Iranian’s attitudes toward law-abidingness in administration system in Iran

Abstract

According to international statistics and domestic research, the rate of law-abidingness in Iran is low. The purpose of this article is to measure the degree of law-abidingness in the administrative system. The results show that in general, the mediation effect for three mediation variables in the path model is significant except the relationship between political satisfaction, necessity of organizational rules, and law-abidingness. There is mediation effect between political satisfaction, trust, and law-abidingness, which is positive. There is a positive significant relationship between political satisfaction, success priority of material preference system, and law-abidingness. The relationship between nepotism, trust, and law-abidingness is negative.

Keywords

Law-abidingness necessity of organizational rules success priority of material preference system relationship orientation and nepotism

Introduction

Society is regulated by law, and humans communicate and interact with their fellow human beings. The law covers various areas of life, such as economics, politics, law, family, and work and business. One of the factors for the development of developed societies is the existence of codified, transparent, and explicit laws, so if the laws are vague, inaccurate and complicated, and violate each other, in no sphere of society can one hope that such laws will untie the knot of the individual’s problems or even the administrative system itself and bring about progress and development (Chalabi, 1996).

The realization of the rule of law in society is one of the characteristics of developed societies and one of the main goals of political development. The rule of law in society means “the existence of subjective and objective grounds for the implementation of the law and the superiority of the law over all other authorities in society” (Katozian, 1987). The most important function of the law is to regulate the relationship between the government and the citizens, on the one hand, and the citizens with each other, on the other hand, and judges provide security and freedom through the law. The law is a set of fixed standards and criteria that create rights and obligations for everyone and the members of society regulate their relations according to it, and in this way, everyone becomes aware of their rights. The executive organs of the country, in accordance with the law, determine the boundaries and, with the tools and means of facilitating or deterring, indicate the implementation of the law by individuals and society (Rasekh, 2004).

Law disobedience is a common social problem among a lot of people. This approach being a social problem threatens order and social organizations. Law disobedience has always been a critical issue in Iran; in effect, legality of lawmakers and following the laws by people have always been two major problems in Iran. The Law disobedience is a severe problem in underdeveloped countries. Transition to a modern society from a traditional society, unstable political condition, facing imported phenomena and technologies, foreign threats, and fiscal crisis, makes people law-disobedient (Khedry et al., 2020).

Since the foundation of modern states, bureaucracies have become the major tools of governments to achieve developmental aims. The existence of an effective bureaucracy has been considered essential to realize these aims. Nevertheless, in the literature of sociology, specifically after the classics, the state bureaucracy has been abandoned and it seems as if there is a type of conceptual emptiness and embezzlement (Hedayati, 2018).

According to Fereydoun Khavand (2020), Perception of corruption is an indicator that relies on various forms of corruption, including bribery, bribery of government officials, theft of public funds, embezzlement of government sales through auctions and tenders, and so on. Through Standardization of criteria related to the perception of corruption a grade point average of zero to one hundred is given, in which zero indicates absolute corruption and one hundred indicates the absolute purity of a country. Transparency International reports show that the perception of corruption in Iran is deteriorating year by year. According to the organization, the average of this index in Iran has decreased from 30 in 2017 to 28 in 2018 and 26 in 2019, and at the same time, Iran’s position among the 180 countries surveyed in three consecutive years, has fallen from 130 to 138 and then to 146. In other words, Iran’s position in the ranking of countries in terms of corruption perception index, in 2019 compared to 2018, has decreased by eight steps, and compared to 2017, by sixteen steps.

According to the latest Transparency International report, dated 23 January 2020, in terms of corruption, Iran’s name is in the category of countries such as Bangladesh, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Angola. Many African countries that used to be at the forefront of corruption are now far behind Iran. Although Iran has dropped to 146th in the International Transparency Index, Senegal is ranked 66th this year, 80 steps cleaner than the Islamic Republic. In the same table, Burkina Faso is 61 steps lower than Iran in terms of corruption perception index and is less prone to corruption. Even in the Middle East, Iran is considered one of the most corrupt countries. Among the 18 countries in the region, the UAE is ranked 21st, even cleaner than France and the United States. However, Iran with the rank of 146 stands 14th in the Middle East, and only four crisis-hit countries, namely, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, are worse than Iran. It is worth mentioning that in the same Middle East region, Jordan is in the 60th place in terms of corruption perception index and in fact, it is 86 steps cleaner than Iran.

The purpose of this article is to examine the degree of law-abidingness in the administrative system and to examine the factors affecting the degree of law-abidingness (tendency to obey the law) in the administrative system of the country. In Iranian society, we face three categories of norms, namely, customary, moral, and legal norms. In the case of law disobedience, we have a problem in the area of modern legal norms, not in the area where custom and ethics have become law. Thus, the laws that are most often violated and have created the social problem of law disobedience are the laws of modern spheres and the relationship between government and people.

The most important part of this research is to provide accurate and transparent statistics and information about the situation of law-abidingness and law disobedience in the country (here the administrative system) to the organizations and supervisory institutions of the country. It is also possible to be aware of what is going on in the departments under the supervision of an organization and the reflection of the process and output of that organization is a necessary condition for any careful planning and monitoring and thoughtful solutions to solve the problems. Therefore, this study answers the following questions: (1) What is the current state of the Iranian administrative system in terms of law-abidingness? (2) What are the factors affecting the law-abidingness of the employees of the administrative system?

