Abstract
Federal principles do not encourage the dominance of a single locus of power. This is regarded as one of the federal glues that maintain a healthy equilibrium in a federation. By focusing on Brussels and Addis Ababa—the capitals of Belgium and European Union, and Ethiopia and African Union, respectively—this article examines the governances of contested federal capital cities that transcend national politics. The article uses “contested conditions”—historical and contemporary intranational and supranational rivalries and cooperation—to argue that rather than diffusing powers to promote alternative capitals, federalism appears to have enhanced competition over the existing “primate” capital cities.
Introduction
Federalism, as eloquently defined by Daniel Elazar (1987) as a combination of shared-rule plus regional self-rule, denotes that there is no one locus of power as it is constitutionally diffused to different spheres—federal and various state governments. Each government needs a political seat or a capital city. In a federation constituted, for instance, of nine-member states, there would be 10 governments—nine states and one federal—leading to potentially 10 political capital cities. Dispersion of power in federations hence implies the formation of multiple capitals or seats for both shared-rule and self-rule governments. Ramesh Dikshit classifies the origins of capital cities of all states in the world into “natural” and “artificial,” and then categorizes federal capitals in the latter: Federal capitals are artificial in the sense that they often are not the “primate” cities of their countries, and have often not developed from some original nuclei of the State-area. The reason why federal capitals are usually new creations rather than centres established on some old nuclei, is that, as opposed to most unitary State-structures, a federal structure often means almost a new evolution. (Dikshit, 1975: 243)
What appears exception to this argument is that most federations created out of devolved unitary polities retained their “primate” cities or colonial capitals as their new federal capitals. In those federations where the federal structure is more or less a new creation by coming together means, the need for new and neutral capitals does arise, whereas in the formerly more or less centralized unitary systems, as most of the post-colonial federations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa were, the former colonial capitals have often continued to serve as the seats of their respective new federations, irrespective of the fact whether they are sited on neutral ground or not (Dikshit, 1975). It also means that old “primate” cities are “artificially” re-designated by the new constitutions as the political capitals of the new federal governments. Belgium and Ethiopia, former unitary states, fall within the latter category.
It is true that in older federations, as exemplified by the United States, Canada, and Australia—where the new state structure did not evolve from a somewhat unitary organization—the capital of the new polity had the necessity to be built afresh and believed to be neutral to guarantee that member states of the federation have fair access to the capital (Dikshit, 1975). This requires capital to be founded on neutral territory. Capital cities may also be established as a compromise location between competing blocs as were the cases of Bern and Fribourg in Switzerland (Gales, 2002). Another cross-capital similarity is the distinction shared by Bern, Canberra, Pretoria, and Ottawa for they were chosen as capitals because they were not major urban centers (Slack and Chattopadhyay, 2009). In general, the federal capitals or other cities of the classical federations were developed largely on a “neutral” or “compromise site.”
This article, however, shall attempt to identify and compare “contested” capital cities that have been designated as the seats of multiple governments—of the city, state, federal, and supranational institutions. Brussels and Addis Ababa (also known as Finfinne), 1 the federal capitals of Belgium and Ethiopia, respectively, are carefully chosen for empirical and comparative purposes. Brussels is the capital city of Brussels-Capital Region, of the Flemish and French Communities, of the Flemish Region, of the Federal Government of Belgium, and of the European Union. Similarly, Addis Ababa/Finfinne is the capital of the city government of Addis Ababa, of the Oromia Regional State, of the Federal Government of Ethiopia, and of the African Union. 2 The contested politics of the two cities begins right from their geographic locations: Brussels is located in the Flemish Region (Dutch-speaking Region) but speaks French dominantly; likewise, Addis Ababa is located at the heart of the Oromia Region (Oromo speaking Region) but speaks Amharic dominantly. It is, therefore, worth comparing these two capital cities and testing how federal theory is working to moderate this contest. Before we delve into the discussions of disputed capital cities, some contexts about Ethiopia and Belgium are in order.
The Belgian state evolved from a unitary into a federal system following the devolutionary reform of the 1980s (Weerts, 2012). Belgium, with a population of well over 11.6 million, is an emergent multinational federation composed of three linguistic groups: Dutch-speaking majority (59%), French (39%), and German (less than 1%).
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The restructuring of the Belgian state and society has both territorial and non-territorial elements: Belgium comprises three Communities: the Flemish Community, the French Community and the German-speaking Community. Belgium comprises three Regions: the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels Region. Belgium comprises four linguistic regions: the Dutch-speaking region, the French-speaking region, the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital and the German-speaking region. Each municipality of the Kingdom forms part of one of these linguistic regions. The boundaries of the four linguistic regions can only be changed or corrected by a law passed by a majority of the votes cast in each linguistic group. (Belgian Revised Constitution, 2014: Articles 2, 3, 4)
Therefore, in Belgium, there are two types of overlapping federated entities, with distinct constitutional powers, that is, three territorial states and three communities. According to Johanne Poirier (2006), communities were created in response to the Flemish struggle for cultural autonomy in a country historically dominated by the French-speaking elite. The communities have competencies over issues that are closely related to persons such as education, culture, media, and significant aspects of social services such as courts (Poirier, 2006; Weerts, 2012). This non-territorial arrangement has allowed the two main cultural communities to have jurisdiction over cultural matters for their respective linguistic groups in Brussels (Popelier, 2015).
Ethiopia, with a population of about 118 million, is an emergent multinational federation since 1995. Founded as an empire-state in the late 19th century, Ethiopia had been a unitary state, dominated by Amharic-speaking elites. In terms of cultural diversity, it is home to no less than 80 different ethnonational groups, of which the major ones include Oromo (35%), Amhara (27%), Somali (6.2%), Tigrayan (6.1%), Sidama (4.0%) and others. 4 The Constitution of Ethiopia recognized these ethnonational groups as building blocks, on the basis of which, nine territorial member states of the Ethiopian federation were formed and the tenth and eleventh states were added in 2019 and 2021, respectively (Government of Ethiopia, 1995). These member states enjoy constitutional autonomy on cultural and language matters including primary education and media. They are also entrusted to implement federal laws. However, Ethiopia’s authoritarian one-party system has undermined the constitution, autonomy of member states, and the functioning of the federal system in general (Kefale, 2009). 5
At least in principle, Addis Ababa and Brussels went through transitions from being unitary state capitals to multinational federal state capitals parallel to the devolutionary processes of holding together federalism in Ethiopia and Belgium. Following the collapse of a socialist regime in Ethiopia in 1991, the country was restructured into 14 transitional regional states, and Addis Ababa was granted an autonomous regional state status until the 1995 constitution revokes that status and designates it the capital city of the federal state. Likewise, in Belgium, during the interim period of 1980–1989, Brussels had been managed by the national government through the accountability of its executive committee to the national Parliament, without prejudice to its municipal autonomy (Van Wynsberghe, 2013). But since 1989, Brussels has been a city-state, serving both as a member-state as well as the federal capital. By focusing on Brussels and Addis Ababa—the capitals of Belgium and European Union, and Ethiopia and African Union, respectively—this article examines the governances of “contested” federal capital cities that also transcend national politics. To this end, the following part of the article is organized into four major sections. First, a federal theory of capital city formation and development will be discussed. Second, it chooses the research design and conceptual lenses for the analysis and discussion of the data. Third, it presents the main discussion part of the study. Both intranational and supranational roles of Brussels and Addis Ababa cities are argued here. Fourth, the article draws some conclusions and raises questions. In doing so, both capital cities will be compared.
