Community-Based Organizations and Stakeholders’ Engagements: A Dialectics of Countering Violent Extremism and Humanitarian Service Delivery in North-East Nigeria

Abstract

There is still little discussion on how community-based organizations (CBOs) may help counter violent extremism (CVE) in Nigeria. This research explores the implications of CBOs’ use of external networks for CVE and the distribution of humanitarian aid in North-East Nigeria. It finds that because CBOs depend so heavily on outside funding, they are constantly exposed to the demands and whims of donors. We therefore urge the government to prioritize CBOs in CVE programmes and operations to reduce external influence and to limit the spread of violent extremism in the region.

Keywords

CBOs countering violent extremism humanitarian service delivery external resource dependence North-East Nigeria

Introduction

Despite the escalation and rising tide of violent extremism in North-East Nigeria, community-based organizations (CBOs) have remained active through reliance on a web of external networks of interdependence based on ‘operational and contractual relationships’ to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) and deliver humanitarian support (Olojo, 2013; Stoddard et al., 2019). Violent extremism, which has resulted in insurgency and extremist attacks wreaking havoc in North-East Nigeria, has directly or indirectly resulted in the deaths of approximately 350,000 people, the displacement of over 2 million people and the need for humanitarian assistance and services by over 7.7 million people in the region (Lenshie and Yenda, 2016; Okpanachi, 2019; Olojo, 2013; Salifu and Ewi, 2017; Sanni, 2021; Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020). Following the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States, CVE has remained a viable approach and a credible option for combating violent extremism worldwide. Governments, international governmental organizations (IGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and other non-state actors (NSAs), including the civil society organizations (CSOs), have adopted several approaches to prevent violent extremism.

The statist militaristic or hard power approach to CVE has failed to prevent the formation of violent extremists and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in the way that it was intended (Ofongo, 2018; Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020). Governments, IGOs, INGOs, and other NSAs in Europe and America are adopting a non-militaristic approach to CVE. Following the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PAPVE) issued by the UN Secretary-General in December 2015 and the Geneva Conference in April 2016 to mobilize support for the Plan of Action to address conditions necessitating violent extremism and terrorism, the concept of CVE has been expanded from the state-centric approach to include CSOs. Nigeria’s adoption of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) of 2014, updated in 2016, and the National Security Strategy (NSS) enforced in 2014 considered the soft approach as one of the strategies effective for CVE. The government’s commitment to working with CSOs, particularly CBOs, on CVE was reflected in the CVE policy frameworks. However, their involvement has been limited to advice and advocacy (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2014). Despite this, CBOs’ participation in CVE programmes and activities has remained a fantasy. CSOs, notably CBOs, were left out of the de-radicalization, demobilization and reintegration process of the ‘repentant Boko Haram terrorists’ by the Nigerian government’s recent ‘Operation Safe Corridor’ soft approach to CVE (Ugwueze et al., 2021; Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020).

With the establishment of the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management, and Social Development to formulate humanitarian policies, coordinate national and international humanitarian activities, and foster partnerships to prevent and respond to strategic disasters, the process of formulation, mobilization and implementation of CVE policies and programmes have been a top-down approach in Nigeria. In February 2017, the UN established the UN-Nigerian Humanitarian Fund (UN-NHF) in conjunction with the Nigerian government to support humanitarian agencies in addressing humanitarian concerns (UN-Nigeria Humanitarian Fund, 2017). The UN requirements for UN-NHF can only be fulfilled by INGOs, National Non-Governmental Organizations (NNGOs) and bilateral and multilateral organizations. Many CBOs lack the necessary structures and infrastructure to access UN-NHF funds and support. As a result, CBOs in North-East Nigeria have become increasingly reliant on foreign governments, governments, IGOs, INGOs and NSAs for funding to participate and offer humanitarian assistance to alleviate the conditions that lead to violent extremism (Olojo, 2019).

Scholarly discourse on CBOs and CVE is diverse. According to Frazer and Nünlist (2015: 1), CVE should address the structural causes of violent extremism, such as ‘intolerance, government failure, and political, economic, and social marginalization’, in addition to the state-centric approach. Aly et al. (2015) argued that CVE requires a broad and diffused counter-extremism approach, including citizen-led grassroots activities. The role of women-led civil society in CVE was investigated by d’Estaing (2017) and Nwangwu and Ezeibe (2019). Human rights have been violated in CVE in the name of using civil society to combat violent extremism (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018). In a similar vein, Njoku (2017) demonstrated how the interactions between CSOs and government have been tense, with negative consequences for smaller organizations, such as CBOs closing or merging with larger ones.

