Abstract
Black Power during the 1960s is a shift in direct action protest with its aim at procuring power (economic, political, educational, etc.). The manifestation of Black Power in Philadelphia in the late 1960s provides us an elaborate model of direct action protest that included central components of the African American community. Moreover, the selective patronage movement successfully maintained organization and momentum without the prototypical one leader model that was prominent in the civil rights movement that preceded it. Much like the Black Lives Matter movement, the selective patronage movement in Philadelphia drew on the national outcry for racial justice but largely built the core of its strength on local networks. This article explores the history of the selective patronage movement in Philadelphia during the early 1960s. Next, it assesses the strengths and weakness of the movement. Lastly, it provides recommendations for future movements aimed at economic development.
Introduction
In order to completely understand, and address, poverty within the African American community in Philadelphia, specifically and African American communities across the nation in general, a critical analysis of the historical practice of institutional forms of racial exclusion from wealth accumulation and the perpetual reinforcement of race having economic value must be assessed. The two factors mentioned above link African Americans’ contemporary collective economic status with a structural issue not yet addressed by legislation or advanced models for racial equity and antidiscrimination. The Black freedom movement in Philadelphia during the 1960s sought to confront structural and systemic forms of White supremacy and establish culturally affirming institutions aimed at affording African Americans power and self-determination. A critical examination of the complexity of the movement reveals the expansive nature of racism in the United States. Black Power in Philadelphia helps to dispel the myth of the racially progressive North. According to Jeffries, “unlike the Civil Rights Movement, the Black Power movement was dispersed throughout the United States. Prominent Black Power organizations existed in California, Louisiana, New York, Michigan, Mississippi, and New Jersey” (Jefferies, 2006, p. 7). When examining Black Power in Philadelphia, we find a wide range of organizations adopting and engaging in Black Power strategies to obtain power.
Like other large metropolitan cities with substantial Black populations, the local government in Philadelphia sanctioned the systematic practice of excluding African Americans from the city’s core industries. African Americans were largely barred from three of the city’s leading industries: (a) construction, (b) government jobs, and (c) administrative-level manufacturing jobs. In addition, it was common practice for African Americans to be denied membership to labor and trade unions; thus, the jobs afforded to union members.
Despite the lack of movement of the preverbal economic needle, African Americans in Philadelphia and around the nation continue to fight and advocate for the deconstruction of systemic barriers that limit their access to economic resources. A comparative look at the Civil Rights and Black Power era in Philadelphia allows social activists and those interested in economic development an example of a significant shift in tactics used for advocacy and the power of protest. Furthermore, the proposed models of these eras for economic development expose the need for a necessary shift in contemporary models.
In light of the momentum and force of the Black Lives Matter movement and the historical fight for racial and social justice for African Americans in the United States, a look at the Black Power movement is useful as a guideline for making sense of the power of protest. African Americans used various approaches that have been informed by the ideological framework of those resisting. Black Power during the 1960s is a shift in direct action protest with its aim at procuring power (economic, political, educational, etc.). The manifestation of Black Power in Philadelphia in the late 1960s provides us an elaborate model of direct action protest that included central components of the African American community. Moreover, the selective patronage movement successfully maintained organization and momentum without the prototypical one leader model that was prominent in the civil rights movement that preceded it. Much like the Black Lives Matter movement, the selective patronage movement in Philadelphia drew on the national outcry for racial justice but largely built the core of its strength on local networks.
This article explores the history of the selective patronage movement in Philadelphia during the early 1960s. In addition, it highlights the transformative potential of direct action protest. Next, it assesses the strengths and weakness of the movement. Lastly, it provides recommendations for future movements aimed at economic development.