A federal theory of capital city development
This section of the article attempts to discuss the federal theory of city formations and developments in general and capital cities in particular. Its central argument is that federal political systems—more than unitary systems—offer the opportunity for the emergence and development of equally important multiple cities. It is linked to the formation of federations. This is due to the fact that federations need to either choose or newly establish capital cities for both federal and constituent states. In the “coming together federations,” member states do already possess their respective capitals, which often predate the newly formed federal capitals. But, if it is a “holding together federation,” its member states are provided with the opportunity to newly develop their corresponding seats or capital cities. Put differently, federalism, at least in principle, promote the creation of multiple centers of authorities, that is, multiple capital cities. Daniel J. Elazar (1975) observed that “the development of modern federalism parallels to no small extent the development of modern urbanism” (p. 15). In this regard, federalizing is urbanizing.
The choice of federal capitals is of great importance in federations, for capitals sometimes play a crucial role in the success or otherwise of federalism (Dikshit, 1975). In spite of this claim, little attention has so far been given to the study of federal capitals in general and disputed capital cities in emergent federations in particular. Among the rare scholars is Daniel Elazar (1975), who highlighted non-centralized urban development patterns in federations.
Federal polities are notably ones in which no single urban center is dominant. Within the federal matrix there is also a network of cities of relatively equal importance, often specializing in one or more functions. Contrast, for example, France and Germany, two polities of relatively equal size. Life in highly centralized France is centered in Paris whereas no single city can be said to dominate federal Germany. Federal systems generally follow the German rather than the French model, while most unitary states reflect the French pattern. (p. 28)
The argument is that the federal type of state organizations (as opposed to the unitary state system) greatly contribute to the development of multiple equally significant cities, often specializing in different sectors. The development and hegemony of one city at the expense of the rest of cities (or relegating all other cities and towns as satellites) is not a federal character. In another word, the type of power relation between the federal capital and the member states’ capitals tends to be the replica of the type of power relations between the federal government and states. Elazar (1975) put it this way: “there is a clear relationship between the degree of centralization within a particular federal system and the extent to which a single national capital has emerged” (p. 28).
According to David Kaufmann (2020), “nation-states deliberately chose secondary cities as capitals to exert a balance between different regions or cities within a nation-state with the idea that they should refrain from developing into economic powerhouses” (p. 1169). In some instances, he adds, competing capital cities were encouraged to avoid the concentration of economic and political powers and “to serve as independent and alternative sites to traditional commercial centers” (Kaufmann, 2020: 1170). This is more so in federations. The more member states a federation has, the more economic and political capital cities are likely to grow. Besides the rising number of capital cities of federal member states, the federal government, as David Kaufmann rightly observed, may consciously disperse its offices to various cities leading to the development of many cities (Kaufmann, 2020). For example, the “central roles in Germany are divided quite equitably among Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich and Bonn” (Elazar, 1975: 29). In Switzerland, the specialized cities of Berne, Geneva, and Zurich are comparably essential. Likewise, Scott Campbell (2003) discussed the US dispersing key offices in various cities (p. 5): Nations—especially federal states—often have large centers of national government employees outside the capital city. The United States has located federal courts, military offices and bases, mints, and many agency offices in various cities throughout the nation. This is increasingly the case in Germany as well. This decentralized pattern creates local dependencies in these towns on national government employment and contracts.
Thus, Washington—the federal capital—is not even the dominant city in the United States due to the fact that a city such as New York is the world trade center and headquarter of the UN. Regional state capital cities may not also be the biggest cities. Therefore, the non-centralization of power in federations creates equal opportunities for various cities to freely develop. In the case of the Republic of South of Africa, three cities in provincial governments were designated as capitals of the three branches of the Federal Government as a federal compromise: Pretoria (the administrative capital), Cape Town (the legislative capital), and Bloemfontein (the judicial capital).
Related to the federal capital is federal territory. The term “federal territory” means the territorial areas—inhabited or otherwise—that for certain reasons are left under the direct control of the federal government (Dikshit, 1975). Dikshit identified two categories of federal territories. The first takes the form of newly acquired lands through the blood or treasure of all the federal units, and lands of vast open spaces, which territories are likely to consist of near-virgin areas awaiting exploitation and settlement such as precisely the nature of the frontier territories in the United States and Canada. Second, in the territories forming new federations, as for example India, the federal territories may consist of smaller political units, which either for reasons of their separate identity were not considered fit to merge with some neighboring units of the federation, or for strategic reasons (such as disputed territories) the federal government and the constituent units agreed to let these areas remain under the direct federal control (Dikshit, 1975). In some cases, federal capitals, such as Abuja and New Delhi, capitals of Nigeria and India, respectively, have taken the form of federal territory (Government of India, 1950; Government of Nigeria, 1999). Abuja, which was founded as the capital of Nigeria in 1991, emerged from near virgin areas and was developed mainly from the resources of the federation. Lagos was the capital before Abuja.
The models of federal capitals vary across federations with at least three patterns, according to Donald Rowat (1973): (1) special federal capital district or territory—local government governs the city but under the control of the federal government (e.g. Washington, Abuja, Delhi, Canberra, Buenos Aires, Brasília, Mexico City, Moscow, Kuala Lumpur, Islamabad); (2) dual status as a capital city and federal member state (e.g. Berlin, Madrid, Vienna); and (3) located in a federal member unit serving as federal and state capital city with no special status and is governed by local governments as any other city (e.g. Bern, Sarajevo, Pretoria, Cape Town & Bloemfontein) (Campbell, 2003; Rowat, 1973; Steytler, 2009). All models have their own merits and demerits. The federal district gives much leverage to the federal government at the expense of local autonomy to the extent of creating a “danger of too much central control over local residents” (Rowat, 1968: 350). In a capital controlled and dominated by a state, the federal government has no direct control over its own seat. A city-state model protects the rights to self-government and autonomy for the local residents of the capital, but it creates difficulties for the federal government to intervene in the internal affairs of its own seat (Rowat, 1968). The real challenge comes when trying to balance these legitimate concerns and rising interests.