The disregard for CSOs in government’s CVE programmes and operations, according to Ugwueze and Onuoha (2020) and Ugwueze et al. (2021), is counterproductive to addressing conditions that motivate violent extremism. Working with the state, according to Njoku (2020), has a negative influence on CSOs’ efforts to checkmate and hold politicians responsible. Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to how CBOs’ reliance on external funding and support affects their CVE activities in North-East Nigeria. This is why researching CBOs’ reliance on external resources, CVE and humanitarian service delivery in North-East Nigeria is important. This research is divided into six components. The first section is the review of related literature. In the second section, the resource dependence theory (RDT) is discussed. The third section contains the research design and methods. The fourth portion looks at implication of CBOs’ reliance on external funding and support for humanitarian services in North-East Nigeria, and the last segment is the conclusion.

Review of extant literature: CBOs and CVE

Utilizing community development agencies like CBOs as viable tools in CVE is important. In CVE, CBOs concentrate on the soft approach to counter violent extremist groups. CBOs commit to the local community and stakeholders to identify the causal variables weakening the efficacy of the community in P/CVE. According to Nwangwu and Ezeibe (2019), the mobilization and recruitment into violent extremism by individuals and groups and the effects it creates, domestically and internationally, are disastrous, which is the reason CBOs are required to play an important role in CVE. Patricio Asfura-Heim and Julia McQuaid (2015: p. 6) note that the complex nature of the conflict in North-East Nigeria is rooted in ‘historical, political, economic, and ethnic antagonisms, which resolving it will require a deep understanding of the conflict dynamics, as well as the motivations and capabilities of various key actors’.

Although the important stakeholders in resolving the conflicts include government agencies, the private sector and civil society, the CBOs are critical to understanding the root causes of the conflict giving rise to violent extremism in the region. They can influence patterns and institutional performances and mould people’s opinions by motivating them to achieve particular objectives (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid, 2015). The process of CBOs’ involvement in CVE is multi-sector. The dominant approach to understanding CVE in Nigeria is most often viewed from the standpoint of the communities and government stakeholders. CVE involving civil society actors such as CBOs appears to be the least strategy adopted by the government in Nigeria because it has continued to approach CVE militaristically (Okoli and Lenshie, 2020).

Most governments across the world have included CBOs in policy frameworks and programmes. CBOs are one of the most important actors in CVE in Europe and the Americas, particularly in the United States. CVE policies are moving away from military and extrajudicial responses to a more holistic strategy in combating violent extremism and terrorism. In the United States, CBOs are strategic in CVE (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018; Lorenzo and Hughes, 2015; The United States of America, 2011). CBOs work directly with communities and their stakeholders to address the factors that lead to violent extremism in a direct and precise way. In Europe and America, the integration of CBOs as part of the CVE framework takes into account the multi-faceted spectrum to promote the inclusion of values and limit the spread of extremist beliefs. CBOs are viewed as important players with the ability to combat violent extremist groups utilizing a variety of approaches (Davies, 2009; Ghosh et al., 2017).

CBOs work to undermine the conditions that make individuals vulnerable to violent extremism, recruitment and radicalization into VEOs. The crucial role CBOs play in the United States and Europe is to persuade governments to endorse their push for participation in CVE. Several government policies and programmes on CVE give CBOs leeway for addressing conditions motivating violent extremism since they are community-oriented. CBOs are thought to be inclined to interact more with stakeholders to enlist the help of community members to address violent extremism (Davies, 2009). Regrettably, the CBOs are mostly disregarded in Africa’s effort to counter the escalation of violent extremism (Barr et al., 2010; Onyeozu, 2010). Although Nigeria’s CVE legislation is modelled after the US CVE strategy, the Nigerian government’s CVE frameworks ignore CBOs (Bakker, 2015; Cohen, 2016; Faluyi et al., 2019; Nwangwu and Ezeibe, 2019; Sampson and Onuoha, 2011). Despite the federal government’s methods, rebel groups’ violence, for example, by Boko Haram continues to rise, causing havoc on the lives and property of Nigerians (Eji, 2016; Okoli and Lenshie, 2020; Umar, 2013). Scholars have linked the problem to the neglect of CSOs as essential actors in CVE and the preference for the use of force to combat insurgency and violent extremism in Nigeria (Barkindo and Bryans, 2016; Okunade and Ogunnubi, 2020; Sampson and Onuoha, 2011).

