Abrogation of Article 370: A State Project of Legibility and Simplification

Introduction

The British colonial rule over Indian subcontinent ended with the partition of India into two independent dominions – India and Pakistan – in line with Indian Independence Act, 1947. The territories not ruled directly by the British Indian government came to be known as ‘Princely States’. The Act provided discretion to the heads of Princely States to choose either of the dominions or be independent. Though a majority of the princely states went with India, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) were one of the few princely states, the other being Hyderabad, Junagarh, Bhopal, Jodhpur and Travancore, who decided otherwise. Before joining either of the two dominions, the rulers were supposed to take into consideration the geographical proximity and demographic composition of their states (Thomas, 1992). J&K, though a Muslim-majority state and having close trade links with areas that went to Pakistan, was ruled by Hindu Maharaja. Given the favourably aligned geography and Muslim character of J&K (Schofield 1997, p. 119), Pakistan had a fair degree of confidence and expectation of J&K’s merger with it, driven as they were, by the logic of partition. Since Maharaja could not timely decide the future of the state, Pakistan sensing fishy about it (Mullick, 1971) launched state-backed aggression disguised as tribals and occupied a part of the territory, now popularly known as Azad Kashmir (Jamal, 2009). To repel the aggression, Maharaja sought Indian help which only came when J&K first acceded to India on three matters of defence, foreign affairs and communication. For the rest, J&K was completely autonomous.

The rationale for incorporating Art. 370 in an Indian constitution, spelling the extent of autonomy to be enjoyed by J&K, can best be understood in the context of the unique identity and history of J&K handed down to the present generation through National Conference’s (NC) freedom struggle against the autocratic rule of Maharajas. Kashmir’s unique identity is broadly encapsulated in the term ‘Kashmiriyat’ which loosely translates into a syncretic culture of brotherhood, humanity, communal harmony and so on. The inclusion of language (Kashur) constitutes an important component of this identity. The refusal of popular leadership of J&K in the form of NC headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to join Pakistan and their desire to go with India is underlined by their faith in secular, democratic and federal India where the unique identity of J&K will find a safe place. Sheikh’s deep commitment to Kashmir’s autonomy arose out of his desire to chart out the state’s political, economic and social trajectory following Naya Kashmir Manifesto. The inclusion of Art. 370 in the Indian constitution, despite strong opposition from certain groups within and without the Indian Parliament, reflects the appreciation of Indian leadership of Kashmir’s unique history and identity. This sums up the brief context of the Art. 370 having become a part of Indian constitution.

The recent decision of the Government of India to scrap the special status of J&K as encapsulated in Art. 370 on August 5, 2019, forms the essential background of my present work. The paper argues how the abrogation of Art. 370 represents the state project of legibility and simplification, to use the words of James Scott. I will use his conceptual approach that he has developed in his work, ‘Seeing Like a State’, to try to understand and analyse the rationale of the centre’s decision to scrap the special status. In this respect, I will mainly utilize his four elements, employed by states, aimed at social engineering. What transpired on 5 August and after, in particular, and over the course of decades since 1947, in general, concerning J&K constitutes a series of state-initiated actions at social and political engineering. All the four elements are relevant in the context of J&K at one point or the other. All have the cumulative effect of state simplifications for better understanding with the ultimate object of exercising control. He sees these state simplifications simply as attempts to make a society legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription and prevention of rebellion (Scott, 1998).

The multilevel governance is believed to reduce the policy capacity of the states as a result of challenges from below (Peters and Pierre, 2005). The existence of complexities in J&K at political and societal level exacerbated by its autonomous character is one such impediment to policy capacity of the Indian state which in the understanding of the current governing regime in the centre eluded any permanent solution to the dispute. The regime driven by Hindutva ideology has the distinction of endeavouring to promote and impose homogeneity in a rather hugely diverse nation. The articulations like one India; one law, one India; one tax, one India; one constitution and flag and so on encapsulate the vision of the regime. Rather than appreciating the diversity of actors in the conflict, the state strode on the best possible homogenizing path. The presence of geographically and culturally distinct regions and sub-regions in the erstwhile state of J&K was one such complexity which caused intra-regional tensions. To overcome this complexity, the state was divided into two Union Territories (UTs) to calibrate the policy measures to the nature of different regions. The other complexity, more serious and having the capacity to influence the overall politics of the state and its relations with the centre is the existence of dual parallel political spaces: mainstream and separatist. The dynamics of this complexity also has bilateral (between India and Pakistan) and international political fallout. The complexity, in view of the central governing regime, had long evaded any uniform policy intervention capable of addressing the historical political grievances, particular to each region of the state besides dealing with the problem of separatism.

