Abstract
This commentary discusses Bangladesh’s interactions with Middle East countries, particularly focusing on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Turkey. Although Bangladesh’s relations with the GCC are seemingly and dominantly economic, there is a significant level of cultural interconnectedness as well, especially with Saudi Arabia. In Bangladesh–Turkey relations, there is also a similar type of cultural attachment operating via each country’s religious identities. This attachment, especially in the last decade, was bolstered by deepening cooperation in counterterrorism activities and further economic interactions. The interactions with these Middle Eastern countries are not only important to Bangladesh’s foreign policy and economy but also to assuage some domestic tensions.
Introduction
In maintaining foreign policy, Bangladesh’s focal point of concern has always been economic (Jasim Uddin, 2015). In 2009, Willem van Schendel (2009) mentioned that four-fifths of the Bangladeshi population survive on less than $2 a day and one-third on less than $1 a day. This situation has been exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, which created the worst economic malnourishment throughout the world.
As per the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have consistently had the maximum amount of bilateral trade with Bangladesh since 2010. The GCC has been contributing to Bangladesh’s economy via remittance, which was more than 6% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Bangladesh in 2021 (Bangladesh Bank, 2021). This commentary examines these transregional economic relations with the GCC in terms of their numerical importance and questions whether such asymmetry is used as a means to influence and control Bangladesh policies. This commentary also elaborates on Dhaka’s relations with Turkey. Although the asymmetry in this bilateralism is not comparable to the one with the GCC, Turkey’s proactive middle-power policies in South Asia have been the major reason for the development of Dhaka–Ankara relations. Therefore, the asymmetry in these relations is caused by the imbalance between the international status and influence of Turkey and Bangladesh. In both cases, that is, the GCC and Turkey, the relations were facilitated with cultural, primarily religious, bonds. This commentary also studies how these bonds operate and further influence the relations.
Bangladesh’s relations with the GCC: Economic asymmetry and remittance
Bangladesh’s foreign policy with the Middle East depends primarily on economic diplomacy. Bangladesh’s history of forming economic relations with the Middle East developed simultaneously with its political association with the region in 1972 at the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) conference, which condemned the atrocities committed by the Pakistan Armed Forces on Bengali-speaking-dominated erstwhile East Pakistan. In the same year, Bangladesh was admitted as a member of AAPSO, and the United Arab Republic, Iraq, and South Yemen voted in favor of Bangladesh’s membership in the World Health Organization (WHO). In 1973, within two years from its independence, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rehman met King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia (Husain, 2020).
Labor migration from Bangladesh to the Middle East began when the oil-rich states in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman, Libya, and (up to 1990) Iraq began to expand speedily and needed cheap labor. Thereafter, under partial supervision of the Bangladesh government, low-skilled Bangladeshi workers were brought over on contracts to these countries. Emphasis on migration continued, and it became one of the major sources of revenue for Bangladesh. Tables 1 and 2 show the import–export details between Bangladesh and Middle Eastern nations from 2015 to 2021:
Country-wise import from Bangladesh (in million Taka).
Source: Statistical Yearbook Bangladesh 2020, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Dhaka, Bangladesh, URL: https://www.bbs.gov.bd.
Country-wise export to Bangladesh (in million Taka).
Source: Statistical Yearbook Bangladesh 2020, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Dhaka, Bangladesh, URL: https://www.bbs.gov.bd.
From the tables, it can be seen that Bangladesh has a maximum volume of trade with Turkey and the GCC countries. Relations between Turkey and Bangladesh range from subjects such as trade, economic and technical cooperation, culture, military education and training, to banking, shipping, and double taxation. In 2007, the Turkey–Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry was founded. Turkey’s relations with Bangladesh took a fresh turn when in November 2010, the Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Bangladesh and became the first Turkish Prime Minister to visit Bangladesh after 21 years. During his visit to Bangladesh, both countries also pledged to work on combating all forms of terrorism and maintaining world peace and security. This visit revealed that Turkey’s new proactive foreign policy is trade-oriented (Baba, 2017).
