Rebel Fragmentation and Protracted Conflicts: Lessons from SPLM/A in South Sudan

Abstract

The rise in splinter groups within rebel movements and opposition groups has serious implications for conflict resolution efforts. Yet existing literature has not sufficiently touched on the key implications and factors that lead to the split and fragmentation of rebel groups. One of the conflicts that have been impacted by the problem of fragmentation of warring parties is the South Sudan conflict. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has experienced internal fragmentation historically during the struggle for independence from Sudan and today during the civil war that began in 2011. New groups have emerged claiming to be paying allegiance to leaders and pursuing a different course. This paper argues that internal fragmentation within the SPLM constitutes a serious threat to peace in Africa’s youngest nation. The author examines the motivations behind such fragmentations and their implication in the understanding of the South Sudan prolonged conflict. The paper begins by examining the causes of the South Sudan conflict and the patterns of violence, and it assesses wartime governance and the fragmentation of the groups. The study concludes with a set of recommendations for the resolution of the conflict.

Keywords

South Sudan rebel fragmentation civil war SPLM

Introduction

The characteristics and impacts of contemporary civil wars and many other forms of conflicts that involve non-state actors have increasingly become complex and difficult to resolve. These conflicts have brought about changes in the nature of the conflict that had not been envisioned in the International Humanitarian Law or the Geneva Convention (1946) (Bellinger and Padmanabhan, 2011). As a result of that, most of these conflicts have become protracted, going on for a long time and posing serious threats to civilians and human security. The conflicts also have both direct and indirect impacts on governance, social and economic stability.

A lot has been studied about civil wars: from how civil wars affect political and economic practices, to causes of civil wars, the variation in time they take to be resettled, to the impact of identity on civil wars, as well as alliance formations (Christia, 2012; Fearon, 2004; Zeitlin, 2014). These studies have covered very interesting issues on civil wars. However, it is worth noting that civil wars are very fluid and keep changing all the time; for this, a new set of emphasis has also emerged where authors have interrogated relationships between civilians and rebel groups, different dynamics and trends in civil wars, the origin and transformation of rebel groups, and governance framework within the groups among other issues (Fotini, 2012; Loyle, 2021; Mampilly, 2011; Weinstein, 2006). One question that has remained elusive although some scholars have highlighted it is the fragmentation of rebel groups. Most of the existing studies on rebel fragmentations including but not limited to Doctor (2020), Mahoney (2020), Nagel and Doctor (2020) and Ives (2021) seem to focus on the circumstances that lead to or result from the fragmentation of rebel groups, but few have looked at the impact of such fragmentation on conflict resolution.

Instances of divisions within rebel groups have continuously been on the rise over the last three decades (Mahoney, 2020). On the one hand, these numbers can be attributed to the growing number of rebel groups that have come to characterize contemporary conflicts. Most of the contemporary conflicts involve rebel groups with hierarchical structures or authorities. But more often than not, those structures and authorities appear to face internal rivalry. One of the rebel groups that has experienced the problem of internal fragmentation is the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM/A). While its involvement in the conflict that led to the independence of South Sudan, as well as the civil war that began in 2013, is well documented, little attention has been put to examine how the break-up within the group is affecting the conflict in general.

Formed in the early 1980s as a rebel group in Sudan, the SPLM/A, embarked on a two-decade armed conflict with successive governments in Khartoum that culminated in the independence of South Sudan in 2011 (Ajak, 2020). Important to note, SPLM/A was not the only rebel group in Sudan at the time, but there existed several other groups. Some of these groups merged with the functions of the Anyanya. SPLM/A’s primary support and the constituency were in the southern part of Sudan although its activities got support from other non-Arab regions of the country. By 1989, the SPLM/A had significant influence in the southern towns of Bor, Torit and Nasir (Johnson, 2011). During its early stages, the group appeared to support a united country, which Garang referred to as the New Sudan, characterized by democracy and secularism (Pinaud, 2021).

However, by the time of the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, it was clear that the country was likely to be split and not united (Aalen, 2013). The SPLM/A manifesto launched in July 1983 spelled out the grievances of the people living in the south and expressed opposition to the efforts by the government in Khartoum to construct a Sudanese people national identity based on Arabic culture, language and Islam. From 1983, the movement evolved into a formidable force that took on the Sudanese army and other militia groups forcing regional and international actors to put pressure on the Khartoum government to call for a referendum that led to the independence of South Sudan (Sanjaume-Calvet, 2021). Despite this great success, the movement struggled with internal wrangles that threatened the fulfilment of the dreams that the people of South Sudan had. Indeed, we argue in this essay that the internal wrangles and fragmentation of SPLM/A undermined government performance, unity and state-building as well as the human security of the people of South Sudan. The paper begins with a brief background, causes and dynamics of the current civil war in South Sudan; then discusses the wartime governance practices before examining the pre- and post-independence fragmentation of the SPLM; and concludes by discussing some of the possible causes for the fragmentation within SPLM.

A systematic review of the research methodology approach

The deep research and writing of the study followed a systematic approach that can be classified into three phases. The first two phases focus on the validity and the reliability of the sources, claims and arguments advanced in the study, while the third phase expounds more on the theoretical perspectives of the study.

The first phase anchors the research in the literature, identifies the study gap and sets the research questions and objectives of the study. The depth of the existing literature reviewed was useful in understanding the trends in civil wars and rebel groups’ governance structures as well as the nature of the gap to be filled by the researchers in rebel fragmentation and conflict resolution. Many aspects of South Sudan’s conflict resolution process are covered relatively well in the literature, but the effects of the fragmentation of the main rebel groups on the conflict resolution process and post-independence governance were established to have received limited scholarly attention. This phase was guided by critical questions: What are the main causes of rebel fragmentation in South Sudan? What are the effects and consequences of rebel fragmentation in the South Sudan Peace process, conflict resolution and post-independence governance? What available theoretical approaches can be useful in understanding splinter groups’ protraction of conflicts? Do the home state and/or rebel international linkages have any role in the nature of rebel fragmentation?

