Middle East–South Asia Relations: Transregional Minilateralism Cemented with Bilateralism

Abstract

The politico-economically uneven structure, fragile inter-state affairs and weak regionalism of the Middle East make it difficult to explain its interactions with South Asia within a single theoretical pattern. Neither interregionalism nor multilateralism could illuminate these interactions individually. This study merges recently popularized interaction schemes of minilateralism and bilateralism on a transregional basis to provide an eclectic and flexible conceptual framework to explain the patterns of Middle East–South Asia inter-state affairs. It argues that regardless of its weak regionalism and intra-regional power games, the Middle East, with these trendy interaction schemes, could still develop effective inter-state relations with South Asia. The study utilizes the empirical analysis method to interpret various levels and types of interactions between actors of various capabilities. In addition, it also uses case studies to produce a deeper context-dependent knowledge of Middle Eastern – South Asian actors.

Keywords

Transregionalism minilateralism bilateralism Middle East South Asia

Introduction

This study aims to draw the general pattern of interactions between the Middle East and South Asia, by majorly focusing on the peculiarities of the former and its actors’ interactions with their South Asian partners. Since the interactions under examination are between two regions, it is expected that they should fit into the interregionalist and multilateral framework. Yet, due to the peculiar characteristics of Middle Eastern intra-regional affairs, neither interregionalism nor multilateralism could accurately frame them. A more flexible framework for regional interactions and a less institutional and norm-binding concept is required.

This study argues that transregionalism and minilateralism strengthened by bilateralism could frame these interactions more suitably. By using the less-membered, less-institutionalized, and less-rule-based outlines of these concepts, this study unfolds the motivations, expectations, and policy practices of the Middle Eastern actors towards South Asians.

Structurally, the study first discusses interregionalism and multilateralism by underlining their main requirements for successful interaction between regions. It also explains why these sorts of interactions are slowly becoming unfashioned and particularly unfitting for the major characteristics of the Middle East, for example, weakly institutionalized regionalism, never-ending intra-regional and inter-state power games and sharp divisions between its actors. Second, the study proposes a less familiar but more fitting eclectic theoretical frame to present the inter-state relations between these two regions: transregional minilateralism bolstered by bilateralism. In this part of the study, transregionalism is presented as a more flexible, less-institutionalized scheme operating via fewer rules and a more narrowed-down focus. Minilateralism is claimed as a practical complement of transregionalism, with its fewer membership needs and not being hindered by power asymmetries. More importantly, unlike interregionalism, these schemes do not need an institutional framework or a great power’s auspices. Therefore, like bilateralism, they are becoming more of a fashion in today’s inter-state relations. Bilateralism is presented as the supplementary scheme that operates through the specific needs of regional powers. Similar to minilaterals, bilaterals can be easily arranged and maintained and are not hindered by power asymmetries. With this eclectic framework, this study argues that today’s Middle East–South Asia relations operate on eclectic, less-institutionalized, more flexible and less-membered inter-state interaction platforms.

Regionalism studies do not only have an empirical but also a theoretical gap regarding the analysis of Middle East–South Asia relations. By examining and eclecticizing the concepts above, this study aims to draw a theoretical pattern for these two regions’ interactions, which was not tried before. Empirically, the study utilizes transregional and minilateral interactions which are supported by bilateral relations between these regions’ actors to show the practical functionality of this eclectic theoretical framework. The study, as a result, tries to prove that even for regions as fragmented and asymmetrical as the Middle East and South Asia, a theoretical pattern could still be drawn.

Interregional multilateralism: falling off the map?

Although it has been widely used, interregionalism does not have an authoritative definition. Yet, its requirements are distinguishing. Successful interregional interactions demand institutional interchanges between two distinct regions embodied in formal regional organizations relying on interdependence (Baert et al., 2014a; Mattheis and Litsegård, 2018). Therefore, most interregionalism debates are devised around the European Union (EU) due to its strong mandate and institutional capacity, which underline the level of its actorness, coherence and autonomy (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Hill, 1993). Other regional organizations, for example, MERCOSUR, SAARC, or Southern African Development Community, also carry out group-to-group interactions but most of them have been ‘ad-hoc-ist, intermittent and noncommittal’, which weakens their regularity (Hänggi et al., 2006b: 7), and therefore their interregionalist nature. Interregionalism aims to strengthen regional cohesion and regional identity, for both of which institutionalism matters (Gilson, 2002; Hänggi, 2003). The three most significant examples of interregional interactions are the dialogue partnership between the EU and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the EU and Mercosur, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

Regional organizations in interregionalism need to be ‘regional actors’ which is ‘more often than not a framework for action of member states rather than an actor itself’. These organizations interregionalize in three forms: ‘relations with regional organizations in other regions’, ‘relations with third states in other regions’ and ‘direct or indirect involvement in other interregional (or transregional) mechanisms’ (Hänggi, 2006a: 33–34). These forms depict that interregionalism requires well-functioning regional organizations capable of representing their region, and cohesive and autonomous enough to carry out relations, symmetrically or asymmetrically with their counterparts bearing, more or less, similar characteristics.

Another important element of inter-state affairs between different regions is multilateralism, which is seen as complementary to interregionalism (Hettne and Ponjaert, 2014: 1–2). Multilateralism has both quantitative and qualitative features. Quantitatively, and simply, three or more states’ interactions are acknowledged as multilateral. Yet its qualitative dimension makes the concept more distinctive (Ruggie, 1992: 571). In multilateralism, states coordinate their national policies ‘through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions’ (Keohane, 1990: 731). Through these, multilateralism provides generalized organizing principles, indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity between its members. Generalized organizing principles ‘specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence’ (Ruggie, 1992: 571). Indivisibility refers to the existence of public goods recognized and accepted by the members (Ruggie, 1992: 571). Diffuse reciprocity is an expectation of the parties in a multilateral scheme that there would be a ‘rough equivalence of benefits’ (Keohane, 1986: 19–24; Ruggie, 1992: 571). In short, multilateralism requires ‘agreed-upon rules and principles’ eventually causing ‘some reduction in policy autonomy’ of the members (Ikenberry, 2003: 534).

In recent years, there has been a stagnation in multilateral organizations’ reforms, fulfilment of their objectives and attempts to deepen global cooperation (Alvarez, 2000: 395; Tirkey, 2021: 3), which reduced their popularity. Moreover, multilaterals’ formal institutional structures tightened by their bureaucracies and complex mixtures of national interests slow down decision-making processes and taking prompt actions. Multilateralism has been losing ground, particularly in Asia due to the participants’ variety in development levels, trade potentials and threat perceptions. Another weakness of multilateral schemes is opportunism and free-riding. Very rarely they are based on equitable funding rules (Buchanan, 1965: 1–14), which makes the burden-sharing disproportional. This reduced efficacy makes multilaterals counterproductive (Schmitt, 2017). Another underlying reason for the decline of their popularity is the rise of far-right and populism which has been detrimental to the norms of globalization and liberalism. The US–China trade war, which has been sharpened by the Chinese efforts to alter Western liberal norms, the weakening of the EU and the degrading efficiency of the UN agencies demonstrate this recession. Even for climate change, uncontrolled migration and cybersecurity, multilateral schemes have not produced the necessary level of success. COVID-19 crisis very recently and very strongly underpinned the limitations of multilateral efforts even under the auspices of the World Health Organization. These weaknesses of multilateralism underline its ineffectiveness and therefore highlight the increasing functionality of minilateralism (Sabatini, 2014).

