Foreign Policy Choice or Domestic Compulsion? Maldives’ Deep Ties With Saudi Arabia

Abstract

This paper analyses how Maldives’ close ties with Saudi Arabia have affected its relations with other countries from Middle East Asia. Following the footsteps of Saudi Arabia, Maldives severed its diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016 and with Qatar in 2017. The paper discusses the economic investments Riyadh has made to develop civic infrastructure in the island nation. However, more than diplomatic ties and economic investments, close relations between Malé and Riyadh have affected the Island state’s society. There is a spread of religious obstructionism in Maldivian society, for which several outside scholars and Maldivians blame Saudi Arabia. Finally, the paper briefly discusses Maldives’ ties with Middle East countries other than Saudi Arabia.

Keywords

Iran Saudi Arabia Turkey Wahhabism

Introduction

More than any other country in Middle East Asia, Maldives has close ties with Saudi Arabia. During the presidency of Abdulla Yameen (2013–2018), Maldives developed very close relations with Saudi Arabia. The island nation has followed Saudi in many of its foreign policy-related matters, even at the cost of deteriorating relationships with some other countries from the region. For instance, following Saudi Arabia’s footsteps in 2016, Maldives severed its diplomatic relationships with Iran. Then, on 5 June 2017, again following Saudi Arabia, Maldives broke its decades-old diplomatic ties with Qatar. Saudi Arabia is one of the nine countries with an embassy in the Malé. Saudi embassy in Malé was opened in 2015. Despite close ties, Saudi Arabia, along with a few other countries from South Asia, Southeast Asia and North Africa, is accused by many Maldivians, such as the former President and the present Speaker of Maldives’ parliament, Mohamed Nasheed, for the spread of Islamic radicalism in the island country. Over the years, radical Islamic groups have strengthened their presence in the island country and carried out attacks in which some people have lost their lives. Moreover, several Maldivians have been reported fighting in Asia’s different conflict zones, including the Middle East.

This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s shadow on the Maldivian foreign policy especially in the matters related to the affairs in Middle East Asia. Then, the paper analyses how political closeness with Saudi Arabia has benefitted the Maldivian economy and the impact of Riyadh’s investments in social sector on Maldivian society. Finally, this paper examines Maldives’ relations with other Middle East countries. In this paper, the author chiefly argues that close relationship with Saudi Arabia has brought much needed investment in Maldives’ civic infrastructure sector; however, simultaneously, it has also radicalised the Maldivian society. For example, Saudi Arabia-funded mosques and students trained in Saudi universities are held responsible for spreading the tenets of Wahhabism in the island country. Second, after the change in government in the Maldives in 2018, Ibrahim Mohamad Solih’s administration has taken steps to re-set its foreign policy and refurbish bilateral relationships with many countries; but, nothing much has changed in the Maldives–Saudi Arabia relationships. Finally, the author argues that more than a foreign policy choice, Maldives relations with Saudi Arabia is a domestic compulsion. Yameen government followed Riyadh mainly to politically placate the Islamists in the island nation. The island nation also needs investment which Riyadh can provide.

Economic and security dependence of Maldives

There is no universally agreed definition of a small country or small state. In the past, attempts to define small states have included geographical size, population size and a country’s degree of influence in international affairs (Hey, 2003). For Rosenau, small states are more vulnerable to the vagaries of the international system (Rosenau, 1990 [1966]). In matters of foreign policy, small states tend to (Hey, 2003: 5):

Exhibit a low level of participation in world affairs;

Address a narrow scope of foreign policy issues;

Limit their behaviour to the immediate geographic arena;

Employ diplomatic and economic and not military options to achieve objectives;

Emphasise internationalist principles, international law and other ‘morally minded’ ideals;

Secure multinational agreements and join multinational institutions whenever possible;

Choose neutral positions;

Rely on superpowers for protection, partnerships and resources;

Aim to cooperate and avoid conflict with others;

Spend disproportionate foreign policy resources on ensuring physical and political security and survival.