In the second phase, the study involved thorough searches in the relevant academic databases to identify journal articles, books, reports and other useful peer-reviewed publications with valid and up-to-date information on the topic. The main databases included but were not limited to the Web of Science, JSTOR, Scopus, university, government and other institutional digital libraries among others. The most relevant search terms used can be found within the major disciplines of political science, public administration, international security, conflict management and international relations (see Table 1). The study benefited from the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) inclusion and exclusion criteria to narrow down on the most relevant and valid literature analysed for the study. From the total of all searches of 132, duplicates, ineligibilities and publications in other languages were eliminated from analysis as well as generalized summaries on the conflict resolution and civil wars at large. In the end, a total of 67 most relevant and valid sources comprising of scholarly articles and books were included in the analysis (see Figure 1).

Table 1.

Some of the key search words used in the various databases to scrutinize the literature.

Database	Search titles/keywords/terms
Jstor, Scopus, Web of Science, University Libraries, Academic Databases, Digital institutional libraries such as those that belong to governments and international agencies.	‘Conflict resolution’, ‘splinter groups’, ‘civil wars’, ‘rebel fragmentation’, ‘South Sudan conflict’, ‘wartime governance’, ‘Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)’, ‘motivations of fragmentation’, ‘implications of fragmentation’, ‘non-state violent actors’, ‘protracted conflicts’, ‘ethnic identity’, ‘Nuer-Dinka conflict’, ‘political settlement’, ‘economic development’, ‘rebel alliances’, ‘rebel hierarchies’, ‘armed conflict’, ‘state building’, ‘human security’

Database

Search titles/keywords/terms

Jstor, Scopus, Web of Science, University Libraries, Academic Databases, Digital institutional libraries such as those that belong to governments and international agencies.

‘Conflict resolution’, ‘splinter groups’, ‘civil wars’, ‘rebel fragmentation’, ‘South Sudan conflict’, ‘wartime governance’, ‘Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)’, ‘motivations of fragmentation’, ‘implications of fragmentation’, ‘non-state violent actors’, ‘protracted conflicts’, ‘ethnic identity’, ‘Nuer-Dinka conflict’, ‘political settlement’, ‘economic development’, ‘rebel alliances’, ‘rebel hierarchies’, ‘armed conflict’, ‘state building’, ‘human security’

Figure 1.

PRISMA inclusion and exclusion criteria.

Phase: 3

In the third phase, the study identifies that rebel fragmentation is a gap in the existing literature on South Sudan. Previous studies have offered a solid foundation to understand the conflict in South Sudan from different dimensions. There are those studies that have looked at the governance aspect, and ethnic and identity-based drivers, and some have explored the impact of climate change as well as the involvement of regional and international actors in the conflict. This paper aims to add a new dimension to the conflict by proposing that more scholarly and policy efforts need to be directed towards understanding the causes and implications of fragmented SPLM/A on the prospects of peace and security in the young nation. We identify three important dimensions of rebel fragmentation (see Table 2): (1) power distribution dimension, (2) institutional dimension and (3) rebel organization dimension.

Table 2.

Three dimensions of rebel fragmentation (prepared by the authors).

Dimensions	Power distribution dimension	Institutional dimension	Rebel organization dimension
Definition	Concentrated and dispersed rebel fragmentation with most likely potential outcomes for rebel movements where ‘cohesion’ and ‘fragmentation’ will be used for possible rebel movement outcome,	Institutional rebel fragmentation dimensions are showing their dimensions in different categories of strength such as ‘Strong/high or weak/low/none’ for potential outcomes for rebel movements. In this dimension, ‘amalgamation’ and ‘fragmentation’ will be used for understanding the outcomes of the rebels	In the rebel fragmentation dimensions, the parameters of rebel organizations will be few or many. For understanding and assessing the ‘rebel organizations’, ‘concentration’ and ‘division’ of rebel fragmentation will be clarified as a part of rebel outcome
Psychological moods	Posture of complacency	Posture of hope	Posture of caution

Table 2 depicts three dimensions of rebel fragmentations and their relationship with the Nuer–Dinka fragmentation which is one of the reasons the Khartoum counter-insurgency efforts delayed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebel movement. In the theory section, we discussed more regarding the dimensions, parameters and possible rebel outcomes of rebel fragmentation in the case of South Sudan.

Locating the origin and persistence of the South Sudan civil war

The conflict in South Sudan can be divided into two significant periods: the pre-independence period and the post-independence period in South Sudan. Although the causes of conflicts during these particular periods are very different and perhaps even unrelated, they both have one important actor, the SPLM/A, who this paper seeks to examine the internal challenges it faced during the two periods. During the pre-colonial period, SPLM/A led a successful revolt against the North-Arab-dominated government in Khartoum. During this time, the black Southerners were more united. This appears to quickly change in the post-independent period where we see ‘Southerners’ fighting against each other leading to fragmentation of the independence movement. Noteworthy, when South Sudan became independent in 2011, there was a lot of hope for the South Sudanese people but also for analysts studying the east and horn of Africa where other revolutionary, rebel-led governments had taken power in Uganda, Ethiopia Eritrea and Somalia between 1980 and 2010. While there were concerns that these revolutionary governments were practicing high-handedness and dictatorial tendencies in the countries mentioned, no one would predict the kind of violence that would come to characterize South Sudan in 2013. So, what triggered the conflict in the young nation of South Sudan? We examine some key issues that have informed the debate on the conflict in South Sudan.

Edward Azar’s theory of protracted social conflict, which he constructed in the early 1970s and 1990s, provides as a compass for this study (Azar, 1990). It mainly focuses on conflicts that are protracted, severe, contentious and generally violent. The concept provides an explanation for the protracted and usually destructive crisis that communities get involved in when they demand fundamental rights such as safety, acceptability, inclusivity and opportunity for economic contribution as well as access to government-related employment and organizations (Ramsbotham, 2005). This theory holds that situations in which a group’s identity is challenged or undermined, or in which the group’s ability to meet its basic needs is constrained, almost always lead to recurring social conflict. In either scenario, the collective’s ability to satisfy even its most fundamental requirements is severely hindered. These two aspects can interfere with a group’s capacity to function regularly and achieve the objectives it has set for itself. A prolonged social conflict is characterized by antagonistic encounters between tribal or folkloric groups that continue for extended period with intermittent outbursts of violence.