The first element, according to Scott, is the administrative ordering of nature and society – state-initiated transformations at simplifications to generate legibility. He likens these ‘state simplifications’ to a map which does not depict the whole actual reality but only the piece of information that interests the official (Scott, 1998: 3). Maps by reducing large complex details to classifiable categories aid in the processes of legibility. An illegible society, according to him, creates problems for the state for undertaking any effective policy or decision to shape it in state-desired fashion. The author further adds that states try to reduce the infinite complexities to the lowest common denominator, again for the sake of legibility. The individual characteristics – be it, person, group or region – however unique, are irrelevant for official purposes. The extent of legibility of the society is determined by the state’s objectives. More ambitious objectives of the state, like changing the way of life, require the state to foster greater legibility; ignorance is the last thing the state can afford. Though techniques of legibility have changed over time yet, the political motives behind them have changed little. Appropriation, control and manipulation remain the most prominent one. State simplifications foster the legibility of the society; it provides the authorities with a synoptic view of their society. Scott describes these state simplifications as an ‘ongoing project of legibility’, which is never fully realized.

My paper will analyse, in the next section, how the decision to scrap the special status of Kashmir and subsequent legislation and executive orders from the centre is aimed at state simplifications which, in turn, engenders legibility to have control over the society.

Second, Scott discusses what he calls ‘High-modernist Ideology’ which is strong, muscular and infuses confidence: a scientific and technological. The ideology exuded great confidence about overall scientific and technological advancement which afforded the state new capabilities for state simplifications. Here, I would like to add another dimension of ideology – a philosophical one, in the context of Kashmir: the Hindutva ideology which is again strong, muscular and generates confidence among its adherents. The ideology in both the senses contributed greatly to what happened on August 5, 2019, about Kashmir.

The third element, according to Scott, is an authoritarian state. The above two elements, he believes, in combination with the third one tend to have potentially dangerous consequences. To quote him:

. . . authoritarian state is willing and able to use the full weight of its coercive power to bring these high modernist designs into being. The most fertile soil for this element has typically been times of war, revolution, depression and struggle for national liberation. In such situations, emergency conditions foster the seizure of emergency powers and frequently delegitimize the previous regime. They also give rise to elites who repudiate the past. (Scott, 1998: 5)

The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) with its brute majority in the parliament and direct central rule over J&K is displaying tendencies of authoritarianism, at least, concerning to J&K reflected in its unilateral decisions concerning J&K post-abrogation of Art. 370. The deployment of the coercive state apparatus, utilizing the lockdowns and other pandemic time to push through some crucial legislation and executive fiats, is testimony to its authoritarian character.

The fourth and the last element, Scott observes, is ‘prostrate civil society’ which is too exhausted to put up a fight against these arbitrary decisions. He cites war, revolution and economic collapse as the possible reasons for society’s complacency. Viewed in the context of Kashmir, out on streets for most of their political history, the separatist movement has been experiencing a cycle of crest and trough during its course. The present phase of separatist movement with an extreme crackdown on key organizations and leaders and frequent shutdown calls in response, coupled with pandemic, has considerably drained the Kashmir economy. The present regime capitalized on the situation to make drastic changes in J&K.

Nature and layers of complexity in J&K

To begin with, J&K state, as it existed before August 5, 2019, is an artificially created state bringing three major geographically and ethnically diverse regions of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh together by the colonial British Indian government after defeating and wresting the territory from Sikh Empire in first Anglo-Sikh war (1845–1846) (Puri). The British then sold the state to Raja of Jammu – Raja Gulab Singh – for just 75 lakh rupees (Gupta, 2012). The diversities get reflected at many levels contributing to the complex nature of the society (Chowdhary, 2010).

The J&K State . . . is a ‘created state’ in that it came into existence by a deliberate act on the part of British imperialism, who for their time honoured colonial interests, clubbed three diverse regions- Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh- with no commonality in geography, history, ethnicity, culture and economy together and handed it over to their favourite, Gulab Singh . . . (Wani, 2013)