Relations between Bangladesh and GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar similarly followed the path of trade, together with investment, and direct shipping between important cities. Bangladesh has excellent bilateral relations in trade and commerce, human resources, and the energy sector with Kuwait, as discussed by the outgoing Ambassador of Kuwait Adel Mohammed A. H. Hayat and Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Dr A. K. Abdul Momen on 14 June 2022. Dr Momen thanked the government of Kuwait for providing free vaccines and treatments to Bangladeshi expatriates in Kuwait during the Covid-19 pandemic and expressed gratitude for extending humanitarian support to Rohingyas. Ambassador A. H. Hayat also mentioned that Kuwait can recruit more medical professionals, including nurses, and medical technicians from Bangladesh (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Bangladesh exports frozen food, processed food items, fruits and vegetables, tea, garments, and so on to Qatar and imports urea fertilizer from Qatar Fertilizer Company Limited (QAFCO) annually under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in October 2009 (Embassy of Bangladesh, Doha, n.d.).
Bangladesh also started importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar under the long-term agreement in 2018 (Embassy of Bangladesh, Doha, n.d.). Tables 1 and 2 show the huge trade deficit in this bilateral trade. The continuing LNG import from Qatar is likely to increase this deficit. To reduce the gap, Bangladesh began to focus on non-traditional supplies such as pharmaceutical products to capture the market of Qatar. In 2018, the Bangladesh State Minister for Foreign Affairs attended an Investment Seminar in September organized by the Bangladesh Forum in Qatar in cooperation with the Embassy of Bangladesh to discuss these alternative trade items (Embassy of Bangladesh, Doha, n.d.).
Bangladesh and Qatar also signed several MOUs since 2005. 1 Qatar further inaugurated two visa centers in Bangladesh (Dhaka and Sylhet) in December 2018 to facilitate and streamline procedures for bringing in an expatriate workforce. These centers provide services, including fingerprinting for the workers, registration of vital data, conducting medical examinations, and signing of a contract of employment (Embassy of Bangladesh, Doha, n.d.) In an effort of growth in bilateral relation, Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina met with Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad al Thani on 4 March 2023 while visiting Qatar to attend the 5th UN Conference on Least Developed Countries. In this meeting, she received positive response regarding Bangladesh’s demand for more Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), better working condition for Migrants and Qatar’s investment in Bangladesh’s economic zone ( The Daily Star 2023).
In the case of Oman, Bangladesh’s relationship is framed by several MOUs on Air Services Agreement, an MOU between Oman and Bangladesh’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry, an MOU on Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Derived from International Transport, cooperation in the field of Manpower, and MOU to Hold Regular Foreign Office Consultations between Bangladesh and Oman (Embassy of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Muscat, n.d.).
Bangladesh’s economy also heavily relies on remittances. As per the World Bank Migration and Development Brief 36 (2022), Bangladesh was the seventh-highest recipient of remittances from abroad in 2021. Table 3 lists the countries from which Bangladesh has received the maximum amount of remittances from 2010 to 2020.
Country-wise remittances in Bangladesh 2010–2021 (in US million $).
Source: Statistical Yearbook Bangladesh 2020, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Dhaka, Bangladesh, URL: https://www.bbs.gov.bd.
As Table 3 shows, GCC countries provide the most remittances to Bangladesh’s economy. By 2020–2021, Saudi Arabia has become the top destination for the Bangladeshi migrant workforce. Among all the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia hosts a total of 4.58 million Bangladeshi migrant workers. However it is to be noted that Bangladeshi immigrants were not allowed to work in specific sectors of Saudi Arabia. 2 (Mahmud, 2022).
As per the data of the Bureau of Manpower, Development and Training, Ministry of Expatriates Welfare and Overseas Training (2020), even during the peak of the pandemic in 2020 when most of the labor markets remained closed off, Saudi Arabia employed 161,726 Bangladeshi workers. In 2022, among 1,135,873 Bangladeshi migrants, 612,418, almost 54% of total overseas employment, went to Saudi Arabia, which is currently executing several large projects under its “Vision-2030” 3 (Shazzad, 2022).