These encounters are characterized by the fact that they are deeply ingrained with hatred and that they persist for a long time. The following are some of the conceivable settings in which conversations like this might take place, but the list is not exhaustive. This category of bigotry covers diverse attitudes and behaviours such as racism, xenophobia, religious bigotry and cultural prejudice. These kinds of hostility can be traced back to historical dynamics that predate that particular period by at least a few decades, if not several centuries (Azar, 1990). ‘Protracted social conflicts’ arise when certain groups are prevented from having the ability to fulfil the most needs and desires. As a result of this, members of the oppressed group could develop feelings of resentment and anger. This is due to the historical and contemporary legacies of oppression, discrimination, or domination that still exist within the society today.

In his primary argument, Azar refers to as ‘Communal Content’ and asserts that ‘multi-ethnicity’ is the primary factor that contributes to ongoing conflict in any group or community. This is the case regardless of the community that is being interrogated. It is often the case that multi-ethnicity leads to the creation of racial and ethnic stereotypes that cause ‘disarticulation between the state and society as a whole’, whether it is because of colonial invasion and its lingering effects or the long-standing control of one group over another. However, it is not always the case that multi-ethnicity causes this ‘disarticulation between the state and society as a whole’. It is possible that the historic ascendency of a fraction over another is to blame for this ‘disarticulation’ (Azar, 1990; Ramsbotham et al., 2011).

Azar (1990) also opines that ‘it is the relationship between identity groups and the state that is at the core of the problem’ to give one illustration. Due to their propensity to be oblivious to the interests of other parts of society, it is feasible that states ruled by one racial community or a combination of a few diverse ethnic groupings will pave the way for continuous societal instability. The reason for this is that such nations tend to have a higher prevalence of authoritarian regimes. It can be argued that nations with fewer resources are unable to meet the requirements of a population that varies in terms of demographics. This is due to the fact that states that have fewer resources typically have smaller populations. One might make the argument that other ethnic groups in South Sudan are subjected to oppression and are not welcome due to the fact that certain rebel factions have monopolized South Sudan’s political and economic sectors on an ethnic basis and have fragmented the country. Although this is highly unlikely, it is not impossible.

The ensuing social unrest has a tendency to continue for a longer period of time when the administrations and politicians of multiethnic settings are either incapable or reluctant to meet the fundamental requirements of the people who live there. Because of this, people attempt to find support and stability within the social organizations they already belong to, whether those groupings are religious or racial. Many people have a negative impression of politicians as a result of the widespread belief that they do not adequately represent the public’s interests, and as a result, they steer clear of political participation. Many of Africa’s current ethnic conflicts may be traced back to colonialism, which unilaterally divided the continent and imposed European conceptions of geographical nationhood on a wide variety of distinct communal blocs. This led to the escalation of tensions between these groups. This occurred as a direct result of colonialism, which arbitrarily and permanently partitioned the African continent into two halves (Ramsbotham, 2005). This made it possible for some ethnic groups to consolidate their authority at the expense of other ethnic groups, establishing the stage for disagreement among the rebels and a drawn-out conflict in places like South Sudan. The disparities that were already present between the various subordinate groups of a race only become more pronounced when the dominant group chooses to disregard the issues that affect the subordinate groups (Ramsbotham, 2005).

The second consideration is the human needs approach, and it focuses on an individual’s capacity to fulfil their prerequisites. The wants of humans are never-ending and always changing; the fulfilment of any one need leads to the emergence of an entirely new desire. All of the other necessities are supported by these foundational necessities: nutrition, livelihood, clothes, proper hygiene, schooling and medical care (Maslow, 1943). As a consequence of this, it is essential to one’s existence to provide for one’s own fundamental requirements as well as those of one’s community. On the other hand, some people have a very difficult time satisfying their fundamental necessities, and others lead relatively comfortable lives as a result of structural inequalities that exist in some parts of society. Consequently, the relative deprivation and dearth that one group in society is forced to endure paves the way for complaints that are founded on that group’s lack of resources. Disputes of this nature, if not handled properly, can frequently escalate into more drawn-out forms of social strife. The extent to which underrepresented groups are able to engage in the economy or government can either contribute to the prevention of ongoing social unrest or make the problem worse. The failure of a community to provide for its members’ most fundamental requests may not be a primary source of crisis, but the processes of crisis are almost certainly made worse in communities in which these needs are not addressed to an adequate degree. This is still the case even if a person’s most fundamental requirements are not being met, even if there does not seem to be any link between the two.

The third factor in the South Sudan civil war is the government/ the role of the State, which delves into how the state ensures that all groups living within its territorial boundaries and under its authority are provided for in terms of meeting their fundamental requirements, obtaining an equitable share of resources and having a say in the political process. Azar contends that the dominance of one identity group over the government in countries that have seen lengthy social unrest is one of the primary causes of instability in these nations. Because of this, the group in power can redistribute resources among its members at the expense of individuals who belong to other groups. In addition, the current ruling faction makes it a priority to thwart the efforts of any other factions that could seek to assume political power in the future. Because of this, there is a one-to-one correlation between the type of administration and its legitimacy, the accessibility of essentials and the length of social unrest (Azar, 1990).

The fourth and last segment is international linkages which explores how the availability of safety, stability and acknowledgement in local communities is impacted by outside forces in those communities. Azar was aware of the fact that elements like economic reliance and client ties may have a detrimental effect on the capacity of a state to function normally as a whole. As a result of an excessive amount of foreign influence on their economy and administrations, dependent states frequently have trouble maintaining stable political and economic systems. As a result, it is possible that community groups in these states will have reduced access to fundamental necessities. When two states have a client relationship, one state authorizes the protection of its citizens to the other state. In this kind of relationship, one state pledges its allegiance to the other in exchange for guaranteeing the latter’s safety. Because of this agreement, the country that is getting the security guarantee will, of course, be required to give up some of the sovereignty that is rightfully theirs. As a result, this has an effect on the ways in which the requirements of the community groups can be satisfied.

Azar also pointed out four outcomes that could take place as a result of social strife that goes on for an excessive amount of time. Some of these impacts include an increase in reliance and cliency, a weakening of institutional frameworks, a hardness of mental processes and a decrease in physical safety. Other effects include the hardening of mental processes and a loss in physical safety. When the current situation in SPLM/A of South Sudan is taken into consideration, it is not hard to see how each of these problems has developed into their current state. As a result, the concept offers a comprehensive setting that sheds light on the continuous struggle that is taking place in the country.