Transregional minilateralism: getting ahead?

Unlike interregionalism, transregionalism (Aggarwal, 1998; Köllner, 2000; Rüland, 2002; Yeo, 2000) defines looser and less institutional interactions. Rather than explaining relations between regional organizations, transregionalism focuses on state and non-state actors together (Ribeiro-Hoffmann, 2016). It goes ‘beyond the narrow interaction between two institutionalized regions within a formal and mainly intergovernmental framework’ (Aggarwal and Fogerty, 2004: 5; Baert et al., 2014b: 5). Thus, cooperation between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is also counted within this scheme (Aggarwal and Fogerty, 2004b: 5).

Transregionalism does not aim for deepening regionalism but focuses on agenda-setting, policy planning, and developing and prioritizing mutual policy aims. Therefore, it is a ‘dialogue process with a more diffuse membership’ (Rüland, 2006: 296). In transregionalism, individual states ‘act in their individual capacity’ (Baert et al., 2014b: 5), rather than via regional organizations. Since it does not require a structured, inclusive and institutional interaction between the representatives of different regions, transregionalism ‘is not reducible to [pure, full-fledged] interregionalism’ (Betts, 2010: 29). The former is much more comprehensive and flexible. Due to the below-explained intra-regional fragmentations and its regional organizations’ weaknesses in cohesiveness, autonomy and even performance, transregionalism could provide a more suitable framework for Middle East’s relations with South Asia.

As a result of its flexibility, minilateralism fits into transregionalism better than multilateralism (Patrick, 2015: 116). First, minilateralism is defined as ‘multilateralism with small numbers’ (Oye, 1986: 21). Although it requires fewer participants, no minimum number for the concept was specified. Naim’s (2009) widely referred to magical number for minilateralism is between a dozen and 20. Cha (2003: 116–117) claims that for Indo-Pacific this number is three or four. Nilsson-Wright (2017) and Green (2014) also highlight three-membered minilaterals. Especially, due to the varieties of transregional interactions, it is not easy to propose a ‘certain’ magical number for minilateralism. Second, minilaterals give their members the option to engage with different actors on different frameworks with an array of policy aims. Due to their small number, minilaterals bring fewer national interests to the table, which makes the negotiation processes smoother (Falkner, 2016: 89; Lee-Brown, 2018: 168). Numerically speaking, the smaller the grouping, the better for committing to a joint vision and working towards clear and time-bound aims (Keohane, 1990: 731; Olson, 1965; Ruggie, 1993: 11; Taylor, 1987: 12; Tirkey, 2021: 20). Therefore, minilateralism has recently been more widely applied to international trade and security interactions (Brandi et al., 2015; Brummer, 2014; Hampson and Heinbeker, 2011). With its expanding application, minilateralism has the potential to ‘overshadow and eventually challenge multilateralism’ (Teo, 2018).

Minilateralism diverges from multilateralism in various aspects. Minilateralism does not necessarily aim for generalized organizing principles or indivisibility but for more practical and satisfactory results. As Naim (2009) argues, minilaterals aim for ‘the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem’ with the smallest possible number. Therefore, unlike multilateralism’s inclusiveness, minilateralism utilizes exclusiveness and even discrimination. Minilateralism is also claimed to be more effective than multilateralism due to its resilience to power asymmetries (Falkner, 2016: 88). In other words, minilateralism underlines efficiency and efficacy rather than equity (Porter et al., 2004). As seen in the Middle East–South Asia relations, only a very limited number of countries come together in power asymmetries and deliberately exclude others to achieve a specific aim.

Minilaterals’ limited number also provides more functionality. They target only specific needs or challenges and due to the lack of a commitment to an institution, they motivate the participants to operate more informally. Such a lack of commitment acts as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it increases effectiveness and reduces negotiation costs. Haass (2010) describes this as functional minilateralism, in which the parties do not necessarily maintain their arrangement after they achieve the ‘specific task’. On the other hand, it makes minilaterals more fragile than multilaterals and could turn them into mere ‘talk-shops’ (Cha, 2011: 36).

Minilateralism operates in various areas ranging from economy to security, from blockchain, to supply chain resilience, and from 5G to climate change. Minilateralism proved its efficiency in trade and infrastructural investment due to its ease of decision-making (Chheang, 2020; Naim, 2009). Minilateralism is similarly appealing for countering non-traditional threats due to their complexity (Nilsson-Wright, 2017). Minilateralism between middle and small powers in the security realm is even more preferable since the national interests of these powers in these schemes are not manipulated by the interests of major powers, as is usually seen in multilateral alliances. Although minilaterals do not necessarily provide a strong coalition, they can deepen the ‘degree of familiarity and trust’ between their members (Tirkey, 2021: 13).

This does not necessarily mean that minilateral groupings are only composed of weak powers. These schemes can also be made up of small/emerging/middle powers that can exert politico-economic influence (Rothkopf, 2009) at least on selected sectors of global affairs (Victor, 2006: 101) ‘incommensurate with their size’ (Tan, 2020: 123). The more like-minded they are, the easier they could create issue-specific minilateral partnerships (Tirkey, 2021). On the other hand, the expansion of minilaterals does not mean that they will replace multilateralism for global competition, but they can rejuvenate the latter’s weaknesses (Teo, 2018).

The preference for minilateralism is clearly seen in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific (Qinghong, 2021: 123). The emerging minilateral security regionalism and the rivalry between the United States and China have been weakening multilateralism in the region and motivating smaller actors to be organized in minilaterals (Chheang, 2020: 108; Lee-Brown, 2018).

Bilateralism: a cement for minilateralism

Although bilateralism numerically speaking is even less minilateral, its aims are pretty much the same in transregional interactions. Similar to minilaterals, in bilateral interactions, there is an element of exclusion, through which two state actors ‘give particular privileges to one another that they do not give to other countries’. This depends on a normative belief that the issues at stake should be dealt with one-to-one governmental links, without involving the private sector, or multilateral platforms (Pempel, 2004). The shortcomings and weaknesses of regional multilateral initiatives and constantly changing domestic political requirements lead Middle Eastern actors to increase their bilateral initiatives. This increase is not surprising since bilateralism has become a global fashion in international trade, investment and security (Heydon and Woolcock, 2009: 9–11; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2012).

Unlike multilateralism, bilateralism requires less generalized organizing principles to specify appropriate conduct for certain actions. It allows for relations to be formulated to the expectations, needs and requirements of the two parties on a case-by-case basis (Ruggie, 1992: 571; Tago, 2017). In bilateralism, rather than a rough equivalence, there needs to be a ‘simultaneous balancing of specific quids-pro-quos by each party’, which contrasts with multilateralism’s diffuse reciprocity (Ruggie, 1992: 572).