The military option of CVE to the neglect of the CBOs approach failed to yield the desired relationships that should have enabled effective CVE activities in the region, even though the federal government’s CVE frameworks advocated for a gentle and subtle approach (Anyadike, 2016). Although the federal government’s CVE frameworks for North-East Nigeria led to the formation of the North-East Development Corporation (NEDC) to address the conditions that motivated violent extremism (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2014), CBOs have not been directly involved as oriented stakeholders in the programming and implementation of government programmes. Furthermore, the strategy was not only top-down but also militaristic (Eji, 2016; Okunade and Ogunnubi, 2020). The Nigerian culture is community-oriented (Olutuyi, 2020), which presents an opportunity for the federal government to exploit in reaching the goal of CVE by implementing certain programmes or initiatives. Unfortunately, most government programmes are haphazard, partly due to the neglect of CBOs, which undermines effective people’s engagement. CBOs, being non-profit organizations, are frequently dedicated to improving the lives of residents. They usually function on a local level and have a high level of expertise, in addition to the enormous local information in their possession, especially in the areas where they work. CBOs are primarily concerned with providing solutions to one or more community issues (Olutuyi, 2020). In this respect, they are better prepared and placed to face issues that are difficult for any level of government to address.

Because of the usefulness of CBOs in development and social integration, developed countries and partners have agreed to fund and provide logistical support to enable them to undertake a variety of social and economic projects in various areas across the world (Anyadike, 2016; Olutuyi, 2020). Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada committed approximately $330 million to support communities, homeless groups and other persons who were vulnerable to the pandemic in Canada. During the Covid-19 pandemic, CBOs in the United States played a key role in assisting the poor in seeking emergency financial aid from the Seattle Fund (Olutuyi, 2020). In Nigeria, the government and business groups have mostly ignored CBOs. It is no surprise that the way finance corporations and philanthropists donated to the federal government to battle COVID-19 resulted in political distrust, public discontent and instability in Nigeria (Ezeibe et al., 2020). The implication is that addressing community concerns from the top down, especially CVE, has ramifications for violent extremism in Nigeria.

The federal government’s approach to solving problems like the CVE has not yielded the desired results since it has not fully integrated CBOs as significant partners (Anyadike, 2017). The recent federal government’s ‘Operation Safe Corridor’ did not include CBOs (Ugwueze et al., 2021). According to Waldmann (2010), the lack of community participation in government CVE programmes may have a larger role in fostering the recruitment and radicalization of people into violent extremist groups, especially if the community is sympathetic to and reminiscent of certain insurgent groups. CBOs play a critical role in minimizing the growth of violent extremism and insurgency in the right socioeconomic context. It is sufficient to show that CVE is expected to be at the forefront of national CVE initiatives and activities with the participation of CBOs. The government’s failure to financially and logistically integrate or assist CBOs undermines their effort to engage communities and stakeholders in CVE. This is despite that CBOs are the conduits via which governments can identify and solve the concerns and complexities that underpin violent extremism as government-community agencies. They can advise governments on how to address CVE collectively. Regrettably, in its fight against terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria, the federal government has not paid enough attention to CBOs that can address the core causes of violent extremism in North-East Nigeria.

Theorizing resource dependence in the context of CBOs’ external networks of interdependence

The RDT is employed as an analytical framework in this study. The idea was developed in 1978 by Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salanzcik to explain organizational links and abstract structure (De Camargo et al., 2018). The RDT looks at how businesses connect with the resources they need to succeed. It also addresses how a company’s reliance on external resources affects its activities, behaviour, interaction, structures and outputs, as well as how to avoid the risks that come with such reliance (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer and Salanzcik, 1978). RDT sees businesses as open systems that are subject to the whims of the outside world (Pfeffer and Salanzcik, 1978). The organization’s external environment is occupied by other organizations, each with its interests and goals. These organizations use resources available to them to exert control over other organizations’ conduct and operations to the extent that they can influence or constrain their behaviour and operations (Cobb and Wry, 2020; Davis and Cobb, 2010; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976).

External resource sourcing, which encompasses technical, logistical, strategic and operational resources, is a critical component of controlling and managing an organization, according to the RDT. External resources, such as human, financial and working capital, are essential for a company’s success (Cobb and Wry, 2020). Organizations with access to specific external resources inspire other organizations’ trust in their operations (Janse, 2020). As a result, organizations that require specific resources develop agreements with other organizations to obtain them (Ulrich and Barney, 1984). Dependence on others creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and makes an organization vulnerable to external controls, both of which can have a significant impact on its operations.