Finally, other studies have also established that ethnic support and sponsorship have a direct impact on the splintering of an armed group. For example, Ives (2021) demonstrates that rebel groups with substantial external ethnic support are less likely to fragment. On the other hand, rebels with a non-ethnic external supporter are prone to splintering but they can manage the situation by improving internal communication and cohesion. The amalgamation and amassing of both power and wealth by the main leader of the rebel group in a highly centralized model can potentially disenfranchise other top and key leaders to break away forming sprinter rebel groups. In contrast, a more balanced, less centralized model, with consultative decision-making builds trust and reduces the chances of splitting (Joo and Mukherjee, 2021). Some factors such as the rebel group’s organizational decisions on issues like mobilization, command and territorial control form the main divergent points for new splinters to emerge within the main rebel group (Burch and Ochreiter, 2020).

Rebel fragmentation and protracted conflicts: a theoretical perspective

Rebel fragmentation is one of the biggest threats to mediation efforts to end the conflict. When it occurs it leaves the mediators in a dilemma about which strategy to use to bring the now multiple actors to the negotiation table. But what causes fragmentation? Rebel fragmentation is believed to be caused by disagreements over conflict strategies and means such as violence or diplomacy, insubordination, interference by foreign actors, different post-conflict visions, especially negotiated political settlements, changing commitments and conflict motivations, as well as simply personal differences among leaders of various factions (Levkowitz, 2016). The Nuer–Dinka fragmentation is one of the reasons the Khartoum counter-insurgency efforts delayed the SPLA rebel movement.

Avoiding fragmentation may be the only survival tactic of the rebel groups, especially against a strong government side. A weak state that can rarely exercise sovereignty and territorial integrity in some areas leaves more room and space for the rebels to start competing among themselves increasing the chances of fragmentation (Ojo, 2020). To prevent fragmentation, rebel groups are supposed to institutionalize and coordinate the factions representing the group in different organizations. The process of institutionalization can adopt either a formal or informal approach involving norms, traditions and customs (Albert, 2022). However, the kind of state institutionalization is normally higher than that of the competing rebels regardless of whether the state is weak or strong. Bakke et al. (2012) identify the three dimensions of fragmentation based on power distribution among the rebels, the level of rebel institutionalization and the total number of rebel organizations involved as simplified by the authors in Table 3 (also see Cunningham, 2016).

Table 3.

Rebel fragmentation dimensions with the most likely potential outcomes for rebel movements.

	Parameters	Dimensions	Possible rebel outcomes
1.	Power distribution	Concentrated	Cohesion
1.	Power distribution	Dispersed	Fragmentation
2.	Level of institutionalization	Strong/high	Amalgamation
2.	Level of institutionalization	Weak/low/none	Fragmentation
3.	Number of rebel organizations	Few	Concentration
3.	Number of rebel organizations	Many	Division

Source: Author’s compilation.

Table 3 shows that when power is concentrated among members of the group, there are more chances of cohesion. Fragmentation is likely to occur if power is dispersed among different leaders as it is in the case of SPLM/A which has many leaders with influence within the group. In addition, if there is a high level of institutionalization, the group is likely to hold together. The SPLM/A is not institutionalized as it emerged as a guerrilla movement, thus making it vulnerable to fragmentation. The other issue is the number of groups that came together to form the rebel movement. In the case of SPLM/A, the group was a product of different ethnic militia which came together to fight for freedom from the Khartoum government, and this made the group less concentrated and prone to divisions.

Doctor (2020) brings in other dimensions arguing that rebel fragmentation to some extent depends on the relation between the rebel leadership and the local population, the relations among rebel leaders themselves, and the individual experiences and attributes of the rebel leaders before the war such as former military or political leaders. It follows that rebel groups with a solid and good relationship with the local population are unlikely to go separate ways fearing repercussions from the civilian support base. The local population, therefore, influences the behavior and the direction of the rebel group which is expected to behave in ways that are perceived normal by the local civilian population. A relationship built on trust and a spirit of camaraderie among the leaders of the various rebel factions can also avert possible fragmentations (Wood, 2014). The example of set by Kiir and Machar shows lack of trust and confidence in the capacity of each other as leaders.

On the last point, the rebel groups which are led by leaders with immense political and military experience are also more likely to hold together. Political experience will be useful in building wider coalitions and alliances that maximize the gains at the negotiating table for the group, whereas military experience plays a major role in organizing and coordinating the violence against the state or other competing groups (Cunningham and Loyle, 2021). Experienced political leaders play an important role in establishing the political structures and diplomatic machinery that potentially institutionalize the rebel group, limiting the chances of fragmentation.

We therefore argue that former military leaders can use their experience to avoid losses on the battlefield, recruit, train and deliver critical supplies to the insurgent soldiers who remain relatively motivated and loyal within the established command, hence possible to call for a ceasefire at appropriate times such as when gains are made at the negotiating table without losing other armed factions. Prior military discipline and centralization of command are critical in realizing the rebel military means and objectives. This makes the nature of a group’s leadership during a civil war critical to whether fragmentation will happen or not. Perhaps giving incites in the inherent differences between the leadership style of Garang before independence and Salva Kiir after independence.

A study conducted by Nagel and Doctor (2020) to establish the relationship between rebel fragmentation and sexual violence provides more insights into conflict protraction caused by rebels splitting up. Rape and other forms of sexual violence in the conflict increase the chances of rebel fragmentation. This is because sexual violence brings the guilty battalions together but the net effect on the insurgent organizational structure is negative as leaders see an opportunity to splinter with cohesive battalions following them. If sexual violence is taken into account, then one can associate the devastating cases of rape in 2005 when there was a split between Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the rise in the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army–Mini Minawi (SLM/A-MM) where numerous sexual violence cases were recorded. Perpetuation of group-based violence such as sexual violence forges social bonds among the group and it is one of the strategies employed by rebels to create compliance and cohesion. Haer et al. (2011) discuss other methods and tactics used by rebel groups to forge cohesion.

The Second Congo War provides an example of the role of external interference by different actors in rebel fragmentation. The war between Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD; Congolese Rally for Democracy) and the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC; Movement for the Liberation of Congo) was a collusion of many external interests from the neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda in 1998 (Tamm, 2022). The MLC under Uganda’s sole leadership and supervision was able to hold together up to the 2003 power-sharing negotiation whereas the RCD which received support from both Rwanda and Uganda had at least six splinter groups (Tamm, 2019). External support for the rebels especially the amount and variations in resources by the external actors is responsible for the rebel fragmentation. The rebel leaders also attempt to exploit the rivals between the external supporters. Accordingly, external state sponsors allocate the rebel resources in line with their own interests in the conflict which is sometimes contrary to the rebel group’s interests leading to divisions and splits among the ranks of the rebel forces.