About their significance and character, first, in his review essay, Keohane (1969: 310) highlights that, like bigger states, small states are important constituents of the international system; hence, they must also be studied very carefully. Unlike bigger powers, small powers or states are vulnerable to economic, politico-strategic and environmental-ecological factors. They are highly dependent on external trade, making them prone to economic shock. Second, in terms of politico-strategic matters, the small powers do not have enough resources to spend on military means which restricts them to have an independent foreign policy. Third, most small island states are vulnerable to climate change (Baba and Önsoy, 2021). Realists feel that small states usually follow two strategies to overcome their vulnerabilities: balancing the threat by allying with a powerful state or collecting medium or small-sized states, or bandwagon with a powerful state that threatens the small state (Waltz 1979; Zahir, 2021: 81). In contrast to the Cold War (1948–1991) tactics of balancing or bandwagon, some small countries also believe in hedging, a mix of confrontational and cooperative elements (Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019).

In an article, Bailes et al. (2016: 10) argue that under the concept of alliance ‘shelter’, which better explains small state alliances than traditional theoretical approaches, small states adopt a series of strategies ‘to alleviate the inherent vulnerabilities of being small’. The small states can make domestic arrangements in order to do what one might call ‘buffer from within’ (Bailes et al., 2016: 12–13) or align with neighbouring state(s) and/or with regional and international organisation(s). The theory of alliance shelter diverges from the others in six ways (Bailes et al., 2016: 13–14). First, small states differ in capabilities and are different social units that operate on different logic from their larger counterparts. Second, small states seek shelter from larger states for both domestic and international reasons. Third, shelter and cooperation bring disproportionate benefits to smaller states. Fourth, small states seek shelter in an effort to limit the effects of their economic and political vulnerabilities. Political threats can also be from small groups within the country. External shelter helps small countries to connect socially and diplomatically with the outside world. Fifth, Social and cultural relationships with the outside world are especially important for a small society. Sixth, the shelter relationship has political, economic and social consequences. Smaller countries have to bear the expanse for shelter. Usually, the shelter providing powers impose stringent conditions that often reduce the small state’s choices (see Neal, 2017). In many cases, the shelter-seeking states have to even pool their sovereignty with powerful countries or organisations. However, at certain fronts smaller countries do benefit from seeking shelter. For instance, many small European states such as Malta have maintained autonomy, gained access to a larger market and become a part of a security community by acceding to the European Union (Briffa, 2020).

Considering the factors such as geographical size and features, population size and gross domestic product (GDP), Maldives fit to the definition of a small state (Zahir, 2021: 81). Maldives is an archipelago of 1192 coral islands (or about 1200 islands), out of which only one-sixth is inhabited by the country’s 557,000 (in 2022) people. Maldives’ GDP is US$4.03 billion. The Maldives is vulnerable to climate change and even faces an existential threat due to rising sea water levels. Maldives does not have many foreign policy options regarding its relationships with the outer world. For many small states, as Elman (1995) maintains, domestic politics and institutions are more important than external actors because they tell the available options open to a government in foreign policy situations. Likewise, the Maldives give more priority to domestic matters, political and economic situations and institutions.

As a small and environmentally vulnerable state, Maldives has traditionally depended a lot on India for economic and security reasons. One of the challenges Maldives faced was in the 1980s when President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom (1978–2008) faced three coups in 1980, 1983 and 1988. To protect his government when, in 1988, around 80 sea-borne fighters, supported by some more infiltrated the country disguised as tourists, reached on shores of the Malé and overthrow the administration from power (Mitra et al., 2006: 218), on Gayoom’s appeal, then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi dispatched paratroopers to help him. Within 24 hours, the Indian paratroopers cleared the capital and restored law and order in Malé (Mitra et al., 2006: 218). Over the years, to help the Maldives, India has also provided monetary aid to develop infrastructure such as hospitals and educational institutes (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, n.d.). In return, Maldives has remained closely associated with India and prioritised New Delhi’s interests.

India’s position in the Maldives was gradually replaced by China, mainly after Yameen came into power. In September 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the Maldives. During the visit, the Maldives indicated its support for China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative. It pledged to enhance cooperation in maritime economy, maritime security, ocean research, environment protection and so on. In 2016, Chinese company got on lease the Feydhoo Finolhu Island near Malé from the Yameen government for 50 years for US$ 4 million to develop tourism facilities. Later, in 2017, Beijing and Malé signed a free trade agreement that would allow zero tariffs on over 90% of goods in bilateral trade. The agreement, in turn, would improve the country’s aquatic exports, which had been affected by the European Union’s removal of Maldives from the Generalised System of Preferences countries list in 2013 (Marwaan, 2017).