Black Power in Economic Context
The discourse on the Black Power Movement has grown in popularity due to the expanded body of literature written about the era and the depiction of images, proponents, and organizations in motion pictures, documentaries, music, and other venues that exposes people to aspects of the movement (Fenderson, 2013). The contribution of Black Power toward African Americans’ historical fight for freedom represents a radical shift in aim and a reconceptualization of the movement’s desired outcome. While the core principles of Black Power ideology are consistent among organizations and Black Power proponents, the implementation and strategic approach vary from one organization to the next. Selective patronage in Philadelphia served as one illustration of how Black Power, specifically the component of self-determination, was an effective means of acquiring political power. Selective patronage, as a direct action protest strategy, expands early articulations of Black Power. For example, in 1966, Clayton Powell Jr. articulates Black Power as a working philosophy for a new breed of cats-tough, proud young Negroes who categorically refuse to compromise or negotiate any longer for their rights . . . who reject the old-line established white financed, white controlled, white washed Negro leadership (Powell, 1966).
Later, more developed conceptions of Black Power create a framework to properly locate selective patronage.
Carmichael (2007) argues that Black Power can best be understudied as the . . . proper representation and sharing of control. It means the creation of power bases from which [Black] people can work to change statewide or nationwide patterns of oppression through pressure from strength – instead of weakness. Politically, Black Power means . . . the coming together of [Black] people to elect representatives and to force those representatives to speak to their needs. (p. 21)
It is important to note that Ture’s articulation helps to frame the selective patronage campaigns in Philadelphia in that both seek to engage and negotiate representation for African Americans. Other prominent organizations in Philadelphia such as Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), the Black Peoples Unity Movement (BPUM), the Philadelphia Freedom Organization, and later MOVE incorporated a nationalistic approach to address structural White supremacy (Countryman, 2006). Selective patronage is grounded in Black Power ideology in that it used direct action protest for the purpose of establishing a power base and defended African Americans’ economic interests.
Maulana Karenga (2016) contends that Black Power seeks . . . to achieve three things: self-determination, self-respect and self defense . . . its basic aim remains one of power, power to defend our interests and develop our potential as a people and to transform and transcend this society of which we have become willingly or unwillingly a real and recognizable part. (p. 61)
The actualization of Black Power ideology in Philadelphia can be illustrated through the selective patronage campaign in its aim to actualize power through methods grounded in the principle of self-determination. The relevance of the Black Power movement lies in its philosophical and ideological framework, which informs its objectives.
The significance of Black Power ideology in regard to Black economic development is a prioritization of power and shared control of resources. The use of direct action protest was utilized well before the nomenclature of Black Power was used, but the aim and objective of protest shifted. The acquisition of power was central and necessary for structural change.
Black Power ideology moves away from legislative reform as a means to obtain economic stability. Direct action protest, under the guise of Black Power, was pointed at actualizing power and seizing control of resources that legislation was unable to secure. Moreover, Black Power ideology accepted the racialized reality left largely ignored by liberalists and conservatives alike. To this end, racial unity, grounding in an African cultural identity and critical analysis for deconstructing oppressive system, became the structural foundation for Black Power. The central objective is for actualizing revolutionary thought and action geared at establishing and maintaining a political, economic, and social system capable of humanism.
Black Power represents a shift in objective, but more important, it explores economic development by critically analyzing systems of oppression. Thus, capitalism is placed under a microscope to determine whether it is fit for Black economic development. To explore the utility of Black Power ideology, I will analyze direct action protest used to actualize Black Power. The next section will explore the selective patronage campaign and how it was useful in obtaining power. Although the selective patronage campaigns do not challenge the exploitive component of capitalism, it seeks to acquire power for the Black community through unified resistance. In addition, Leon Sullivan’s economic plan offers an alternative to the traditional model of capitalism. As a result, the selective patronage campaign in worthy of analyzing as act of actualizing Black Power and a movement geared toward Black economic development.