The religious, lingual and cultural diversities follow, by and large, the natural geographical divisions of the state. Geographically, the Pir Panjal Range separates Jammu from the Kashmir Valley while Zojila intervenes between Kashmir and Ladakh (Bhat, 2011). The three major religions of the state – Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism – predominantly inhabit three distinct regions of the state. The Muslims are mainly concentrated in the Kashmir Valley, though a sizable number can also be found in Jammu and Ladakh region. While Hindus mainly inhabit the Jammu region, the Buddhists predominantly reside in the Ladakh region (Chowdhary, 2010). The complex nature of J&K society is further reinforced by the existence of many other markers of identity which eludes the religious basis of categorization as a template to understanding the politics of the state. For instance, Kashmir, though is an overwhelmingly Muslim-dominated region, yet it was and still is being dotted by prominent Pandit community who constituted less than 10% of the Valley Population (Hussain, 2020) before their mass exodus in 1990 (Mohanty, 2018). Hindu-dominated Jammu contains a significant Muslim population. In fact, among the 10 districts of Jammu Province, 6 are Muslim-dominated; Hindus are a majority in only four districts (Indian Express, 2020). The Buddhist-dominated Ladakh has also a large Muslim population. In fact, the two districts of Ladakh – Leh and Kargil – are, respectively, dominated by Buddhists and Muslims.

The diversities of the state reflected in multiple layers of ethnic identity which sometimes overlap lend complex nature to the polity of the state as well. The conflicting complexities and intricacies pervading inter- and intra-regions contribute to the agitational politics of the state where one region and community is pitted against another region and community. And at another level, people of the state are in conflict with the Indian state. The inter-regional tensions within the state may best be understood through the diverse history and culture of these regions which constitutes an important background of the politics of these regions.

No region of the state is homogeneous, rather there are sub-regions within regions having their own past histories and memories. This explains the emergence of demands of sub-regional autonomy, particularly in Jammu and Ladakh provinces. Kashmir Valley, though, is relatively homogeneous in terms of Islam being the dominant religion, yet it co-exists with other minor faiths – Hinduism and Sikhism. Culturally and linguistically, even within Kashmiri Muslims, there are diverse groups with distinct geography. Although the majority living in plains speak Kashmiri, those inhabiting geographically higher areas speak as diverse languages as Pahari, Gojri, Shina, Kohistani, Balti and Purkhi. The other two regions – Jammu and Ladakh – are no less different from Kashmir, rather they exhibit more diversity than the latter. Jammu is the most complex of all provinces with a mosaic of religions, cultures and languages. Many independent principalities, with their own histories and deep-seated memories, on the fringes of Jammu, had been militarily merged with the province during the reign of Maharaja Gulab Singh. Their forced merger explains the rise in demands of sub-regional councils there (Wani, 2013).

The region of Jammu and its diverse, multiethnic communities have significant cultural repositories connected to their sense of place and memory . . . . The connection between the region’s varied and turbulent history and its subsequent influence on cultural memory is evident through these cultural markers, which attempt to perpetuate the feeling of identity-consciousness among the diverse communities of Jammu. (Hussain, 2021)

Ladakh faced a similar situation of military conquest by Gulab Singh. Rooted in different culture and geography, they could not relate themselves to the rest of the state; hence there were demands for autonomous councils from very early on. In harmony with other regions, sub-regional demands rared head with Kargil district in Ladakh demanding separate Hill Council for them. Consequently, both Leh and Kargil got separate autonomous Hill Councils in 1995 and 2003, respectively. Thus, ethnically, linguistically and religiously heterogeneous societies were patched together where group identities were formed and assumed salience. These heterogeneous identities formed their respective social and political organizations to maximize their power, privilege and prestige by restricting their membership to a limited circle of eligible persons. The Power model of Giles and Evans (1986) views ‘racial and ethnic groups as participants in the ongoing competition for control of economic, political and social structures and suggest that intergroup hostility and antagonism are natural products of that competition’.

The upshot of the above description is that there is hardly any single marker of identity that satisfies the collective sentiment of the people of the state if, at all, it exists in the first place. The collective sentiment of the Kashmir Valley – Right to Self-determination – is not shared by the other two regions, not even by Muslims of those regions. Ladakh’s demand of separating from Kashmir and making it UT does not find resonance in the rest of the two regions; even within the Ladakh province itself, Kargil opposes the decision granting UT status and decoupling from Kashmir. The dominant discourse in Jammu revolves around the abrogation of the special status of J&K, though the Muslim population do not favour any such demand. The fact that Kashmir has remained a political centre of the state right after 1947 with all Prime and Chief Ministers from the province has generated a perception of deprivation and neglect in other two regions (Sharma and Manhas, 2014). What unites Ladakh and Jammu is their shared antipathy towards the special status of the state which they construe it as ‘special status for Kashmir’ only, though this narrative does not go uncontested there also. The point that, therefore, comes to the fore is that the three regions of the state do not see any common ground as far as their collective/dominant regional aspirations are concerned. The complex nature and distribution of ethnic identities predispose them to the path of mutual confrontation.