Some capitals in federal countries, such as Ottawa, appear neither special federal districts, nor federal units, nor capitals of federal units. Brussels has got dual status as a capital city and a member state, whereas Addis Ababa is a hybrid model (this will be discussed shortly). Scott Campbell asks a vital question as to what factors influence polities to choose one of these models and succinctly answers himself that “the internal political structure of the nation (including the level of centralization) certainly plays a central role” (Rowat, 1968: 25). Therefore, it is difficult to label one model as intrinsically better than the others. The territorial location of a capital city as well as its administrative arrangement, Campbell explains, is “the product of chance, historical legacies, the relative political and economic power of the capital city, and the balance of power between regional and national political force” (Rowat, 1968: 25). This is more so in the cases of the capital cities of emergent federations such as Ethiopia and Belgium.
Research design and conceptual framework
This study falls within the comparative study of contested urban centers. The most usual and least complicated comparative research techniques are the most similar systems (MSS) and the most different systems (MDS) designs (Lim, 2010). The most similar systems design, Timothy Lim (2010) explains, is based on finding two or more very similar social systems, typically “countries.” More specifically, it is based on matching up and then comparing two or more systems that share a whole range of similarities [. . .] but also differ in at least a couple of important respects. (p. 34)
Differences are crucial in the MSS design: In a vast sea of similarities, there should be at least two meaningful differences between the systems. One of these differences should be among the many potential explanatory or independent variable. The other difference must be in the dependent variable. (Lim, 2010: 42)
The MSS design is not without limitations: no matter how similar two (or more) social systems may seem, there are bound to be so many potentially relevant differences that it would be impossible, in strict methodological terms, to establish exactly which differences have causal significance and which do not. (Lim, 2010: 41)
Seemingly most similar systems could end up very different systems. The binary cities of Addis Ababa and Brussels are deliberately selected for various comparative similarity reasons including, but not limited to, urban ethnolinguistic diversity, the existence of inter-group rivalries, historical roles of these cities as capitals of unitary states, their contemporary roles as capitals of “emergent federations” and of other multiple governments (Watts, 2008). These capitals are chosen not only for domestic political parallels but also for their hosting supranational political bodies–the African Union and the European Union. In this regard, it would be interesting to assess the political implications of the supranational interests in both cities. As critics could go, there could be more potential differences than similarities between the two cities for the fact that one practices democratic politics and the other may not. Still, differences do not prevent comparison. In our case studies, federalism would be taken as an independent variable to assess its effect on the modes of governance of capital cities in contested contexts. This is hoped to be part of the impact assessment of the Belgian and Ethiopian federal experiments as both emerged out of unitary backgrounds. To this end, legal-constitutional, academic research, and government documents were consulted as the main sources of data in this article.
Then, what is a contested capital city? A capital city is a political center of a given polity. It could be an organically developed center of power or a deliberatively chosen seat of government or of various branches of government. It is a place where political decisions are frequently made. Capital cities are often designated by federal/national, supranational, or subnational constitutions or by other legislations. Scott Campbell (2003) defines that “a capital is the seat of the national government and a representation of national power and culture” (p. 25). It is also the seat of subnational government and a representation of that subnational power. The same argument could be advanced for the supranational governing bodies. Therefore, capital cities symbolize the powers and actions of the governments that use them as their capitals. Federal power is, for instance, sensed when we often read news headlines stating “Washington responded to Moscow’s action.” As a result, a capital city is not only the seat of government where the latter operates its routine functions but it also represents the government itself.
The idea of federalism is thought to play an important role in defining capital cities. Daniel Elazar (1987), for instance, argued that “true federal systems do not have capitals, they have seats of government. ‘Capital’ implies a place at the top of the governmental pyramid, whereas ‘seat’ appropriately suggests a place of assembly” (p. 75). The ideas of choosing a seat or a capital city could even further be explained to differentiate coming-together and holding-together federations. 6 If the federation’s origin is from a coming-together one, it tends to choose a seat for its newly formed federal government; whereas if a unitary state constitutionally devolves power in a holding-together approach, then the preexisting capital city is likely to be designated for the newly negotiated federal government. The choice of capital city or seat of government is hence an issue that is embedded in the founding of federations (Gilliland, 2013). Despite the conceptual and political differences between seats and capital cities noted above, the two terms might be used interchangeably in this article only for convenience.
In the study of cities, we see labels such as “contested,” ‘divided “polarized,” ‘violent “disputed,” and “conflicted” adjectives attached to the term city or urban. Scott A. Bollens (2009) argues that cities fall within this category in numerous circumstances of political division and contestation along social cleavages. Thus, a contested city implies not merely diverse societies in terms of ethnicity, language, religion, or culture; what marks a contested city is that “these differences are politically salient—that is, they are persistent markers of political identity and bases for political mobilisation” (Choudhry, 2009: 5). Likewise, Scott Bollens (2009) explained it in the following manner: [W]here the very legitimacy of their political structures and their rules of decision-making and governance are strongly contested by ethnic groups who either seek an equal or proportionate share of power or demand group-based autonomy or independence. Governance amidst severe and contested multicultural differences is viewed by at least one identifiable group in the city as artificial, imposed, or illegitimate. Socioeconomic cleavages and urban questions become bound up with strong political claims; socially “divided” cities at this juncture become politically “polarized” cities. (p. 2)
A divided or contested city, therefore, denotes a politicized urban situation of intergroup relations, which also explains our case studies of Brussels and Addis Ababa. In this article, the term “contested city” is “a major urban centre in which two or more ethnically-conscious groups—divided by religion, language and/or culture and perceived history—coexist in a situation where neither group is willing to concede supremacy to the other” (Hepburn, 2004: 2). This article relies on this definition and other conceptual lenses developed by Scott Bollens (2009) for “comparative research on urban political conflict” and further contextualizes it to the federal politics. Overall, Scott Bollens (2009) identified key “urban ethnic conditions”—territorial control, distribution of economic benefits, access to policy-making, and collective identity—to explain urban divided politics and its impact on peaceful cultural co-existence. In order to examine the governance of federal capital cities in contested national and international contexts, this article conceptualizes “contested condition” in terms of urban historical and cultural evolutions, ethnolinguistic inter-group competition and cooperation, and the existence of inter-country competition to host supranational political bodies. Such contested urban situations are more likely to be institutionalized when political parties are organized in order to protect and promote the causes of their respective ethnonational groups.
