in Lusaka city due to two reasons. First, by virtue of being the capital city of Zambia, Lusaka hosts a lot of public institutions. Second, the headquarters of the CSAWUZ are located in Lusaka city.

Both documented and undocumented data were collected. On one hand, documented data were collected from textbooks, journal articles, research reports, working papers, Acts of Parliament and union constitutions and membership records. On the other hand, undocumented data were collected from a sample of 19 key informants, comprising 5 managers of public institutions and 14 union leaders. A sample of 19 key informants was selected because it was large enough to provide valuable insights into industrial relations, social dialogue and trade union pacification in the public sector. According to Creswell (2014), qualitative research is characterised by small samples, which can range from 1 to 30 individuals. To ensure validity and reliability of the data, the key players in industrial relations and social dialogue in the public sector in Zambia were represented in the sample. Two measures were put in place to achieve this. First, both managers of public institutions and union leaders were included in the sample. Second, union leaders were selected from all the four levels of the organisational structure of the CSAWUZ, which are national, provincial, branch and workplace levels.

Multistage sampling was used to select managers of public institutions. The first stage involved the use of the lottery method to select 4 out of 67 public institutions where the CSAWUZ drew its membership in Lusaka city. The lottery method was applied by writing the names of the 67 public institutions on similar pieces of paper. The pieces of paper were then put in a container and mixed thoroughly. Thereafter, 4 pieces of paper were drawn. The institutions that were drawn at this stage were Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Chainama Hills College Hospital, Chilenje Clinic, and Lusaka Business and Technical College. The lottery method was used to give each institution an equal chance of being sampled. The second stage involved the use of purposive sampling to select 1 manager from each of the 4 sampled public institutions. Purposive sampling was chosen because it enabled the researcher to use his judgement to identify and select managers that were more knowledgeable of industrial relations and social dialogue in their institutions. In so doing, there was room for snowball sampling to be used in cases where the researcher was referred from one manager to another. This was the case at one institution where 2 managers were selected instead of 1.

Purposive sampling was also used to select union leaders at national and provincial levels. However, it was difficult to locate union leaders at branch and workplace levels. As such, snowball sampling was used to select the leaders at these lower levels of the union’s organisational structure. Through this sampling method, each leader who was contacted was requested for information relating to the whereabouts of their colleagues. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data from the informants. This method involved having a number of predetermined questions but with room for new questions to be introduced during the interview. Through semi-structured interviews, detailed information on industrial relations, social dialogue and pacification of public sector unions was collected. The interviews were conducted during the period 16 January–19 February 2015.

Origin and evolution of social dialogue in Zambia

Although the concept of social dialogue was coined in 1985 in Europe (Kip, 2011), its practice in Zambia emerged in the colonial period when the country was called Northern Rhodesia. The origin and evolution of social dialogue has been influenced by three major factors. These are colonial exploitation, high expectations in the post-colonial period and the implementation of structural adjustment policies. The details of these factors and their influence are examined below.

Colonial exploitation

Colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia was characterised by high levels of economic and social exploitation of Africans by European settlers. This included African workers being subjected to high rates of poll tax, low wages, assaults, job insecurity and high cost of living (Meebelo, 1986). The strategy of exploiting workers especially Africans by colonial employers was aimed at minimising costs (Parpart, 1983). In an attempt to fight against colonial exploitation, African workers especially miners on the Copperbelt began to organise strikes. The first strike took place in 1927. Thereafter, there was a series of strikes which intensified in 1935 and 1940s. The strikes did not only involve work stoppages but also violence, which sometimes led to injuries and death (Meebelo, 1986). The fight for improved conditions of employment was not done by African workers only but also by their European counterparts. While black workers wanted workers to be treated equally and fairly regardless of their race, whites wanted racial discrimination to be perpetuated. This led to the formation of a European Mineworkers’ Union in 1937, which could negotiate with management for segregation of jobs on racial lines and ensuring that white workers continued to have better conditions of employment than their black counterparts. This approach to industrial relations by Europeans was similar to what was being practised in other colonised African countries such as Southern Rhodesia and South Africa (Parpart, 1983).