RDT is rarely used to evaluate public and non-profit organizations, notably in the political science discipline, despite its prominence in the field of organizational and strategic management. The RDT is helpful in understanding non-profit organizations and the constraints they face as a result of their reliance on external resources for survival and operation (Malatesta and Smith, 2014). The character and dynamics of CBOs in Nigeria are reflected in RDT. CBOs are founded to find, motivate and implement community-based projects in Nigeria and beyond. CBOs are local since they are created in the community, and they are operationally limited and lack the resources to successfully pursue their aims or implement their programmes in the community.

As a result, CBOs in North-East Nigeria establish a web of external networks of interdependence and reliance to get external resources (financial and material), which are critical components of their technical, logistic, strategic and operational management and administration. To put it differently, CBOs in North-East Nigeria collaborate with external partners to balance their reliance on limited government resources. They use the funding and materials they get to engage with stakeholders while strategizing to combat violence and extremist organizations in Nigeria’s North-East region.

The study setting and methodology

The study setting

This research was carried out in North-East Nigeria. It stretches from 6° 28′N to 13° 44′N and 8° 44′N to 14° 38′E, encompassing six states (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe) (Dada et al., 2007). According to the 2006 census, the region’s population was estimated to be 18,984,299 (13.52%) of Nigeria’s overall population of 140,431,790, with a land area of around 272,395 km², or 29.45% of the country’s total land area (Mayomi and Manu, 2014).

Methodology

This study used an exploratory simultaneous integrated mixed-methods design that comprises qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Exploratory investigations are intended to look at specific incidents for which no considerable preliminary studies have been completed. There are few, if any, studies that indicate how CBOs in Nigeria use external resources to engage in CVE and how this affects their CVE strategies. As a result, a preliminary investigation is adequate to demonstrate the dynamic and complicated nature of CSOs’ involvement in CVE in North-East Nigeria. The researchers had access to the research area’s statistical and interpretive data. The research was done among 142 registered CBOs in varied areas across the six states of North-East Nigeria between November 2020 and September 2021, with a history of existence and operations extending back at least 5 years before 2010. In the six North-East states, Figure 1 displays the demographic location/distribution as well as the types/distribution of CBOs.

Figure 1.

Demographic presentation of CBOs identified in North-East Nigeria (n = 142).

A survey, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were used to obtain information. The data collection approach involved 284 people from 142 CBOs across the region. Figure 2 depicts the demographic characteristics of the participants.

Figure 2.

Demographic characteristics of participants of CBOs members in the research process in North-East Nigeria (n = 284).

The purpose of the data collection method was to gather information to assess and describe the behaviour of the respondents. In-depth interviews and focus groups provided the researchers with a wealth of information about the participants’ lived experiences and thoughts on CBOs’ reliance on external resources for CVE initiatives in North-East Nigeria. The data gathering procedure was saturated after engaging with 234 individuals since no new themes or topics emerged from the interviews and focus groups held in the six North-Eastern states. The question was sent to each of the region’s CBOs in one of three ways: face-to-face, over the phone or via email. In-depth interviews were conducted over the phone, via Zoom, either through written responses sent to the CBOs’ email addresses. Each state included two focus groups, each with at least 7–10 participants selected from among the 142 CBOs subject based on the availability, accessibility, acceptability of the participants and the researchers’ assurances of their confidentiality and anonymity.

CBOs’ dependence on external resources and community stakeholder’s engagements in North-East Nigeria

CBOs play an essential part in CVE in North-East Nigeria, although it is difficult to say whether they have achieved the desired effects. CBOs have increasingly relied on external assistance in terms of funding and related support to participate in CVE programmes and activities. The field survey shows that the dominant source of funding and support for CBOs is from the bilateral and multilateral donors (n = 72, 25.35%). Diverse sources (n = 50, 17.61%), charities and foundations (n = 38, 13.38%) and other sources (n = 46, 16.2%) are the other most often cited sources. Self-help funds, comprising own fund-raising (n = 18, 12.68%) and foreign and national collaborations (n = 34, 11.97%), came in fifth and sixth. The government funding mechanism (n = 12, 4.23%) and international business groups (n = 20, 7.04%) provided the least funding and support to CBOs. This is presented in Figure 3 to show on a bar chart, the disparity in financial and material supports accruing to CBOs in North-East Nigeria from a variety of sources.

Figure 3.