Literature review

For Hosseini et al. (2020), four main corruption risks among construction industry are procedural infringement in awarding contracts, embezzlement of contractual arrangements, disregard of project management bases, and unreasonable decision making. While corruption risks found in other countries align with Iran, with funds being embezzled for financial gain, Iran also demonstrates a strong tendency to defend projects that serve the government’s political agenda. A significant outcome of this study is root cause identification of corruption risks, namely, the notable influence of authoritarianism on project selection in Iran, over criterion of economic advantage or social good.

Hedayati (2018) had an investigation on crucial discussion of the important theories on the state bureaucracy and examined their reductionist attitudes; then giving a transparent formulation of this concept, he finally gave a conceptual model for its empirical study. In regard to this model, the quality of the state bureaucracy in every country is resultant from its special institutional and structural composition. The institutional context is the major determining element of the quality of bureaucracy. A number of variables in the context of this institutional logic are (1) the order of power and the features of political structure, (2) the pattern of resource removal and the system of economic relations, (3) the kind of association between government and society, and, finally, (4) the subject of the power and function/agency of the elites.

Theoretical framework

In defining anomie, Durkheim considers it non-adherence to moral rules (Mestrovic and Lorenzo, 2008). This lack of commitment is due to the fading or unclearness of these rules in society (Turner, 1991: 412–414). For Durkheim (1981), the main source of these moral rules during human life has been two important factors of tradition (religion) and custom (customary laws) (Durkheim, 1981: 48–49). Durkheim applies anomie to societies that he says are in transition. That is, societies in which religion and religious laws (tradition) have lost their authority, desirability, or application and the role of these factors is diminishing (Durkheim, 1999). On the other hand, the customary rules resulting from the advanced division of labor that are the cause of the cohesion of the modern world and are based on the assumptions of modern society, have not yet found their proper place (Durkheim, 2006).

Anomie is one of the effective factors on the degree of law-abidingness in the Iranian administrative system because the organizational system is one of the achievements of modern society and its optimal functioning depends on the observance of the rules of the modern world in its management. Among these rules are universalism, specialization, law-abidingness, and so on, which must be observed by the employees of each department at any organizational level. But the employees of the Iranian administrative system do not consider themselves obliged to observe modern customary norms because some of their values are still rooted in tradition, and customary rules (without external deterrents) are not binding and valuable to them. Thus, many of law disobedient behaviors, while violating customary rules and values, are commonplace in the administrative system because they are not prohibited (or even encouraged by) traditional rules. On the other hand, the non-internalization of organizational values in the individuals makes them a selfish and self-centered element that only step to satisfy their personal desires and are not bound by organizational rules. The prevalence of phenomena such as partisanship and nepotism, as well as negligence in performing legal duties and the so-called “avoiding work” can be attributed to this factor.

This research applied Durkheim’s theory to Iranian society, and Iran is entering the modernity, and traditional structures are collapsing with the wave of modernity, but modern society has not yet been formed in Iran; consequently, this has caused an anomic situation in Iran. It is also not given as a result just because of adaptation to the research, Durkheim theory was used.

In explaining the structural causes of conformity (here law-abidingness) and heterogeneity (here law disobedience), Merton also points to the existence or absence of a gap between socially acceptable goals (for the individuals) and the legitimate means of achieving them (Heidensohn, 1989: 44; Orru, 1987: 122–123). According to Merton, if individuals fail to meet goals through legitimate means, they will resort to unkind behaviors (such as law disobedience) to achieve goals (Clinard, 1974: 112). He calls this form of heterogeneity innovation or heresy and considers it as a state in which a person accepts the accepted goals of society, but the ways to achieve them are not possible or acceptable for him (Merton, 1997: 516).

According to Tyler, all people do not obey the law only because of the existence of systems of punishment and reward and the calculation of profits and losses, but the most important factor in this field (law-abidingness) is the legitimacy of the system and system in which laws are made and implemented. This is why many people abide by the law while it may not benefit them or even harm them in some cases (Tyler, 2001: 33; Tyler and Huo, 2002). Therefore, one of the important factors of law-abidingness in the administrative system is the degree of legitimacy of the legislative and executive system among employees, which is due to another indicator called procedural justice. Procedural justice, which is measured by the three variables of credibility, trust, and impartiality, makes the employees of the administrative system—even in the absence or weakness of the supervisory system—obliged to obey the law. On the other hand, factors such as feelings of discrimination and injustice, the existence of a system of punishment and reward, kinship, and nepotism affect the three mentioned variables’ degree and, therefore, affect the index of procedural justice and, consequently, the legitimacy of the legal system (Tyler, 2006; Tyler and Darley, 1999; Tyler and Fagan, 2008). It therefore explains the theory of “insubordinate law disobedience.” In other words, if the level of legitimacy of the legislative and executive system (political system) is high for a person (regardless of profit or loss), his tendency to obey the law will increase; conversely, if legitimacy is undermined (again, regardless of profit or loss), the individual is reluctant to abide by the law, and even in the absence of an effective oversight system, he or she will break the law to protest the illegitimacy.