Because of the racial approach to trade union formation adopted by European workers, African workers decided to follow suit by forming their own unions to negotiate for the improvement of their conditions of employment. The first union by African workers was called Shop Assistants Union established in 1947 (Seleti, 1992). African trade unions were then formed in the other sectors of the economy such as the mines where the Nkana Trade Union was formed in 1948. In 1949, four newly formed unions in the mining sector merged to form the African Mineworkers’ Union. The other unions formed by Africans included the Northern Rhodesia African Drivers’ Trade Union, Northern Rhodesia General Workers’ Trade Union, African Railway Workers’ Trade Union, Northern Rhodesia African Municipal and Management Board Workers’ Trade Union, and Hotels and Catering Workers’ Union. In 1951, African trade unions decided to form a federation called Northern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress. The formation of these unions enabled African workers to formally engage in collective bargaining with employers and reach agreements on wages and other conditions of employment such as hours of work, holidays, annual leave and tools (Meebelo, 1986). This shows that the early stages of social dialogue in Northern Rhodesia took the form of bipartite social dialogue. That is to say, the dialogue process involved the representatives of two social partners only whose aim was to deal with issues affecting them. These partners were employers who wanted to maximise their profits and trade unions who wanted wages and other conditions of service to be improved.

Despite African trade unions negotiating with employers, they were generally not satisfied with the terms and conditions of employment offered by their employers. As such, they continued to demand for higher wages and using militant methods such as strikes, pickets and processions to present their demands. As the struggles continued, African workers realised that they were not going to secure real economic benefits if political power continued to be in the hands of European settlers. This is because government officials were seen to favour employers when dealing with industrial disputes. This made African trade unions to work with nationalist movements in the fight for political independence. In this regard, union leaders also held political positions in nationalist movements in their localities. Similarly, political leaders such as those in the African National Congress were allowed to attend trade union meetings and make political speeches (Parpart, 1983; Seleti, 1992). Eventually, Northern Rhodesia gained political independent in 1964 and changed her name to Zambia. The new government was led by the United National Independence Party (UNIP).

High expectations in the post-colonial period

After gaining political independence, Zambian workers had high expectations. As such, they continued to demand for improved terms and conditions of employment. To try and control the workers, the UNIP government enacted the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act in 1965 which established the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) to which trade unions could affiliate. ZCTU was also given powers to dissolve member unions, change union rules and approve or reject industrial action (Larmer, 2005). Despite ZCTU having these powers, workers continued to demand for higher wages and the need to harmonise wage scales between Zambians and Europeans. Nonetheless, these demands were rejected by both the employers and the government. The new government’s argument was that national resources especially copper revenues should be used to promote national development rather than wage increases. This infuriated the workers especially in the mines who decided to go on strike in 1966. The strike was followed by several others within the mines and other sectors such as textiles, railways, local councils and schools (Larmer, 2005; Parpart, 1983). After realising that bipartite social dialogue was unable to resolve industrial disputes, the government decided to introduce tripartite social dialogue on an ad hoc basis. The first event of this nature was the Livingstone Labour Conference held on 7–8 April 1967. The conference was attended by representatives of employers, trade unions and government to deal with labour matters affecting the country. The resolutions of the conference included promotion of industrial peace and linking wage increases to productivity (Larmer, 2005).

However, workers continued to demand for higher wages after the Livingstone Labour Conference and strikes continued. To increase control of industrial relations, the government nationalised 51% of the copper mining industry in 1969. This enabled the government to not only control wage levels in the mines but also use copper revenues to deliver social services across the country. The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1965 was also replaced with the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 which increased the power of ZCTU over its member unions. The 1971 Act also provided for conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes and made it very difficult for legal strikes to be undertaken (Larmer, 2005). The Act also prohibited the formation of multiple unions in one industry. This helped to unify the labour movement under the control of ZCTU (Mulenga, 2011). In addition, Zambia was declared a one-party state in 1972 to deal with the problem of political divisions (Parpart, 1983).