J&K is a Muslim-dominated state with Muslims forming approximately 65% of its total population (Rehman, 2011) and between 80% (Sarila, 2005) and 94% (Rai, 2004) in the Kashmir Valley. However, the Muslim-majority character does not, in any way, help reduce the complex nature of its politics. The ethnic majority and minority concepts are quite fluid in the context of J&K. Majority in one context becomes minority in another depending upon the numerical selection of a specific variable. Majorities, like minorities, are created according to circumstances and choices, depending upon the goals pursued (Rao, 2011). The diverse but antagonistic nature of political demands of the said regions, rooted in diverse geography (Sharma & Manhas, 2014), ensures no permanent majority and/or minority. In this context, Chowdhary (2010) describes,

Despite being part of the largest religious group of the state, the Kashmiri Muslims perceive themselves as a minority in the context of the larger reality of India. . . The Hindus of Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh, though majority in their respective regions, perceive themselves as minority not only in context of the Muslim majority character of the state but also in the Kashmir-centric political and power context of the state. (p. 5)

Antagonistic diversity of political demands is not restricted to said regions only; sub-regional assertions add another layer of complexity to already much complex problem. Talking about sub-regional assertions, Wani (2013) describes,

The Kashmiri Pandits perceive their minority status vis-à-vis the Kashmiri Muslims, while Jammu Muslims perceive their deprivation both vis-à-vis the Hindus of Jammu as well as Muslims of Kashmir Valley. The situation is no different in the Ladakh region. While the region as a whole views itself as marginalized with respect to Kashmir, the Muslims of Kargil perceive their marginalization both in the immediate context of Buddhist domination as well as the power centre in Kashmir. (p. 15)

The ethnic divide cutting across religious, linguistic, cultural and regional lines has added more complexity and tensions at multiple levels of the divide in domestic politics of J&K and its relations with the centre. Broadly, the three major regions are at loggerheads with one another. The diverse geography and demographic composition determine their respective regional interests and, in certain cases, sub-regional interests which, in most cases, are contrary to one another. Therefore, it would, almost always, be problematic for both central and state governments to devise policies and decisions that would satisfy all the three regions of the state in a given structure of power where Kashmir is believed to occupy the central political space within the state. Any central or state-level policy intervention has always faced the challenge of reconciling the different political aspirations of the regions and sub-regions of J&K. At the policy level, the political elite of the three regions has/had a fundamental disagreement over the nature of polity that J&K should evolve into. While the political elite from Kashmir Valley clamour for the political system, more or less, in line with the autonomy status enjoyed by the state pre-1953, reflected in the report of the ‘State Autonomy Committee’ set up in 1996, their counterparts from Jammu and Ladakh favour more integrationist approach. The feeling of neglect and discrimination generated in Jammu and Ladakh is attributed to Kashmir being the centre of power, itself the outcome of the special status of the state (Wani, 2013). Reinforcing Wani’s view, Chowdhary (2019) affirms that political discourse in J&K got to be shaped around the idea of ‘Kashmir’s domination’ (p. 236). That is why we had witnessed strong protests by Hindu nationalist party Jana Sangh around the time of granting autonomy to J&K. The slogan of ‘ek vidhan, ek Pradhan, ek Nishan’ (one Constitution, one president, one symbol) encapsulated the theme of the agitation (Chowdhary, 2012). The agitation, at the core, was about ending the ‘Kashmiri domination over Jammu’ through the transfer of power from Kashmir to Delhi (Behera, 2006). The situation in Ladakh was no different; Ladakh was equally unhappy and insecure about the transfer of power from Maharaja to a Kashmiri administration (Behera, 2006).

The political grievance of the regions and sub-regions snowballed over a period of time due to various reasons, which forced central and state governments to set up commissions and committees to study the problem and recommend measures for redressal. Gajendragadkar Commission (1968), for instance, was constituted by the J&K government in consultation with the centre vide Order No. 878-D of 1967 to make an assessment of whether equitable resources and opportunities are made available to different regions and sub-regions of the state. The commission found certain inadequacies in the allocation of resources and opportunities and recommended, among other things, establishment of statutory state and regional development boards to address the gulf. The failure to implement the recommendations led to large agitation in Jammu in 1978, which resulted in the establishment of commission of inquiry under Justice S.M. Sikri. The Sikri commission admitted the discrimination in allocation of resources among the regions, and suggested setting up of ‘state development board’ for redressal. Later, many other commissions and committees were set up to go into the questions of imbalance and discrimination which included, among others, Wazir Commission, State Autonomy Committee and Regional Autonomy Committee. Here, it is important to mention that though the majority of agitations took place in Jammu region, the larger demands raised there captured the aspirations of Ladakh region as well. Besides, Buddhist Ladakh itself witnessed an intense and prolonged agitation against Kashmiri dominance which rather hastily degenerated into a social boycott against Kashmiri Muslims. The issue was resolved only after central intervention (Behera, 2006).