Selective Patronage Movement
A key figure in the fight to improve African American’s economic conditions in Philadelphia was Reverend Leon Sullivan. In 1950, Sullivan, who formerly trained under Adam Clayton Powell and A. Philip Randolph, became the presiding pastor of Zion Baptist Church located in the heart of North Philadelphia. During most of the 1950s, Sullivan spent a significant amount of his attention and leadership toward organizing around issues of juvenile delinquency and youth employment. While in New York, Sullivan embarked on similar programs. In 1953, Sullivan was instrumental in forming an alliance called the Philadelphia Citizens Committee Against Juvenile Delinquency and Its Causes (CCAJDIC). The CCAJDIC sought to engage the “problems of crime and ineffectual law enforcement and mutual disrespect between citizens and the law” (Sullivan, 1969, p. 62). Sullivan’s position was that the issue of juvenile delinquency was plaguing the African American community in Philadelphia and Harlem.
In Sullivan’s observation, juvenile delinquency was partially attributed to high rates of youth unemployment. He argued that the high drop-out rate during the 1950s left large numbers of African American youths with unsupervised idled time, which translated to delinquency. He asserted, “Few boys got in trouble who were employed either full time or part time” (Sullivan, 1969, p. 65). Consequently, Sullivan’s first attempt to address unemployment rates in the African American community and discriminatory practices in employment was with the Youth Employment Program (YEP). YEP served as an interracial job placement agency for youth. The program collaborated with other state funded job placement agencies to assist with directing youth to employers with openings.
Through working with the CCAJDIC and YEP, Sullivan recognized one painful reality: the existence of an overwhelming prevalence of discriminatory practices based on race and its use by many of the industries in Philadelphia. Difficulties with placing African American youth made the common practice of discrimination obvious. Sullivan (1969) commented on YEP’s youth job recommendations when saying, Every day the want ads in the newspapers begged for workers. And when we sent white boys and girls to apply, they were hired. But when we sent colored boys and girls, the response was usually different: “We will call you later.” The telephone never rang. (p. 66)
In June of 1960, the issue of racial discrimination in youth employment gained local attention when an article titled “Local Ministers Organize for Youth Employment Opportunity” (1960) was published in the Philadelphia Tribune. Due to the challenges of finding job placements for African American youth, a formation of an alliance of African American clergymen was established to launch a “selective patronage” movement. After measures taken by the Comission onHuman Relations, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and other civic organizationsfailed during much of the 1950s, Sullivan called a small meeting of ministers that ultimately served as the impetus of the selective patronage demonstrations.
Beyond serving as a spiritual sanctuary for the African American community, Sullivan envisioned the Black church as a viable network that could fasilatate communication and maximize communitypower” (Countryman, 2006, p. 106). He identified the fundamental power of the Black church as the African American minister’s independence and impartiality in regard to political and economic affiliation. Thus, in structuring a movement that centralized selective patronage, Sullivan went to the heads of Black churches for collective cooperation. His conceptualization of the church was very similar to how the church was utilized by his mentors Powell and Randolph. Similar to the national civil rights movement that was currently in motion, Sullivan sought to transform Philadelphia’s Black churches into the active headquarters for a social movement geared toward resisting discrimination in employment. Furthermore, he attempted to cement the African American minister as the spiritual and public head of the movement. In an article published in the Baltimore Afro-American titled “Ministers Wage Economic War on Discrimination” (1960), the author reported that “ . . .the ministers agreed that they [could] not, in good conscience, remain silent while their members support companies which are violating not only Philadelphia laws, but human rights of those who are the victim of job discrimination” (p. 5).
From that small meeting of ministers, a priority group was formed that would serve as the nucleus of the collaborative. The group would be responsible for charting the course of action and selecting a new spokesperson for each campaign. This central group was made up of leaders of denominational conferences and other ministers who were active and vocal on civil rights (Sullivan, 1969). The organizational structure was based off of Sullivan’s, as well as his successor Reverend Gus Roman’s, belief that any significant social movement that was rooted in the African American community was successful because it was grounded in the church. Furthermore, Sullivan regarded the African American minister as the most respected leader within the African American community. While many of the ministers were active in previous demonstrations in Philadelphia, Sullivan sought to devise a method that deviated from the liberal political reform approach and reestablished the grassroots bases that were responsible for the emergence of the liberal reformist movement in Philadelphia.