Despite the above measures being in place, union leaders through ZCTU continued to demand for better conditions of service and organising strikes and protests against government policies (Parpart, 1983). When copper prices started falling in the mid-1970s, the government lost its major source of revenue and was forced to borrow money from international financial institutions to finance its operations. Nevertheless, the conditions attached to external loans required the country to implement structural adjustment policies (Burawoy, 2014). The details of these policies are discussed in the next subsection.

Implementation of structural adjustment policies

The implementation of structural adjustment policies in Zambia began in the early 1980s as a condition for the country to access financial assistance from international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Structural adjustment policies included removal of price controls, having pay limits and liberalisation of exchange rates. The immediate effect of these policies was the rapid increase in inflation, which made workers and ordinary citizens to protest against the structural adjustment policies. Workers even went on strike demanding pay increase to mitigate the effects of inflation. Because of widespread protests, riots and strikes, the UNIP government decided to cancel structural adjustment policies on 1 May 1987. Nonetheless, strikes and demands for pay increase continued (Larmer, 2006). In 1990, ZCTU decided to work with the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and other civil society organisations to fight for the re-introduction of multiparty politics. Eventually, the republican constitution was amended to re-introduce multiparty politics. This amendment enabled the MMD to transform itself from a civil society organisation to a political party. Multiparty elections were held in 1991 where UNIP lost power to MMD (Larmer, 2006; Mulenga, 2011).

After forming government, the MMD decided to resume the implementation of structural adjustment policies as agreed with the IMF and World Bank. The repackaged policies included liberalisation of the economy, downsizing of the civil service and privatisation of state-owned enterprises (Madimutsa et al., 2021). The unions through their two federations, ZCTU and Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ), protested against the implementation of the repackaged policies but they were unsuccessful (Mulenga, 2011). The unions failed to resist the repackaged structural adjustment policies because of internal divisions which made it easy for management and government to manipulate them. The Director of Research and Information at CSAWUZ stated that ‘we have a proliferation of trade unions especially in the public sector . . . If they [employers] clinch a deal with the [one] union, that is the deal that is going to cut across all the other unions’. As a senior union employee mandated to conduct research on behalf of CSAWUZ, the informant saw labour market liberalisation as a threat to the unity of the labour movement and strength of the CSAWUZ. The unions find themselves in this situation because of the amendment of the Industrial Relations Act in 1990 which allowed several unions to be formed in industries (Mulenga, 2011). Union divisions were further promoted when the 1990 Act was replaced by the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993 and its subsequent amendment in 1997 which allowed the formation of rival federations (Republic of Zambia, 1997). This situation is the opposite of what obtained in the 1980s when the labour movement was united and strong. Through ZCTU, the unions managed to organise nation-wide strikes against structural adjustment policies and forced the UNIP government to abandon the reforms in the late 1980s (Larmer, 2006; Rakner, 2003).

To address labour issues in a liberalised economy, the MMD government decided to institutionalise tripartite social dialogue. This was done by establishing the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council (TCLC) in 1993 (Fashoyin, 2002). The TCLC consists of the Minister of Labour and an equal number of representatives of trade unions, employers and the government. The exact number of members of this council is decided by the Minister of Labour but it is not less than 21. The Industrial and Labour Relations Act requires social partners to choose their own representatives in this council. The function of the TCLC is ‘to advise the Government on all issues relating to labour matters, manpower development and utilisation and any other matter referred to the Council by the Government’ (Republic of Zambia, 1997: section 83). Another institution for tripartite social dialogue is the National Economic Advisory Council (NEAC) established in 1993. It comprises representatives of different groups chosen by the republican president who include public institutions, private companies, civil society organisations, academic institutions, professional bodies, religious organisations and trade unions. The NEAC offers stakeholders the opportunity to influence the agenda of public policies in general and economic policy in particular (Fashoyin, 2002). Koyi et al. (2021) assert that the effectiveness of unions in such interactions depends on the strength of their internal organisational strategies to mediate external influences.