Another advantage of bilateralism is its easier arrangement. Unlike multilaterals, bilateral schemes do not have checks and balances, which helps more resourceful states to carve better terms out (Dent, 2006). More conceptually speaking, bilateralism is a dyadic relationship, which ‘can be asymmetric due either to an imperfect balance of power or, alternatively, to a difference in the nature of actors’ (Renard, 2016: 19–20). This has been particularly appealing for the stronger Middle Eastern actors to formulate asymmetrical relations with their smaller South Asian partners. Moreover, bilaterals are much less vulnerable to intra-organizational divides or disagreements, which is quite a quality for the Middle East. Therefore, for the Middle East–South Asia relations, the former of which has already been quite fragmented, bilateralism provides a more meaningful mode of cooperation.

Bilateralism and minilateralism complement each other, especially for the relations that require functionality via informality (Cha, 2014: 742; Rochester, 1990: 143). Little cohesiveness and fragility of the Middle East, as explained below, push for informality which paves the way to bilateralism.

Bilateralism, with these features, is ‘more likely to advance commercial interests’ (Meissner, 2018: 54), which is the case for the Middle East–South Asia relations in the last decade. As explained below, most of the minilaterals in these relations originated from previous bilateral initiatives.

Peculiarities of the Middle East: reasons for being non-interregional and non-multilateral

Due to its two very characteristics, the Middle East could not develop rule-based, sustainable and institutionalized interregional relations with South Asia. These are first, the intra-regional inter/intra-state fragmentations resulting in the increased fragility of the region, and second, the well-known weaknesses of Middle Eastern regional organizations.

The first major reason for the intra-regional fragility is the recent history of the Middle East. Since the 1950s, the inter-state affairs of the region have been shaped by coups, uprisings and revolutions and also by the tension between Israel and Arab states, which exploded several times. In addition, the Iran–Iraq War continued for almost 8 years. The US intervention in Iraq via the Gulf and Iraq Wars increased the fragility of the region, which was further intensified by the Arab Spring and proxy wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. And finally, the devastating threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and the Syrian civil war made the region extremely brittle.

The second reason for this fragility is the unilateral maximalist aims of the Middle Eastern regional powers, for example, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. They are not only divided among themselves but also act at the expense of each other. Regional rivalries are acutely challenging the inner stability of the region. Saudi Arabia and UAE’s threat perceptions towards Iran have been a clear example of this (Taddonio, 2018). Similarly, Israel sees Iranian nuclear missile ambitions as the most significant threat (Netanyahu, 2015). Yet, shared threat perceptions do not lead Middle Eastern actors to develop common foreign policy applications. Although the anti-Iran goal coalesced Saudi Arabia and UAE with Israel (McKernan, 2022), they have not been operating as a coalition. From a larger perspective, even if their great power allies are the same, for example, the United States for Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia, they cannot develop common aims in their foreign policies, due to their political, cultural, ideological and religious domestic policy requirements.

This fragility is also bolstered by sectarian division. Sunni/Wahhabi versus Shi’/Iran threat or Turkey’s, although weakened by still rhetorically active, neo-Ottomanist threat versus Sunni/Wahhabi threat continues to divide the region. Saudi Arabia’s stance towards Iran and Iran’s actions towards the Iraqi Kurds are examples of that.

The last but not least reason for such fragility was the competing interests of great powers in the region. The United States tries to secure energy outflow from the region, keep the Middle Eastern market open for its strategic allies, maintain its strategic alliance with Israel and deepen security cooperation with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan (The White House, 2022). Russia, although not as economically dominant as the United States, has similar aims in the region. Moscow’s major aim is to keep the level of its arms sales and position in Syria intact (President of Russia, 2019). China aims to keep the energy inflow from the region uninterrupted and secure (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). For this, Beijing has been increasing its strategic role in the Middle East via Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road, and also with the increased infrastructural investments in Egypt and military installations in Djibouti (Paraschos, 2017: 20; Tanchum, 2021). These great power aims to produce ad hoc alliances with Middle Eastern actors and sharpen the divide between great and regional powers.

Such fragility, rivalry and polarization keep the Middle Eastern actors’ behaviour ‘increasingly secretive, unpredictable, and harsh’ (Amour, 2020:430). With these characteristics, the Middle East fits into the conceptual description of a ‘shatterbelt’, which is a ‘geographic region that is plagued both by local conflicts within or between states in the region, and by the involvement of competing major powers from outside the region’ (Hensel and Diehl, 1994: 33). The constant change, vulnerability and volatility in the inter-state relations in the region prevent the development of strongly institutionalized organizations. The weakness of the national identities of the post-Ottoman state actors and the low level of intra-regional economic exchange, which hindered the necessary economic incentives for regional integration, have made strong regional organizations even less of a possibility for the Middle East (Schulz and Schulz, 2005: 189; Pinfari, 2016). In short, the Middle East can be described as a ‘region without regionalism’ (Aarts, 1999: 911).

Major Middle Eastern inter-state organizations have been suffering from various weaknesses, which make them almost incapable of carrying out interregional interactions. The two most well-known and formal institutional forms of regionalism in the Middle East are the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Arab League was established with an ambitious pan-Arab agenda which was bound to fail from the start (Barnett and Solingen, 2007). Due to these foundational failures, the League was described as ‘weak’ (Howard, 1952: 108) or ‘almost defunct’ (Haas, 1956: 247) with a very little success rate even for intra-organizational conflicts (Nye, 1971) or regional conflicts (Awad, 1994; Pinfari, 2009). The above-mentioned inter-state divisions sustained the ineffectiveness of the League, which was clearly seen during the Gulf Crisis (1990–1991), the Iraq War (2003) and the Gaza conflict (2009). The dominance of authoritarian Arab states and the emphasis on the principle of non-interference and unanimity in its charter prevent the League to take determining actions neither in regional conflicts nor for democratization and liberalism (Beck, 2015: 195–196; Valbjorn, 2016), which are the two major requirements of interregional transactions.

Similarly, the Gulf Cooperation Council had ambitious aims presented in its preamble focusing on increasing coordination, integration and interconnection between its members (Gulf Cooperation Council, 2022). Yet, the timing of its formation in 1981 rendered the possibility of their achievement, since the Gulf region in the 1980s was under the influence of the Iranian Revolution which ‘pushed the smaller shaykhdoms closer to’ Saudi Arabia (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 164), and the Iran–Iraq war pushed these actors further away from cooperation (Guazzone, 1988: 136). Although the Council achieved some success in mediating regional border disputes and encouraging cooperation among its members (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 175–176; Ramazani, 1988: 123–127), the fragility of intra-organizational affairs has been weakening it. In 2017–2018, Qatar’s distancing from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE shook the unity of the organization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, 2017). But even before that the Council’s attempts to create a common currency and a Gulf central bank failed in 2006, when first Oman and then the UAE pulled out. Similarly, the introduction of an intra-organizational value-added tax was only supported by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The high-speed passenger and freight railway line project was another failure due to the disinclination of the Council members to fund it (Dudley, 2018).

These shortcomings and repeating failures of the two major Middle Eastern organizations underline that the regional actors have not produced and ‘in the foreseeable future will not’ (Pinfari, 2016) produce the type and style of organizations that would perform interregionalism. Therefore, Middle East’s relations with South Asia require a less-institutionalized and more flexible framework. As seen in the empirical examples below, minilateral and bilateral schemes operating via transregionalism define these two regions’ interactions more accurately.