Following Saudi Arabia, since 2020, Qatar has recruited approximately 280,000 semi-skilled and less-skilled workers from Bangladesh. They have been employed primarily in construction projects, which were aimed to develop infrastructures for the World Cup in 2022. The migrant workers have also been majorly employed for several development projects under the National Vision 2030. Bangladeshi migrants in Qatar constitute 10.43% of the total overseas employment in Bangladesh. It is estimated that approximately 420,000 Bangladeshi citizens are working in the government, semi-government, and private sectors of Qatar at present (Embassy of Bangladesh, Doha, n.d.). Several hundred Bangladeshi citizens, albeit a small number, are also engaged in running their businesses and working as contractors and semi-contractors. An even smaller number of Bangladeshis are working in defense forces and police. Roughly 500 Bangladeshi are in white-collar jobs working as engineers, teachers, bankers, and doctors. Finally, Bangladeshi citizens are also working as imams and muezzin in different masques of Qatar (Embassy of Bangladesh, Doha, n.d.).
Approximately 200,000 Bangladesh nationals are presently living in Bahrain (Embassy of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Manama, n.d.). In the last few years, Bangladesh emerged as one of the top manpower exporting countries to Bahrain. Construction is the largest sector of employment for Bangladeshis in Bahrain. However, this sector is filled with primarily unskilled Bangladeshi laborers. About 70% of the Bangladeshi workforce in this sector is unskilled (Embassy of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Manama, n.d.). Only a small section of these laborers is semi-skilled and/or skilled workers. Aside from construction, Bangladeshis are employed in cleaning companies, carpentry, retail shops, tailoring shops, and hairdressing shops; and as accountants, drivers in offices, and fishermen in fishing trawlers; hotel management staff, chefs, cooks, bakers, and service staff in restaurants; and workers in agricultural farms and plantations. Several thousand, both male and female, are working as domestic aides (Embassy of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Manama, n.d.).
The numbers of skilled Bangladeshi laborers in Bahrain are much more limited. These white-collar Bangladeshi employees are working as lawyers, teachers, engineers, financial experts, bankers, business management officials, doctors, and in Police and Bahrain Defense Forces. The involvement of Bangladeshi workers in the Bahraini economy is however increasing. More than 100 investors are now maintaining business in Bahrain, and this number is increasing. Several thousand Bangladeshis are running businesses by hiring commercial licenses. Bangladeshis own or run construction licenses, grocery shops/cold stores, Internet shops, small restaurants, garages, saloons, and so on (Embassy of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Manama, n.d.).
With regard to the UAE, the Bangladesh Ministry of External Affairs has confirmed that jobs for migrants are growing gradually. However, it was pointed out that most Bangladeshi migrant workers go there on tourist visas. Yet, many of them fail to change their visit visas into employment visas (Palma, 2022). To resolve the issue of receiving employment visas, the Bangladesh Ministry of Expatriates Welfare and Overseas Employment along with the UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation is currently processing electronic passports for Bangladeshi expatriates as part of the country’s document safety procedures. Furthermore, a legal infrastructure for worker migration is being developed between the Bangladeshi Ministry of Expatriates Welfare and Overseas Employment and the UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation (Zaman, 2022).
Oman was the other significant destination for Bangladeshi migrants from 1976 to 2019, coming after Saudi Arabia and the UAE. From 1996 to 2008, Omani visas for Bangladeshi nationals were only granted for agricultural work. Such restrictions were lifted in 2008, as Oman’s larger, more ambitious construction plans required semi-skilled and skilled laborers. The Bangladesh Embassy in Muscat estimates the number of Bangladeshis presently living in Oman at 750,000, which includes undocumented workers (Blanche, 2021). Bangladesh nationals continue to remain the largest expatriate community in Oman (The Arabian Stories, 2022).
Kuwait is another destination for Bangladeshi workforce. In 2021, Bangladeshi migrant workers earned remittances worth more than $1.5 billion through authorized channels in Kuwait. It was the fourth highest in terms of remittance in Bangladesh. Even with having such a large presence in the country, the future of the migrant laborers in Kuwait remains unstable. This is due to a bill related to the expatriate community’s ratio that could be introduced in Kuwait politics. In June 2020, Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Khaled Al-Sabah discussed the possibility of reducing the expatriate ratio in Kuwait to 30% of the country’s population from 70% at present (South Asia Monitor, 2020).
As per a proposed bill in 2020, Bangladeshis must not exceed 3% of Kuwait’s total populace, which is approximately 4.8 million at present. If the bill is passed, only about 1.5 lakh Bangladeshis will be allowed to stay and work in the country. Through this law, almost half of the existing Bangladeshi migrants already living in Kuwait will have to leave (South Asia Monitor, 2020). There has not been much discussion from the Kuwaiti government on this aspect. However, in a much more recent development, in 2022, a committee of experts and financial consultants is formed to put forward a plan by combining sectors of similar work and through the privatization of government bodies. As per this committee, the government can let go of around 50,000 expatriate workers in Kuwaiti companies within 3 years, specifically in construction companies, already lacking Kuwaiti workers (Kuwait Times, 2022).