China’s relations with the Maldives changed after Yameen lost power and Solih was elected as President of the country in 2018. The election results miffed China which banked on Yameen, while Solih was considered too close to India. According to Nasheed, soon after Solih took charge, the Chinese ambassador to the Maldives, Zhang Lizhong, handed the government an invoice of US$3.2 billion. However, China maintained that the amount was nearer to US$1.5 billion. To meet the new government’s immediate crisis, India stepped forward and provided US$1.4 billion in assistance to the Maldives. This was seen by many commentators and media persons as a payoff to establish its military base in the Maldives – a point that Malé refuted.

Since elected into office, the Solih-led government is pursuing ‘India first’ policy. Furthermore, during the Solih government, the Maldives and the United States signed a defence pact in 2020. The defence pact has complicated the situation in the Maldivian waters, where the US presence is mainly seen to check Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean region. Notably in 2013, a similar pact was proposed by the United States. It was mainly shelved because India did not want the Maldives to enter into such a pact. In 2020, the strategic situation in the Indian Ocean was different and it seems that India understood that it could not check the Chinese alone, so it needed a friendly power (Ranjan, 2020).

Besides India and China, Maldives has close ties with Saudi Arabia. The following section discusses bilateral ties between the Maldives and Saudi Arabia.

Maldives’ bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia

Maldives established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in March 1981. However, the Maldivian embassy was opened in Riyadh only in May 2008. In 2013, Saudi Arabia promised the Maldives a 5-year soft loan facility of US$300 million. In 2014, Saudi Crown Prince Salman bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud, then deputy premier and defence minister of the country, visited Maldives. That year, Saudi real estate company Best Choice planned to develop a tourist resort in Vadinolhu Island located in Laamu Atoll (Arab News, 2014).

Maldives sought Saudi partnerships in energy and transport. However, the biggest beneficiary of Saudi’s investment is sectors associated with Islamic affairs. During his visit to the Maldives, Salman promised to build ‘world-class’ mosques in the archipelago, including the five-storey King Salman Mosque and Islamic centre in the Malé. The construction work at the mosque began in 2018. It is spread over about 41,000 square feet and can accommodate around 10,000 people (Edition MV, 2022). In 2014, the visiting Saudi scholars pledged a grant of US$100,000 for the propagation of Islamic education. They also announced 50 scholarships for Maldivian students to study in Saudi Arabia (Haviland, 2014).

During Yameen’s period, Saudi’s shadow on Maldives’ policy towards other Middle East countries was apparent. In January 2016, Saudi Arabia cut ties with Iran over the storming of Iranian protestors in the Saudi embassy in Tehran after the execution of Shiite cleric Baqir al-Nimr. He was beheaded on 2 January 2016 along with 46 others on charges of terrorism. In reaction, Iranian protestors also attacked the Saudi consulate in Mashhad, the capital of Razavi Khorasan province of Iran (AlArabiya News, 2016). Following Saudi Arabia, in May 2016, Maldives severed its diplomatic relationship with Iran. In its statement, the Maldives foreign ministry said that Iran’s policies are ‘detrimental to peace and stability in the [the Middle East and Arab Gulf] region, which in many ways, is also linked to stability, peace and security of the Maldives’ (Maldives Independent, 2016). Maldives’ then opposition party Maldives Democratic Party (MDP) called it ‘irrational adventurism’ in foreign policy decisions of Yameen’s administration. MDP’s spokesperson, Hamid Abdul Ghafoor, said ‘President Yameen is amassing all the world’s contentious issues to the Indian Ocean, with Maldives at the heart of it; clearly disregarding the security and protection of the Maldivian people’ (Reuters, 2016). The Maldives established diplomatic relations with Iran in 1975. In May 2017, a year after cutting ties with Iran, Yameen participated in the Arab-Islamic-American summit held in Saudi Arabia in May 2017 (ABC News, 2017). Salman bin Abdelaziz Al-Saud chaired the summit. It was attended by leaders from Islamic countries and the then US President Donald Trump. At the summit, Yameen stated that (The President’s Office, Republic of Maldives, 2017)

. . . t[T]he Maldives condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and highlighted on the importance of addressing social grievances such as disillusionment, injustice and alienation that drive young people towards extremism . . . the Arab-Islamic nations are unfortunately at the epicentre of today’s debate and that terrorist activities carried out in the name of Islam continue to tarnish the name and image of our religion as one of peace, compassion, harmony, tolerance, justice and unity.