Minilateral–bilateral nexus: transregional empirical cases

The first significant example of minilateralism in the Middle East–South Asia relations is between Pakistan, China and Iran. China and Pakistan’s strong relationship achieved a new level with China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which aims for multitiered connectivity expanding from South and Central Asia to the Middle East (CPEC, 2022). This particular project is an example of transregionalism regarding its institutional capability, structure and aims. Iran is interested in the project in the areas of energy and infrastructure (CPEC, 2019), which is a narrowed-down and practical minilateral focus. Asymmetries between the participants do not matter for minilateralism but like-mindedness and issue-specific orientation do. In this particular example, China’s role in Iran’s foreign trade highlights issue-specific orientation. China’s oil dependency on Iran (Dorsey, 2017) and its investments in Iranian oil fields make the US sanctions almost meaningless in Beijing–Tehran relations. In addition to trade, this minilateral scheme underlines like-mindedness in the security realm, especially regarding the current situation in Afghanistan (Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 2022). None of the participants desires extensive US involvement in Afghanistan (Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 2022; O’Connor, 2022). An additional point for this minilateral is that Iran and Pakistan relations are not in their best shape since the stationing of the US troops in Pakistan for their operations in Afghanistan, and were further aggravated by the sectarian violence issues in Pakistan. Yet, as Khan argued (2014), this minilateral scheme can be linked with Pakistan’s rivalry with India and Iran’s antagonism towards the United States, which naturally pushes Islamabad and Tehran towards Beijing. More importantly, the China–Iran deal could balance out the significantly asymmetrical relations between China–Pakistan and incentivize Pakistan’s relations with Iran. This minilateral could be quite functional for all parties that China could get ‘cheap Iranian oil’, Iran could get a ‘financial lifeline’ and Pakistan could ‘become the transit hub of China’s Middle East trade and energy supplies’ (Safdar and Zabin, 2020). The China–Pakistan–Iran triangle fits into the general mentality of minilateralism that even if all participants do not exactly share the same point of view, they can still cooperate without needing an institutional framework as long as the scheme targets the specific needs of the partners. In this particular case, Beijing’s specific needs overlap with Tehran’s and Islamabad’s have been acting as a bridge between Pakistan and Iran.

Another minilateral grouping is between India, the UAE, Israel and the United States, in a way, the incoming Middle Eastern or the West Asian Quad (Hussain, 2022; Maini, 2021). It is being formed with a snowball effect. India’s developing relations with the United States, Israel’s deepening relations with the UAE in both economic and strategic realms and India–UAE evolving relations in oil and diaspora spheres are being merged in this example of transregional minilateralism. It does not have an institutional framework or attempt to generalize some organizing principles, indivisibility or diffuse reciprocity. It covers engagements with different actors on different frameworks with a specific focus on efficiency and efficacy. Policy planning and developing mutual policy aims are its additional foci. One of its aims is clearly a transnational one, which goes beyond inter-state relations and attempts to develop business-to-business ties between the participants (Deutsche Welle, 2021; Maini, 2021). The newly forming ‘Quad’ is an illustration of the developing familiarity and trust between its members on various agendas. Although the Israeli Ambassador Naor Gilon said that the focus of the scheme is to pursue a constructive agenda on economy and infrastructure projects, that is, it does not have a military angle, the former Indian Ambassador Zikrur Rahman underlined that ‘even when you discuss economic cooperation, shared security concerns are bound to come up’, such as ‘intelligence sharing and closer coordination on the security front’ (Laskar, 2021). Similar to Rahman’s claim, due to the complexity and intertwined nature of the issues in the Middle East–South Asia affairs, this scheme aims to cover a wide range of agendas. The US State Department’s spokesperson Ned Price stated that the four discussed ‘expanding economic and political cooperation in the Middle East and Asia, including through trade, combating climate change, energy cooperation, and increasing maritime security’ and also people-to-people ties in science and technology (US Department of State, 2021). Yet, as seen in the previous example, not every member is on the same page on every topic. Regarding Iran, they diverge significantly. While the UAE and India aim to improve their relations, Israel and the United States have a more antagonized posture. They have a similar divergence on the issue of China as well. The UAE and Israel have been developing their economic relations with China but the United States and recently India attempt to counter the Chinese ‘threat’. Yet, none of these disagreements could hinder the development of this minilateral, since this scheme focuses only on specific needs or challenges rather than a unanimous accord.

The third example, between Turkey, Qatar and Afghanistan, is lacking a great power and therefore less ambitious but became significant after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The developing closeness between Turkey and Qatar is the starting point of this scheme. The participants came together to control Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport (Ghosh, 2021). Fitting into transnationalism, Turkey offered non-governmental elements, that is, private companies, for securing the airport (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, 2021). As a minilateral, this grouping has specific, clear and time-bound aims. For Ankara, securing the airport would help not only to protect Turkish commercial and political interests in Afghanistan but also to prevent a new wave of refugees. More importantly, Turkey uses this role to re-ignite relations with the United States and even with the EU (Dalay, 2021). For Afghanistan, it is more critical since the airport’s security is a guarantee for the flow of foreign humanitarian aid and investment (Soylu and Kemal, 2021). For Qatar, it would increase its diplomatic clout to act as a ‘hub for countries to maintain links with Afghanistan’, like the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and others have already moved their embassies to Qatar (Gumrukcu, 2022). The Spokesperson of the Qatari Foreign Ministry Abdul Qahar Balkhi underlined the continuing significance of Turkish, Qatari and Afghani minilateral by stating that ‘Turkish and Qatari technical teams are intended to work together so that they reach an agreement on the operation of five Afghan airports’ (Lalzoy, 2022). With such a specific aim, this scheme exemplifies another quality of minilateralism that the parties maintain their arrangement as long as their interests and commitments converge on that specific task. As noticed after the meeting in April 2022 between Afghan and Qatari representatives, the trilateral negotiations between the Qatar–Turkey consortium and the Taliban for operating and rebuilding Afghanistan’s five airports, in Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Khost, hit a deadlock with the Taliban’s statement. The Taliban official stated,

The contract for Kabul airport with [the] Qatar-Turkey consortium is only for receiving technical support Our people will protect the airport . . . . The presence of foreign troops or security experts on our soil is not acceptable to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. (Al-Monitor, 2022)

An expert tracking the negotiations also stated that Turkey and Qatar ‘don’t trust the Taliban’ (Al-Monitor.com, 2022).

Although minilateralism has become the new fashion in transregional affairs, its lack of institutionalization and organizing principles to regulate parties’ actions and rough equivalence of benefits make it quite dependent on the participants’ priorities, which, for the Middle East, can change quite rapidly. This makes transregional minilateralism between these two regions visibly fragile and therefore in need of an amplifier. Bilateralism, here, steps in as a booster.

Parallel to the global proliferation of bilateralism, the bilaterals in the Middle East–South Asia relations are much more numerous than minilaterals. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel and Iran are the top major players in these bilateral schemes.