Capital cities in diverse societies are unique because they are seen as an important symbol of the whole country and hence prone to disputes (Slack and Chattopadhyay, 2009). The same symbolic significance has been advanced by states to host supranational entities like the European Union and African Union. This symbolism has special meaning for federal countries, which tend to be culturally diverse. Consequently, in federal countries, the choice and development of a capital city, its monuments, its policy and governance arrangements have to reflect this diversity while also being as neutral as possible with respect to individual states or provinces (Slack and Chattopadhyay, 2009). Let us now see the experiences of our case studies.
Governing contested federal capital cities in Ethiopia and Belgium
This section discusses the governance of the two capital cities focusing on their historical and cultural foundations, the present ethnolinguistic inter-group competition and cooperation, and inter-country competition to host supranational political bodies, one after the other. The revised Belgian Constitution (Government of Belgium, 2014) attempts to escape the controversies associated with “capital” versus “seat” by adopting both terminologies in the same constitutional clause: “the city of Brussels is the capital of Belgium and the seat of the Federal Government” (Article 194). But the federal constitution of Ethiopia (Government of Ethiopia, 1995) adopts the “capital city” approach: “Addis Ababa shall be the capital city of the Federal State” (Government of Ethiopia, 1995: Article 49/1).
Brussels as the capital of intranational governments
Brussels, with greater than two million inhabitants in 161 km2, is one of the three territorial constituent units and the capital of the Belgian federation. The Parliament and Government of the Brussels-Capital Region (BCR) were institutionally created during the State Reform of 1989 (Flemish and Walloon Regions have had theirs since 1980). It is officially bilingual, although the French-speaking inhabitants are a clear majority (63.2% are native French speakers and 20% are native Dutch speakers). Brussels-City is one of the 19 municipalities of the Brussels agglomeration/Region (Peeters, 2007). Since Brussels-Capital Region is a fully federated entity as well as the seat of the federal government of Belgium, it is safe to conclude that it is a city-state just like Berlin, Vienna and Madrid (Van Wynsberghe, 2013). The implication of the European Union presence in Brussels will be discussed shortly. Then, what makes Brussels a contested city?
The political history of Belgium had created a situation that minoritized a majority group in the city of Brussels that laid the foundation for the future contestation over the capital city. Historically a Dutch-speaking city, Brussels has seen a major shift to French as the majority language and lingua franca since the independence of Belgium in 1830. This language shift, the Frenchification of Brussels, is however rooted in the 18th century and accelerated after Belgium became independent and Brussels expanded its original boundaries (Poirier, 2006). The factor for the Frenchification of Brussels, a city that turned into a powerful French acculturation machine, was mainly attributed to the historical ban on the Dutch language in politics, administration, courts, media and culture, army and education in Belgium. This made French the only language of administration, law, politics and education, and social mobility in Belgium (Poirier, 2006). French-speaking immigration to the capital also contributed to the Frenchification of Brussels; both Walloons and expatriates from other countries, mainly France, came to Brussels in great numbers. But officially the exclusively French educational system played an irreplaceable role in this changing language landscape.
Geographically, Brussels “is enclaved in the territory of the Flemish Region” (Poirier, 2006: 6). Flanders did not want to “abandon” part of their territory, especially since it is often argued that Brussels used to be a town where Flemish was spoken before it was “Frenchified” by policy design (Poirier, 2006; Popelier, 2015). In other words, the Flemish carries a sense of loss with regards to Brussels. For their part, the Francophones of Wallonia, in the South, wanted to maintain strong links with the French speakers of the capital city.
Furthermore, the contestation over the city of Brussels between French and Dutch-speaking communities was articulated by Van Wynsberghe (2013) as follows: Flanders claims “property rights” over Brussels because it is supposed to be geographically and historically a Flemish city. The French-speaking Community considers Brussels as a predominantly French-speaking city and therefore sees it as a part of its territory that might be threatened were Flanders to become independent. The actual tensions are due to the Frenchifying of the agglomeration, landlocked in Flanders. Neither side is prepared to cede this central territory to the other, nor to consider full independence for Brussels. (p. 127)
The competition between both communities shows little readiness to end which has political ramifications. This polarization led the Flemish politicians to make Brussels the sole capital of Flanders, and the French-speaking Parliament responded by declaring Brussels as its capital city. According to Carole Van Wynsberghe (2013), the designation of Brussels-Capital Region as a third federated entity constitutes “one of the famous Belgian compromise solutions between French-speaking political parties who wanted Brussels to become a fully autonomous polity and Flemish politicians who claim that Brussels is part of Flanders” (p. 130). However, Brussels continues to be a contested capital city of four federated entities—Brussels and Flemish Regions, Flemish and French-speaking Communities— and the seat of the federal government which altogether indicates the complexity of the Belgian federal system. Hence, the federal praxis in Belgium appears to be the opposite of federal theory of city formations and developments expounded by Daniel Elazar (1975) and Scott Campbell (2003). Rather than territorially dispersing centers of powers, the Belgian model of federalism concentrated powers in a single capital city.
Although the majority language of Brussels is French, the city is officially bilingual to guarantee equal opportunity and access for both communities. The sophisticated self-rule policy in contested Brussels has got some drawbacks. The co-existence of different concurrent sometimes exclusive government actors on the same territory makes it difficult to build bridges between the two communities. Johanne Poirier (2006) found that the two communities, for instance, run their own schools, and have found it nearly impossible to create bilingual schools or effective bridges between Flemish and French-speaking schools which are sometimes next to one another. The tendency of pure monolingualism in education in a multicultural setting of Brussels, Sophia Weerts (2012) comments, could hinder mutual understanding between communities.
There are strong institutional arrangements aimed at facilitating intergroup cooperation through protection and representation of the Flemish minority in Brussels. First, the Flemish minority in Brussels enjoys a guaranteed minimum representation in the Brussels Parliament (Poirier, 2006). That way, even if the number of Flemish residents in Brussels was too small in size, at least 17 out of the 89 members of its assembly would be Flemish (Poirier, 2006). Second, at least 3 of the 8 Ministers of the Brussels-Region are Flemish and these all measures were designed to protect the Flemish minority in Brussels, just as parity-based institutions at the federal level were designed to protect the French-speaking minority at the national level (Peeters, 2007; Poirier, 2006; Van Wynsberghe, 2013). Whenever the Belgian people of Brussels vote for the federal, the community or the regional elections, they make a language choice before they can make a political one. The reason for this is that ministerial positions and seats should be distributed proportionally to linguistic communities. This explains why almost all political parties in Belgium are either French or Dutch speaking. 7 This inter-elite power sharing practice has enhanced intergroup cooperation in Brussels/Belgium and this is often called consociational democracy.