The first action of the priority group was to solicit the support of African American ministers in which they received a strong base of 400 ministers. The priority group then investigated several businesses’ workforce demographics and employment practices and made recommendations for which companies were to be targeted. The informational meetings were the venue where all 400 supporters could discuss the recommendations of the priority group and outline the specific courses of action. Of the selective demonstrations conducted, the group of 400 demanded a meeting with the executives of the targeted company. The organizations outlined their concerns regarding selective employment based on race. The ministers established a time frame for which the executive had to meet the collective’s demands. In the case that executives refused to meet with the ministers, the collaborative would negotiate with the executives for the established time frame, in most cases 4 weeks, and then move to action if demands were not met. It must be noted that the demands established by the 400 ministers were minimal when compared with the devastating effects that racial discrimination in employment had on African American poverty rates. Sullivan (1969) states, “ . . .the minimum requests were never really excessive. Really, what was being asked was a concrete, visible change of employment practices as far as the colored worker was concerned” (p. 74). This collective act of resistance, at minimum, attempted to achieve what the White LRM failed to and to afford African Americans access to employment in industries and companies that were exclusively White.
When companies did not comply with the demands presented by the group of 400 ministers, the collaborative would encourage their congregation not to patronize the businesses and/or their products. The strategy of the collective was to force businesses to acknowledge their racist employment practices by redirecting the spending power of the members of 400 Black churches. The idea was that if a significant number of African Americans withheld their support, it would have a devastating blow for businesses that heavily relied on African Americans’ dollars. Moreover, Sullivan’s philosophy was that the most effective strategy for negotiating with business owners was through direct action that affected their pocketbooks. Sullivan (1969) states “ . . . our desire was not only to get black men and women into sensitive positions they had never held before, but also to break the company’s entire pattern of discriminatory employment practices” (p. 74).
One of the pivotal demonstrations of selective patronage organized by the group of 400 ministers was directed at the Tasty Baking Company (TBC). Throughout the late 1950s, TBC had a thriving business that sold products in nearly every convenient and grocery store in the African American community. African Americans supported their products despite being excluded from employment as salespeople, delivery drivers, office workers, and production-line workers. The Philadelphia Tribune (1960) reports that as a result, the priority group targeted the TBC and demanded the following five assurances (Pastors reject tasty baking co. compromise, 1960): 1. That the recently assignment [African American] driver salesmen and two in training be given “fixed routes and that more be added in the immediate future,” 2. A minimum of two [African American women] be included on the clerical force of the company, and additional colored office personnel be added in the immediate future, 3. That bulletin board announcements declare the end of restroom and locker room Jim Crow for women employees, 4. That [African American women] be given equal opportunity for upgrading, and 5. Assurance is given that these policies will be continued and not slighted if and when the campaign is declared ended. (p. 1)
The TBC initially rejected the demands outlined by the 400 ministers. TBC refused to acknowledge the disproportionate number of African American employees in low-level positions compared with skilled and managerial positions. On June 16, 1960, the group of 400 launched their selective patronage campaign against TBC with Sullivan serving as the spokesperson for negotiations. The TBC rejected the minister’s claim of discriminatory hiring practices and responded by outlining the company’s commitment to the hiring of African American workers and hiring based on qualifications. On June 28, TBC ran the advertisement “Tasty Baking Company Outlines Fair Employment Program Obvious Misunderstandings is Corrected” (1960), providing their explanation for low numbers of African Americans in skilled positions. The ad states, With our extremely low turnover and unusually large amount of employment applications, our standards and qualifications are high so that we have become the envy of the industry, and the sole consideration for anyone in the regard irrespective of race, color, or creed is their qualification as compared with all others applying for employment. (p. 20)
TBC also challenged the legality of the “selective patronage” tactic by requesting that the CHR investigate the demonstration; this approach parallels similar tactics used by corporations and governmental agencies, which were designed to delegitimize Black Power initiatives. The CHR later declared that the demonstration was within the law. During the demonstration, 150 convenient stores throughout African American community in Philadelphia refused to sell TBC products. The Tri State Defender reported that at the height of the demonstration, 250,000 people were actively participating. The overwhelming support of community members and local businesses forced TBC to accommodate all five demands outlined by the ministers. On August 7, the ministers discontinued the campaign after 3 months of economic withdrawal and negotiation. TBC began to hire a minimal numbers of African Americans as salespeople, delivery drivers, office workers, and production-line workers. Shortly after, TBC addressed the remaining demands.