Again, on 5 June 2017, following Saudi Arabia, Maldives broke diplomatic relations with Qatar (ABC News, 2017). In doing so, it joined the ranks of Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in cutting ties with Qatar. The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1984. Announcing severance of ties, the statement of the Maldivian government read (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Maldives, 2017)

The Government of Maldives has decided to sever diplomatic relations with Qatar effective from today, 5 June 2017. The Maldives took the decision because of its firm opposition to activities that encourage terrorism and extremism. The Maldives has always pursued a policy of promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. The Maldives reiterates its commitment to work with countries that promote peace, stability, and show solidarity in the fight against terrorism.

During the visit of Yameen to Saudi Arabia in October 2016, the Saudi government pledged to lend US$150 million to help the Maldives to repay loans taken for an unprecedented infrastructure scale-up. A year earlier, in 2015, the Saudi Fund for Development provided a loan of US$100 million to finance a new passenger terminal at the Velana International Airport, which was to be built by the Saudi Binladin Group (Maldives Independent, 2017). Yameen also managed to secure US$80 million from the fund to finance infrastructure development projects in Hulhumalé. Saudi Arabia provided US$50 million pledged for a military housing project, a US$20 million grant for budget support in May 2015 and US$1 million as grant aid to finance the feasibility study for a transshipment port in the Maldives’ northernmost atoll. Then, the Speaker of the Saudi Shura Council Dr Abdulla bin Mohamed bin Ibrahim Al-Sheikh donated US$100,000 to the Islamic University of Maldives during a visit in early 2015. In 2017, the Saudi embassy donated 17,500 Arabic language textbooks to Maldivian schools to help teach students from grades 1 to 5. The Saudi kingdom has sent 17 language teachers and plans to set up an Arabic language centre in the Maldives. It has also funded a project to build a grand mosque in Malé that can accommodate 6000 worshippers. Since assuming office, Yameen has made two official and three private visits to the kingdom (Maldives Independent, 2017).

In 2017, as a crown prince, Salman was about to visit the Maldives. The opposition political parties opposed the visit, who believed that the Saudi ruler had a special interest in Faafu Atoll. After Yameen announced that Saudi Arabia had drawn up plans for a massive integrated development project in the Maldives, speculation was fuelled that government plans to sell Faafu atoll to the Saudis and to relocate its 4365 people to an urban centre under development near the capital (Maldives Independent, 2017). The opposition criticised and termed it ‘creeping colonialism by the Saudi government’ (Saberin, 2018). The tour of Salman was, however, postponed.

In 2018, when Yameen was globally criticised for suppressing the democratic rights of the Maldivians, Saudi Arabia stood with him. At that time, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced a US$160 million grant for ‘development projects’. On grant, the statement from Maldives’ President’s office read:

As part of the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Saudi Fund for Development and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development have pledged $160 million in support of the Maldives and its brotherly people for the development projects including the airport development and fisheries sector of the Maldives.(Cited by Saberin, 2018)

The Saudi and UAE’s announcement came days before Yameen extended the state of emergency in the Maldives. Yameen used his powers under Article 253 of the Maldivian Constitution and declared the State of Emergency for 15 days. The President is required to inform the legislative body about the implementation of the Emergency in the country within 2 days of taking such a decision. However, this was impossible as the legislature has been suspended since 2017. The emergency was imposed by Yameen on 5 February 2018, for 15 days to annul a Supreme Court’s verdict that quashed convictions against nine opposition leaders (Ranjan, 2018).