The point to illustrate here is that cross-cutting and antagonistic identities have taken a toll on the governance of the state. Since the aspirations are divergent, the endeavour to take all regions along, on an equitable basis, had become hard under the given political setup. The widespread belief (in Jammu and Ladakh) is that existing political structure, while privileging Kashmir, politically and economically alienates Jammu and Ladakh (Chowdhary, 1998: 331). Chowdhary adds that numerical superiority should not be the ground for power imbalance and that power differential far overweighs the numerical gap; the population of valley being only slightly more than that of Jammu (Puri, 2008: 29). The under-representation in power structure translates, so is the perception in Jammu and Ladakh, into disproportionate allocation of resources between Kashmir and other two regions resulting in development of Kashmir at the cost Jammu and Ladakh (Chowdhary, 1998). The claim, though, is contested by Wani on two grounds: (a) it is core–periphery phenomenon within each region, not an inter-regional one as is being portrayed by many, (b) comparing two capital cities of Jammu and Srinagar, he statistically demonstrates that Jammu district got twice of funds than Srinagar (Wani, 2020). Whether it is an inter-regional phenomenon or a core–periphery one, the fact, however, is that inter-regional tensions around these themes persist and needed a resolution. In this context, Chowdhary, among many others, aver that ‘only the federal set up is bound to eliminate the sources of inter-regional tensions and is bound to satisfy ethnic aspirations’ (Chowdhary, 1998: 337). By contrast, we have witnessed a creation of centralized political structures by bifurcating the erstwhile state into two UTs – J&K and Ladakh – and stripping it of whatever vestiges of autonomy still enjoyed by the state. Hence, centralization not federalization was devised and implemented as a tool to mitigate the inter-regional tensions.

The other sphere which adds complexity to the politics of the state and its relations with the Union government constitutes the sphere of ‘separatist politics’. Although, now, limited largely to the Kashmir Valley, its potential and influence is writ large on the politics of the whole state. Chowdhary believes that separatist politics manifested in the armed struggle against the Indian state sharpened the sense of sub-regionalism in J&K. The irony is that separatist space enjoys more popular support and represents the sentiment of the people in the valley as against mainstream political parties who participate in the electoral process and ideally should represent the people’s aspirations (Faesal and Makhdoomi, 2019). As custodian of peoples’ sentiments, Hurriyat Conference, a representative of separatist politics, presents itself as a formidable stakeholder in the Kashmir conflict. Hurriyat Conference wields a considerable influence in the domestic politics of the state without actually becoming part of the formal political system. The Union government sees the Hurriyat Conference as an obstacle in various state political projects ranging from normalizing and legitimizing the Indian rule to further integration and assimilation of J&K. The existence of Hurriyat Conference has raised the cost of implementing various administrative and political measures deemed by Hurriyat as prejudicial to the interests of the Muslim majority of the state. The vivid case in point is the mass protest, spearheaded by Hurriyat, triggered by the decision of the state government to transfer 100 acres of forest land to Amarnath Shrine Board in the year 2008. The shutdown calls by Hurriyat would paralyse the normal functioning of the state and people. For instance, in the year 2016, after the killing of militant leader, Burhan Wani, ‘the valley had its first full working day after a record of 133 days of shutdown’ (Catch News, 2016). Similarly, back in the year 2010, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a separatist leader, gave a shutdown call for 5 months. Representative of popular sentiment, shutdown calls would largely be obeyed bringing society to a standstill. The agitational politics of Hurriyat has adversely affected the governance of the state besides, making inter-regional faultlines sharper and bitter. The other much-disliked aspect of the existence and relevance of Hurriyat from the Indian perspective is the leverage it affords to Pakistan. Pakistan has deep connections with Hurriyat (Jaleel, 2015) and employs it to influence the domestic politics of India while Hurriyat, in turn, uses the domestic political dynamics to try to coerce the state and national political leadership to diplomatically engage Pakistan in Kashmir conflict, thereby sustaining its relevance in the said conflict. The coalition government of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and BJP in J&K formed in the year 2014 was based on the so-called ‘Agenda for Alliance (DNA Web Team 2015)’ which required the BJP government at the centre to enhance ties with Pakistan in the hope of resolution of Kashmir conflict. Incidentally related to this, many believe that before forging an alliance with BJP, PDP had the blessings of Hurriyat (Yasir 2015). The foregoing discussion amply demonstrates that the internal politics of J&K is riven with complexities and interlocking identities which militates against the application of uniform legislation and administrative rules and measures.