Research methodology

Participants

The population of this study consists of “all government offices in Tehran and Mashhad.” In this study, first, using “judicial sampling,” a number of government agencies were selected as a sample. Then, since we did not have an accurate list of the number of employees in the selected offices, we had to use the non-probabilistic sampling method. For this purpose, using quota sampling from among the employees of the above departments, we selected a number according to the organizational category. One of the most important problems that the researchers faced in this research project was the method of collecting the questionnaires because in the organizations, unlike the streets (in which people are anonymous), we dealt with very specific people (employees), and this made it difficult to answer some of the sensitive questions in the questionnaire. Therefore, if the questionnaires were collected in the usual way, the probability of not answering or giving wrong answers would increase. To reduce this important bias in research, two strategies were implemented. (1) Although the letter of the inspection organization was used to coordinate with each department to complete the questionnaires, when collecting information, the questionnaires provided the respondents with letters from the Institute of Social Studies and Research, University of Tehran, which helped to answer without bias. (2) The second strategy for collecting questionnaires was to use a ballot box. To do this, the institute had designed a white box for each organization on which it was completely unmarked. Then, when presenting the questionnaire to each employee of this closed box, they were shown that they should put the questionnaire in it personally. In this section, the questioners were urged to refrain from looking at the completed questionnaire in order to provide anonymity and reassurance to the respondents as much as possible. Of course, this method also had disadvantages, including the fact that we had a large number of incomplete questionnaires, and to overcome this shortcoming, we completed a questionnaire 20% more than the number that the questionnaire had to be completed. For this purpose, using quota sampling from among the employees of the above departments, we selected a number according to the organizational category. Finally, information was collected in 49 government offices and 1238 employees of Tehran and Mashhad were selected as a sample in this study.

The questionnaire addressed 12 variables such as efficiency of reward and punishment, feeling of discrimination, financial failure in the case of law observation, individualism, necessity of organizational rules, nepotism, political satisfaction, relationship-oriented, success priority of material preference system, supervision weakness in feelings, and trust. Dependent variable is law-abiding with three dimensions, namely, cognitive, behavior, and emotional. Descriptive statistics were used to summarize the sample. Furthermore, the sample demonstrated that 63 % of the respondents were male (n = 674) and 37% were female (n = 564).

Measurements

The Feeling of Discrimination was measured with four items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their Feeling of Discrimination in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 5 to 25. Furthermore, one question ranges from Very low to Very high.

In addition, Efficiency of reward and punishment was measured with 11 items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their Efficiency of reward and punishment in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 11 to 55.

Relationship-oriented was measured with six items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their relationship-oriented in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 6 to 30.

Furthermore, Success priority of material preference system was measured with six items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their Success priority of material preference system in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 6 to 30.

Also, necessity of organizational rules was measured with eight items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their necessity of organizational rules ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 8 to 40.

For measuring, financial failure in the case of law observation was measured with 10 items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their financial failure in the case of law observation in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 10 to 50.

Also, trust was measured with six items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their trust in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 6 to 30.

Moreover, individualism was measured with four items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their individualism in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 4 to 20.

Furthermore, political satisfaction was measured with six items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their individualism in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Moreover, one question ranged from Very low to Very high. Range of score for this dimension is from 6 to 30.

Furthermore, nepotism was measured with four items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their nepotism in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. In addition, one question ranged from Very low to Very high. Range of score for this dimension is from 4 to 20.

Furthermore, supervision weakness was measured with seven items, with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their supervision weakness in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. In addition, one question ranged from Very low to Very high. Range of score for this dimension is from 7 to 45.

Furthermore, law-abidingness was divided into three dimensions, namely, cognitive, behavior, and emotional. Cognitive dimension was measured with five questions with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their knowledge of law-abidingness in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 5 to 25. Behavior was measured by 10 items with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Respondents were asked for their behavior in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 10 to 50. Emotional sub-dimension was measured by 11 items in the organization ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree for each statement. Range of score for this dimension is from 11 to 55. Overall, 26 items measured law-oriented.

Data analysis

This study used partial least square (PLS) as the most important motivations are exploration and prediction, which is recommended in an early stage of theoretical development in order to test and validate exploratory models. It is also suitable for prediction-oriented research. Thereby, this methodology assists with explanation of endogenous constructs. In addition, descriptive analysis was employed to determine the efficiency of reward and punishment, feeling of discrimination, financial failure in the case of law observation, individualism, necessity of organizational rules, nepotism, political satisfaction, relationship-oriented, success priority of material preference system, supervision weakness feeling, and trust. Dependent variable is law-abidingness with three dimensions, namely, cognitive, behavior, and emotional. Furthermore, demographics of the respondents are gender, age, marital status, education, mother tongue, and housing ownership status by using frequency, percentage, mean, and standard deviation. PLS analysis was employed for the regression analysis for mediating the effects of trust and success priority of material preference system and necessity of organizational rules in relationship with law-abidingness.