In the last 2 years, the number of returning migrants from the Middle East has increased. This is primarily due to reduced employment opportunities leading to loss of income among migrant workers. In addition to that recruitment costs have also increased during the Covid-19 crisis (International Organization for Migration, 2015). Furthermore, jobs in construction, manufacturing, agricultural sectors, food services, and the retail trade are generally considered disagreeable to the local population. Such menial jobs often cause a threat to the welfare of migrant workers and make them experience exploitative working and living conditions, including forced labor, debt bondage, commercial sexual exploitation, forced begging and child labor, human trafficking, and forced labor (International Organization for Migration, 2015). The local population further carries a persistent idea that most migrants are uneducated, which creates an image that migrant workers are inferior (Begum, 2020).
Oftentimes deceptive or false information on job related matters (monthly wages or the type of job) is provided to the workers through contracts written in Arabic and signed upon arrival in the destination country. Brokers and agencies from home countries also frequently charge exorbitant recruitment fees, with extreme interest rates leading to the worker’s debt. In many cases, particularly where the government has banned the recruitment of domestic workers, migration is continued through irregular ways that aggravate already precarious employment conditions (International Organization for Migration, 2015).
From the understanding of Bangladesh’s dependence on GCC remittances and the unstable status of Bangladeshi workers in GCC countries, it could be noted that remittances are a fickle source of income for a country. Bangladesh’s relations with the GCC countries are dominated by asymmetric economic diplomacy because it is leaning in favour of Middle Eastern nations. The next section discusses how the asymmetry caused by this economic relation merges with cultural affinities and provides a channel of influence for Middle Eastern actors over Bangladesh.
Middle East’s relations with Bangladesh: A culture-based influence
As already discussed, Bangladesh’s relations with the Middle East are primarily based on economic necessities. From that perspective, it can be seen that Bangladesh’s trade relations with the region are witnessing growth with increasing export. In the context of remittances, it is seen that GCC countries are working with the Bangladesh government to support migrant laborers. This section discusses the impact of Bangladesh–Middle East relations on the foreign and domestic affairs of the former. Some parts of the relation are based on migrant movements related to remittances, the others are religion, culture, and civil society or just tertiary bilateral developments, such as counterterrorism cooperation.
Historically, both Saudi Arabia and Turkey supported Pakistan when Bangladesh was trying to secure its liberation. This tension was also reflected during the prosecution by the Awami League government of the leaders of the Islamist religious party Jamaat-e-Islami (Chopra, 2015). In 2010, the government of Bangladesh established a special, ad hoc court called The International Crimes Tribunal (Bangladesh) 4 to adjudicate grave crimes committed during the war of independence that led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. This Tribunal was involved with the indictment, conviction, and execution of leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami, the country’s largest Islamist party (Chopra, 2015).
Saudi Arabia opposed the prosecution but did not directly intervene as requested by Khaleda Zia (Khan, 2015). On the contrary, the ruling political party in Turkey, the AKP, adopted a political Islamist ideology in 2011, and it had been providing support to the political Islam network across the world, including the Jamaat-e-Islami Party in Bangladesh. Therefore, AKP leaders were affronted by the ongoings of Bangladesh and were likely to function in solidarity with the Jamaat-e-Islami. In December 2012, the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, wrote a letter to his Bangladeshi counterpart, Zillur Rahman, urging Bangladeshi courts to grant 1971 war suspects clemency (Çolakoğlu, 2019). Turkey also had withdrawn its ambassador to Bangladesh in 2016 (Reuters, 2016).
Religion plays an important role in propagating cultural linkage between Bangladesh and the Middle East, especially when it comes to Saudi Arabia. Bangladesh has been influenced by Saudi Arabia’s propagated Wahabism. Its emphasis on Islam began when President Ziaur Rahman introduced Islam rescinding the existing ban on religion-based political parties in the 1970s. This facilitated the rehabilitation and integration of Jamaat-e-Islami, a political group with an aspiration to create an islamic state in Bangladesh. Next President Hussain Muhammad Ershad continued these policies declaring Islam as the state religion (Fernando, 2011).