How states respond to diversity and complexity

There is a wealth of literature on how accommodation, autonomy, federalism and power-sharing arrangements have the potential to resolve conflicts in multi-ethnic societies. Gurr (1993) argues that the ‘recent historical track record shows that, on balance, autonomous arrangements can be an effective means for managing regional conflicts’ (p. 301). Agreeing with Gurr, Wallensteen (2002) points out that ‘thus far, territorial solutions negotiated since the end of cold war using autonomy or federation have not failed’ (pp. 175–179). In line with this thinking, Saideman et al. (2002) observe that ‘ federalism reduces the level of ethnic violence’ (p. 118). Similarly, Bermeo (2002) reflects that ‘federal institutions promote successful accommodation’ (p. 97) in conflict-ridden multi-ethnic societies. Reinforcing the above views, Kymlicka, Taylor, Requejo, Gagnon and Gibib argue that asymmetrical federalism is necessary for the protection of rights and identity of smaller groups in the multi-ethnic state (Tilly, 2007). And the list goes on and on. Keeping along with the wisdom of the literature, numerous nation-states across the globe have embraced the federation or its various variants to address the domestic tensions emanating from the multi-ethnic character of their societies. Notwithstanding a few exceptions, appreciating and institutionalizing diversity tends to mitigate tensions and promote harmony (Gurr 1993). On the contrary, the failure of states to recognize and respect pluralism in ethnically conscious multi-ethnic societies and try to impose hegemonic homogeneity, more often than not, proves counterproductive. The urge to impose hegemonic homogeneity, believes Horowitz (2000, p. 567), proves not only ineffective but also counterproductive, tending to exacerbate what is being sought to eradicate (p. 567). The conscious policies of assimilation, according to him, frequently provoke separatist tendencies. The case of South Asia serves well to illustrate this objective assessment. Sethy (2020) examines the effects of attempted hegemonic state actions to impose a homogeneous language in three nation-states of South Asia – India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (pp. 95–118). She empirically demonstrates that in all the three cases, the state action produced a violent reaction from minority ethnic groups ranging from a civil war in Sri Lanka to dismemberment of Pakistan.

Recognizing the immense diversity, the framers of the Indian constitution have devoted ample space to rights and privileges of minorities of diverse nature. In the wake of bloody partition and other challenges to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, there was an incentive and pressure on constitution framers to make India a strong centralized polity. However, notwithstanding all of this, founding fathers deemed it proper and, rightly so, to balance between the imperative of unity and integrity of India and demands of its constituent units to recognize and respect their respective social, political and cultural identity. The federal structure thus evolved reflected the regional aspirations of people. To accommodate the emerging regional aspirations, the Indian state ceded ground, though hesitatingly, to the bottom-up demands and pressures, of the reorganization of states on linguistic basis. Initially, Fazl Ali Commission rejected the notion of carving out new states on the basis of language or religion only. The commission affirmed that ‘it is neither possible nor feasible to reorganize states on the basis of a single test of either language or culture’ (The Economic Weekly,1995). However, the public pressure forced the central government to enact States Reorganization Act 1956, whereby number of states were reorganized keeping multiple factors in consideration. Provincial reorganization, according to Nanda (2006), was undertaken keeping the following goals in view: (a) establishing parallelism between the politico-administrative unit and cultural unit, (b) maintaining the unity and integrity of the state, (c) accommodating the diverse population under a common civil–political authority, (d) promoting a ‘terminal’ civil loyalty to the state in place of multiple primordial loyalties and (e) introducing large-scale state-sponsored modernization so that all types of disaffection resulting from ties of race, colour, language, religion and so on would be displaced eventually. Indian federalism has successfully tackled many conflicts arising out of the diverse nature of Indian society and enabled India to emerge stronger. Whether it is Tamil agitation in the south; Insurgency in the northeast, J&K and Punjab; or the emergence of new regional demands and aspirations, barring few exceptions, tensions got resolved within the broad federal structure of India. The initial apprehensions and suspicions that granting concessions to regional ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic country like India would unleash forces of separatism leading to political balkanization of India did not come true. On the contrary, it solidified the support for the Indian state and the Indian nation (Adeney, 2017).