Frequency and percentage of the sources of CBOs funding/supports in North-East Nigeria (n = 142). B/M (Bilateral/Multilaterals), DS (Diversified Sources), C&F (Charities & Foundations), NFM (National Funding Mechanism), ICG (International Corporate Groups), F&NC (Foreign & National Collaborations), SHF (Self-Help Fund) and Other Sources.

Despite the diversity of financial and material support at the disposal of CBOs in North-East Nigeria, a respondent stated that the national funding mechanism and multinational business groups do not constitute significant sources of their finance and support in the region. Financing the CVE is entangled in government’s politics and bureaucracies, and above all, there is a lack of commitment to employing CBOs as crucial actors in CVE. Furthermore, obtaining financial and other forms of assistance from multinational corporate groups in Nigeria is typically challenging, particularly when it involves intermediaries and the government (Interviewed CBO respondent in Yobe, March 2021). Because of the difficulties they have in obtaining the needed fund either directly from the government or indirectly through the government, CBOs develop networks of contacts to gain access to external support for CVE programmes and activities.

The fact that CBOs rely on outside funding and materials has an impact on their performance. As a result, in the North-East of Nigeria, funding and aid for internally displaced persons (IDPs) concentrate mostly on women and children, as well as health and youths. Donors have placed a higher priority on delivering funds to Boko Haram victims than explicitly addressing worries about radicalization to violent extremism (European Union Commission, 2017; UN Department of Operational Support, 2018). Several international governmental agencies, foreign donors’ agencies, foreign individual donors and INGOs, among others, have expressed a growing interest in financing and supporting countries in the global south, such as Nigeria, as well as CSOs, including those working on CVE. A Director of a CBO revealed in a telephone conversation that

The Boko Haram insurgency has piqued the interest of international organizations, international funders and partners, as well as representatives from numerous countries. However, they are concentrated in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states, where the Boko Haram insurgency has had a particularly negative impact. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, France, Switzerland, and Germany have all made significant monetary donations and provided humanitarian aid in North-East Nigeria. Among the organizations currently operating in North-East Nigeria are USAID, the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, the Norwegian Refugee Council (2017), Doctors Without Borders, Action Aid International, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, Action Against Hunger, Save the Child, Mains Sans Frances, Global Fund, Belinda and Gate Foundation, and Search for Common Ground. In North-East Nigeria, several international organizations and their agencies have also been working and aiding. The European Union, the World Bank Group, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have all made significant contributions to resolving the humanitarian crisis in North-East Nigeria. (Interview with a CBO Coordinator in Gombe, June 2021)

The fact that around 10.6 million people in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe are in desperate need of nutrition, food, shelter, health, education, protection, and water and sanitation informs the concentration of governments, bilateral and multilateral organizations, and donors providing humanitarian assistance to the people, including CBOs in the region (OCHA, 2020). Since 2016, the presence of humanitarian agencies in North-East Nigeria has expanded dramatically, according to Stoddard et al. (2020: 5), from a few NGOs and the UN to over 80 local and international organizations with an estimated 4000 assistance workers. There were 37 Nigerian CBOs and NGOs, 34 INGOs, 8 UN institutions (including OCHA and the International Organization for Migration (IOM)) and 4 Nigerian government agencies by the end of 2019.

The majority of those impacted live in military-run camps set up in garrison towns to house IDPs. In several sections of North-East Nigeria, there is also a sizable population living in communities in need of aid (Stoddard, 2020). International donors, organizations and institutions, according to one respondent, provide both direct and indirect humanitarian relief to people affected by the crisis in Nigeria’s North-East region. Direct humanitarian services imply that funders use their field workers to carry out their activities or programmes while reporting daily to them, whereas indirect humanitarian services imply that they use non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to carry out their activities and programmes in diverse communities throughout North-East Nigeria. CBOs are in charge of delivering regular reports and proof that activities or programmes have been performed (Interview with a CBO respondent in Bauchi, June 2021).

Humanitarian organizations working in North-East Nigeria were unable to accomplish substantial outcomes until they enlisted the aid of CBOs. The notion of indirect humanitarian assistance offered by international donors, which requires CBOs participation, has resulted in a proliferation of CBOs with unique but overlapping goals to pursue and implement in various parts of North-East around 2020 (FGDs and Interviews with CBO actors in Damaturu, Maiduguri and Yola, September 2021).