After Solih came into power, he promised to revisit the country’s foreign policy. However, Saudi Arabia remains an important partner to the Maldives. Taking note of the 40th anniversary of their diplomatic relationship in 2021, in September that year Maldives Minister of Defence, Uza Mariya Didi, reiterated Maldives’ commitment to exploring further avenues of cooperation with Saudi Arabia, especially in the Defence and Security domain. Some landmark Saudi-led projects include the Government’s Affordable Housing Scheme, Fisheries Sector Development Project, Velana Airport Development Project and Hulhumale Phase Two Development Project, and the King Salman Mosque construction in Malé’. Mariya also mentioned that the Maldivian soldiers are on duty at the Coalition’s Counter-Terrorism Centre in Riyadh. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) collaborates with the Naif Arab University for Security Sciences counterterrorism awareness programmes (Ministry of Defence, Government of Maldives, 2021).

The Saudi Fund Development (SFD) provided the first loan to the Maldives in 1978 to develop Malé International Airport. Since then, the SFD has financed 12 projects, amounting to approximately US$271.52 million. Of the total, five projects are in the Transport sector for the expansion and development of the airport and the reconstruction of fishing harbours, the Water Supply and Sanitation Project and Housing and Infrastructure Development Project, and Budgetary Support for the repair of damages resulting from tsunami and project in Health Sector (Embassy of the Republic of Maldives, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, n.d.).

Saudi Arabia is one of the top 10 markets for tourism to the Maldives in 2021. In 2021, 37,495 tourists from Saudi Arabia visited the Maldives. It is 3.2% share of the total tourists arrived in 2021 in the Maldives (Ministry of Tourism, Republic of Maldives, n.d.). In Saudi Arabia, and also in other Middle East countries, family members and tourists are assured about the Maldives being a safe Islamic holiday destination (Robinson, 2015: 91).

More than influencing its foreign policy towards Middle East countries and extending support to Yameen when he used coercive power to suppress human rights activists and opposition parties’ leaders, Saudi Arabia, as discussed below, is criticised for the radicalisation of Maldivian society and institutions.

Saudi’s Role in Religious Radicalism of the Maldivians

Radicalism in the Maldives has its initial origin with many students going to foreign countries such as Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia for study. Many returned to find jobs in various academic and non-academic sectors of the country.¹ Some of those who returned came after imbibing militant and radical versions of Islamic values and global terrorist leaders to eulogise. For example, in 2003, posters appeared on Edhyafushi Island’s walls, eulogising Osama bin Laden (Ranjan, 2017). Even during their years of study in mentioned countries, some Maldivian students were attracted to militant activities in other parts of the world and actively participated in them. One of the early signs of the Maldivian youth fighting in militancy-affected areas was between 1998 and 2003, when a few were found fighting in the Kashmir valley. The fighters were trained by Pakistan based militant groups. (Swami, 2022). The militants did not even spare the Pakistani citizens. A Maldivian youth, Ali Jaleel, was involved in the 2009 bombing at Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence headquarters in Pakistan that killed 23 and 300 injured (Robinson, 2015: 168).

It is believed that the greater number of Maldivians became more God-fearing after Tsunami hit the country in December 2004. Thirty-nine islands were significantly damaged and one-third of the Maldivian population were severely affected by the 26 December tsunami (Kan et al., 2005). The local Islamists and militant groups from outside the country exploited the widening God-fearing attitude among several Maldivians. Many of the Non-Government Organisations and governments in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, came forward to help the Maldives. However, they provided aid, funded the country’s reconstruction and engaged in religious ‘capacity building’ (Robinson, 2015: 167). Then President of the Maldives Abdul Gayoom was not an extremist himself, but his emphasis on Arab-style Islamic nationalism had undermined Maldivian’s confidence in their own culture and tradition, making them vulnerable to Wahhabism after Tsunami. Post-Tsunami, many Maldivian students got scholarships to study in Pakistani Madrasas and Universities in Saudi Arabia (Robinson, 2015: 167).