The demonstration on the TBC was the first and one of the longest demonstrations organized by the 400 ministers. More important, the demonstration was pivotal in that it provided the momentum for future campaigns organized by the ministers. The demonstration’s success was gained without the support of the local and many of the national daily publications. The minister did not call on any government agency to intervene. Nonetheless, the network organized via the church helped to gain the community’s confidence in the method and immediate prestige and sense of urgency for the group of ministers within the business community in Philadelphia. In the reader’s response section of the Philadelphia Tribune, a community member’s response to the minister’s organizational efforts stated, “ . . . besides liking the manner in which they’re doing it, I am overwhelmed by the momentum their ‘selective patronage’ campaign is picking up steam (p. 21). Ultimately, the TBC demonstration also illustrated the tremendous power of collective participation. Grassroots methods of organizing community activism were able to accomplish what liberal politics and reformist legislation failed to. It forced a White-owned business that practiced discriminatory hiring in selective departments of the corporation to immediately abandon that practice.
Following the demonstration against TBC, the ministers chose a new spokesperson and research committee to target Freihofer, a local bakery. Partially due to the success of the TBC protest, the ministers reached an agreement with Freihofer’s without having to utilize selective patronage (Countryman, 2006). The group of 400 ministers and the act of selective patronage began to gain a reputation for its effectiveness. The Tri State Defender (1960) reports, This campaign was one of the most effective ever waged against what has been termed “Gross Discrimination in Northern Industry” and had the cooperation of all segments of the [African American] community in Philadelphia and nearby areas, -clergy, business, fraternal, civic and youth. (Preachers call halt to selective buying, 1960, p. 4)
Through Black Power protest, the negotiation process between civil rights advocates and big businesses in Philadelphia began to drastically change. After reaching agreements with two of the largest baking companies, the ministers directed their protest tactics against the bottling industry. On October 2, the ministers targeted the local Pepsi-Cola bottling company for selective patronage. On October 4, the Philadelphia Tribune announced the demonstration and reported that Pepsi-Cola’s bottlers only had two employees who were not White on its staff. In the article “400 Preachers Aim Selective Patronage Guns at Pepsi-Cola” (1960), the Tribune reports that the ministers encouraged their followers to refrain from purchasing Pepsi products.
In less than a week, the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company made assurances to accommodate the ministers’ demands. The Pepsi-Cola protest, like TBC, solidified the group of 400 ministers and the method of selective patronage. Soon after the Pepsi-Cola’s victory, Philadelphia’s Coca-Cola and 7 Up bottlers complied with the demands made by the ministers. Demonstrations launched on Philadelphia’s baking industries and the soda bottling industries were strategically planned so that the companies were targeted during what was perceived to be the company’s most profitable business quarter. This approach made any business heavily depended on African Americans’ patronage extremely vulnerable. This further dramatized the protest and contributed to its success. The same tactics were used when targeting the city’s petroleum companies. During the winter months, the group of 400 launched selective patronage demonstrations during the petroleum industry’s most profitable quarters.