CBOs are specialized and broad-based in their activities. This is corroborated by field observations. Other CBOs in North-East Nigeria cover a wide range of concerns affecting communities, including youth, gender, health and faith-based. They are multi-activity-oriented CBOs, implying that their activities and initiatives are not limited to a specific activity or regional area. Table 1 shows the diversity of CBOs that contribute to CVE in North-East Nigeria’s vulnerable areas with overlapping agendas.

Table 1.

CBOs’ types, focused areas and humanitarian services they provide.

Categorization of CBOs based on their focus areas	Some of the identified CBOs’ focused areas and humanitarian services they provide in North-East Nigeria
Youth-oriented CBOs	• Youth-focused grassroots mobilization towards profitable ventures that undermine violent extremism • Developing prompt and consistent communication among youths that encourages the inculcation of positive societal norms and values • Developing consistent communication and the building of resilient capacity among youths to resist mobilization, recruitment and radicalization into violent extremism and VEOs • Youth mobilization and involvement in the organized social service delivery programmes through community inclusive strategies • Consistent consciousness-raising of social education to roll back the narratives of violent extremist ideologies • Providing employment and employability opportunities for youth engagement in entrepreneurial skill acquisition and development • Opening and expanding spaces for civic education and civic responsibility among youths to prevent the culture of violence that motivates involvement in violent extremism and joining of VEOs
Gender-oriented CBOs	• Women and girl-child mainstreaming in social, economic and political inclusion • Women’s advocacy towards improved quality of life and livelihood • Building resilience through involvement in intelligence gathering and the prevention and countering of violent extremist ideologies and activities • Advocating for the prevention of gender-based violence and promotion of women’s human rights and dignity of their human persons • Enhancing Women’s capacity building in addressing conditions necessitating violent extremism, joining and aligning with VEOs
Health-oriented CBOs	• Addressing health and other related challenges in various communities in the region • Provision of drugs and treatments of diseases at the community level through the primary healthcare support system • Provision of treated mosquito nets to communities for the prevention of the spread of malaria • Logistical support for the supply of Water Sanitation Hygiene to improve the healthy quality of life in displaced communities • Building primary healthcare facilities and donations of medical resources to ameliorate community health concerns
Faith-based oriented CBOs	• Promoting ideas that encourage internal cohesion and understanding of the dangers of violent extremism and joining VEOs • Assisting and strengthening members affected by the Boko Haram insurgency and other related violent extremism • Countering violent extremist narratives and dissuading members from associating with and joining VEOs • Building interfaith coalition for community and stakeholders’ advocacies against violent extremism and VEOs • Changing narratives and enhancing discourse that separate ideology and religion to deter violent extremism and members from VEOs
General focused-oriented CBOs	• Create and facilitate community-stakeholders discussion and collaboration among different groups and communities in addressing violent extremism • Create and participate in domestic CVE programmes and activities that actively protect civil liberties and undermine the spread of violent extremist ideologies by encouraging community involvement in counter violent extremism engagements • Advocate and mainstream support for the improved condition of displaced peoples from their communities now in and out of camps due to insurgency and terrorism • Addressing social, health and economic challenges bedevilling the people and discouraging their decisions to join VEOs and actions of violent extremism

Source: FGD data from the six states in North-East Nigeria, August 2020 and August–September 2021.

CBO: community-based organization; VEO: violent extremist organization; CVE: counter violent extremism.

Despite the factors illustrated in Table 1, the categories and tasks performed by each CBO indicated that they work independently and together to achieve common aims and objectives. The common thread that runs through all of their goals and objectives is that they are all working to solve problems associated with violent extremism and to alleviate the suffering of the victims, which are housed in camps and dispersed across various host communities. CBOs had long been a part of the communities in North-East Nigeria. They have been involved in tackling a variety of concerns that affect inhabitants. Boko Haram’s growing operations necessitated the creation of more CBOs to modify the narrative that the group had been spreading. The CBOs, in the considered opinion of foreign donors, are important and hence are involved in the activities and initiatives of community engagement in North-East Nigeria (Interview with a CBO Coordinator in Jalingo, August 2021).

Nonetheless, another Coordinator asserted that international funders and organizations collaborate with CBOs to achieve their goals in several communities in Nigeria’s North-East region (Interview with a CBO Coordinator, Jalingo, Taraba State, June 2021). They form partnerships that are either egalitarian or directive, with the same purpose in mind: to reach out to individuals in the region who are suffering from the impacts of violent extremism (Stoddard et al., 2019). While partnering with CBOs engaged exclusively with community members or target communities in Nigeria’s North-East, the partnership is based on either an operational or contractual basis. Stoddard et al. (2019: 15) presented the basic categories of partnerships between INGOs, bilateral and multilateral agencies, and national and community organizations in addressing violent extremism factors and providing humanitarian services in Figure 4.