Although public sector unions in Zambia have opportunities to protect workers’ interests as they interact with the external environment, they still fail to negotiate for living wages for their members (Koyi, 2010; Koyi et al., 2021). Furthermore, the labour movement in general no longer exhibits high levels of militancy that were witnessed in the colonial period and the first three decades of the post-colonial period. This shows a degree of union pacification in the era of structural adjustment. This is the issue covered in the next section.

Pacification of public sector unions in the era of structural adjustment

The type of social dialogue covered in this section is bipartite social dialogue, particularly the interaction between union leaders and managers of public institutions. These actors have been chosen because they deal directly with public sector workers. The pacification of unions will be discussed at all the three levels of industrial relations activity. These are policy-making, collective bargaining and workplace levels. The details of the pacification at these levels are discussed below.

Policy-making level

At policy-making level, the unions are persuaded to be diplomatic and understanding rather than militant as they participate in institutional policy-making processes. This was the case during the formulation of the Public Service Reform Programme in 1993. In the meetings held between the unions and the government, the unions were persuaded to help the government meet the IMF and World Bank conditionality of reducing the wage bill by downsizing the public service. A National Trustee of CSAWUZ indicated that ‘the wage bill was not supposed to exceed 8% of the GDP [gross domestic product]’ if the country was to continue getting assistance from international financial institutions. In the persuasion process, the unions were promised that when the workforce is reduced, ‘the few who remain can get better paid’ (National Trustee, CSAWUZ). In addition, those to be retrenched were promised prompt payment of severance package in accordance with the Employment Act. The CSAWUZ and other public sector unions understood the situation and allowed the government to go ahead with the retrenchment of workers. At that time, the informant was not only a union leader but also a civil servant holding the position of livestock officer in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. This meant that he and other union leaders risked losing their jobs during the retrenchment process. As such, they were in a weak position to negotiate a good deal with the government which was their employer.

Two strategies were used to retrench workers during the implementation of the Public Service Reform Programme. The first was mandatory retrenchment of Classified Daily Employees (also known as general workers). These included drivers, cleaners, office orderlies and cordon guards. The second strategy was voluntary separation, which was extended to any civil servant who was willing to leave the service (National Trustee, CSAWUZ). These strategies resulted in the reduction of the size of the public service from 180,000 workers in 1993 to 104,000 in 2000 (Republic of Zambia, 2005). Despite the massive job losses, the above-mentioned informant was not retrenched. At that time, he was the President of the CSAWUZ and presided over the union’s National Executive Council (NEC) which had the power to ‘carry out any business aimed at fulfilling the objects of the Union’ (CSAWUZ, 2014b: 8). After serving as CSAWUZ President for 16 years (from 1994 to 2010), he stepped down and became a national trustee of the same union (Nawa, 2018). This means that the informant was a senior union leader during and after the retrenchment exercise. Despite being in that position, he failed to mobilise his colleagues and the general membership to force the government to fulfil its promise of better pay in the post-retrenchment era. Public servants continued to get low wages (Koyi, 2010). In addition, retrenched workers were not paid their terminal benefits. This was in spite of suing the government and the court ruling in their favour (Lusaka Times, 2016). This finding shows that union leaders and the government colluded to exploit workers during the reform of the public sector.

The retrenchment of workers also led to loss of union membership. The membership of CSAWUZ reduced from 65,000 in 1995 to 17,000 in 2010. The other public sector unions went through the same experience. The membership of the National Union of Public Service Workers reduced from 34,000 in 1995 to 13,000 in 2010. For the Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union, its membership reduced from 22,000 in 1995 to 14,500 in 2010 (Koyi, 2010). This finding implies that by consenting to the retrenchment of workers, the unions also allowed the destruction of public sector unionism thereby exposing workers to more exploitation.