The migration from Bangladesh to GCC also indirectly impacted the spreading of Wahabism in Bangladesh. For the migrants, long working hours and employer-imposed restrictions on mobility results in social isolation, especially for women working as domestic help in private households. The acquirement of trustworthy religious knowledge in Saudi Arabia for these migrants is primarily attributed to adaptation to the strict religious environment of Saudi Arabia. Often the immigrants form a sense of religious duty to instruct their family and community members on correct practices as learned in the “land of Allah” (Kibria and Zakaria 2022). This may include instructions on how to pray or the importance of enforcing the rules of separation between men and women. Such practices mesh with the religious teachings introduced by Jamaat-e-Islami and other conservative religious elements in present Bangladesh depicting that, Islamic practices in Bangladesh. This is creating an impression that Islamic practices in Bangladesh are impure and corrupt (Kibria and Zakaria 2022).
The continued migration from Bangladesh to the GCC could be one reason Bangladesh’s social structure went through a transformation. In the 1980s, changes were visible not only in the politics of Bangladesh but also in society. The old tradition of Sufism in Bangladeshi society was being replaced by a new version of Islam, Wahabism. This new version of Islam fell into place with Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamist political elements in Bangladesh which were against the Awami League government. This started a radical Islamist political movement in Bangladesh creating a breeding ground for extremist groups (Kibria and Zakaria 2022). Terrorism in Bangladesh also has a close and direct association with Saudi Arabia. Bangladesh’s religious terrorist groups also depend on external support for funds. Allegedly Saudi Arabia’s Al Rajhi Bank provides considerable support to these groups (Kibria and Zakaria 2022). Furthermore, Bangladeshi citizens have joined various terrorist organisations in the Middle East, such as the Islamic State (IS). According to the police chief of counterterrorism operations, Monirul Islam, from June 2017 to 2018, about 20 Bangladeshis, including male and female, had tried to enter Syria to join the IS, and approximately 38 Bangladeshis had tried to join other terrorist agencies (Kibria and Zakaria 2022).
Along with business and commercial interests, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of Bangladesh have been an important channel for Saudi influence. Albeit, the precise scope and significance of Saudi Arabia in this regard are difficult to assess due to the absence of data on funding channels (Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, 2016). However, it has been so far identified that several charitable NGOs are operating in Bangladesh with significant amounts of funding from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, including the Islamic Relief Organization, Al Markajul Islami, Ishra Islamic Foundation, Ishrahul Muslimin, Al Forkan Foundations, and Al Maghrib Eye Hospital (Kumar, 2009). Through these organizations, Saudi Arabia has sponsored the construction of mosques, madrasas, and orphanages in Bangladesh. They have also helped in resuscitating the existing Wahabism. For example, several institutions in Saudi Arabia, such as the Islamic University of Medina and Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, offer scholarships to foreign students from around the world, including those from Bangladesh. Jamat-e-Islami, also reportedly indulges in a wide range of abilities, including the development of banks, hospitals, schools, universities, and NGOs with funding from Saudi Arabia (Rahman, 2018).
The recent global outlook on counterterrorism has impacted Bangladesh’s relations with Turkey as well as GCC. After the Holey Artisan Bakery attack on 1 July 2016, the Bangladesh government has undertaken a “Zero Tolerance Policy” to fight against extremism and militancy. This has been a primary agenda in Bangladesh’s internal and external foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh, 2022). In a security deal on 9 January 2022, Bangladesh and Turkey agreed to cooperate in countering terrorism via information exchanges. The recent security deal will also create a new opening for Bangladesh’s Security Forces to buy new weapons as part of their diversification plan from Armed Forces Goal 2030 which is an attempt introduced in 2009 to expand and modernize the Bangladeshi Army, Navy, and Air Forces (Islam, 2022). This bilateral understanding will help both the countries to improve their ranking on the Global Terrorism Index (ProthomAlo, 2022). As per the Index in 2022, Turkey was the 23rd most impacted country by terrorism in the world, while Bangladesh was 40th. Counterterrorism efforts have been a catalyst in developing Bangladesh–Middle East relations even before 2016. An example of this is when Bangladesh joined a Saudi Arabia–mediated 34-state Islamic military coalition to combat terrorism in 2015 (The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2019).