The group of 400 ministers first targeted Atlantic Richfield and Standard Oil. The two companies entered negotiations immediately and reached an agreement with the ministers without the pressure of protest. As Countryman points out in his text Up South, the significance of Atlantic Richfield’s compromise with the ministers was that after being investigated by the CHR and declared discriminatory in their employment practices, the CHR had failed in forcing Atlantic to integrate all departments within their corporation (Countryman, 2006). The inadequacy of liberalism was most evident by this protest. While local liberals were initially sympathetic to businesses targeted by the ministers, the agencies responsible for resolving discriminatory employment were largely ineffective. The next major selective patronage demonstration organized by the ministers was directed at the local Gulf Oil retailers. The Tri State Defender reports that on January 15, 1961, the 400 ministers launched a selective patronage campaign against Gulf Oil to demand that African American workers be hired in the company’s offices and as salesmen drivers on oil and gasoline trucks (Gulf hires Negroes, boycott called off, 1961). Unlike Atlantic Richfield and Standard Oil, Gulf refused to make assurances to the minister’s demands. The minister’s research of Gulf found that African Americans were only employed in the company’s cafeteria. The Pittsburg Courier reported that Gulf assured that they were willing to make immediate steps to set a fair employment policy and requested the ministers to assess progress over a 7-day observation period. The ministers rejected Gulf’s request and reemphasized their commitment to continue the campaign until all demands were met. Immediately after the campaign was announced, Gulf customers sought to terminate their home heating contract. In addition, the Tri State Defender reports that 1,000s of African American motorists immediately discontinued use of Gulf’s filling stations. After a week of protest, Gulf made assurances to meet the ministers’ demands. Gulf hired an African American accountant, a sales representative, and several oil truck salesman drivers.
The Sun Oil Company (SOC) was the next firm targeted by the group of 400 ministers. The Sun Oil campaign illustrated the stark difference between the African American fight for economic liberation and White liberalism’s conceptualization of equal opportunity. Sun Oil was generally accepted by liberals due the high number of African Americans employed by the firm. However, the ministers were clear that volume did not correlate to equal opportunity. The ministers initiated negotiations with SOC on February 3. Due to the large number of African Americans being employed at the refinery, SOC rejected the ministers’ demands. The SOC strongly felt that they complied with the state’s fair employment practices policies. After a month of negotiating, the ministers announced that SOC did not meet the minimal demands put forward and had declared the beginning of a selective patronage campaign on March 19, 1961. On March 20, leaflets were distributed throughout the African American community titled “No More Dollars for Discrimination.” SOC launched a public relation campaign of their own sending letters to various employees and distributing a press release to local and statewide papers. The SOC went as far as distributing letters to protest participants outlining the progress made.
The ministers intensified their campaign by incorporating the African American Masons. Countryman (2006) states, At an April press conference, the 400 Ministers kicked off the second phase of their campaign against Sun with the announcement that the state leader of the [African American] Masons had ordered Pennsylvania’s 25,000 masons to stop buying Sun products. (p. 103)
The SOC finally made assurances that they would comply to all of the demands of the ministers. On June 11, 1960, the ministers terminated the selective patronage campaign. Sullivan states that between 1959 and 1963, the ministers were successful in over 29 selective patronage campaigns. He argued, “It has been estimated that as a result of these campaigns in Philadelphia more than two thousand skilled jobs were opened directly to colored workers. Indirectly, the number reached several thousands more, because there was a chain effect” (Sullivan, 1969, p. 76). Barriers of discrimination were being broken solely by African American collective cooperation. Multimillion-dollar corporations such as TBC, Sun Oil, Pepsi-Cola, Coca-Cola, 7 Up, Gulf Oil, Atlantic Richfield, and Standard Oil were forced to reconstruct employment practices because of selective patronage.
Selective patronage was a Black Power grassroots method of resisting discrimination in employment. The minister’s ability to direct and redirect the spending patterns of many African Americans in Philadelphia allowed them to dictate the content of meetings and forced some of the most powerful companies to engage in business agreements on the terms outlined by the ministers. The ministers stepped out of the restricted scope of liberalism and reclaimed their agency. Through the act of protest, they were able to form a movement that was exclusively controlled by African American leadership and independent of outside aid. This method allowed African Americans to define the criteria for justice and made all other negotiating groups honor and adhere to that standard.