Saudi Arabia’s link with South Asia is historic, civilizational and also diasporic due to a large community of South Asian workers in Saudi Arabia (Siddiqui, 2020). This diaspora has already created an economic and diplomatic platform between the Kingdom and South Asian countries. On high level, important linkages were also established. King Salman in 2017 and Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman in 2019 during their Asia-Pacific visits touched upon South Asian countries, for example, the Maldives, Pakistan, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, 2017, 2019, Panda, 2017; Saifi, 2019). Saudi–Pakistan relations are possibly the clearest example of multitiered bilateralism. The two countries are connected with Islamic ideologies and values together with historical bonds tracing back to the 1950s. As King Abdullah stated, they are ‘more than strategic partners and even more than brothers’ (Khan, 2012). As a part of Saudi Vision 2030, bilateral relations are decided to be augmented with intensified diplomatic, military and economic collaboration. The current trade volume is over 2.5 billion dollars and is aimed to be reinforced with a preferential trade agreement (Siddiqui, 2022). Another tier of this bilateral is the military collaboration and exchanges (Wagner and Cafiero, 2015.) On the political tier, bilateral relations are also quite strong, even on the thorny issues of Kashmir and Yemen (India Today, 2021; Jamal, 2022). Economically, the relations are more asymmetrical due to the gigantic revenues of the Saudi economy but are still quite cordial. Almost 3 million Pakistanis are working in the Kingdom and sending remittances back home (Arab News, 2019). Saudi Arabia has been financially assisting Pakistan with direct funding. In April 2022, the Kingdom agreed to provide Pakistan with a ‘sizeable package’ of around 8 billion dollars to bolster its forex reserves (Hindustan Times, 2022).

The second significant example of bilateralism is Turkey and Bangladesh. Although it is not Turkey’s strongest bilateral in the region, it illustrates how two parties’ specific needs could be a real catalyst for boosting relations. Similar to the Saudi–Pakistan relations, cultural and religious affinity provides the basis for this bilateral. Yet, the specific need is both countries’ ambition to boost their foreign trade. Since the beginning of the 2010s, with high-level visits, a series of bilateral trade agreements, and the establishment of a business council, they boosted trade volume to 1 billion dollars (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Another significant point of this bilateral is its resilience. Although the relations were strained in 2016 with Turkey’s reaction to the execution of the Motiur Rahman Nizami, chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and withdrew its ambassador (Ramani, 2016), the relations picked up the pace very quickly after Dhaka’s condemnation of the 15 July coup attempt (Zaman, 2016). Another point of this scheme is a transnational one, which is the impact of non-state actors, for example, business communities, in intensifying the relations. High-level visits open the way, and businessmen, industrialists and investors follow.

The third example is between Israel and India. Unlike the others, the basis of this bilateral is not religion or culture but leadership traits and strategic needs. Narendra Modi’s special relations with Israel as the first Prime Minister of India, who undertook a standalone visit to Israel in July 2017, was a major key (Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India, 2017). The visit ended up with a series of agreements on science, technology, agriculture and water management (Inbar, 2017). The similarity of strategic goals, as simultaneous balancing of specific quid-pro-quos, strengthens and deepens this bilateral. Both countries aim for military dominance over their rivals augmented with autonomy in weapon-related technologies. Although the technological transfer of arms and direct FDIs have been mostly from Israel to India, which exemplifies the usual imbalance in the Middle East–South Asia relations, the political and other economic tiers balance it. Before the pandemic, bilateral trade was about 3.5 billion dollars. Exports from India to Israel are 2.04 billion and from Israel to India are 1.64 billion (OEC India-Israel, 2020). The number of Indian software companies has been rising in Israel, and in the areas of renewable energy, water technologies, homeland security and real estate, Israeli companies are increasing in India (Embassy of India Tel Aviv, 2022). With the 2017 visit, the bilateral focus has been expanded to joint ventures in renewable energy, offshore exploration of oil, space programmes, wastewater management and agriculture. The pace of deepening in relations underlines the easy arrangement nature of bilateralism. Via bilaterals, more resourceful states, in this case, Israel, can carve better terms out, which does not weaken the dyadic relationship.

Yet, not every bilateral between the two regions is that robust. The Iran–Afghanistan example illustrates a fragile bilateral. Particularly after the US withdrawal, Tehran re-designed its bilateral relations with the Taliban, which were visibly strained at the beginning of the 2000s. Iran’s re-design depends on the normative belief that the issues at stake should be resolved via inter-governmental relations, without private sector or multilateral involvement. That belief relies on some probable gains that this bilateral could challenge the US pressure in the region and widen the channel for Iranian fuel exports (Nejad and Azizi, 2021). Second, closer bilateral relations with the Taliban would increase the security of Iran’s borders against refugees, opium smuggling and insurgencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2021). Taliban’s treatment of the Hazara people also brought Tehran closer to Afghanistan’s new leaders (Kachiar, 2020). Third, the steadiness of the Iranian exports to Afghanistan, which are sustained at 4 billion dollars, keeps this bilateral stable (Nejad and Azizi, 2021). Afghanistan has its own specific needs from Iran. The Taliban is in great need of foreign investment and capital from various sources and Iranian funds will help the new regime to diversify its foreign supporters. Yet, the fragility of this bilateral is quite visible as a result of the negative sentiments of the Iranian public towards the Taliban. More importantly, to what extent the Taliban will keep its promises regarding the transactions above, due to the impact of its radical elements, is a question mark.

Conclusion

The fragmented structure of the Middle East not only makes its members’ regionalism efforts difficult but also prevents to analyse of their regional interactions within a mono-tiered framework. Even the general context of multilateralism could not explain these interactions. When it comes to Middle Eastern actors’ relations with South Asians, it became even more complicated. Rather than individually describing the relations between these actors, this study utilized an eclectic conceptual framework.

Inter-state relations have been moving from institutional structures, which usually operate under great powers’ interests, to more flexible and smaller schemes. Rather than being organized under the global rules of these great powers, region-to-region affairs also move towards a similar approach. Middle East–South Asia relations are not an exception to that. Transregionalism provides that flexibility and non-institutional pattern. Not only the weaknesses of Middle Eastern institutions but also the intra-regional fragmentation pushes this region’s actors for more flexible and narrow-aimed schemes.

Yet, these schemes, especially the minilaterals, are not purely composed of Middle Eastern and South Asian actors. As explained above, in these minilateralism examples, great power allies of the Middle Eastern actors, that is, the United States and China, also take an active part. The rivalry between these two impacts the positioning of these schemes in regional politics.

The impact of intra-Middle East rivalry is more clearly seen in bilateral schemes. Although this study could not examine every bilateral relation between the two regions, the above-examined cases show that each of these schemes relies on different motivations, expectations and practices. And more importantly, they are more easily established and maintained than multilaterals and even minilaterals.

The interpretation of these mini/bilateral schemes also illustrates the asymmetry between the Middle Eastern and South Asian actors. Most of the schemes are initiated and maintained by Middle Eastern actors due to their relative strength in global politics.

These schemes not only provide a conceptual framework for the interactions between the two regions but also underline a new pattern of inter-state affairs. Middle and small powers via these schemes could develop multitiered and multifocal relations. This not only reduces the impact of great powers in transregional affairs but also inserts a new conglomerate level of inter-state affairs into global politics.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Gürol Baba

Author biography

Gürol Baba had his MPhil and PhD degrees from the Australian National University. He is a Professor at the Social Sciences University of Ankara, Political Science Faculty, Department of International Relations. Dr Baba’s research areas are South Asian and Southeast Asian Regional Affairs, the History of the early Turkish Republic, the International History of the Modern Middle East, Australian Foreign Policy, and Turkish Foreign/Defence Policies.