Brenner’s (2015) study focusing on the insurgent groups in the protracted Myanmar conflict finds some puzzling results which point out the unintended consequences of the state action towards insurgent groups. According to the findings of this study, co-opting rebel leaders by the state through economic incentives results in the emergence of another more popular resistance from within the economically silenced groups/group leaders. However, in the short run, the advancement of economic gains to rebel leadership by the government leads to the fragmentation of the rebel group into various factions. This is caused by the increased resentment among the group itself and the local population due to lack of legitimate leadership (Brenner, 2015).

Fragmented rebels groups do not just wait to be crushed by the state forces, but they also seek to form and join new alliances based on ideology, power asymmetries and sponsorship with the ultimate aim of not just surviving but realizing the war efforts and objectives (Gade et al., 2019). Ideology was a major factor in the coalition building of the many fragmented rebel groups in the Syrian civil war (Berti, 2023). Berti looks at how rebel governance is affected by the fragmentation of the rebels. Using the case study of Jabhat al-Nusr in Syria she argues that rebel fragmentation alters the balance of power between the local civilian population and the armed groups in favour of the armed groups.

This potentially explains the increased civilian casualties in the South Sudan conflict when Machar and Kiir forces struggle for dominance in the civilian towns and villages. Second, the protractive conflict coupled with dwindling resources as well sheer rivalry between the factions shifts the type of governance from cooperative to competitive governance (Berti, 2023). The evolving situation in South Sudan has largely brought out Machar and his armed faction as having a competitive approach to local governance as opposed to cooperative approach which has got more dividends for peace stability. The fragmentations and approach to governance have militarized governance and blurred the role of ordinary South Sudan civilians in the country.

SPLM/A wartime governance

When the war broke out in the 1980s, the Southern part of Sudan did not have strong governance institutions and this would later shape how the SPLM/A would govern the spaces during the independence war and later inform how different warring factions would interact with civilians after the 2013 civil war erupted (Kindersley and Rolandsen, 2019). Historically, the south was characterized by rudimentary local administration structures and the SPLM/A opted to adopt an indirect administrative system to manage the civilians during the war. SPLM/A identified and appointed a small number of individuals to act as local administrators. These people were the link between civilians and the top SPLM/A officials and commanders at the top.

In terms of the administration of justice, the SPLM/A had appointed magistrates who could travel across the region and mostly settled disputes between the civilians and SPLM/A fighters. This is a unique strategy that would ensure good relations between civilians and rebels. Arjona (2016) identifies such behavior by rebel groups as being crucial to their survival. She identifies that rebel groups that have good relations with civilians are likely to benefit from the social network and order that arises from such partnerships. In addition, the SPLM/A leadership appears to have been keen on avoiding misbehaviour by foot soldiers who can end up committing atrocities against civilians. By providing a legal framework to address the potential dispute between civilians and local fighters, the SPLM/A was able to curb a serious fallout during the war for independence.

However, when the south became independent, the rebel group (SPLM/A) formed the government. But there seems to have been an oversight in establishing a strong dispute-resolution mechanism that could address potential rivalry in the newly formed government. Such oversight would come back to haunt the country as the society became too vulnerable to wrangles among leaders. Because there has been a lack of a serious dispute resolution mechanism, it is not surprising that the government and the SPLM/A could easily be fragmented. Wood (2008) perhaps captures the post-2013 situation in South Sudan when she explains how identities can be used to militarize local authorities, socialize the military and mobilize different groups into conflict. When the crackdown against those who were alleged to have planned a coup against President Kiir began, members of the opposition were able to quickly mobilize civilians, local authorities and soldiers to form a formidable SPLM-IO. The governance nature during the 2013 civil war has been highly dependent on identity dynamics and control of spaces occupied by perceived supporters.

In comparison, SPLM/A wartime governance between the struggle for independence and the civil war shows some significant differences. One, during the struggle for independence, civilians (especially in the south) were not being targeted by the rebels. People from different social, political and economic backgrounds were brought together to support the rebels. On the other hand, the 2013 civil war has seen sharp division along identity lines and deliberate targeting of civilians (Nyadera, 2018). In addition, fragmentation between members of the SPLM/A has been more pronounced and evident in the 2013 civil war where the group has fragmented into different fighters.

SPLM/A’s troubled history of fragmentation

The prolonged conflict in South Sudan can be partly attributed to internal fragmentation and the emergence of new groups with leaders demanding representation at the negotiation table and a share of the post-war spoils. The cause of this crisis can be associated with the very nature of peace efforts adopted by regional and international actors such as IGAD which has prioritized power-sharing among the most active actors in the conflict. But the root causes of SPLM’s internal troubles can be traced back to the second Sudanese civil war (Johnson, 2014). SPLM/A as a movement was making good progress, gaining support not just in the South but also in other parts of the country. However, the group was facing internal leadership wrangles. John Garang who was positioning himself as the supreme leader of the group at the time was being challenged and accused of using authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies (Young, 2005). An attempted coup against John Garang in the mid-1980s was a reflection of how many internal challenges the group was facing.

SPLM/A leaders Lam Akol who had risen to become a member of the Political-Military High Command (PMHC) and was accused of being behind the unsuccessful coup against Garang’ accused him of being wicked and incompetent to lead the movement (Akol, 2011). The PMHC was the highest decision-making organ of the SPLM/A with two types of members, ordinary and alternate. Trouble was brewing over Garang’s reluctance to call for meetings for this important organ of the movement. This made members of the movement begin to have mistrust against Garang and could have been one of the reasons for early attempts by some of the members to split from the group (Tamm, 2016).

Dr. Riek Machar first revealed divisions within the SPLM/A in the early 1990s when he differed with John Garang’s approach to call for reforms within a united Sudan. Machar and his supporters wanted a radical approach that would see the South secede from the North. Machar formed the SPLM/A-Nasir group which engaged in fierce fighting with the SPLM military wing, the SPLA. Ironically, although Machar was supporting efforts to split Sudan and Garang’ was pushing for unity and reforms in Sudan, the government in Khartoum offered a lot of support to the Machar wing, even appointing him as one of Bashir’s deputies (Brosché and Höglund, 2017). According to Seymour (2014), such an irony is difficult to understand by simply looking at the narratives fronted by both leaders. In this essay, I argue that the alignment between Machar and the Khartoum government can also be explained by looking at elite interest for power in Sudan and now the South Sudan crisis.