The Indian state and Kashmir experience

J&K, though a part of India, has a different history and trajectory as against other units of India. Without going into the detailed historical events that made J&K an integral part of India, it is important to briefly note here that an agreement between the two sovereign entities known as ‘Instrument of Accession’ brought J&K into the Union of India. The agreement limited the powers of the centre and gave maximum autonomy to the state of J&K, later enshrined in Article 370 of the Indian constitution. Article 370 was in line with the spirit of the evolving Indian federal structure. This was one of the first major instances of power-sharing, where Indian state allowed its constituent unit to exercise some of its powers otherwise meant to be wielded by the centre. The power-sharing arrangement was a reflection of the Indian state’s capacity to tolerate the diversity of identities and cultures. It was the perception of this capacity of the Indian state – reflected in its federal character – among the political leaders of J&K, that shaped their decision to integrate with India instead of Pakistan being the Muslim-majority country like J&K. It is this federal context that Shiekh emphasized in 1950:

We are proud to have our bonds with India, the goodwill of those people and government is available to us in unstinted and abundant measure. The constitution of India has provided for a federal union and in the distribution of sovereign powers has treated us differently from other constituent units. With the exceptions of items grouped under Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Communications, we have complete freedom to frame our Constitution in the manner we like.

Chowdhary (2012) feels that Article 370 and Indian Asymmetrical Federalism acted as a linkage between Indian and Kashmiri nationalisms, and this instrumentality of federalism proved helpful in accommodating Kashmiri aspirations within Indian nationalism (pp. 166–170). After going through the historical records of the late 1940s and early 1950s, it emerges quite evident that the differing and antagonistic nature of polities of India and Pakistan proved instrumental in J&K’s accession with India. In other words, the provision of space for the expression of Kashmiri identity through autonomy has significantly weighed in on the decision to accede with India. Condemning feudal character of Pakistan, said that it had nothing else to offer except a Muslim homeland where our aspirations would not find space for realization.

Not only in Kashmir, but the model of asymmetrical federalism has been applied elsewhere also to accommodate various ethnic groups as a means of conflict resolution. Rekha Saxena (2012) has elaborately demonstrated the widespread use of this model outside J&K (pp. 70–71, 73–75). Prominently, he has discussed the northeastern states of Mizoram and Nagaland, where Articles 371A and 371E limit the powers of Indian Parliament to extend certain statutes to them without their consent. She goes on to show how these asymmetries are even extended to sub-state levels with regard to the administration of tribal areas. What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that the Indian state has created multiple levels of power to govern its multicultural and multinational population. The complexity thus emerging in the distribution of power at multiple levels is thought to produce better governance by giving due respect and recognition to the demographic diversity of the nation.

August 5, 2019 episode: a negation of diversity and federalism in the state project of legibility and simplification