Even though Brussels-Capital Region has the same powers as the other two Regions, critics argue that, practically, there are some limitations to its regional autonomy. For instance, Brussels may not be able to organize its own institutions, and “the laws of the national government have precedence over the laws of the BCR (unlike other regions), and any potential conflicts are to be resolved through arbitration at the Council of State level” (Wolman et al., 2007: 1). As a result, the federal government has the theoretical power to suspend or cancel any ordinance that would harm Brussels as a federal capital and international city (Van Wynsberghe, 2013; Wolman et al., 2007). Furthermore, the Brussels capital city does not enjoy direct representation in the upper house [the Senate] of the Belgian federal parliament, but indirectly through communities (Government of Belgium, 2014). This also affects its political autonomy as a city-state.
Addis Ababa as the capital of intranational governments
Addis Ababa is a multicultural city, with about 4.7 million inhabitants in 540 km2.
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Geographically, Addis Ababa is located at the heart of Oromia Regional State. The political history version of Addis Ababa resembles that of Brussels’s for it was historically an Oromo city, called Finfinne until it was conquered and renamed Addis Ababa in 1886 by Amharic-speaking ruling elites (Benti, 2000): Proximity does not explain Addis Ababa and Oromia. Addis Ababa is totally surrounded by Oromia. In effect, Addis Ababa is part of Oromia. This geographical nexus in turn yielded an historical perspective on the relation of Addis Ababa and Oromia. The original settlers of Addis Ababa were the Oromo. (Wakene, 2010: 93)
The city became the capital of the Ethiopian empire state in 1889 when the rulers imposed Amharic official language, banning all non-Amharic languages in the empire. As a result, Addis Ababa slowly shifted from Oromo to the Amharic language (Benti, 2001). In 1910, the Oromo were the majority in the city, and the Amharic speaking population was less than 20% (Cooper and Horvath, 1973; Pankhurst, 1985). But after 40 years, the Oromo had already taken the status of minority and Amhara took majority status through Amharization policy equivalent to Franchification policy in Belgium (Cooper and Horvath, 1973; Pankhurst, 1985). However, there are individuals who often marginalize the Oromo history of the city because the former shares aspect of political thought with the pre-1991 Amharic-speaking ruling class (Fessha, 2020). This laid the foundation for the dispute over Addis Ababa, and the contestation starts right from the naming of the city. The same city is Addis Ababa for Amharic, Finfinne for Oromo.
Following the collapse of the military regime in 1991, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE, 1991) was established on the basis of the Transitional Charter. In accordance with the spirit of the Charter, the proclamation No. 7/1992 was adopted to provide for the establishment of fourteen self-governing regions of the TGE in which Addis Ababa was granted self-governing status as Region Fourteen (Article 3/1). Consequently, “Addis Ababa served both as a regional government and as the seat of the newly established transitional national government” (Fiseha, 2009: 84). However, the proclamation No.7/1992, Article 3/4 also provided that the special national interests and political right of the Oromo over Region Thirteen and Region Fourteen are reserved. These regions shall be accountable to the Central Transitional Government and the relations of these Self-Governments with the Central Transitional Government shall be prescribed in detail by a special law. (Transitional Government of Ethiopia, 1992).
Region Thirteen was Harari Nationality Self-Government Region. Three points could be made here. First, Addis Ababa was one of the fourteen National/Regional Self-Governments of the TGE. Second, the special national interests and political rights of the Oromo over Addis Ababa were reserved by the law. These political and national rights of the Oromo were later constitutionalized in 1995 as the rights of Oromia Region. Third, Addis Ababa Region was made accountable to the Central Transitional Government of Ethiopia. Subsequently, the fourteen regions were reconfigured into nine by the new federal constitution in 1995. As a result, Addis Ababa lost its capital city-state status.
Now, Addis Ababa is a city administration. Unlike Brussels, it is officially a monolingual city. As a result, Addis Ababa continues to be regarded as an “island” in Oromia even after the introduction of federalism in Ethiopia. Employment reports of Addis Ababa show that from 2006 to 2015, on average, 60% of the city’s employees were Amhara (Addis Ababa City Government, 2016). This is due to the reason that “fluency in Amharic was made an essential pre-requisite for entry into government services” (Leta, 1999: 177). As it was rightly argued, “official language has the potential to enlarge participation in power, wealth and prestige and to restrict it. Restricted participation eventually means that one group is dominated by another” (Weinstein, 1983: 79). Though one might certainly expect more Oromo migrants to the capital city due to its location in Oromia, migrants to the city are mainly Amharas (World Bank, 2010). Getahun Benti (2001) observes that: [I]t was not easy for them [the Oromo] to live in a city dominated by a single group because the Amhara consider(ed) themselves indigenous or hosts. . . and regard(ed) all others as outsiders, thus discouraging the Oromo from migrating to the city. A very important mechanism by which the Oromo was excluded from establishing themselves in Addis Ababa and benefiting from the opportunities created in the empire’s capital was the imposition of Amharic as the “national” language. The subtle policy of imposing Amharic was accompanied by a systematic suppression of Afaan Oromoo. (p. 159)
Addis Ababa became an extremely contested city due to its historical and cultural evolution, which made the indigenous the guest, and the guest the indigenous. Asebe R. Debelo and Teshome E. Soboka (2022) correctly argued that “the peculiarity of Addis Ababa is related to the encounter between an invading power and indigenous societies that eventually cemented asymmetrical power relations in the form of settler-indigenous relations” (p. 5). The monolingualism that seems to be preserving the policy-driven minoritized status of the Oromo in the capital city continues to be the source of resentment among the Oromo. The Oromo’s conflict over the city’s planning and policies reached its climax between 2014 and 2018, during which time the capital’s expansion master plan faced strong resistance. The Oromo students’ protest that began in 2014 against Addis Ababa’s outward frontier expansion in the form of a master plan (Debelo and Soboka, 2022), finally compelled the former prime minister of Ethiopia to resign in March 2018.
As a short-term response to a deep-rooted contest over Addis Ababa, the federal government of Ethiopia devised an informal power-sharing deal which was effected since 2005 within the ruling coalition–the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The four-member parties of the ruling coalition 9 shared executive and legislative seats in the administration of Addis Ababa on an “equal quota” formula (Gemechu, 2021). The formula was introduced following the 2005 national election by which the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) won 23 of the 24 federal seats in Addis Ababa. Due to the protests that followed the election, the ruling regime did not hand over the city administration to the CUD and arrested their leaders and formed a caretaker government in the city. Under this caretaker city administration, each of the four-member parties of the EPRDF shared 25% of executive appointments and legislative seats of the city center, of the 11 sub-cities, and of the 116 districts of Addis Ababa. It was an authoritarian grand coalition within the ruling party as opposed to Brussels’ consociational democracy. The posts of mayor and deputy mayor of the city was very important according to the deal. Even though the “equal quota” formula was reportedly abandoned by the Prosperity Party, which was created in late 2019 out of the ashes of the EPRDF, the successive mayors and deputy mayors of Addis Ababa city so far continue to be assigned from the Oromo and the Amhara members of the ruling party.