Results and discussion

Demographic

About 21% of respondents are between 20 and 29 years old, about 44% are between 30 and 39, about 26% are between 40 and 49, more than 9% are between 50 and 59, and about 0.5% are 60 years old and older. The average age of the respondents is about 36.8. Also, more than 18% of the respondents were single, about 81% were married, and 1% were married once. About 1% of the respondents were illiterate or had an elementary level of education and 1.7% of them had a guidance school and high school level of education, 13.2% of them had a diploma, 21.2% had an associate’s degree or were university students, 51.4% had a bachelor’s degree and 11.7% had postgraduate level of education. Housing ownership status of 54.2% of the respondents was private, 3.2% of them were corporate, 11.3% of them were mortgages, and 31.4% of them were leased.

Descriptive analysis

The priority index of material issues in the system of preferences in the form of a scale shows that 2.2% of respondents have low priority, 69.7% have moderate, and more than 28% have a high priority of material issues in their system of preferences. The Individualism Scale shows that 23.6% of respondents were low, 41.6% were moderate, and 34.8% were highly individualistic. In the index of feeling the weakness of organizational supervision, 23.6% of the respondents felt the weakness of organizational supervision to a small extent, 41.6% to the extent of moderate, and 34.8% to the extent of high. The results of the trust scale show that 32.4% of the respondents had a low level, 61.2% a medium level, and 6.4% a high level of trust. In the index of discrimination, 3.9% of respondents felt low discrimination, 19.5% moderate, and 76.6% high discrimination.

In the index of feeling the efficiency of the reward and punishment system, 42% of the respondents felt the efficiency of the reward and punishment system to a low extent, 53% to a moderate degree, and 5% to a high degree. The results of the Relationship-Oriented Scale show that 4.6% of respondents felt low or less, 54.1% moderate, and 41.3% high in the administrative system. The results of the material failure index regarding compliance with the law demonstrate that 22.6% of the respondents believed in low rate, 57.2% in moderate rate, and 20.2% in high rate in the case of material failure regarding compliance with the law. The concept of binding organizational rules, which is made up of eight items, shows that 2% of respondents considered organizational rules to be low, 57.7% moderate, and 40.3% high. Regarding the feeling of nepotism, it can be said that 9.3% of the respondents felt low, 51.1% moderate, and 39.6% high. But in the results of political satisfaction, we see that 29.1% of the respondents had low political satisfaction, 61.1% had moderate political satisfaction, and 9.8% had high political satisfaction.

The concept of law-abidingness is divided into three parts: cognitive, behavioral, and emotional. The results of the cognitive section show that 7.8% of the respondents had a low rate of cognition, 69.9% had a moderate rate, and 22.3% had a high rate of cognitive law-abidingness. The results of the behavioral section show that 3% of the respondents had a low level of law, 39% had a moderate level, and 60.7% had a high degree of behavioral law-abidingness. The results of the emotional section show that 5% of the respondents had a low level of law, 43.6% had a moderate level, and 55.9% had a high level of emotional law-abidingness. In addition, the legislative items on a scale show that 55% had moderate and 45% had a high level of emotional law-abidingness (Table 1).

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics summary of all variables.

Variable	Level n (%)			Mean	SD
Variable	Low	Moderate	High	Mean	SD
Law-oriented
Behavioral	0.3	39	60.7	69.29	13.13
Cognitive	7.8	69.9	22.3	56.08
Emotional	0.5	43.6	55.9	68.15	13.10
Efficiency of reward and punishment	42	53	5	36.74	19.26
Feeling of discrimination	3.9	19.5	76.6	77.92	19.70
Financial failure in the case of law observation	22.6	57.2	20.2	49.43	19.62
Individualism	23.6	41.6	34.8	60.34	13.03
Necessity of organizational rules	2	57.7	40.3	62.36	15.8
Nepotism	9.3	51.1	39.6	59.64	20.87
Political satisfaction	29.1	61.1	9.8	43.88	21.44
Relationship-oriented	4.6	54.1	41.3	65.73	19.19
Success priority of material preference system	2.2	69.7	28.1	60.34	13.03
Supervision weakness	13.1	62	24.9	54.43	17.42
Trust	32.4	61.2	6.4	54.43	17.42

SD: standard deviation.

Law-abidingness in organizations

In general, it can be said that the employees of the Railway Administration with an average score of 70.77 were the most law-abiding employees in this study. After this department, the Department of Industries and Mines, the Department of Government Penitentiaries, and the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization had more law-abiding staff than other departments. The forensic medicine staff and the center municipality had the lowest average score of law-abidingness, respectively. Also, the employees of Mashhad Industries and Mines Department with an average score of 74.18 were the most law-abiding employees of Mashhad in this research. After this office, Mashhad Railway Office, Government Penitentiary Office and Mashhad Gas Company Office had more legal employees than other Mashhad offices. Employees of the Imam Relief Committee and the Mashhad Welfare Organization had the lowest average score of law-abidingness, respectively. In Tehran, the employees of Tehran Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization with an average score of 70.81 in law-abidingness were the most law-abiding employees in Tehran in this study. After this office, the Welfare Organization, the Imam Relief Committee, and the Tehran Islamic Culture and Guidance Office had more law-abiding employees than other Tehran offices. Employees of the Water and Sewerage Department and the Tehran Cooperative Department had the lowest average scores of law-abidingness, respectively (Table 2).

Table 2.

Table of the average scale of law-abidingness by organization.