Collective bargaining level

Following international financial institutions’ conditionality of limiting pay, the MMD government started imposing wage freezes on public sector workers. The first wage freeze was imposed in 1998. Having failed to fight against the wage freeze through collective bargaining, the Civil Servants Union of Zambia and National Union of Public Service Workers sued the government in the Industrial Relations Court for unilaterally imposing a wage freeze on its workers. The court declared the wage freeze illegal and awarded civil servants 40% salary increment (Mangani, 2000). The second wage freeze was imposed in 2004, which was accompanied by an increase in income tax. The two union federations, ZCTU and FFTUZ, organised national protests against the wage freeze and increase in income tax but the government did not rescind its decision (Mulenga, 2011). This finding shows that a divided labour movement cannot successfully resist the implementation of structural adjustment policies driven by international financial institutions.

Because of the determination of the government to dilute conditions of employment in the era of structural adjustment, employers tend to hold preliminary meetings with union leaders so that collective bargaining is not characterised by union militancy. The Assistant Labour Commissioner of Industrial Relations at the Ministry of Labour and Social Security revealed that the meetings between employers and trade unions enable the unions to have a clear understanding of the situation in the organisation so that when it comes to collective bargaining, there is no unnecessary conflict. Being a government official responsible for regulating industrial relations, the informant’s overall objective is to maintain socio-economic stability (Salamon, 2000). Therefore, he views social dialogue as a strategy to persuade trade union leaders to maintain industrial peace even if wages are low.

Workplace level

At the workplace level, trade unions are persuaded by management to pacify workers so that they do not rise against exploitative policies and conditions of employment. The Acting Senior Human Resource Management Officer at Chainama Hills College Hospital stated that ‘the other time we had a challenge with long service bonus . . . We had a separate meeting with our local union, the branch, where we told them to say it’s up to you to explain to our staff’. After the union leaders explained the situation to workers, they calmed down. By virtue of being a senior management official, the main interest of the informant is to ensure that the hospital continues being productive. This means that social dialogue is used by management to persuade union leaders and their members to continue working despite working conditions being bad. Another public institution where this strategy is used is Lusaka Business and Technical College (LBTC). The Deputy Director of LBTC said that trade unions ‘need first to educate their members about industrial harmony, the issues of collective bargaining and the process of handling labour grievances’. Since the informant is a senior management official at the college, his main goal is to use the unions to calm down the workers so that the college continues delivering its services. This, in turn, makes it difficult for the unions to take industrial action against poor employment conditions. This outcome was witnessed in 1998 when ZCTU cancelled the second phase of the nation-wide strike against the wage freeze imposed by the government in preference of dialogue (Times of Zambia, 1998). However, when dialogue failed to yield positive results, two affiliates of ZCTU decided to litigate against the wage freeze and the court ruling went in their favour (Mangani, 2000). This implies that bipartite social dialogue shifts the task of determining wages from collective bargaining units to courts of law.

Because of the pacification of the unions, the terms and conditions of employment are diluted. This was the case when health boards were abolished and their workers transferred to the Ministry of Health in 2006. The transfer process resulted in workers being demoted. The Acting Senior Human Resource Management Officer at Chainama Hills College Hospital stated that ‘you find out that maybe in the board this person was a human resource staff. When they come to the civil service, they are maybe a cook or a cleaner’. The demotions came with reductions in pay. From this testimony, it can be noted that social dialogue facilitates institutional reforms that enable management to save costs at the expense of workers. In a related manner, the Chairperson of Ridgeway Branch of CSAWUZ mentioned that although civil servants are entitled to subsistence allowance of K500 per night when they work outside their stations, management at Zambia Statistics Agency (ZamStats) sometimes ‘say we pay you half the rate [because] . . . we don’t have enough resources’. The informant further mentioned that ‘half the rate is not part of my terms . . . Even if you want to tell members to stop working . . . they say you are working against management’. This testimony shows that the informant is intimidated by management when he tries to fight for higher wages. The informant finds himself in this situation because of role conflict he faces at the workplace level. On the one hand, he is a cartographer at ZamStats where he is supposed to follow instructions from management. On the other hand, he is a union branch chairperson who is supposed to organise members, handle members’ grievances and negotiate with management on matters affecting members (CSAWUZ, 2014b). Therefore, the fear of victimisation by management makes him fail to perform union functions.