Figure 4.

Basic categories of partnership.

International organizations and agencies have provided financial and material support for CVE through establishing CBOs, either directly or indirectly, according to a participant in Maiduguri. Most CBOs and other national NGOs are at the mercy of these donors when it comes to determining the nature of their partnerships, which can range from directive to supportive and/or cooperative depending on the situation. CBOs are involved in CVE and humanitarian assistance by foreign funders and agencies for a variety of reasons, including risk mitigation and the reality that CBOs have been crucial actors in a wide range of conflicts in Nigeria’s North-East region. Neglecting communities have direct ramifications for the Nigerian people and government (Interview with a CBO participant in Maiduguri, August 2021).

Humanitarian aid provided by international donors in the region, according to CBO players, supports CBO activities and initiatives such as community advocacy, strengthening resilience and improving communication among individuals, groups and community stakeholders in the region. CBOs have been contributing to solving community problems by providing services that help in the reduction of maternal mortality, poverty alleviation and more generally in economic and rural development in Nigeria (Abegunde, 2009; Ikwuba, 2010; Odunola and Odunsi, 2017; Oseji and Ogu, 2014). In North-East Nigeria, among other problem-solving activities, CBOs collaborate with international donors to engage in addressing conditions necessitating violent extremism and the joining of VEOs (FGDs in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa State, May–June 2021). CBOs’ success in CVE is influenced by the constancy with which foreign donors and partners give humanitarian aid to the region. CBO impressions of the frequency with which international donors offer humanitarian relief in North-East Nigeria are depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5.

Perception of CBOs on the frequency and percentage of humanitarian supply in North-East Nigeria (n = 284).

The varied responses of CBOs on the frequency of humanitarian assistance include daily (n = 36, 12.68%), weekly (n = 58, 20.42%), bi-monthly (n = 56, 19.72%), monthly (n = 52, 18.31%), quarterly (n = 46, 16.20%), yearly (n = 20, 7.04%) and not sure (n = 16, 5.63%). In Figure 5, the perspectives of CBOs in the region are dominated by a weekly, bi-monthly, monthly and quarterly basis humanitarian supplies foreign donors provide to North-East Nigeria. To better understand the reasons behind the unusual uniformity of responses, a participant stated,

The humanitarian help provided by aid organizations, as well as the frequency with which they deliver it, differs from state to state in North-East Nigeria. During the last 5 to 10 years, aid groups have concentrated their humanitarian activities, particularly the supply of humanitarian resources, in states such as Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. Several individuals have been uprooted from their homes and livelihoods, with the majority of them residing in various camps spread across the three states. The Boko Haram insurgency has also had a social, psychological, and economic impact on them. (Interview with a CBO participant in Maiduguri, Borno State, August 2021)

According to a coordinator in one of the communities in Adamawa state, the increasing population and livelihood conditions of IDPs in Borno, Yobe and the Adamawa States have reached a crisis and emergency levels, necessitating the presence of aid agencies providing humanitarian services and supplying other humanitarian resources in those states. IDPs in camps and outside of camps, as well as other individuals suffering from food insecurity and economic hardship as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency and other non-state armed groups, receive humanitarian aid from international donors (Interview with a CBO Coordinator, Adamawa State, September 2021). Another reason for international funding agencies’ and partners’ focus on Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, according to a coordinator in Gombe, is that the distribution of IDPs and the hardship caused by the Boko Haram insurgency and other non-state violent groups (NSVGs) is significantly felt in the three states compared to others within the region (Interviews with CBOs participants in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa State, August–September 2021).

Meanwhile, VEOs have continued to target populations including aid workers, which make delivery of jobs difficult, if not impossible. They also harm aid agencies and their employees. This situation makes for the utilization of CBOs to carry out their humanitarian programmes in camps and communities affected by Boko Haram insurgency and other NSVGs. However, CBOs are unable to effectively support CVE activities because they rely on external aid agencies that have varied objectives that may not necessarily be CVE centred. These varied objectives could also impede CBOs’ effective involvement in community advocacy against violent extremism, as well as their ability in helping build resilience among various groups vulnerable to violence and prevent people from joining VEOs.