Organization	Mashhad	Tehran	Total	Organization	Mashhad	Tehran	Total
Railway Office	70.77	–	70.77	Post Office	65.48	–	65.48
Department of Industries and Mines	74.18	65.3	69.52	Endowment and Charity Office	63.74	66.79	65.45
The Department of Government Penitentiaries	69.38	67.91	68.6	Agricultural Jihad Organization	62.89	66.99	65.1
Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization	62.89	70.81	67.7	Imam Relief Committee	58.53	69.62	65.06
Gas Company Office	68.34	67.04	67.59	Cooperative Office	66.24	64.04	65.03
Islamic Culture and Guidance Office	65.82	68.47	67.59	Governor’s office	64.77	–	64.77
Justice Department	67.41	–	67.41	General Administration of Prisons	64.64	–	64.64
Bus Organization	68.28	66.37	67.26	Ministry of Education	63.77	65.15	64.53
Welfare Organization	62.39	70.57	67.24	Document Registration Office	63.48	65.61	64.49
Employment and Social Affairs	65.16	68.46	66.84	Department of Finance and Economic Affairs	64.29	–	64.29
Civil Registry Office	67.71	65.73	66.72	Center Municipality	64.08	–	64.08
Power Department	66.61	–	66.61	Forensic medicine organization	63.87	–	63.87
Municipal Services Organization	66.37	–	66.37	Water and Sewage Organization	68.19	63.82	65.8
Technical and Professional Organizations	66.15	66.24	66.2	Insurance and Health Services Department	67.09	64.73	65.72
Department of Telecommunications	63.75	66.59	65.52

Measurement model

The measurement model requires the rules to display how the latent variables are measured in terms of the observed variables, and it describes the measurement properties of the observed variables.

Convergent validity

As a general rule of thumb the (standardized) outer loadings must be 0.708 or higher (Hair et al., 2017). Indicators with very low outer loadings (below 0.40) should always be removed from the scale (Hair et al., 2011). Commonly, indicators with outer loadings between 0.40 and 0.70 should be considered for removal from the scale only when omitting the indicator leads to a substantial increase in the composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE) (Henseler et al., 2009).

Table 3 shows the outer loadings of all items for all variables in initial and modified measurement model. According to these results, all outer loadings except the items trust indicator TRUST2, supervisory weakness indicator SUP7, success priority of material preference system indicator SPMPS3,4,5, relationship-oriented indicator REL4, necessity of organizational rules indicator NEC3,5, individualism IND 4, financial failure in the case of law observation indicator FIN2,6,7, efficiency of reward and punishment indicator EFF1, and feeling of discrimination indicator DISC5 and emotional dimension in the law-oriented indicator EMO5,8,9,10, in the cognitive dimension COG5, and in Behavior dimension BEH 1,2,3,8,9 were eliminated from initial measurement model due to low loading factor which was less than 0.5, which confirmed their low contribution to related constructs. Regarding the findings of this study, the CR ranged between 0.759 and 0.964 and AVE ranged between 0.503 and 0.791.

Table 3.

The result of convergent validity.

Construct	Item	Factor loading (>0.5)	Cronbach’s alpha (>0.7)	Composite reliability	AVE (>0.5)
Law-oriented
Behavior	BEH10	0.673	0.773	0.847	0.526
	BEH4	0.801
	BEH5	0.702
	BEH6	0.781
	BEH7	0.658
Cognitive	COG1	0.854	0.744	0.84	0.57
	COG2	0.784
	COG3	0.731
	COG4	0.634
Emotional	EMO1	0.852	0.956	0.964	0.791
	EMO11	0.905
	EMO2	0.85
	EMO3	0.886
	EMO4	0.924
	EMO6	0.918
	EMO7	0.889
Feeling of discrimination	DISC1	0.508	0.762	0.846	0.587
	DISC2	0.875
	DISC3	0.815
	DISC4	0.812
Efficiency of reward and punishment	EFF10	0.802	0.898	0.914	0.518
	EFF11	0.716
	EFF2	0.617
	EFF3	0.744
	EFF4	0.698
	EFF5	0.656
	EFF6	0.768
	EFF7	0.742
	EFF8	0.815
	EFF9	0.609
Financial failure in the case of law observation	FIN1	0.666	0.849	0.881	0.516
	FIN10	0.755
	FIN3	0.717
	FIN4	0.661
	FIN5	0.835
	FIN8	0.727
	FIN9	0.652
Individualism	IND1	0.91	0.909	0.759	0.523
	IND2	0.57
	IND3	0.645
Necessity of organizational rules	NEC1	0.733	0.837	0.88	0.551
	NEC2	0.737
	NEC4	0.851
	NEC6	0.7
	NEC7	0.668
	NEC8	0.749
Nepotism	NEO1	0.825	0.725	0.826	0.545
	NEO2	0.68
	NEO3	0.802
	NEO4	0.628
Political satisfaction	POL1	0.863	0.868	0.902	0.608
	POL2	0.798
	POL3	0.846
	POL4	0.623
	POL5	0.806
	POL6	0.715
Relationship-oriented	REL1	0.732	0.813	0.869	0.57
	REL2	0.722
	REL3	0.816
	REL5	0.802
	REL6	0.695
Success priority of material preference system	SPMPS1	0.622	0.616	0.799	0.573
	SPMPS2	0.803
	SPMPS6	0.83
Supervision weakness	SUP1	0.623	0.804	0.858	0.503
	SUP2	0.735
	SUP3	0.666
	SUP4	0.795
	SUP5	0.692
	SUP6	0.731
Trust	TRUST1	0.778	0.81	0.868	0.569
	TRUST3	0.769
	TRUST4	0.753
	TRUST5	0.79
	TRUST6	0.676