References

Aarts

(1999) The Middle East: a region without regionalism or the end of exceptionalism? Third World Quarterly 20(5): 911–925.

Aggarwal

(1998) Analyzing institutional transformation in the Asia-Pacific. In: Aggarwal

Morrison

(eds) Asia-Pacific Cross-Roads: Regime Creation and the Future of APEC. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Aggarwal

Fogerty

(2004) Between regionalism and globalism: European Union interregional trade strategies. In: Aggarwal

Fogerty

(eds) EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.1–40.

Al-Monitor (2022) Deadlock in talks to run Afghan airports: officials. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/deadlock-talks-run-afghan-airports-officials#ixzz7T1GObIQ8

Alvarez

(2000) Multilateralism and its discontents. European Journal of International Law 11: 393–411.

Amour

(2020) Regional rivalries and security alliances in the gulf region and the Middle East. In: Amour

(ed.) The Regional Order in the Gulf Region and the Middle East. Cham: Palgrave, pp.407–434.

Arab News (2019) Over 2.7 million Pakistanis living in Saudi Arabia to benefit from new green card. Available at: https://www.arabnews.pk/node/1496861/pakistan

Awad

(1994) The future of regional and subregional organization in the Arab World. In: Tschirgi

(ed.) The Arab World Today. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp.147–160.

Baert

Scaramagli

Söderbaum

(2014a) Intersecting Interregionalism: Regions Global Governance and the EU. Dordrecht: Springer.

10.

Baert

Scaramagli

Söderbaum

(2014b) Introduction: intersecting interregionalism. In: Baert

Scaramagli

Söderbaum

(eds) Intersecting Interregionalism: Regions, Global Governance and the EU. New York: Springer, pp.1–12.

11.

Barnett

Gause

III (1998) Caravans in opposite directions: society, state, and the developments of community in the Gulf Cooperation Council. In: Alder

Barnett

(eds) Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.161–197.

12.

Barnett

Solingen

(2007) Designed to fail or failure of design? The sources and institutional effects of the Arab League. In: Johnson

Acharya

(eds) Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.180–220.

13.

Beck

(2015) The end of regional Middle Eastern exceptionalism? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council after the Arab Uprisings. Democracy and Security 11(2): 190–207.

14.

Betts

(2010) The global governance of migration and the role of trans-regionalism. In: Kunz

Lavenex

Panizzon

(eds) Migration Partnerships: Unveiling the Promise. London: Routledge, pp.27–45.

15.

Brandi

Berger

Bruhn

(2015) Between minilateralism and multilateralism: opportunities and risks of pioneer alliances in international trade and climate politics. Briefing Paper 16/2015. Available at: www.die-gdi.de/en/briefing-paper/article/between-minilateralism-and-multilateralism-opportunities-and-risks-of-pioneer-alliances-in-international-trade-and-climate-politics/

16.

Bretherton

Vogler

(1999) Actors and actress in global politics: locating the European Union. In: Bretherton

Vogler

(eds) The European Union as Global Actor. London: Routledge.

17.

Brummer

(2014) Minilateralism: How Trade Alliances, Soft Law and Financial Engineering Are Redefining Economic Statecraft. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

18.

Buchanan

(1965) An economic theory of clubs. Economica 125(32): 1–14.

19.

Cha

(2003) The dilemma of regional security in East Asia: multilateralism versus bilateralism. In: Diehl

Lepgold

(eds) Regional Conflict Management. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp.104–122.

20.

Cha

(2011) Complex patchworks: U.S. Alliances as part of Asia’s regional architecture. Asia Policy 11: 27–50.

21.

Cha

(2014) American Alliances and Asia’s Regional Architecture. In: Pekkanen

Ravenhill

Foot

(eds) The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.737–757.

22.

Chheang

(2020) Minilateralism in Southeast Asia: facts, opportunities and risks. In: Singh

Teo

(eds) Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN. London: Routledge, pp.103–119.

23.

CPEC (2019) Iran open to join CPEC which ensures prosperity of the entire region, Iranian Envoy. Available at: https://cpecinfo.com/iran-open-to-join-cpec-which-ensures-prosperity-of-the-entire-region-iranian-envoy/

24.

CPEC (2022) Introduction. Available at: http://cpec.gov.pk/

25.

Dalay

(2021) Will Turkey’s Afghanistan ambitions backfire? Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/10/will-turkeys-afghanistan-ambitions-backfire?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIwdv_3KXY9wIVA4jVCh0bLA0NEAAYASAAEgKpzfD_BwE

26.

Dent

(2006) The new economic bilateralism in Southeast Asia: region-convergent or region-divergent? International Relations of the Asia Paciﬁc 6: 81–111.

27.

Deutsche Welle (2021) Can India and Israel help drive cooperation in the Middle East? Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/can-india-and-israel-help-drive-cooperation-in-the-middle-east/a-59563532

28.

Dorsey

(2017) Iran’s surprisingly strong geopolitical hand. Available at: https://www.theglobalist.com/why-iran-has-the-longterm-regional-upper-hand-saudi-arabia-china/

29.

Dudley

(2018) Is time running out for the Gulf Cooperation Council? Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/07/25/is-time-running-out-for-the-gulf-cooperation-council/?sh=32986c0c56b8

30.

Embassy of India Tel Aviv (2022) Available at: https://www.indembassyisrael.gov.in/pages?id=nel5a&subid=7ax9b

31.

Falkner

(2016) A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits, and international legitimacy. Perspectives on Politics 14(1): 87–101.

32.

Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (2022) Wang Yi Chairs the Foreign Ministers’ meeting among China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202203/t20220331_10658064.html

33.

Ghosh

(2021) Why Turkey wants to guard Afghanistan’s gateway to the world. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-turkey-wants-to-guard-afghanistans-gateway-to-the-world/2021/09/07/a5a9db2c-0fa1-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html

34.

Gilson

(2002) Asia Meets Europe: Inter-Regionalism and the Asia–Europe Meeting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

35.

Green

(2014) Strategic Asian triangles. In: Pekkanen

Ravenhill

Foot

(eds) The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.758–774.

36.

Guazzone

(1988) Gulf Co-operation Council: the security policies. Survival 30(2): 134–148.

37.

Gulf Cooperation Council (2022) About GCC. Available at: https://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/Pages/StartingPointsAndGoals.aspx

38.

Gumrukcu

(2022) Turkey, Qatar reached preliminary deal on Kabul airport security-Turkish sources. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/turkey-qatar-reached-pending-deal-kabul-airport-security-turkish-sources-2022-01-20/

39.

Haas

(1956) Regionalism, functionalism, and universal international organization. World Politics 8(2): 238–263.

40.

Haass

(2010) The case for messy multilateralism. Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/18d8f8b6-fa2f-11de-beed-00144feab49a

41.

Hampson

Heinbeker

(2011) The ‘new’ multilateralism of the twenty-first century. Global Governance 17(3): 299–310.