Similarly, CBOs’ ability to develop effective communication to counter violent extremist narratives is impeded. This is also true from the field study that their efforts to dissuade young people to join aggressive extremist groups or provide assistance for mitigating violent extremism in North-East Nigeria are not enhanced. Most CBOs that rely on international donors for CVE activities and programmes particularly face difficulties in engaging community stakeholders effectively. From the foregoing challenges associated with external funding, it is evident that without aid agencies assisting community-based groups in engaging with stakeholders, extremist cells and organizations are more likely to grow.

On the contrary, external resources are not dependable and sustainable sources of funding for an important programme like CVE. This is so because such funds are not always available to CBOs when needed for them to effectively interact with community stakeholders, but they come at the mercy of donors in the time that is deemed necessary to the donors. Largely due to scarcity of financial and material resources, CBOs have been limited to concentrate only on achieving the goals set forth by international donors, who provide them with both financial and material resources to engage with community stakeholders in the fight against extremist violence in the region.

Conclusion

The importance of CBOs in CVE vis-à-vis the implication of their reliance on external funding in North-East Nigeria was examined in this paper. Most governments around the world have incorporated CBOs into their policy frameworks and initiatives. In Europe and the Americas, particularly in the United States, CBOs are one of the most significant players in CVE. To combat violent extremism and terrorism, CVE policies are shifting from a mostly military and extrajudicial reaction to a more comprehensive strategy that includes CBOs in counterterrorism. While CBOs are crucial to CVE, particularly in the United States, in Nigeria they are not supported by the government as a major player in CVE especially in the VEO-infested North-East region.

The government’s strategy for addressing issues like the CVE has not produced the desired results despite repeated attempts and failures in using kinetic approach. This is a result of the government’s non-integration of CBOs as important partners in CVE. To fill in this apparent void in the research, this paper steps in. It emphasizes the importance of CBOs to CVE in the North-East region of Nigeria. This paper leveraged the RDT as an explanation to achieve this goal. Among other things, this theory presupposed that acquiring external resources – which include technical, logistical, strategic and operational resources – is an essential part of overseeing and directing an organization. Because it follows from this premise that CBOs in the region create a web of external networks of interdependence and reliance to obtain external resources (financial and material), it presupposes that this theory applies to the situation in North-East Nigeria.

With field data evidence, we came to the conclusion that VEOs continue to target vulnerable populations, including aid agencies and their workers, which makes it difficult or impossible to give humanitarian assistance in the region. Because CBOs rely on external assistance from foreign donor organizations, with varying goals that may not necessarily be CVE-focused, CBOs partnering with them are unable to properly engage in CVE activities in the region. The difficulties CBOs experience in implementing CVE programmes and activities due to their dependence on external resources and networks create the conditions that enable the growth of extremist cells and organizations in North-East Nigeria. Moreover, external resources are not reliable and long-term sources support crucial programmes like CVE. This is true because funding and supports from donors are not always readily available to CBOs at the precise moment required for them to engage community stakeholders effectively in CVE programmes. Donors make the resources available to CBOs on their terms and when they feel necessary. We, therefore, recommend greater government structural funding of CBOs and their mainstreaming into the overall government’s CVE strategies, programmes and activities that are necessary for mitigating violent extremism in North-East Nigeria.

Research Data

sj-docx-1-jas-10.1177_00219096221120920 – for Community-Based Organizations and Stakeholders’ Engagements: A Dialectics of Countering Violent Extremism and Humanitarian Service Delivery in North-East Nigeria

sj-docx-1-jas-10.1177_00219096221120920 for Community-Based Organizations and Stakeholders’ Engagements: A Dialectics of Countering Violent Extremism and Humanitarian Service Delivery in North-East Nigeria by Nsemba Edward Lenshie, Buhari Shehu Miapyen, Michael I. Ugwueze and Christian Ezeibe in Journal of Asian and African Studies

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us-sagepub-com-s.web.bisu.edu.cn/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Nsemba Edward Lenshie

Buhari Shehu Miapyen

Christian Ezeibe

Author biographies

Nsemba Edward Lenshie is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Taraba State University, Nigeria. His research interest. Nsemba does research in Political Economy, Race, Ethnicity and Politics and State Politics and Policy

Buhari Shehu Miapyen lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Taraba State University, Nigeria. His research interest. He is most renowned for his publication in understanding racial capitalism.

Michael I. Ugwueze is senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His research interests are in the areas of conflict, security, governance, separatist movement and development studies.

Christian Ezeibe is a senior researcher with the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu Sate, Nigeria. He has been researching and publishing on economic development in Africa.

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