AVE: average variance extracted; BEH: behavior; COG: cognitive; EMO: emotional; DISK: discrimination; EFF: efficiency of reward and punishment; FIN: financial failure in the case of law observation; IND: individualism; NEC: necessity of organizational rules; NEO: nepotism; POL: political satisfaction; REL: relationship-oriented; SPMPS: success priority of material preference system; SUP: supervision weakness.

Discriminant validity

Discriminant validity demonstrates the extent to which a construct is empirically distinct from another construct. The heterotrait–monotrait (HTMT) ratio of correlation is a new criterion for measuring discriminant validity in PLS—SEM models (Henseler et al., 2014). For Hair et al. (2010), the HTMT value has to be less than 0.85, meaning that two constructs were distinct. In this study, all the variables demonstrated that the measurement model used meets and exceeds the requirements for establishing discriminant validities (Table 4).

Table 4.

Discriminant validity for all variables.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1
2	0.543
3	0.319	0.412
4	0.296	0.193	0.089
5	0.3	0.332	0.838	0.05
6	0.368	0.239	0.598	0.16	0.63
7	0.129	0.085	0.184	0.07	0.256	0.464
8	0.316	0.265	0.121	0.299	0.138	0.392	0.242
9	0.387	0.326	0.808	0.167	0.828	0.581	0.172	0.168
10	0.187	0.297	0.684	0.082	0.567	0.492	0.294	0.109	0.627
11	0.343	0.317	0.764	0.162	0.757	0.674	0.164	0.094	0.822	0.465
12	0.285	0.631	0.295	0.181	0.173	0.25	0.244	0.116	0.196	0.166	0.161
13	0.274	0.238	0.59	0.12	0.528	0.523	0.308	0.115	0.622	0.532	0.578	0.158
14	0.248	0.394	0.708	0.11	0.549	0.495	0.262	0.135	0.682	0.82	0.567	0.353	0.709

1—behavior; 2—cognitive; 3—efficiency of reward and punishment; 4—emotional; 5—feeling of discrimination; 6—financial failure in the case of law observation; 7—individualism; 8—necessity of organizational rules; 9—nepotism; 10—political satisfaction; 11—relationship-oriented; 12—success priority of material preference system; 13—supervision weakness; 14—trust.

Second-order model of law-oriented

Since perceived value was second-order latent variables, in order to evaluate the significant contribution of all, first-order latent variables were investigated using bootstrap approach. The first stage produces parameter estimations for the components and computes their factor scores. The factor scores for behavior, emotional, and cognitive were then used as the scores to compute the higher order law-abidingness. Hair et al. (2006) suggest that a higher order construct should be assessed in a similar manner as in the lower order construct structure. Therefore, reliability, discriminant, and convergent validity were checked again against acceptable threshold values. Outputs from this stage showed that emotional, behavior, and cognitive had significant loading on law-abidingness (p < 0.001). The results for law-abidingness with three subscale were behavior (β = 0.677, p < 0.001), cognitive (β = 0.581, p < 0.001), and emotional (β = 0.816, p < 0.001). In addition, cognitive and behavior were two first-order variables having a loading below 0.7 except emotional which had the highest loading (Table 5).

Table 5.

Results of second order model for law-oriented construct.

	β	SE	T value	p values
Law-oriented ⩾ behavioral	0.677	0.021	32.84^*	<0.001
Law-oriented ⩾ cognitive	0.581	0.031	18.985^*	<0.001
Law-oriented ⩾ emotional	0.816	0.019	43.799^*	<0.001

*p<0.05.

Structural model

This model included efficiency of reward and punishment, feeling of discrimination, financial failure in the case of law observation, individualism, necessity of organizational rules, nepotism, political satisfaction, relationship-oriented, success priority of material preference system, supervision weakness feeling, and trust as input and law-abidingness with three dimensions, namely, cognitive, behavior and emotional, as output. In addition, trust is a mediation for political satisfaction, supervisory weakness, and nepotism. In addition, success priority of material preference system and necessity of organizational rules are mediation for political satisfaction.

Some inputs had relationship with law-abidingness as an output such as the relationship between feeling of discrimination, this relationship was positive (β = 0.08, p < 0.05). The relationship between political satisfaction and success priority of material preference system was positive and significant (β = 0.075, p < 0.05). There was also a significant positive relationship between political satisfaction and trust (β = 0.482, p < 0.05). In addition, the effects of relationship-oriented and law-abidingness was negative and significant (β = −0.219, p < 0.05). Also, the impact of success priority of material preference system and law-abidingness was positive and significant (β = 0.232, p < 0.05). There was a significant positive impact between supervision weakness and trust (β = −0.295, p < 0.05). There was also a positive and significant relationship between trust and law-abidingness (β = 0.159, p < 0.05). The effects of feeling of discrimination and law-abidingness was positive and significant (β = 0.08, p < 0.05).