Now, let us identify the federal capital cities category that Addis Ababa fits best. Different writers regarded Addis Ababa differently either as a “city-state “; or “federal district” or “federal territory.” For example, “in 1994,” Fekadu Adugna (2011) writes, “the country was reorganized into nine putatively autonomous regional states and two city-states [Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa]” (p. 776). Similarly, the UN-Habitat (2008) writes that “it [Addis Ababa] has the status of both a city and a state under a charter endorsed by the national government” (p. 127). Valentina F. Linares (2013) says that “the city of Addis Ababa has the dual status of a city and state” (p. 19). Beijing municipal website had to write this: “Addis Ababa is a chartered city that has the status of both a city and a state.” 10 As will be shown in the following, these all are incorrect conclusions, and definitely show a lack of clarity on the status of Addis Ababa. Moreover, there are authors who view Addis Ababa as a federal territory or district. For instance, Fransen and Kuschminder (2009) remark that “the constitution established Ethiopia as an ethnic federalist state with nine regional states based on the predominant ethnic groups, with the exception of two federal territories, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa” (p. 6). Likewise, Shimels Demissie (2010) argues that Ethiopia’s “Constitution clearly makes the city [Addis Ababa] a federal territory” (p. 46). Assefa Fiseha (2009) writes about “the federal-district model in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia” (p. 80). These indicate that there is massive confusion and misrepresentations in the literature regarding the governance model of Addis Ababa.
This article argues that Addis Ababa may readily fit neither the federal district nor a city-state nor a city governed by state but could be seen as a hybrid model on the following grounds. The first critical question is whether or not Addis Ababa is a federal territory/district similar to Abuja, New Delhi, Canberra, or Washington, DC. The 1995 federal constitution of Ethiopia (Art 49) proclaims “Addis Ababa shall be the capital city of the Federal State” and it “shall be responsible to the Federal Government,” for which reason it resembles a federal district/territory. This, argues Fessha (2020), “makes the city closer to the federal territory model . . . . where the capital is under the control of the federal government, albeit with some autonomy” (p. 16). However, according to the same constitution, there is no designated federal territory in Ethiopia. “The territorial jurisdiction of Ethiopia shall comprise the territory of the members of the Federation [emphasis added]” (Article 2). And members of the federation are eleven States as listed under Article 47 and its amendments. In accordance with the territorial principles of the Constitution, there could be no territory outside the territories of the eleven-member states of the Ethiopian federation.
Regarding Addis Ababa, Article 49/5 of the Constitution indisputably proclaims “the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia” and provides the special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, shall be respected.
Even though the interpretational controversy of this clause is yet to be settled officially (Fessha, 2020), the State of Oromia enjoys constitutional special privileges and rights in Addis Ababa. It means that contrary to the basic characteristic feature of the federal district model, which claims neutrality of the capital city to all federal member states, Addis Ababa, at least legally speaking, appears not neutral to all regional states of Ethiopia. Moreover, Addis Ababa has been the capital of not only the Federal Government but also of the Oromia Regional State, the most populous and territorially the largest region of Ethiopia. The Oromia Regional State officially regards Addis Ababa as part of its contiguous territory and designates by its original name, Finfinne (Oromia National Regional State, 2005: Articles 2 and 6). Here it looks like a capital city in a province serving as the capital of both federal and provincial governments similar to Bern. Addis Ababa has its own city-government; it also serves as the seat of the Federal Government, Oromia Regional Government, and the African Union institutions, making it the seat of multiple governments.
However, there are practices that put Addis Ababa within the city-state category. For instance, according to the constitution of Ethiopia, the States—not the cities—are entrusted with the powers and functions “to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with Federal laws” (Art 52/d). In clear contravention of this provision, the federal legislature adopted a charter for Addis Ababa by extending those state powers and functions to the capital city (Addis Ababa City Government, 2003: Art 11). It is also not uncommon to see Addis Ababa represented in various stages including national sports festivals and in ad hoc meetings and conferences at the federal level as co-equal with regional states which gives it a city-state status. That is why Fasil Nahum thought that the status of Addis Ababa “for all practical purposes, amounts to a state” (quoted in Afesha, 2014: 23).
When it comes to the real politics in Ethiopia, the ruling party implements what it likes only and does not care about what is written in the constitution. This is the key difference between Ethiopia and Belgium, suggesting evidence of more centralization in Addis Ababa than in Brussels. For instance, nothing has so far been legislated to implement the special interests of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa as enshrined in the constitution of 1995. Nico Steytler (2001) has aptly said, “the lack of fit between the reality of metropolitan cities and the legal and political structure in which they must operate could impact adversely on the functioning of federal systems” (p. 60). As a result, Addis Ababa is effectively governed in a model closer to a unitary French capital city, Paris, because the federal government of Ethiopia enacted a charter for it that declares “the City Government is a component of the Federal Government” and “it shall be accountable to the Federal Government” (Addis Ababa City Government, 2003: Art 61/2). In addition, Addis Ababa has practically remained both politically and economically Ethiopia’s single dominant primate city which deviates from the federal theory of city formations and development. The prime minister of Ethiopia assigns the mayor and deputy mayor through the party channels and has full power to dissolve the city council (Art 61). This, according to Nigussie Afesha (2014), “is simply against the principles of democracy” (p. 27). Furthermore, like Brussels, the city of Addis Ababa does not enjoy direct representation in Ethiopia’s upper house (the House of Federation), except through representatives of nations and nationalities (Afesha, 2014; Government of Ethiopia, 1995). Lack of autonomy of course is not unique to Addis Ababa. As Caroline Van Wynsberghe (2013) observes, it “was a problem pointed out by the inhabitants of Washington, DC” too (p. 4).
In general, it looks that the historical winner-loser relationships over Addis Ababa and Brussels as well as the legacies of the unitary system seem to have “imprisoned” the mindsets of competing forces within these disputed cities; and thereby hiding from their sights the opportunity to develop fresh capital cities in accordance with the federal theory (Campbell, 2003; Elazar, 1975). The historical wrongs committed through minoritizing the majority group have created situations where no one is willing to give up. In the case of Ethiopia, eight regional states, except Oromia, have attempted to develop their respective capital cities. However, Addis Ababa continues to act as an imperial capital city due to the uneven concentration of government offices, economy, technology, education and other sectors in the city. Even the situation in Belgium is far worse from the point of view of the federal theory of city formations and development because out of the six constituent units of the Belgian federation, four are using Brussels as their capital cities—the Brussels-Capital Region, the merged government of Flanders Region and Flemish Community, and the French Community. It is also the capital of the federal government of Belgium and EU institutions. If all constituent units’ governments follow the federal theory of city formations and developments, they could have developed multi-capital cities in the country. But the political history and controversies over the capital continue to influence the national politics and contributed to this complexity.