Bangladesh plans to diversify its defense suppliers, to meet the Armed Forces Goal 2030. This long-term goal was meant to build a force capable of conducting multi-platform warfare (Hossain, 2018). Turkey has been instrumental in such an endeavor of Bangladesh. Presently, Bangladesh is the fourth-largest weapon purchaser from Turkey (Sakib, 2021). In the first 4 months of 2021, Bangladesh imported US $60 million worth of arms and ammunition from Turkey, out of Turkey’s total of US $1 billion in defense sales (Islam, 2022).
The Turkish foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, on a visit to Dhaka in December 2020 expressed enthusiasm to intensify defense cooperation with Bangladesh and pursue a Joint Production and Technology Transfer initiative (Sakib, 2021). As part of Armed Forces Goal 2030, Bangladesh could seek assistance from the Turkish Armed Forces, defense industries, and arms manufacturing companies to help build a similar kind of ammunition industry to become self-reliant and diversify defense capabilities (Ghosh, 2021). Turkey also has a goal of supplying defense equipment throughout the world. In 2021, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan stated his intention to expand Turkey’s defense industrial base by increasing arms sales to US $25 billion by 2023 (Reuters, 2021).
In 2013, Turkey delivered Otokar Cobra light armored vehicles to the Bangladesh Army and received US $1 billion contracts for 680 light armored vehicles in 2017. Moreover, in March 2019, Bangladesh signed a contract with the Turkish Company ROKETSAN to procure medium-range guided multiple rocket launchers. Other projects are being discussed, such as training programs and military exercises between the two countries’ armed forces. Aside from weapons supply to Bangladesh, Turkey also provides training to the country’s security forces. For example, Ankara provided training to 41 members of the Bangladesh Armed Forces in June 2021 (Sakib, 2021). The defense agreement in January 2022 will also follow the same path and will create opportunities for further training exercises and ultimately lead to better understanding and cooperation between these two countries (Islam, 2022).
Turkey also has maintained its unconditional support to Bangladesh on the Rohingya issue which has helped significantly in deepening the ties between the two countries. Both Turkey and Kuwait supported Bangladesh on the Rohingya issue at various multilateral forums such as the United Nations (UN), the G20, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Furthermore, Ankara, via its state institutions such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), and other Turkish NGOs, has built various facilities such as camps, hospitals, schools, and orphanages for refugees in Bangladesh (TIKA, 2019). Turkey’s financial contributions to the welfare of Rohingya Muslims in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar camps surpass US $60 million, besides the aid which is donated through the UN institutions. Turkey also has established a field hospital in Cox’s Bazar, which is operated by Turkish doctors and nurses (Kamruzzaman, 2020).
Beyond the influences discussed above, Turkey has also founded a cultural tie with Bangladesh through its television series. As a convenient platform to promote Turkish culture, history tourism, and products, the Turkish Drama “Resurrection Ertuğrul” had millions of people hooked. Turkish Ambassador to Bangladesh Mustafa Osman Turan visited Bangladesh’s popular private TV channel Deepto in 2021 and exchanged views with the management of the channel about the prospects of Turkish TV series in the country (Daily Sabah, 2021).
This section shows that GCC and Turkey’s relation with Bangladesh goes beyond economy. The bilateral relation is ingrained in historical tradition, cultural similarities, and similar political motivation. However much of this socio-cultural and defense relation depends upon Bangladesh’s economic connections with the region, primarily migration and requirement of capital inflow.
Conclusion
This commentary shows the two layers of Bangladesh–Middle East relations. The first layer of relation is economic asymmetry and negative trade balance for Bangladesh. The Middle East actors’ need for Bangladeshi workers is less than Bangladesh’s need for remittances from the Middle East. Yet, as the commentary suggests, there is a slow change in the trade balance in Bangladesh’s favor. Such asymmetric relation is directly being superseded by Middle East’s influence over Bangladesh on different levels.
The second layer of relation is social, political, and cultural influence of the Middle Eastern actors. Rising Wahabism, bilateral deals in other aspects (particularly in counterterrorism and defense), and Bangladesh’s growing adoration for Turkish culture are significant examples of this. It is still unclear whether Bangladesh’s developing economy could create a more visible positive trade balance with the Middle East, which could gradually eliminate this influence in the future.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