One of the first militant attacks the Maldives witnessed was on 29 September 2007, when a bomb blast occurred in Sultan Park in Malé. Three men – Mohamed Sobah, Moosa Inaz and Ahmed Naseer – were arrested and sentenced for carrying out the explosion, while a few other suspects escaped from the country. Investigations pointed to a link between the Maldivian national, Ahmed Zaki and Lashkar-i-Taiba madrassas in the Kashmir valley. Zaki was a member of a group known as Jama-ah-ul-Muslimeen (Robinson, 2015). Following the 2007 bombings, militant activities increased in the Maldives. In 2015, Malaysian police revealed that three Maldivian youths were trained to target the American and the Israeli consulates in the South Indian cities of Chennai (in Tamil Nadu) and Bengaluru (in Karnataka) (Moorthy, 2021). The American armed forces had also detained a few Maldivian youths fighting along with the Al-Qaeda terrorists on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. In 2015, even Yameen escaped unhurt in an explosion in his official speedboat. Investigations of the explosion led to Yameen’s chosen vice-president Ahmed Adeeb’s arrest for plotting the explosion, in which then First Lady Fathimath Ibrahim suffered injuries. The conspiracy charges’ seriousness became apparent after the then Defence Minister of Maldives Colonel Mohamed Nasim was arrested for plotting to overthrow the government. Both Adeeb and Nasim spent years in prison. Nasim came out of jail after the Solih came into power (Moorthy, 2021). Earlier in 2012, a blogger Ismail Rasheed was stabbed to death. Then, in October 2012, Maldivian lawmaker Afrasheem Ali was murdered (Lui, 2017). In 2017, a young Maldivian blogger, Yameen Rasheed, was stabbed to death by the radicals. He was known for his liberal views.

In 2019, it came to light that some of the Maldivian groups also work as a link to funding the terrorist groups from other countries. Then, as revealed, an Indonesian terror group Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) had wired US$29,569 to 12 people with alleged ties to Islamic State (IS) from the Maldives and 4 other countries between March 2016 and September 2017. The four other countries were Trinidad and Tobago, Malaysia, Germany and Venezuela. The money was transferred via the Western Union’s service (Maldives Independent, 2019).

In April 2020, when the COVID-19 began to spread in the Maldives, five speedboats and two dinghies at the harbour of Mahibadhoo island in the central Maldives were set ablaze. Luckily no one was on the board at that time. The IS took responsibility for that attack in its weekly al-Naba (Zahir, 2020). In his 2020 article for The Diplomat, Azim Zahir observed that the Maldivian supporters of IS and other jihadi groups

have been quick to exploit the pandemic for propaganda purposes. There is a renewed activism to translate and spread IS propaganda. They have focused on framing COVID-19 as a mini-soldier of jihad, a divine intervention that has exposed the weakness of the West. Anti-Western messages have increased. They have also framed the pandemic as a divine punishment for people’s sins and for an ‘un-Islamic’ tourism industry. They have started to spread messages for religious purification and a return to ‘pure’ Islam. (Zahir, 2020)

Militants attacked Nasheed in 2021 for his liberal beliefs. Notably, in 2012, Nasheed’s such views caused his dismissal from the President’s office.

Over the years, Maldives archipelago has become a fertile recruiting ground for militants, including the IS jihadists. Years ago, in an interview with The Independent in 2014, Nasheed revealed that up to 200 Maldivians were fighting for IS in Iraq and Syria (The Independent, 2014). Between 2013 and 2019, it is believed that 423 Maldivians attempted to enter Iraq and Syria. Of the total, 173 have been successful (Storey, 2019). In his interview, Nasheed claimed that there were links between the jihadist groups, the country’s military and the police force. He added that the Maldivian ‘society had become much more conservative because of the influx of Saudi money – paying for Wahhabi imams and mosques and spreading a deeply conservative view of Islam at odds with the islands’ traditions’ (Wright, 2014).

Nasheed’s point was reiterated by then Human rights activist and now minister of environment Aminath Shauna in 2017 (ORF, 2017):

A new strand of Saudi Salafism is strengthening its roots in Maldivian society. An increasing strategic partnership between the [Abdulla] Yameen government and Saudi Arabia has led to more investments in the island’s energy, transport and health sector[s]. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia has donated US$100,000 for the establishment of the Islamic University of Maldives, along with a generous US$1.2 million fund for the construction of ten mosques all over the islands.