Eventually, Garang and Machar were able to address their differences and in 2002, Machar rejoined the SPLM/A. He was appointed as a senior commander, a position that allowed him to be a key player in the negotiations that led to the 2005 CPA (Roach, 2016). When Garang’ died unexpectedly following a helicopter crash, Machar would rise to become the first vice president of the new nation, South Sudan in 2011. However, this did not mark an end to the conflict within the SPLM/A.

Apart from the Riek Machar–Garang, the SPLM was rocked by other internal divisions which triggered new violence that was sometimes overlooked or thought to be part of the independence movement. For example, Maj. Gen. George Athor himself, a former deputy chief of the SPLA, parted ways from the movement and started one of the biggest insurgencies after he accused his colleagues in the SPLM/A of rigging his victory where he claimed he won the governorship of Jonglei State. Another split was led by David Yau Yau who was demanding more autonomy for members of his minority clan.

The third example of another split was the revolt by the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) which became even stronger following the defection from SPLA of Maj. Gen. Peter Gadet. SSLA were mostly former members of the SPLM/A who rejected the outcome of the Unity state governor position that was won at the time by Taban Deng. The group claimed that Deng had rigged out the Wife of Riek Machar, Angelina Teny in the race. The defection of Maj. Gen. Peter Gadet to SSLA also saw influential figures such as Bol Chol Gatkouth a former member of parliament and spokesman of the SPLA. New internal wrangles emerged shortly after independence and caused a lot of problems for the SPLM/A (Arnold and LeRiche, 2013). Challenges the SPLM/A government experienced are elaborated further in the next section.

Post-independence troubles in SPLM

Lack of trust among the leaders and to some extent the citizens started boiling up as South Sudanese began to face the realities of crafting a state and nation-building from scratch (Onapa, 2019). Perhaps many leaders and citizens who were enthusiastic about independence did not understand the cost they would have to endure to benefit from their sovereignty. Things were made even much difficult by the impact of what the people had endured during the division between Garang’ and Machar. The Bor massacre that saw many people dead continued to haunt Machar who many felt was a traitor and therefore should not be trusted.

This lack of trust could have been accompanied by ideological differences on how to shape South Sudan’s political and economic models going forward. The country’s currency which began as a strong medium of exchange that was admired across the region was now facing a serious loss of value as a result of hyperinflation. There were also disputes on questions such as the constitution, presidential powers, election date, control of the party, security arrangement and reforms, as well as appointments to various government positions. These concerns sharpened divisions within SPLM even further leading to a fallout between some of its high-ranking members.

The formation of SPLM-IO and why it easily attracted fighters, especially from the members of the Gajaak and Gajok clans in the Upper Nile state as well as from the Gawaar and Lou clans in the Jonglei state, remains unclear. However, there is a strong argument that the desire for revenge, anger and a general sense of Nuer solidarity played a crucial role given that there was no structured leadership at the early stages of the civil war. SPLM/A was severely fragmented as soldiers in Divisions 7 (southern Upper Nile), 4 (Unity) and 8 (Jonglei) defected to SPLM-IO. Further defections were also reported of Nuer communities and their supports in Divisions 6 (Mobile Division), 2 (Equatoria), and 1 (northern Upper Nile) also defected. In addition, many SPLM/A supporters in the wildlife and police forces defected to the SPLM-IO (Oxford Analytica, 2018).

High-ranking military officials who had either been imprisoned or been dismissed from work on suspicion that they either opposed the government or were not loyal also joined the SPLM-IO. These include Maj. Gen. Garouth Gatkouth, Maj. Gen. Gabriel Tang, Maj. Gen. Simon Gatwitch, Brig. Gen. Thomas Maboir, Maj. Gen. Simon Gatwitch, Maj. Gen. James Koang and Maj. Gen. Dho Atrjong. Such a high number of high-ranking military and SPLM/A commanders defecting to IO reflect the level of division that existed in the SPLM/A. Apart from the SPLM -IO.

There was another splinter group from SPLM/A that called itself the G-10 or Former Political Detainees (FPD); among its members was the wife of former SPLM leader Rebecca Nyandeng Garang’ (Apuuli, 2015). While a series of peace efforts such as the IGAD peace talks, IGAD plus, Arusha talks, Khartoum talks, Nasir convention; and Pagak 1 conference were organized, constant shifts and fragmentations within SPLM/A and opposition groups made it difficult to implement the peace agreements. There were a lot of betrayals as well as the emergence of many new groups which wanted to be involved in the negotiation table.

Figure 2.

An illustration of the fragmentation process of the main rebel groups in the South Sudan protracted conflict.

Rethinking rebel groups’ fragmentation

Figure 4 shows how Rebel fragmentation is associated with state failure, especially in Africa where insurgent groups like the SPLM have experienced multiple fragmentations. Some states deliberately pursue fragmentation of insurgent groups to weaken them and thwart their challenge to state power. This has manifested in Africa in divided opposition camps that have allowed dictatorial regimes to remain in power for too long. The internally cohesive insurgent effort is more likely to be effective in challenging excessive and oppressive state power. According to Clapham, 1998, in his study of African Guerrillas he distinguishes between two types of rebel. Those that are interested in consolidating state power versus those that are interested in subverting state power which must be defeated for peace to be realized. The insurgents aiming at the consolidation of state power can potentially lead to the reduction in endless chaos and conflicts once the objective of amalgamating state power is achieved.

The protracted Somalia conflict can be understood from the rebel fragmentation point of view. Somalia saw the emergence of several clan-based rebel insurgencies following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. The main rival rebel groups competing for the consolidation of state power included the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the United Somali Congress (USC). Somali National Movement was able to maintain internal group cohesiveness and succeeded in consolidating state power in the current Somaliland which is relatively peaceful with well-functioning governance structures and institutions. The region is even lobbying the international community for recognition as an independent state. On the other hand, the United Somali Congress which was controlling Mogadishu and most of Central and Southern Somalia collapsed due to internal divisions and leadership wrangles.