Some inputs had no impact on law-abidingness like the relationship between efficiency of reward and punishment (β = 0.004, p > 0.05), there was no impact between financial failure in the case of law observation and law-abidingness (β = 0.041, p > 0.05). In addition, there is no relationship between individualism and law-abidingness (β = −0.034, p > 0.05). Furthermore, there was no relationship between political satisfaction and law-abidingness (β = −0.082, p > 0.05). There was no impact between political satisfaction and necessity of organizational rules (β = 0.016, p > 0.05).

In addition, there was no effect of supervision weakness and law-abidingness (β = 0.03, p > 0.05), and there was no relationship between efficiency of reward and punishment and law-oriented (β = 0.004, p > 0.05); besides, the relationship between financial failure in the case of law observation and law-oriented was not significant (β = 0.004, p > 0.05).

Path model using bootstrap

The path coefficients obtained from this model are consistent. The respective confidence intervals can be obtained by bootstrapping (Streukens and Leroi-Werelds, 2016). This step also provides estimates for indirect and total effects. Some inputs have no impact on law-abidingness such as the relationship between efficiency of reward and punishment (β = 0.004, p > 0.05). There is no relationship between feeling of discrimination and law-abidingness (β = 0.08, p > 0.05); also, there is no relationship between financial failure in the case of law observation and law-abidingness (β = 0.041, p > 0.05), and there is no relationship between individualism and law-abidingness (β = −0.034, p > 0.05). There is no impact of individualism on law-abidingness (β = −0.034, p > 0.05). The relationship between political satisfaction and law-abidingness is not significant (β = −0.082, p > 0.05). There is no significant relationship between political satisfaction and necessity of organizational rules (β = 0.016, p > 0.05). There is no impact on supervision weakness and law-abidingness (β = 0.03, p > 0.05), and no significant relationship between efficiency of reward and punishment and law-abidingness (β = 0.004, p > 0.05). There is no relationship between fanatical failure in the case of law observation and law-abidingness (β = 0.041, p > 0.05).

However, some inputs have effect on law-abidingness, such as the relationship between political satisfaction and success priority of material preference system is positive and significant (β = 0.075, p < 0.05). There is a positive and significant relationship between political satisfaction and trust (β = 0.482, p < 0.05). The relationship between relationship orientation and law-abidingness is negative and significant (β = −0.219, p < 0.05). The impact of success priority of material preference system is positive and significant (β = 0.232, p < 0.05). Significant and negative relationship is found between supervision weakness and trust (β = −0.295, p < 0.05). Between trust and law-abidingness, a positive and significant relationship was found (β = .159, p < 0.05). In addition, there is a positive and significant relationship between feeling of discrimination and law-abidingness (β = 0.08, p < 0.05) (see Figure 1 and Table 6).

Figure 1.

Path of all variables’ effect on law-abidingness.

Table 6.

Results of path model using bootstrap.

Path	β	SE	T value	p value
Efficiency of reward and punishment ⩾ law-abidingness	0.004	0.054	0.067	0.947
Feeling of discrimination ⩾ law-abidingness	0.08	0.042	1.898	0.058
Financial failure in the case of law observation ⩾ law-abidingness	0.041	0.04	1.03	0.303
Individualism ⩾ law-abidingness	−0.034	0.06	0.563	0.574
Political Satisfaction ⩾ law-abidingness	–0.082	0.047	1.738	0.082
Political Satisfaction ⩾ Necessity of organizational rules	0.016	0.033	0.496	0.62
Political satisfaction ⩾ success priority of material preference system	0.075	0.038	1.944	0.052
Political satisfaction ⩾ trust	0.482	0.027	18.143	0
Relationship-oriented ⩾ law-abidingness	–0.219	0.037	5.857	0
Success priority of material preference system ⩾ law-abidingness	0.232	0.033	7.002	0
Supervision weakness ⩾ law-abidingness	0.03	0.037	0.806	0.421
Supervision weakness ⩾ trust	–0.295	0.027	11.09	0
Trust ⩾ law-abidingness	0.159	0.047	3.378	0.001
Efficiency of reward and punishment ⩾ law-abidingness	0.004	0.054	0.067	0.947
Feeling of discrimination ⩾ law-abidingness	0.08	0.042	1.898	0.058
Financial failure in the case of law observation ⩾ law-abidingness	0.041	0.04	1.03	0.303

Mediation test

There is a mediation effect between success priority of material preference system and political science and law-abidingness. In addition, the necessity of organizational rules is a mediation for political science and law-abidingness. Trust is a mediation for supervisory weakness, nepotism, and political science and law-abidingness.

In general, the mediation effects for three mediation variables in the path model are significant except for the relationship between political satisfaction, necessity of organizational rules, and law-abidingness (β = 0.006, p > 0.05). There is mediation effect between political satisfaction, trust, and law-abidingness (β = 0.077, p < 0.05), and this relationship is positive. There is positive significant relationship between political satisfaction, success priority of material preference system, and law-abidingness (β = 0.017, p < 0.05). The relationship between nepotism, trust, and law-abidingness is negative and significant (β = −0.024, p < 0.05). The last significant and negative relationship belongs to supervision weakness, trust, and law-abidingness (β = −0.047, p < 0.05) (see Table 7).