Rise in radicalism has deep impact on the Maldivian society. The island country’s Sufi-orientated Shafi’i Sunni Islam is contrary to the tenets of Wahhabism exported into the Maldives (Storey, 2019). Wahhabism is associated with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). After the Islamic revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia spent billions of dollars to spread the teachings of Wahhabism across the world, mainly in Islamic countries. Spread of Wahhabism is also seen as a rise in the Saudi’s influence. Wahhabism in the Maldives can be traced in the 1970s and 1980s after, as mentioned above, many students returned to their country after completing their studies in Wahhabi madrasas in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Gayoom kept the Wahabi imams under check. However, with transition to democracy, the imams got chance to influence politics and civil society of the country (Storey, 2019). In some parts of Maldives, journalist Aishath Velazinee has recorded (Cited in Swami, 2022):

. . . a few islands even reverted to ‘the Prophet’s time’, attempting to emulate the Arabian dress and lifestyles of the time of Prophet Muhammad. Men grew their beards and hair, took to wearing loose robes and pyjamas, and crowned their heads with Arab-style head-cloths. Women were wrapped up in black robes. Goats were imported, and fishermen gave up their vocation to become ‘shepherds’. Young girls were taken out of school and married off in their early teens in religious ceremonies said to be sanctioned by Islam.

Some Maldivians see the indented infromation above as an over-exaggeration of the prevailing situation in the Maldives. However, deep Islamic beliefs have made many Maldivians conservative. In 2009, during his visit to the Maldives, a Turkish Islamic scholar and lecturer at Monash University in Australia, Salih Yucel, was rejected by his fellow Muslims because of his too short beard and too long trouser. Under the influence of conservative Islam, many families have refused to send their daughters to school or vaccinate their children (Omidi, 2009).

Besides Saudi Arabia, Maldives is also engaged with other Middle East countries, though not very close. The following section discusses the Maldives’ relations with countries other than Saudi Arabia.

Beyond Saudi Arabia

Turkey (officially called Republic of Türkiye) is a rival of Saudi Arabia in Middle East politics. However, in April 2022, Turkish President Erdogan went to Riyadh to improve bilateral ties that were badly strained after Saudi journalist and dissident Jamal Khashoggi was killed and dismembered by a Saudi hit squad at its consulate in Istanbul in 2018. At that time, Erdogan accused the ‘highest levels’ of the Saudi government of giving the orders; however, Ankara has softened its tone since then (Coskun, 2022).

Turkey established diplomatic relations with the Maldives in 1979. The Turkish Embassy in New Delhi is accredited to the Maldives and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Maldives to the United Nations Office in Geneva is accredited to Turkey (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, n.d.). Aftermath of December 2004 Tsunami, Erdogan visited Maldives in February 2005 during his term as the country’s prime minister. It was the first official visit from Turkey since diplomatic relationship was established between the two countries. The visit by Maldives’ foreign minister Abdulla Shahid in April 2008 was the first official trip from the Maldives to Turkey.

In 2022, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited the Maldives. During his visit, Turkey and the Maldives agreed to establish a joint economic committee. The two countries aimed to increase their trade volume to US$100 million over the next 2 years (Daily Sabah, 2022). The two countries signed five key trade and economic cooperation agreements, agriculture, culture and cooperation between the Foreign Service Institute of Maldives and the Diplomacy Academy of Türkiye (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Maldives, 2022).

Maldives established diplomatic relations with the UAE on 15 March 1978. The Embassy of Maldives accredited to UAE is in Abu Dhabi. In 2020, The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, ADFD, the leading national entity for economic development aid, signed an agreement with the government of Maldives to provide funding support to the tune of US$50 million for infrastructure development projects in the Maldives. Since 1976, ADFD has been supporting development in the Maldives. It has allocated AED748 (US$ 200 million) towards developing several projects serving vital economic sectors, including transport, housing and renewable energy (Emirates News Agency, 2020).