Although the Industrial and Labour Relations Act allows workers to go on strike when negotiations fail, public sector unions in Zambia are too weak to take this kind of action. Due to fear of victimisation, they cannot handle the legal requirements for a strike. These include a collective dispute being declared and referred to a conciliator/s. When the conciliation process fails, a strike ballot should be conducted where a majority of the workers must vote for the strike. In addition, the Minister of Labour is empowered to intervene before a strike commences. The minister can also apply to the Industrial Relations Court to cancel a strike if he or she considers it not to be in the public interest (Republic of Zambia, 1997). Under these conditions, the unions are left with the option of either enduring the pacification or relying on courts to resolve industrial disputes.

The Industrial and Labour Relations Act allows trade unions and employers to refer collective disputes to the Industrial Relations Court if they cannot be settled by strike or lockout ballots (Republic of Zambia, 1997). Nonetheless, the unions in Zambia rarely take this kind of action. Instead, they prefer to continue with social dialogue. This was illustrated in 2014 and 2015 when the government imposed a 2-year wage freeze on its workers. Despite public sector unions declaring a collective dispute with the government over the wage freeze on 1 June 2014, they did not conduct a strike ballot or refer the dispute to court. Instead, they continued persuading the government to lift the wage freeze. However, the government refused because it wanted to resolve the problem of budget overrun experienced in 2013. Negotiations only resumed towards the end of the wage freeze period when the government agreed to award its workers salary increments of between 9% and 29% for 2016 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014; Mfula, 2015). This finding shows that bipartite social dialogue pacifies the unions to the extent that they accept poor remuneration for workers. This finding is similar to reports in other developing countries implementing economic and administrative reforms such as Ukraine (see Zhukov, 2011).

Trade unions’ response to pacification

Although public sector unions are pacified by bipartite social dialogue, they try to respond strategically to the pacification. Their response is at all the three levels of industrial relations activity, which are analysed below.

Policy-making level

At policy-making level, the CSAWUZ responded by changing its structure from a closed and restrictive union to an open and expansive one. This meant that the categories of workers from which it drew its membership had increased (Hyman, 1975). This response was illustrated by the change of its name from Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ) to Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) in 2002. Under the old name, the membership of CSUZ was confined to civil servants only while the new name extended the membership to allied workers. These included other workers in the Zambian public service, grant-aided institutions, parastatals and non-governmental organisations (CSAWUZ, 2014b). The CSUZ changed its structure so that it could recover from the membership loss caused by job losses due to the implementation of the Public Service Reform Programme. After adopting the open and expansive approach, its membership increased slightly from 17,000 in 2010 to 17,463 in 2014 (CSAWUZ, 2014a; Koyi, 2010). Nonetheless, the membership increase did not increase the strength of the union. For instance, in 2013, the CSAWUZ failed to mobilise its increased membership to challenge the 2-year wage freeze imposed by the government on public sector workers. While workers endured the wage freeze, they continued paying subscription fees to the union. The CSAWUZ requires each member to pay a subscription fee of 2% of their basic salary every month (CSAWUZ, 2014b). This means that union leaders continue to have access to union funds while workers lose out.

Collective bargaining level

At collective bargaining level, two major responses were made by CSAWUZ. First, it decided to decentralise its collective bargaining structure. This involved having several bargaining units. Before extending its membership to allied workers, the CSAWUZ used to bargain with the central government only as the employer of civil servants. After incorporating allied workers, the union began bargaining with not only the central government but also the management of grant-aided and semi-autonomous government institutions from which it drew its membership. Under this arrangement, each employer had the power to negotiate the conditions of service for their workers. This allowed the union to link wages to the productivity of each institution. This implied that working conditions could vary from one institution to another depending on each institution’s resource capacity (Madimutsa and Pretorius, 2017, 2021).