Addis Ababa & Brussels as the seats of supranational institutions
Let’s briefly examine the international roles of Addis Ababa and Brussels as the seats of two supranational/continental institutions—the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), respectively. Both AU and EU prefer to use the terms seat and/or headquarters to refer to Addis Ababa and Brussels. But the cities have gradually gained the image of de facto capitals of Africa and Europe. 11 Before the attention is drawn to the manifestations of inter-country contests to host these supranational bodies or to control the benefits thereof, a discussion on their historical evolutions and political implications for the capital city governances will be presented.
In 1963, Ethiopia’s empire capital city, Addis Ababa was chosen to host the Organization of African Unity (OAU) due mainly to two historical factors. First, Ethiopia defeated Italian colonial invaders in 1896 at the battle of Adwa in northern Ethiopia. The victory of Ethiopia over European colonial power was the first of its kind, and hence celebrated as a symbol of black victory and a lesson for many African anti-colonial fighters who were waging wars of liberation and independence. Second, Ethiopia helped many African leaders including provision of military training for those conducting wars of liberation. For instance, Nelson Mandela received his military training in Ethiopia to fight against the Apartheid system in South Africa. Due to these historic factors, Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa was chosen as the seat of the OAU upon its foundation in 1963 (Pankhurst, 1985).
Unlike that of Addis Ababa, the choice of Brussels as the seat of European Union is “more a matter of chance and indecision than of conscious deliberation” (Van Wynsberghe, 2013: 125). Brussels was not a logical choice to serve as a capital city when the European Coal and Steel Community was created in 1951. However, in 1957, the city of Brussels finally announced its official candidacy to host the Community, and in June 1958, it was agreed on Brussels as the seat for the Commissions of the European Economic Community. The main advantage of Brussels’ candidacy lay in its centrality among the six founding countries—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (Van Wynsberghe, 2013).
The Maastricht Treaty which came into force in 1993 transformed the European Community into the European Union, a semi-federation of independent states. In a similar fashion, the Sirte Declaration which came into force in 2002 transformed the Organization of African Unity into the African Union. Unlike the EU, the AU appears to have kept itself within the definition of “league of states” than “federation of states.” Needless to add, some early African leaders and pan-Africanists even tried to advance a more radical concept of a United States of Africa: “One day it will become similar to the United States of America.” 12 However, neither the EU nor the USA models of federalism seem taking root in Africa so far.
Key European Union institutions including the European Council (of Heads of State and Government), the Council of the European Union (legislative body), the European Commission (executive body), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO-common defense) are based in Brussels. The European Parliament which acts as legislature [together with the Council of the EU] had its secretariat seat in Luxembourg; the European Central Bank is based in Frankfurt; and the Court of Justice of the European Union seats in Luxembourg. The status of Brussels as the seat of the European institutions appears very stable and there has been no major change to its initial setup. Various national and international institutions assigning their diplomatic missions to the EU have increased the global role of Brussels (Van Wynsberghe, 2013).
Likewise, except for the Pan-African Parliament which seats in South Africa, and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights which headquarters in Tanzania; the African Union continue to use Addis Ababa as the capital city of its key institutions including the AU Assembly (of Heads of State and Government); the AU Executive Council, African Union Peace and Security Council, and the AU Commission. Besides, different national and major international organizations have their African headquarters and representatives in Addis Ababa. For instance, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the European Union delegation to the African Union, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Bank (WB) and various global institutions are using Addis Ababa as their headquarters for Africa. As a result, Addis Ababa is not only where Africa meets, it has also increasingly become where the world meets Africa. Philippe Parijs and Jonathan Parys (2010) term such phenomenon as “civic center of gravity” to refer to “an ever-growing number of plurinational organizations of all types” in Brussels (p. 11).
The internationalization of these federal capital cities has given more justifications for the federal governments to intervene in, and frequently decide on behalf of, the capital cities. This is due mainly to the fact that the responsibility of conducting international relations falls under the direct mandates of the federal governments. As a result, international activities in the capital cities as well as the activities of the capital cities which affect the interests of federal and supranational institutions are directly governed by the federal governments. Caroline Van Wynsberghe (2013) similarly argues and is worth requoting: “the federal government has the right to cancel any Brussels ordinance that prejudices its status or function as capital and international city” (p. 134). As a result, the presence of supranational institutions in capital cities may not necessarily be good news for the freedom and autonomy of capital city administrations. Because, for the purpose of managing the interests of supranational institutions in those capital cities, the federal governments act like local governments. Cities in federations (e.g. Belgium) in federations (e.g. EU) are expected to fulfill layered responsibilities— accommodating national and supranational interests.
Hosting supranational political bodies is not merely about fulfilling responsibilities, it also means extensive opportunities and benefits for the host states. Thus, the inter-group contest over capitals does not seem to stop at the subnational or national level; it rather tends to take the form of inter-country competition to host supranational political entities due to the symbolic and associated international political-economy benefits. Martin Welz concisely observed the political-economy benefits of hosting the Africa Union: There is no doubt that Ethiopia enjoys playing host to the AU. It brings thousands of business people and politicians (permanently and visiting) to the city, making it a beneficial venture for Ethiopia’s economy. The AU in turn attracts a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and donor agencies to base themselves in Addis Ababa, increasing the economic benefits. But more importantly, they increase Ethiopia’s standing two-fold: first, Addis Ababa is permanently in the press and all high-level politicians visiting AU headquarters cannot ignore the Ethiopian government [. . . ]. Second, Ethiopia capitalizes on the fact that criticism from fellow African states is silenced because it hosts the African headquarters. (Welz, 2013: 97)
The second role mentioned in this excerpt is political, which means a country’s role as a seat of a supranational political body could have significance for its national politics. For instance, the presence of the European Union in Brussels is argued to have created confidence among Belgians and helped the peaceful transition of Belgian politics from a unitary to a federal system (Vanderschueren et al., 2020). The same argument is less likely as far as the influence of the African Union on the public confidence in Ethiopia is concerned, as for example, the latter adopted federalism after conducting nearly two decades of bloody civil war while the former was either silenced as Martin Welz (2013) argued or preferred to silently present in Addis Ababa.