However, while the selective patronage movement was largely successful in breaking the racial barriers in some of the Philadelphia’s largest industries and gained employment for thousands of African Americans, it did not have a significant impact on eliminating discriminatory practices in employment. Many corporations satisfied the minimum demands and allowed an insignificant number of African Americans in mid-level and skilled positions. Furthermore, the basis of the movement sought to demand entrance of African Americans in hostile White institution. Fundamentally, the selective patronage movement was an integrationist model that sought reform. In this regard, the selective patronage movement was a direct extension of the White LRM. It failed to explore ways of directing African American spending toward developing a self-sustaining market that was owned and operated by African Americans. After meeting the demands of the ministers, the companies went on to dominate their industries with the support of the Black dollar. The selective patronage movement had the capacity to forge African American industries that would be competitive with firms who did not honor equal opportunity. African Americans could have taken control of many of the industries that relied on the African American dollar and challenged racism and eliminated African Americans’ reliance on racially exclusive businesses.
Strengths and Considerations Moving Forward
The selective patronage campaign, organized in Philadelphia in the early 1960s under the leadership of the 400 ministers, serves as a model for analyzing the utility of direct action protest and Black Power ideology. The strengths of the movement are best illustrated by the success of realizing its desired outcomes. Analyzing this movement more than 55 years later allows the present generation to critically analyze what can be taken away from this movement and utilized.
Utilizing a Black Power lens, the strength of the selective patronage campaign was the effective use of unity as a means to harness the economic power of the collective community. Through unity, participants were successful at transforming their spending power into a political tool for addressing community needs. Unity is a component that has been a source of power for African Americans during their quest for economic stability. Nemhard-Gordon suggests that cooperatives have been a cornerstone of the collective Black community’s economic stability. African Americans’ buying power has proven to be a tool for transcending political and social realities. The principle of unity is the activating component to activating the transcending power. Like the civil rights movement of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, Black Power ideology emphasizes unity is the power base of the Black community. Furthermore, unity is a central component of the African cultural matrix.
Another strength demonstrated by the selective patronage campaigns was a clear understanding of the racialized reality of African Americans and the inadequate approaches by both liberal and conservatives to address this reality. While African Americans have historically maintained their agency, leaders of the selective patronage campaign identified a strategy that allowed the African American community a high level of independence toward achieving its desired goals. The selective patronage campaign moved away from the liberal reformist movement that was very popular and central to the civil rights movement. It must be noted that these campaigns were successful at accomplishing the goals before the ground braking Civil Rights Bill of 1964 was passed. The success of the movement illustrates the effectiveness of the strategy used and the power of having a clear understanding of racial politics of the time. The 400 ministers were able to accomplish something that Civil Rights legislation has still failed to address.
Unlike the leadership structure of the civil rights movement, the selective patronage campaign established an internal leadership matrix that deviated from the single leader model. The movement was locally based and largely carried out by community members under the leadership of their churches. This model protected the movement from character attacks while placing power in the hands of its participants. More important, the philosophy of the movement and the tactical approaches taken was decided within council of participants and not unilaterally determined. As a result, participants were active agents who were able to shape and influence the direction of the movement.
Participants having a clear understanding of the goals and objectives is another strength of the selective patronage campaign. In each campaign, the 400 ministers outlined demands that were to be accomplished at the conclusion of each demonstration. In addition, the campaign was not to be concluded until all demands were met. Also, each campaign identified the method used for accomplishing the desired ends. Each participant understood from the outset of each protest, what the desired destination as well as their role is.
The strategic approach taken by the 400 ministers was a significant factor for the movement’s effectiveness. Targeting corporations during their most profitable periods gave the movement leverage and placed businesses at a disadvantage. For example, the selective patronage campaign’s protest on 7 Up and Pepsi-Cola during summer months was strategic in that it targeted their peak sales in Philadelphia. These approaches were rooted in research and geared toward making corporations feel the full brunt of the blow. The strategies used forced many of the corporations to the bargaining table in the matter of days and concede to demands shortly after.