The second response involves gathering relevant information before engaging in negotiations with management. In this regard, the CSAWUZ has established a directorate for research whose task is to gather information on the performance of public institutions in particular and the economy in general. The gathered information relates to institutional revenue, pay structures, inflation and cost of living. This information is used to come up with demands and their justification which are presented to management (Madimutsa and Pretorius, 2017, 2021). Nevertheless, this strategy is not effective in the era of structural adjustment. Despite the average inflation rate in Zambia increasing from 7% in 2013 to 10.1% in 2015, the CSAWUZ failed to use this information to persuade or force the government to lift the wage freeze it imposed on its workers in 2014 and 2015 (Mfula, 2015; O’Neill, 2021).

Workplace level

At the workplace level, the CSAWUZ responded by offering its members financial and non-financial services. The financial services were loans and money given to members who recruited new ones. Non-financial services included training and union branded clothes aimed at marketing the union (Madimutsa and Pretorius, 2017, 2021). This strategy is also used by unions in other sectors in Zambia such as mining (see McNamara, 2021). It has also been adopted by other unions in the region such as National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in South Africa (see Botiveau, 2017). However, offering services to members in response to low wages is not helpful to unions. Despite being serviced, some members of CSAWUZ lost confidence in it and left to form splinter unions. Unions that split from CSAWUZ include Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers (ZNUHAW), Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation (ZUNO) and Judicial and Allied Workers Union of Zambia (JAWUZ). The problem of member dissatisfaction and revolt has also been experienced by other unions in the region that have adopted the servicing strategy such as NUM in South Africa (see Botiveau, 2017).

However, formation of splinter unions creates inter-union conflict which further weakens the labour movement. A Trustee of the University Teaching Hospital (UTH) Branch of CSAWUZ said that ‘these unions like ZUNO and ZNUHAW, they have got some weaknesses which we can see. So, as CSAWUZ we are still sitting and having meetings. We want to see how we can capture a lot of [their] members’. This informant is not only a union leader at branch level but also an orthopaedic technician at UTH where he is affected by problems facing workers including non-payment of fringe benefits such as long service bonus, settling-in allowance and travel allowance. Instead of the informant and the other members of the Branch Executive Committee fighting for payment of workers’ benefits, they spend their time fighting other unions thereby destabilising the labour movement. This shows that union leaders in post-independence Zambia are not interested in matters affecting workers but to preserve their positions in the unions. This enables them to continue having access to union resources including membership subscriptions at the expense of workers’ welfare.

Conclusion

The intensification of social dialogue in African countries such as Zambia in the past four decades has pacified trade unions as governments implement structural adjustment policies driven by international financial institutions. Union pacification is at all the three levels of industrial relations activity, namely, policy making, collective bargaining and workplace levels. At these levels, industrial conflict has been institutionalised and diplomacy emphasised rather than militancy. This has made the unions to accept management policies that focus on downsizing the public service, wage freeze and dilution of other conditions of employment. The unions are also persuaded to pacify workers so that they do not rise against exploitative policies and conditions of employment. The unions have failed to resist these conditions because of their own internal divisions which make it easy for management and government to manipulate them.

In response to their inability to raise wages, the unions have adopted an open and expansive approach to unionism, decentralised the collective bargaining structure and offered their members financial and non-financial services. Although the unions have adopted these responses, they are still weak. They have failed to meet workers’ needs. As a result, workers have decided to form splinter unions which have further weakened the labour movement. The major contribution of this article has been to explain how social dialogue is incorporated in industrial relations, how bipartite social dialogue pacifies trade unions and how the unions respond to the pacification. It has also explained how union responses have failed to strengthen trade unionism in Southern Africa in the post-independence era. This contribution is significant because it helps us to rethink trade union strategies in post-independence Africa. Despite making this contribution, the article does not draw causal inference because of its reliance on qualitative data captured from one point in time. Future research can focus on a longitudinal and quantitatively oriented methodology so as to gather more information about the relationship between social dialogue and pacification of trade unions in post-independence Africa.

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Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Clever Madimutsa

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Author biography

Clever Madimutsa is a Lecturer of Public Administration and Coordinator of Postgraduate Programmes in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zambia. His research focuses on public sector reform, collaborative governance and industrial relations.

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