Table 7.

Path coefficients results of indirect effect (mediation).

	β	SE	T value	p values
Political satisfaction ⩾ necessity of organizational rules ⩾ law-abidingness	0.006	0.012	0.49	0.624
Political satisfaction ⩾ trust ⩾ law-abidingness	0.077	0.024	3.208	0.001
Political satisfaction ⩾ success priority of material preference system ⩾ law-abidingness	0.017	0.009	1.986	0.047
Nepotism ⩾ trust ⩾ law-abidingness	−0.024	0.008	3.14	0.002
Supervision weakness ⩾ trust ⩾ law-abidingness	−0.047	0.014	3.325	0.001

Conclusion

Iran has 100 years of experience in legislation, but during the same time it has also experienced law disobedience. Why Iranians, despite their historical attention to the issue of law-abidingness and legislation, face this vast amount of law disobedience, and Iran ranks 26th in 2019 in corruption and law disobedience, is an issue in the field of social psychology and law and politics. And even ethics and religion are debatable. According to international statistics as well as domestic research, the rate of law-abidingness in Iran is low (Khavand, 2020; Mohseni, 1999; Survey, 1995).

The worrying statistics of the rate of law disobedience in Iran, and consequently the warning and concern of the relevant authorities, raises the question of what factors in our administrative system cause law disobedience? The results show that the variable of political satisfaction from two mechanisms has an effect on law-abidingness. The higher the political satisfaction, the higher the level of trust in the legislative system and as a result, people are more law-abiding. This finding is consistent with the theories of Tyler and Fagan (2008) and shows that by increasing trust in the system, the employees of the administrative system are obliged to observe the law. Also, with increasing political satisfaction, material goals for the individual are prioritized in this system. The more a person feels that these goals can be achieved through legal means, the more he observes the law (rational choice theory). The results also show that the more a person believes in the existence of nepotism in the administrative system, the less his trust in the administrative system decreases, and as a result, the degree of his law-abidingness in the administrative system decreases. This finding is consistent with the findings of Tyler and Darley (1999).

The results of the present study are in line with Steiner and Steinberg (1994), who found that neglecting qualified job applicants for somebody with family ties can possibly bring about legal action like discrimination lawsuits. Furthermore, Chao et al. (2004) claimed that participants reported lower loyalty in management and a lower assessment of the impartiality of the organization’s approaches in the nepotistic organization situation. An organization might believe that through hiring their early companions in their workforce, there will be unity, but these studies demonstrate that nepotistic practices can harmfully influence employee responses. Such a condition might be considered as a very good instance of a phenomenon named as the guanxi network, which is clarified as a network of informal interpersonal links within which favors are interchanged for facilitating business activities (Cygler, 2015). Nevertheless, this finding is different from Tsobanoglou (2015), who found that in Greece, just public sector employees feel safe, and the absence of a united national labor system disallows the foundation of a national employment system and the conquering of nepotism and political patronage. In addition, in the United States and Jordan, accepting nepotism was low and a lot of people agreed with the arguments against nepotism in human resources management (Abdalla et al., 1998).

Also, the more employees believe that the oversight of the administrative system is weak, they lose their trust in the system and, as a result, they are less law-abiding. These people believe that breaking the law can increase profits. Besides, Sjamsuddin in Indonesia found that lots of people claimed that the ongoing practice of corruption is common in government institutions, as these institutions have the power to share out budgets, but the supervision and responsibility lacked control. Corruption in government departments happens due to the fact that the strong authority is not balanced with severe supervision. And if total power occurred, it could apply the political saying “Power tends to corrupt, absolute power tends to corrupt absolute” (Sjamsuddin, 2007). Different phenomena and the history of corruption in Indonesia show a powerful relationship between corruption with the behavior of power and authority abuse of the bureaucracy which does a lot of variations (Primanto et al., 2014).

The more one thinks the degree of orthodoxy in the administrative system is, the lower the degree of their law-abidingness becomes. Global experience shows that the only way to curb this old phenomenon is to establish strong institutions that do not allow corrupt people to increase their wealth and prosperity by encroaching on the property and privileges of others by creating “good governance.” In other words, corruption should not be considered a purely moral phenomenon, and it cannot be fought through preaching and “commanding the good.” In fact, corruption originates from abnormal government structures and incorrect economic and social institutions and cannot be confronted without reforming structures and institutions (Khavand, 2020).

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Toktam Namayandeh Joorabchi

Author biographies

Majid Fouladiyan received his bachelor’s in sociology and master’s in social psychology from Ferdowsi University of Mashhad and a Tehran University, respectively. He holds a PhD degree in Theoretical Sociology of Culture from Tehran University. He is currently an Associate Professor of Sociology in Ferdowsi University of Mashhad. His expertise and research interests include conducting research on Iran’s social issues, political sociology, and studying cultural developments in Iran.

Toktam Namayandeh Joorabchi received her B.A in Sociology from Ferdowsi University in Mashhad, Iran. She obtained her Master degree from Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM) and PhD from the same University and post-doctoral from National University of Malaysia (UKM).

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