42.

Hänggi

(2003) Regionalism through inter-regionalism: East Asia and ASEM. In: Liu

Régnier

(eds) Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm Shifting? London: Curzon Press , pp. 197–219.

43.

Hänggi

(2006a) Interregionalism as a multifaceted phenomenon: in search of a typology. In: Hänggi

Roloff

Rüland

(eds). Interregionalism and International Relations. London: Routledge, pp.31–62.

44.

Hänggi

Roloff

Rüland

(2006b) Interregionalism: a new phenomenon in international relations. In: Hänggi

Roloff

Rüland

(eds) Interregionalism and International Relations. London: Routledge, pp.3–14.

45.

Hensel

Diehl

(1994) Testing empirical propositions about shatterbelts, 1945–1976. Political Geography 13(1): 33–51.

46.

Hettne

Ponjaert

(2014) Interregionalism and world order: the diverging EU and US models. In: Telò

(ed.) European Union and New Regionalism: Competing Regionalism and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era. Farnham: Ashgate, pp.115–138.

47.

Heydon

Woolcock

(2009) The Rise of Bilateralism: Comparing American, European and Asian Approaches to Preferential Trade Agreements. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

48.

Hill

(1993) The capability–expectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe’s international role. The Journal of Common Market Studies 31(3): 305–325.

49.

Hindustan Times (2022) Cash-strapped Pakistan gets USD 8 billion in financial support from Saudi Arabia. Available at: https://www.hindustantimes.com/business/cashstrapped-pakistan-gets-usd-8-billion-in-financial-support-from-saudi-arabia-101651405624810.html

50.

Howard

(1952) Middle Eastern Regional Organization: problems and prospects. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 24(4): 103–111.

51.

Hussain

(2022) India-UAE-Israel trade deals set up a US-backed Western Quad ‘alternative to China’, as Abraham Accords bring new reality to the Middle East. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3168338/india-uae-israel-trade-deals-set-us-backed-western-quad

52.

Ikenberry

(2003) Is American multilateralism in decline? Perspectives on Politics 1(3): 533–550.

53.

Inbar

(2017) Modi’s visit to Israel: the view from Jerusalem. Available at: https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/modi-visit-the-view-from-jerusalem_e-inbar_100717

54.

India Today (2021) Saudi Arabia, Pakistan vow to reset ties strained over Kashmir issue. Available at: https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/saudi-arabia-pakistan-vow-to-reset-ties-strained-over-kashmir-issue-1800268-2021-05-08

55.

Jamal

(2022) Pakistan, Saudi Arabia affirm security ties, condemn terrorism. Available at: https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/pakistan-saudi-arabia-affirm-security-ties-condemn-terrorism-1.87567181

56.

Kachiar

(2020) Why Are the Taliban wooing a persecuted Afghanistan minority group? Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/why-are-the-taliban-wooing-a-persecuted-afghanistan-minority-group/

57.

Keohane

(1986) Reciprocity in international relations. International Organization 40(1): 1–27.

58.

Keohane

(1990) Multilateralism: an agenda for research. International Journal 45(4): 731–764.

59.

Khan

MUH

(2012) Pakistan Saudi Arabia bilateral relations: a research study. Available at: https://www.opfblog.com/12675/pakistan-saudi-arabia-bilateral-relations-a-research-study/

60.

Köllner

(2000) Whither ASEM? Lessons for APEC and the future of transregional cooperation between Asia and Europe. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 19: 425–434.

61.

Lalzoy

(2022) Afghan, Qatari FMs meet in Doha, discussing economic & political issues. Available at: https://www.khaama.com/afghan-qatari-fms-meet-in-doha-discussing-economic-political-issues-89687687/

62.

Laskar

(2021) New grouping of India, UAE, Israel, US to meet next year. Available at: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/new-grouping-of-india-israel-us-and-uae-expected-to-hold-meeting-in-march-101639394229418.html

63.

Lee-Brown

(2018) Asia’s security triangles: maritime minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. East Asia 35(2): 163–176.

64.

Maini

(2021) A Middle East Quad? Scope for synergies, but divergences over Iran. Available at: https://www.southasiamonitor.org/jottings/middle-east-quad-scope-synergies-divergences-over-iran

65.

Mattheis

Litsegård

(2018) Interregionalism Across the Atlantic Space. Cham: Springer.

66.

McKernan

(2022) Israel and Saudi Arabia ‘in talks over joint defence against Iran’. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/27/israel-and-saudi-arabia-in-talks-over-joint-defence-against-iran

67.

Meissner

(2018) Resorting to bilateralism: the EU, MERCOSUR, and the strategic partnership with Brazil. Journal of European Integration 40(1): 51–66.

68.

Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India (2017) Visit of Prime Minister to Israel. Available at: https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28566/Visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_Israel_July_46_2017

69.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan (2017) Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif felicitates his Royal Highness Mohammad Bin Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud on appointment as the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Available at: https://mofa.gov.pk/prime-minister-muhammad-nawaz-sharif-felicitates-his-royal-highness-mohammad-bin-salman-bin-abdulaziz-al-saud-on-appointment-as-the-crown-prince-of-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia/

70.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan (2019) Joint statement between Pakistan and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the visit of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan-Islamabad (12-13/6/1440H corresponding 17–18 February 2019). Available at: https://mofa.gov.pk/joint-statement-between-pakistan-and-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia-on-the-visit-of-his-royal-highness-crown-prince-mohamed-bin-salman-deputy-prime-minister-and-minister-of-defense-to-the-islamic-republic/

71.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (2021) Iran calls for return of tranquillity to Afghanistan. Available at: https://en.mfa.ir/portal/PrintNews/674993

72.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2021) Wang Yi proposes a five-point initiative on achieving security and stability in the Middle East. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/202103/t20210327_9168120.html

73.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2022) Wang Yi meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202204/t20220401_10663110.html

74.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar (2017) Qatar denounces statement made by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and UAE. Available at: https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/06/09/qatar-denounces-statement-made-by-saudi-arabia-egypt-bahrain-and-uae

75.

Naim

(2009) Minilateralism: the magic number to get real international action. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/

76.

Netanyahu

(2015) Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to the UN General Assembly. Available at: https://embassies.gov.il/SAN-FRANCISCO/ABOUTISRAEL/Pages/Iranian-Threat.aspx

77.

Nejad

Azizi

(2021) Iran and Taliban after the US fiasco in Afghanistan. Available at: www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-taliban-after-us-fiasco-afghanistan

78.

Nilsson-Wright

(2017) Creative minilateralism in a changing Asia: opportunities for security convergence and cooperation between Australia, India and Japan. Available at: www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/2017-07-28-Minilateralism.pdf

79.

Nye

(1971) Peace in parts: integration and conflict in regional organization. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

80.

O’Connor

(2022) Iran’s worst fears in Afghanistan are coming true as ISIS tests red line. Available at: https://www.newsweek.com/irans-worst-fears-afghanistan-are-coming-true-isis-tests-red-line-1699753

81.

OEC India-Israel (2020) Available at: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/ind/partner/isr

82.

Olson

(1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

83.

Oye

(1986) Explaining cooperation under anarchy: hypotheses and strategies. In: Oye

(ed.) Cooperation under anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp.1–24.