Many clan and religious-oriented insurgent groups sprung up striving for control of these regions. Al Shabaab capitalized on the many small fragmentations of rebel groups to establish itself, especially controlling Central and Southern Somalia (Woldemariam, 2018). The holding together of state power consolidating rebels’ boasted peace and stability in the Horn of Africa following the scare of the fall of the Mengistu Haile Mariam administration. Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) maintained their internal clue and established new administrations in Asmara and Addis Ababa, respectively. Out of these case studies, it is clear that apart from rebel fragmentation protracting the peace process, it also determines the effectiveness of the rebel organization in terms of the realization of its goals (Woldemariam, 2011).

The peace process is arguably one of the factors that necessitate the splintering of rebel groups. Several reasons have been given including the desire of the breakaway splinter groups to reach a better deal with the continued fighting than when negotiating at the table. Others feel disadvantaged in the peace process and decide to withdraw altogether. Other groups have split after the signing of the peace agreement itself notably accusing the rebel leadership of not sharing the peace dividends with members of the rebel group in a fair and justified manner. The intense process of negotiating for peace has also been blamed for exposing the structural and organizational divisions in rebel ranks. Preventing rebel fragmentation therefore becomes one of the ultimate goals of peace negotiation.

According to Duursma and Fliervoet (2021), the signing of the peace agreement and the implementation of the peace agreement are the most critical stages through which rebel fragmentation is likely to occur with grave consequences to the peace process. This is because the Conseil National pour la D ́efense de la D ́emocratie-Forces pour la D ́efense de la D ́emocratie (CNDD-FDD) broke away at the start of the Tanzania peace process over leadership disputes in 1998 jeopardizing the peace process in the Great Lakes region. Moro National Liberation Movement (MNLF) disintegrated into various factions during the implementation of the signed peace agreement throwing the Mindanao peace process in the Philippines into disarray. The splinter groups are neither unimportant nor inconsequential to the peace process, and they are believed to hasten the fall back into violence and anarchy (Rudloff and Findley, 2016). Increased number of rebel groups makes it difficult for negotiating bodies like the United Nations to coordinate communication and messaging with the many actors. The negotiating environment becomes littered with many spoiler groups who are unlikely to make any meaningful commitment further hampering the resolution of the conflict (Arı and Gizelis, 2020).

Findings on the fragmentation of SPLM/A

How did a formidable rebel group that had members drawn from groups with lots of similarities face a lot of internal fragmentation? This is perhaps a question that can further help us understand not only the strength and weaknesses of a rebel group but also the historical and leadership interests.

Weaknesses of peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan

One issue that is emerging as a strong catalyst for the fragmentation of SPLM/A is the nature of conflict resolution efforts in the country. Most of the agreements signed since 2013 have involved parties that have been participating in the conflict. The agreements have resulted in rewarding people directly involved in the violence, therefore, acting as an incentive for those who wish to also have a bigger share to take up arms. The IGAD-led peace efforts have been characterized by continued defections and alignment each of which threatens peace and stability in South Sudan. As Kalyvas (2008) notes, these defections have implications on social relations at the ethnic level. Furthermore, there are still high levels of mistrust among the leaders dating back to the Bor massacre that has not been fully addressed. This is a reflection of how peace efforts have been managed in South Sudan, whereby the focus seems to be on trying to resolve a few issues that may have triggered the conflict while underlying issues are ignored.

Failure to professionalize the SPLM/A

Despite being credited with successfully pushing for the independence of the South Sudanese people, governing a country is not very similar to managing a rebel movement. Yet most of the SPLM/A commanders took over critical positions in government without prior training (Kuol, 2018). The only basis for being placed in important government positions had to be the role one played in the liberation movement. Given that these positions are few, it is possible that rivalry between the leaders can arise. More so if there are no clear mechanisms and timelines within the SPLM/A that guide how new leaders can replace the existing ones. Probably it would have been better for South Sudan to reimagine the role of the SPLM/A after independence and introduce more professional individuals to manage the country. The weakness and failure to separate professional functions from rewards meant for those who participated in the war can trigger endless wrangles among those who feel they played a bigger role than others.

Weak political and ideological pillars

While in the 1980s SPLM/A appeared to have a strong ideological goal, especially in its quest for a ‘new Sudan’, it seems to have lost interest in the demands it had of inclusivity, democracy, equity and good governance when South Sudan became a state (Githigaro, 2020). The sought of reforms that the group wanted to effect in Sudan have not featured prominently in today’s efforts to build the new South Sudan state. This means that perhaps the group did not believe in the demands it was making the Khartoum government or more importantly the top leadership of the group lacked the practical and theoretical ideologies needed to drive a modern state.

This problem is not unique to South Sudan, but many African countries also found themselves facing serious challenges regarding the kind of ideology to adopt after independence as they had not planned for such in advance. It is not surprising that leaders such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Siad Barre of Somalia adopted all manner of ideologies from Ujamaa, to African socialism to Scientific Socialism all of which failed to deliver any serious economic growth. The lack of ideology in South Sudan has led to scarce resources that leaders within SPLM/A continue to compete for thus resulting in internal fragmentation.

Economic triggers

Economic triggers of the rise in splinter groups in South Sudan have come from many sources including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aid agencies which have made leaders of different sections of SPLM vulnerable to compromise. The provision of critical NGO functions and humanitarian aid has enabled respective organizations to interfere with the SPLM operations sometimes deliberately for their source countries or international powers with interest in the conflict.

The influence of Khartoum

The influence of Khartoum is also an important factor in understanding South Sudan rebel fragmentation. The administration in Khartoum has played a fair share of its efforts to weaken the SPLM, especially influencing different factions within the SPLM to deviate from the SPLM’s founding objectives. The Anyanya (II) group achieved SPLM’s first split after staging an internal coup. The splinter group was later integrated into the Sudanese General Army command in Khartoum to fight the SPLM. Khartoum has also played the ethnic card to weaken the internal cohesion of the SPLM. Khartoum leadership has been simmering tensions between the Nuer and Dinka, the main ethnic groups that form the SPLM. The Nuer, including Riek Machar, have sought refuge in Khartoum over what they term as the domination of the SPLM by the Dinka of Salva Kiir. Khartoum utilizes the splinter factions to its advantage shaping their political values and views of the entire peace process.