As mentioned above, under Yameen, the Maldives severed its relationships with Iran and Qatar following Saudi Arabia’s decision. After Solih came into power in 2018, the Maldives re-visited that decision. Soon after assuming the office, in his first press briefing Maldivian foreign minister Abdulla Shahid told reporters,

We have been highlighting the principle we will use to establish relationships; that is countries that are friendly, cooperative, and want to have relations with the Maldives. We will continue strengthening relationships with all the countries who want to have a good relationship with us. (Edition MV, 2021)

Shahid then added that the Maldives is in discussion with Qatar and Iran. He said,

Qatar, specifically, is a country that helps Maldivians a lot. So, we will start work on re-establishing ties with Qatar. We also have to re-establish ties with Iran. (Edition MV, 2021)

In November 2018, Malé decided to reinstate full diplomatic relations with Qatar (Islamic Republic News Agency, 2018). This decision by Malé came hours after Saudi Arabia announced that the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt were joining it in re-establishing ties with Qatar during the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) annual summit that year. The GCC leaders signed the Al-Ula Declaration and a final communique to reinstate ties with Qatar (Edition MV, 2021).

As mentioned above, Maldivian fighters were found fighting a war in Syria and Iraq. The number 200 is a matter of debate. Yameen’s government blamed the opposition for inflating the number of Maldivian fighters in the two countries. The government then said the number would be below 100. This is, however, not real given the number of Maldivians leaving for Syria since 2014 (Maldives Independent, 2016a, 2016b). Even the Maldivian children and 9000 children from other countries were reportedly fighting in Syria (Cornish, 2019).

Maldives and Oman established diplomatic relations in February 1981. Since then, the two countries have worked to enhance their bilateral relationships.

Maldives established diplomatic relations with Kuwait in 1977. In 2021, Shahid paid a visit to Kuwait. During the visit, the two countries signed two Memorandums of Understandings. One on Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, and the second, in the Field of Tourism’ Ministry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Maldives, 2021). The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), established in 1961, provided the first loan to the Maldives in 1976, for the Airport projects. Since then, the KFAED has assisted Malé in various infrastructure projects (Ministry of Finance, Republic of Maldives, 2020).

The Maldives maintained diplomatic relations with Israel from 1965 to 1974. In 2009, Nasheed signed a cooperation agreement with Israel related to tourism, health, education and culture (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Israel, 2009). In 2011, the Maldives then foreign minister Ahmed Naseem became the first top official to visit Israel. Yameen terminated all forms of cooperation with Israel. In 2021, in solidarity with the atrocities committed by Israel on the Palestinian population, Maldives suspended all relations with Israel, except importing essential medical goods after getting special permission from the government (The Edition, 2021).

Conclusion

As a small state, Maldives does not have many options in matters of foreign policy. Unlike a few other small countries, Maldives’ political and economic limitations have made it not to engage in hedging. Instead, on various issues, Maldives has taken sides mainly to serve the country’s political and economic interests. During Yameen’s term, Maldives developed close relations with China at the cost of deteriorating the country’s age-old ties with India. China was favoured over others in matters of investments in the country. However, after Yameen lost power, Solih’s administration reversed many of its policies and followed the ‘India first’ policy. The divided elites of Maldives have taken sides for political and personal reasons. For example, Yameen brought the Maldives closer to China, while Solih is overwhelmingly regarded ‘pro India’ leader. To counter, Solih’s ‘India first’ policy Yameen launched ‘India Out’ campaign. In 2022, Solih issued a decree to ban the ‘India Out’ campaign.

In the Middle East, Maldives developed close relationships with Saudi Arabia. As an economic power, Riyadh has helped Malé to build civic infrastructure. In return, it seems, particularly during Yameen’s tenure, as mentioned above, Maldives followed Saudi’s footprints in foreign policy matters related to the Middle East. Closeness to Saudi Arabia is also because of religious reasons. Like Saudi Arabia, Maldives is home to Sunni Muslims. To spread its brand of Islam, Saudi Arabia is accused for providing money to the Maldives. Many scholars trained in the Middle East, Pakistan and North Africa are widely considered responsible for spreading Islam’s radical version in the island country.

Other than Saudi Arabia, Maldives is also engaged with other Middle East countries. Solih’s government is reconnecting with Qatar and Iran, with whom it had severed relations under Saudi’s influence when Yameen was Maldives’ President. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia remains more important to the Maldives than other countries in Middle East Asia.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Amit Ranjan

Notes

Author biography

Amit Ranjan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.

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