Instead, when the OAU transformed itself into the AU, there were discussions on whether or not to choose a new capital for the new union. In Togo, where the AU constitutive act was approved in 2002, some delegates of African states such as Libya and Senegal had openly advanced their interests to host the African Union, which annoyed the Ethiopian prime minister who was attending.
13
Consequently, Martin Welz argued that Ethiopia added some symbolism to ensure Addis Ababa’s survival as the capital of Africa. The government distributed land to African countries to build new embassies and renamed many streets in the capital city so that the names of all African states are now found in Addis Ababa. (p.98)
This was to weaken the competing states and thereby maintain Addis Ababa’s supranational primus inter pares position in Africa by any means. At a global level also, there has been a superpower competition to control Africa through its capital city. As a strategy to win the support of Africans against the western powers, the Chinese Government, for example, built the African Union head office complex in 2012 in Addis Ababa with US$200 million fund. In his piece “China in the heart of Africa,” Kingsley Ighobor (2012) regarded the AU’s headquarters construction by China in Addis Ababa as a symbol of global economic and ideological contestation. Due to the increasing global politico-economic competing interests to influence supranational capital cities and the intracontinental competing interests to host those supranational political institutions, the hosting federal governments are willing to take into account the supranational interests in their capital cities’ planning and administrations. The presence of supranational interests in those federal capitals would challenge the traditional classification of capital cities in federations.
Finally, unlike Brussels, which receives special financial support from the European Union for hosting it (Van Wynsberghe, 2013), Addis Ababa so far had no special fiscal arrangement from the African Union for hosting it. The discussion of the AU and the EU within the federal capital city politics is important as it also affects and fits the complex nature of governing capitals in contested contexts. The following table (Table 1) summarizes the key discussions presented above. It attempts to show major similarities and differences between Brussels and Addis Ababa on the basis of their contested conditions and federal governances.
Comparison between Brussels and Addis Ababa.
Conclusion
In the preceding sections, this article has attempted to examine the governance of capital cities in contested contexts of emergent federations by focusing on Brussels and Addis Ababa which shared extensive similarities but also significant differences. Theoretically, federalism, as opposed to unitarism, is argued to create better opportunities for the flourishing of multiple politically or economically or culturally significant parallel cities in a polity where powers are really non-centralized. In some federations, the biggest city may not even be the political capital, where the executive or legislative branch seats. In unitary states, the capital city tends to dominate the remaining satellite cities in the country.
In this regard, the finding indicates that, Ethiopia and Belgium seem to have followed the French unitary rather than the German federal model. The lopsided political dominance of Addis Ababa and Brussels shows that the federal praxis differed from the federal theory of city formations and developments. This could mainly be due to the long-established legacies of the unitary systems and the “contested conditions” in both emergent federations. Thus, the impact of federalism seems minimal in this regard. The two capital cities continue to be contested among the competing communities.
This article suggests that Addis Ababa, as some call it “the Brussels of Africa,” needs to reconcile with itself by resolving first its language policy problems. Addis Ababa can better promote its internal cohesion by officially adopting the Oromo language and designating the city a bilingual. As discussed in the paper, the monolingual policy of the capital city since 1889 had favored those who spoke Amharic to the disadvantage of non-Amharic language speakers particularly Oromos. The city is surrounded by the Oromo communities toward which it has been expanding. This expansion was one of the major factors of the Oromo protests (2014–2018). Therefore, a capital city, founded on Oromo farmland, completely surrounded by Oromo population, expanding to Oromo farmlands for over a century, and also continues utilizing natural resources including water and other basic services from a nearby Oromo territories, would be advantageous if it adopts Oromo language as its second working language. It would benefit both residents of Oromia and Addis Ababa. It would fasten them together.
Moreover, if the Oromo, the most populous national group in Ethiopia, is able to see its language serving as one of the working languages of the capital city, which would create equal opportunity for its language speakers, it would restore its sense of belongingness to the city which promotes social unity even at the country level. It is unwise to continue preventing non-Amharic speaking communities in Addis Ababa from having schools of their own. Democratizing public policies could serve to down the politics of indigenous-guest feelings in the city. While linguistic freedom and equality is promoted, knowledge of Amharic will also continue to be a resource for all. This, arguably, helps ease the tension and rivalries among competing groups in Ethiopia in general. Above all, the government of Ethiopia needs to respect the constitution clauses such as the special interests of the state of Oromia in Addis Ababa, and democratize the state-society relationships. In Brussels, the two Communities might want to foster more cooperation by learning the language of each other through education system. Language policies in both capital cities could democratically be redesigned with the aim of encouraging members of different communities to engage in a two-way language learnings by promoting both linguistic freedom as well as bilingualism, multilingualism and multiculturalism. Ultimately, one-way of language imposition and interlinguistic polarization need to be replaced by interlinguistic cooperation and interculturalism. Multilingualism could serve better in easing the tensions and contestations.
It is better that the federal governments concede more autonomy to the capital cities and de-emphasize the old dominant capital cities. The heavy presence of the federal government in the capital tends to endanger self-government initiatives. Furthermore, the federal and constituent units should be free to consider developing more capital cities in the country using federal principles; but first, they need to resolve the old thinking of unitary state capital city legacies. The federal thinking of capital cities is about innovatively developing and diversifying centers of power—be they economic, political, cultural cities. It is about making the old mono-capital primate city less significant by de-emphasizing it and also by creating new multi-capital cities that are physically very closer to the people. The federal theory of city development could thus be beneficial especially in emergent federations if they are willing to implement it properly.
Finally, different writers classified federal capital cities into three categories: (1) federal district/territory; (2) federal capital city-state; and (3) federal capital city managed by a state. For intranational political purposes, Brussels was regarded as a capital city-state; whereas Addis Ababa was presented as a hybrid model mixed with features of authoritarian elements. However, one should ask what is the effect of the presence of supranational political entities—the EU and the AU—in Brussels and Addis Ababa on these federal capital city categories? As has already been argued, these international cities and the arising federal justifications and mandates have created situations for the federal governments to frequently intervene in, and decide on behalf of, the capital city administrations. Addis Ababa and Brussels as the seats of supranational political entities have witnessed inter-country cooperation and competition. Thus, it appears difficult to simply ignore these supranational presences and leave the cities within either of the three categories. Another model is required for the analysis of such cities at least for two reasons. First, Brussels is the capital of the European Union, a semi-federation of independent states. That is why it is often regarded as the European capital. The existence of the African Union and other major international organizations headquartered in Addis Ababa cannot be glossed over. Second, the intranational complexities caused by the “contested conditions” discussed above require a different model for the analysis of such capital cities. The fourth category therefore includes contested capital cities serving as the seats of multiple intranational as well as supranational political entities.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