As systems of oppression advance, strategies for deconstructing these institutions must advance and become more sophisticated. The selective patronage campaigns of the early 1960s in Philadelphia was fitting for its time, but considerations for advancing its objectives is necessary for addressing Black economic development today. To build on the strengths already discussed above, I suggest that a shift in philosophy and objective for contemporary and future movements geared toward economic development. Contemporary movements must begin to explore the plausibility of economic development of poor communities under the current economic system (capitalism).
Although this suggest is not new, it is vital for African Americans in particular, and other community in general, to evaluate the exploitive nature of capitalism. I propose that capitalism necessitates poverty. Thus, economic development for one community would result in exploitation and poverty in anther community. This model promotes competition, which inevitably creates winners and losers. Carmichael (2007) is correct in stating, The liberal says “It is a fact that you are poor, and it is a fact that some people are rich; but we can make you rich without affecting those people who are rich.” I do not know how poor people are going to get economic security without affecting the rich in a given country, unless one is going to exploit other people. (p. 171)
Contemporary movements should shift their philosophy toward advocating for new economic systems that are capable of establishing economic development independent of exploitation. In addition, one’s aim should be to engage in theory building that challenges existing economic systems and propose alternative systems. I concur with Carmichael’s (2007) sentiments that “ultimately, the economic foundations of the country must be shaken if [Black] people are to control their lives.” (p. 22)
Conclusion
In conclusion, social movements that have been spearheaded by African Americans have had a strong focus on economic development and equal access to economic resources and opportunities. Ultimately, these movements seek to preserve and defend African Americans humanity in the face of cultural and racial attacks. These social movements vary in philosophical perspective and strategic approach. When analyzing the history of social movements organized and carried out by African Americans, we can clearly see a continuity and progression from one era to the next. Social movements during the Black Power era represent a philosophical shift directed at actualizing political and economic power for the African American community. The use of direct action protest helps to catapult African Americans into a position of power to address their concerns.
The selective patronage campaigns carried out in Philadelphia in the early 1960s illustrate the efficiency of direct action protest and the benefit of acquiring power as a means of altering political and economic realities. The 400 ministers identified a strategy that allowed African Americans in Philadelphia to harness their spending power and transform it into a tool for change. Direct action protest is still utilized by activist to challenge injustice and bring awareness to social ill and inequalities in society. To continue the fight to preserve African Americans’ humanity, a close and critical analysis of movements such as the selective patronage campaign must be conducted. An analysis should seek to advance past movements and address contemporary threats to the African American community. An analysis of the selective patronage campaign reveals that power is a necessary component for transforming reality. In the past, African Americans’ source of power lies in unity, communal style leadership, strategic planning, and having a clear philosophical framework and strategic approach.
Moving forward, it is necessary for African American to seek alternative economic systems as a means for economic development. (Nembhard, 2008) New systems that align with the principle of our culture and that are conducive for economic development must be explored. This task would force African Americans to engage economic theory building and critical analysis of current economic systems that have failed to materialize forms of economic development that have longevity. In addition, we must utilize tactics that have proven to be successful and useful for addressing contemporary challenges. Any social movement serious about addressing poverty and/or engaging economic development must understand the structural challenges that capitalism pose to the very concept of development.
In addition to the structural challenges that current economic systems pose to economic development, social movement geared toward Black economic development must explore the current existence of a race-based economic value system that hinders African Americans from accumulating wealth in any economic system. Shapiro and Oliver’s groundbreaking work on wealth inequality reveal an unsettling truth; wealth and wealth assessments are influenced by race, and in America, wealth is stored in Whiteness. In the adverse, depreciation of goods and lack of wealth is stored in Blackness. An initiative to address economic development must confront the politics of race and the system that provides economic and social privileges to White society. America, as a racialized nation, habits the practice of White supremacy to reinforce a race-based value system in all institutions (education, real estate, media, law, etc.). At its core, social movements led by African Americans have strived to address this reality. Contemporary and future movements must eradicate systems rooted in racial privilege.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author thanks his wife, Marquita Gammage, daughter Jalia Imani Gammage, son Justin T. Gammage Jr. and mother and father Frederick and Dorothy Gammage.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