The decision to abrogate the Article 370 and reorganize the erstwhile state of J&K into two UTs where the Union government now directly exercise legislative and executive powers was and continue to be basically an exercise in legibility and simplification. Having discussed the nature and levels of complexities and intricacies in the internal politics of J&K which has been an impediment to the ongoing state project of refashioning the contours of state politics, the Union government driven by an ideology of Hindutva under BJP sought to stamp out these complexities to the best extent possible. One such layer of complexity was that of Ladakh’s unique historical and cultural identity which defined their regional interest in a way antagonistic to Kashmir leading to mass agitation resulting in boycotting Kashmir. On every major issue, Buddhist-dominated Ladakh did not see an eye to eye with Kashmir contributing to inter-regional tensions. The central government also would find it difficult to balance regional interests and priorities. To overcome this conundrum, the centre carve out Ladakh from J&K and reduced it to the status of UT. By carving out two UTs from the erstwhile state of J&K and extending central legislation to both the UTs, the centre sought to water down the existing complexities and bring, to the extent possible, homogeneity in newly created units. Admittedly, the central political engineering has certainly reduced the levels of pre-existing complexities, yet very far from eliminating them. In the context of J&K, the central political project of legibility and simplification has been going since 1953 and continues; the remaining levels of complexities necessary to eradicate for policy, security and ideological purposes are expected to proceed in future also. As Scott observes that state simplifications are ‘ongoing project of legibility’, which is never fully realized (Scott, 1998: 80), the above description encapsulates Scott’s first principle. The second element he mentions is High Modernist Ideology which has been used in the broad philosophical and scientific-technological sense. Appropriating this element in the context of Kashmir, the Hindutva ideology of BJP is a significant factor in propelling the regime to go down the above-described homogenizing path. The Hindutva ideology propounded and propagated by umbrella right-wing organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the ideological mentor of BJP, has been clamouring for the abrogation of the special status of J&K and its more integration with the Union of India. Right from the Constituent Assembly itself which made special provision for J&K, the Hindu right-wing has been vehemently opposing the provision (Rai, 2018: 217) since it, in their view, contradicts their vision of unified and centralized India. A total of 51 resolutions on Kashmir have been passed from the various forums of RSS and its affiliates, and a majority of them have demanded the repealing of Article 370 (Yadav, 2019). Understandably, the agenda to do away with the special status of J&K has been one of the priorities of subsequent BJP manifestos. The other aspect of this High Modernist Ideology is the scientific-technological development which generates faith and confidence in the state’s ability to undertake more radical measures to accomplish its agenda. Seen in Kashmir context, India’s growing economic, military and diplomatic clout and simultaneous worsening and waning of Pakistan’s economic and diplomatic status had afforded an opportunity to India to embark on such fundamental changes in the political structure of J&K. These fundamental changes were effected through the instrumentality of an authoritarian state which is the next element in Scott’s analysis. The authoritarian character is evidenced by the way the decision was unilaterally implemented without consulting the stakeholders. Not only were the stakeholders not consulted, but they were also silenced with all prominent political leaders and thousands of political activists put behind bars. Charlotte Thomas (2020) says that ‘Narendra Modi’s government is defined by authoritarian and centralized decision making illustrated, in the context of Kashmir, by coercive measures against Kashmiri society as a whole’. Scott believes that the authoritarian character of the state gets manifested during unusual times. The Pulwama attack on security forces which killed 40 armed personnel and subsequent dogfight between India and Pakistan was a prelude to the August 5 episode. An environment of a threat to National Security was built and utilized and subsequently used as justification for sweeping and swift political reconfiguration of J&K. Furthermore, the deployment of the coercive state apparatus, utilizing the lockdowns and other pandemic time to push through some crucial legislation and executive fiations, is testimony to its authoritarian character. The authoritarian measures, according to Scott, are expected to carry through unless the subject society is robust enough to resist such interventions. A society unable to mount an effective push back, which Scott calls ‘prostrate civil society’, is bound to be at the receiving end of an action. Kashmiri society, though, is not new to street protests, bandhs, strikes and curfews; the last half a decade, yet has been particularly harsh for Kashmir. Starting with devastating floods of 2014 and subsequent killing of Burhan Wani, a local militant commander of a local insurgent group – Hizbul Mujahideen – Kashmir has seen massive unabated protests, and strikes with all economic activities brought to a standstill for several months together. These protests also witnessed the killing of scores of civilians, in some cases, the only breadwinners. This resulted in the adverse economic conditions of the people – one of the reasons for being a prostrate civil society – prompting calls for rethinking the hartal strategy of the Hurriyat (Catch News, 2016; Subramanian, 2010). Moreover, keeping separatist leadership behind the bars has deprived the people of any concrete plan of action to put up a resistance to authoritarian interventions. All these factors cumulatively contributed to Kashmir turning into a ‘prostrate civil society’. There could not have been a better opportunity for the Indian state to resort to such a fundamental and far-reaching political engineering in the state of J&K.

Conclusion

The political engineering has been incrementally going on from the last 70 years in the state of J&K to simplify its relations with New Delhi. The simplifications were intended to facilitate legibility of J&K’s polity and society which in turn enable the centre to exercise relatively centralized control over the political dynamics of the state. Moreover, security-driven policies necessitated the assumption of direct control over the politics of the state to effectively counter the security threat emanating from across the border in Pakistan. Now, the fundamental question which begs an answer is to what extent does this project of legibility and simplification, which afforded the centre a direct control, bring change in the basic character, namely, its disputed nature and armed insurgency and separatism? This question assumes relevance because the previous state strikes on the special status of erstwhile J&K were done, more or less, with similar intentions and objectives. However, far from improving the situation, the state has been plunged into further disorder and chaos (Ganguly and Bajpai, 1994; Wani, 2011; Widmalm, 2002). One of the major reasons why homogenizing central interventions failed to resolve the conflict is rooted in the narrow context in which accession took place. J&K opted for India for its federal, secular and democratic character with the belief that such a polity has enough scope for tolerating and respecting the diversities where J&K would chart out its own political journey and this assurance was given in the form of Article 370. Reciprocating this belief, Chowdhary (2016: 49) states,

The federal logic, it may be emphasized, was the most important one in linking this state with the Indian Union. It was via this logic that Kashmiri nationalist urges were harmonized with the larger Indian nationalist politics.

What the ongoing state project and legibility and simplifications did was to mount an assault on this federal nature of the relationship between Indian state and J&K which turned out to be counterproductive in the centre–state relationship. To put it in another way, the project of legibility – a central problem of statecraft – designed to step up central control over the conflict-torn territory (J&K) to thwart rebellion (one of the objectives of legibility) against the state went awry. Incidentally, it is in harmony with Scott’s observation that the high modernist plans backed up by authoritarian power actually failed to deliver, contributing to the miseries of the populace.