Ethnic and personalization of politics in South Sudan

The independence struggle in South Sudan reflects a similar but more protracted process that many African countries went through. The problem that characterized many African independence movements and is often overlooked is the failure to disassociate this movement from personal and ethical control explaining the political struggles and failure in state-building for many post-independence African states. It seems leaders in South Sudan did not recognize this problem in advance and fell into the same trap. The SPLM/A remains under the control of ethnic and personality loyalties (Dagher, 2021). And this problem has evolved whereby certain ethnic groups and personalities have led to the fragmentation of the SPLM/A. This is evident in the patterns that emerged from the Split with Anyanya (1984), SPLM/A Torit and Nasir factions (1991), split in SPLM/A-United (1994), split in SSIM/A (1995), Split in SPLA-IO (2015) and other instances. In all instances where there has been a split in SPLM/A, one can often trace ethnic grievances or personality loyalty as a source.

Conclusion

This paper explored fragmentation within the SPLM/A and discussed the causes and implications of such divisions to the conflict in general. The authors find that internal wrangles that even triggered the 2013 civil war and have continued to make conflict resolution difficult in the young nation are not new or unique to SPLM/A. The group has many historical examples of cases of internal wrangling. What is interesting though is that much of the wrangles are caused by competition for power among the elites and that the civilians are only drawn into these rivalries. Nevertheless, this study argues that rebel fragmentation is a salient feature of contemporary intrastate conflicts and should be taken into consideration in any efforts towards sustainable peace. The situation in South Sudan is one of the fast-growing problematic cases where complexities arising from rebel fragmentation pose a serious dilemma for peace advocates. To address these shortcomings, we provide the following recommendations:

- Intrastate wars, conflicts and disputes are frequently quite destructive. Although rebel fragmentations are rarely the primary reason why such conflicts arise, it has the potential of exacerbating these conflicts and making them protracted. Rebel fragmentation continue to characterize the conflict in South Sudan, however given that most peace efforts focus on the causes of the conflict, fragmentation remains less examined. Therefore, in order to give this issue the attention it deserves and perhaps attain sustainable peace in the world’s youngest nation, more academic research can be dedicated towards understanding factors that lead to rebel fragmentation and how such division among rebel groups can be used to undermine the rebel group’s efforts and objectives. Research centres, government security agencies and third-party peace ambassadors can direct their attention towards understanding trends and impact of fragmentation. Administrative reforms can also play an important role towards enhancing the state’s ability to have competent personnel, institutions and efficient structures that cannot only identify rebel fragmentation but also have the capacity to take advantage of such divisions and not let its negative consequences prolong conflicts and inflict more pain on the citizens.

- Adopting a system thinking approach to conflict resolution. Systems thinking is a concept borrowed from natural sciences especially engineering department where hundreds if not sometimes thousands of different components of an engine are tailored to function as a single unit. It is imperative that all actors engaged in the settlement of the conflict work together, since this is the only way to ensure that the peace efforts impact on a complex conflict such as the one in South Sudan. This is to acknowledge that the conflict in South Sudan is characterized by many actors a situation that has been made worse as a result of fragmentation among the rebel groups. Once there is a holistic view of the actors involved in the conflict, then more effective policies and strategies can be adopted to address the conflict.

- A more radical approach would be to reduce the influence of the polarizing leaders under whose leadership the SPLM has fragmented into different groups. This can be achieved by giving the option for a negotiated exit from South Sudan’s political sphere to President Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and any other key leaders involved in the continuing crisis in the country. Though they are in a position of authority, they have not been able to unite the country or the SPLM. In addition, they have not taken the required precautions to guarantee that their soldiers comply with the laws of war, particularly the ‘International Law of Armed Conflict’ which has in turn led to desire for revenge. Therefore, they are the ones who have the most responsibility to answer for the continuation of the conflict. It is necessary to have conversations concerning their departure, paying particular attention to the logistics of the procedures and the timetable involved.

In the wake of protracted conflicts in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Myanmar, and Somalia, policy makers and peace advocates have focused on the role of external actors (Bülbül, Islam and Khan, 2022). For example, in Libya, the focus has been on the role of countries such as Russia, Turkey, Italy, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and the United States, or in the case of Syria where the role of Russia, the United States, EU countries, Iran and Turkey and in the case of Somalia where the role of Kenya, Ethiopia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and non-state actors like Al Qaeda have been highlighted (Nyadera and Islam, 2020), very little effort has been made to examine the consequence of internal fragmentation of rebel groups and the implication it has on these protracted conflicts. By using the case of South Sudan, we propose the adoption of this framework not only for scholarly understanding of other conflicts such as the examples given above but also can be incorporated into peacebuilding efforts. This would perhaps open a new window of opportunity to deal with the protracted conflicts that have continued to ravage the world. For South Sudan, we hope that a lesson has been learned and perhaps better reflections will be given to the challenges emerging from the internal wrangle of groups that end up forming governments like the way SPLM did.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Israel Nyaburi Nyadera

Md. Nazmul Islam

Author biographies

Israel Nyaburi Nyadera is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Egerton University and a Teaching assistant at the Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Macau. He is a Charles E. Scheidt Fellow for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, at the Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution, George Manson University, a junior research fellow at Global Africa and was awarded the Kautilya Fellowship in 2016. Nyadera has been a visiting researcher at the Department of Economic and Political Science, University of Milan. Nyadera has co-published two books and contributed book chapters and several journal articles.

Md. Nazmul Islam is a Head of Türkiye, Asia and Indo-Pacific Studies (TAIPS), Institute for International Relations and Strategic Research (ULİSA) and an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at the Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University (AYBU), Türkiye. He is also an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Department of Media and Communication Studies, Ankara University, Türkiye. Islam was a former ERASMUS Research Fellow at Europa Institute, Saarland University, Germany, and a former Research Associate at the Joint Project between the University of Cambridge (Judge Business School) and BRAC. Dr. Islam is the author of several books, such as “Power of Bonding and Non-Western Soft Power Strategy in Iran: Comparing China and India’s Engagement (Springer, Palgrave Macmillan, USA, 2023)” and “Comparing China and India’s Soft Power Strategy in Pakistan” (Lexington, USA, 2023), many book chapters, and peer-reviewed articles. He has edited the Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), Comparative Public Administration (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), and South Asian Politics (Nobel, 2022).

Felix Shihundu is a post-graduate researcher in the Department of International Relations at the Social Sciences University of Ankara, Türkiye.

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