84.

Panda

(2017) What King Salman seeks in Asia. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/3/1/what-king-salman-seeks-in-asia

85.

Paraschos

(2017) Geopolitical Risk in the Middle East and North Africa: Shatterbelts and Great Power Rivalry. Japan SPOTLIGHT. Available at: https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/pdf/212th_Cover_03.pdf

86.

Patrick

(2015) The new ‘New Multilateralism’: minilateral cooperation, but at what cost? Global Summitry 1(2): 115–134.

87.

Pempel

(2004) Challenges to bilateralism: changing foes, capital flows, and complex forums. In: Krauss

Pempel

(eds) Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia Paciﬁc. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp.1–36.

88.

Pinfari

(2009) Nothing but Failure? The Arab league and the Gulf Cooperation Council as mediators in Middle Eastern conflicts. Working paper no. 45, March, London: LSE Crisis States Research Centre.

89.

Pinfari

(2016) Regional organizations in the Middle East. Oxford Handbooks Online. Epub ahead of print 1 September. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935307.013.86.

90.

Porter

Sauvé

Subramanian

, et al. (2004) Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

91.

President of Russia (2019) Press statement and answers to media questions following a trilateral meeting between the leaders of the guarantor states of the Astana process on the settlement in Syria. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/61542

92.

Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications (2021) Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Türkiye-Katar ilişkileri stratejik perspektifle günden güne güçlenmeye başlamıştır. Available at: https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turkiye-katar-iliskileri-stratejik-perspektifle-gunden-gune-guclenmeye-baslamistir

93.

Qinghong

(2021) Asia-Pacific minilateral cooperation and its impact. CIR 31: 123–139.

94.

Ramani

(2016) Can Bangladesh and Turkey mend frayed ties? Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/can-bangladesh-and-turkey-mend-frayed-ties/

95.

Ramazani

(1988) The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

96.

Renard

(2016) Partnerships for effective multilateralism? Assessing the compatibility between EU bilateralism, (inter)regionalism and multilateralism. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 29(1): 18–35.

97.

Ribeiro-Hoffmann

(2016) Inter-and transregionalism. In: Börzel

Risse

(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.600–619.

98.

Rochester

(1990) Global policy and the future of the United Nations. Journal of Peace Research 27(2): 141–154.

99.

Rothkopf

(2009) Roll up your pants, time to wade back into ‘minilateralism’. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/25/roll-up-your-pants-time-to-wade-back-into-minilateralism/

100.

Ruggie

(1992) Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution. International Organization 46(3): 561–598.

101.

Ruggie

(1993) Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution. In: Ruggie

(ed.) Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.443–474.

102.

Rüland

(2002) APEC, ASEAN and EAEC – A tale of two cultures of cooperation. In: Rüland

Manske

Draguhn

(eds) Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC): The First Decade. London: Routledge, pp. 40–71.

103.

Rüland

(2006) Interregionalism: an unfinished agenda. In: Hänggi

Roloff

Rüland

(eds) Interregionalism and International Relations. London: Routledge, pp.295–313.

104.

Sabatini

(2014) Meaningless multilateralism: in international diplomacy, South America chooses quantity over quality. Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-america/2014-08-08/meaningless-multilateralism

105.

Safdar

Zabin

(2020) What does the China-Iran deal mean for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor? Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/what-does-the-china-iran-deal-mean-for-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/

106.

Saifi

(2019) Saudi crown prince builds ties with Asian powers in an effort to improve image. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/18/asia/mohammed-bin-salman-pakistan-deals-intl/index.html

107.

Schmitt

(2017) Alliances (coalitions). In: Durieux

Jean-Baptiste Vilmer

, et al. (eds) Dictionnaire de la guerre et de la paix. Paris: PUF, pp.56–64.

108.

Schulz

(2005) The Middle East: Regional Instability and Fragmentation. In: Farrell

Hettne

Langenhove

(eds) Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice. London: Pluto Press, pp.187–201.

109.

Siddiqui

(2020) For Gulf, South Asia countries, worst is yet to come. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/04/gulf-coronavirus-south-asia-migrant-workers-mideast-economy.html#ixzz7T51WE0HV

110.

Siddiqui

(2022) Saudi Arabia, Pakistan work on long-term business strategy. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/saudi-arabia-pakistan-work-long-term-business-strategy#ixzz7T62T16ev

111.

Soylu

Kemal

(2021) EXCLUSIVE: Turkey and Taliban close to deal on Kabul airport. Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/afghanistan-turkey-taliban-close-deal-kabul-airport

112.

Taddonio

(2018) Saudi official makes rare reflection on kingdom’s role in rise of extremism. Available at: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/saudi-official-makes-rare-reflection-on-kingdoms-role-in-rise-of-extremism/

113.

Tago

(2017) Multilateralism, bilateralism, and unilateralism in foreign policy. In: Thompson

(ed.) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford: Oxford Research Encyclopedias. Available at: https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-449?rskey=8ep292&result=1

114.

Tan

(2020) Asean Defence Ministers’ meeting-plus: multilateralism mimicking minilateralism? In: Singh

Teo

(eds) Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN. London: Routledge, pp.120–134.

115.

Tanchum

(2021) China’s new military base in Africa: what it means for Europe and America. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in-africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/

116.

Taylor

(1987) The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

117.

Teo

(2018) Could minilateralism be multilateralism’s best hope in the Asia Pacific? Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/could-minilateralism-be-multilateralisms-best-hope-in-the-asia-pacific/

118.

US Department of State (2021) Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s Meeting with Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, and Israeli Foreign Minister and alternate Prime Minister Yair Lapid. Available at: https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-antony-j-blinkens-meeting-with-emirati-foreign-minister-sheikh-abdullah-bin-zayed-indian-external-affairs-minister-dr-subrahmanyam-jaishankar-and-israeli-foreign-minist/

119.

The White House (2022) FACT SHEET: the United States strengthens cooperation with Middle East partners to address 21st century challenges. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/16/fact-sheet-the-united-states-strengthens-cooperation-with-middle-east-partners-to-address-21st-century-challenges/

120.

Tirkey

(2021) Minilateralism: weighing the prospects for cooperation and governance, ORF issue brief no. 489, Observer Research Foundation. Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/research/minilateralism-weighing-prospects-cooperation-governance/

121.

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2022) Turkey-Bangladesh Economic and Trade Relations. Available at: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_bangladesh-economic-and-trade-relations.en.mfa

122.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2012) World investment report 2012: towards a new generation of investment policies. Available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2012_embargoed_en.pdf

123.

Valbjorn

(2016) North Africa and the Middle East. In: Börzel

Risse

(eds). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.249–270.

124.

Victor

(2006) Toward effective international cooperation on climate change: numbers, interests and institutions. Global Environmental Politics 6(3): 90–103.

125.

Wagner

Cafiero

(2015) Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s evolving alliance, a unique relationship. Available at: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabia-pakistans-evolving-alliance-14391

126.

Yeo

(2000) ASEM: looking back, looking forward. Contemporary Southeast Asia 22(1): 113–144.

127.

Zaman

(2016) Turkey wants to restore ties with Bangladesh. Available at: http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2016/09/09/turkey-wants-restore-ties-bangladesh/