Economic Pessimism and Racial Discrimination in Brazil

Abstract

When studying Black politics, Brazil is an important country to consider because of its large Afro-descended population, its history of slavery, and persistent racial and economic inequality. In this article, I examine the role perceptions of racial discrimination play on the economic well-being of the Black Afro-Brazilian population. I test the hypothesis that, as Afro-Brazilians’ perceptions of racial discrimination increase, the more likely it is they will hold a pessimistic view of their economic situation. I rely on 2010 national data to conduct an ordered logit regression analysis which shows that Black and Brown Brazilians who have experienced racial discrimination are more likely to be pessimistic about their economic situation when compared with Blacks and Browns who have not experienced racial discrimination. In addition, ordered logit regression analysis demonstrates that respondents who admit experiencing racial discrimination are more likely to be women, identify as preto, and have more education.

Keywords

discrimination Afro-Brazilians economic well-being Brazil

Brazil is an important country in the African diaspora because of its high population of Afro-descendants and its racial history. Nigeria has the highest number of African descendants, and Brazil has the second highest number. Fifty-three percent of Brazilians claim to be Afro-Brazilian (Black or Brown). When studying black politics, Brazil should be considered because of its large Afro-descended population, as well as its history of slavery and persistent racial and economic inequality. Brazil was largely viewed as a racial paradise until the late 20th century when black movement activists became more vocal at challenging racism, although they have been organizing against racism through formal organizations since the 1930s. Black activism has led to the implementation of multiple racial policies which were meant to address social, political, and economic inequality. Even so, Afro-descendants remain significantly underrepresented in national politics, comprise a disproportionate number of the poor, and are economically and socially marginalized.

In this article, I examine the role perceptions of racial discrimination play on the economic well-being of the Black and Brown Brazilian population. I define and measure economic well-being as how well an individual believes they are doing economically. I argue that experiencing racial discrimination has a negative impact on Afro-Brazilians’ perceptions of economic well-being. In other words, those who experience racial discrimination are more pessimistic about their economic situation or economically pessimistic than those who have not experienced racial discrimination. The survey question asks respondents what they think about their economic situation and this is measured from very good to very bad. I test the hypothesis that as Afro-Brazilians’ perceptions of racial discrimination increase, the more likely it is they will hold a pessimistic view of their economic situation. I rely on 2010 national data to conduct an ordered logistic regression analysis which shows that Black and Brown Brazilians who have experienced racial discrimination are more likely to be pessimistic about their economic situation when compared with Blacks (pretos) and Browns (pardos) who have not experienced racial discrimination. In addition, ordered logistic regression analysis demonstrates that respondents who admit experiencing racial discrimination are more likely to be women, identify as preto, and have more education. Throughout this article, I use the term Black to denote the census category preto and brown to denote the census category pardo which is a category that indicates racial mixture. The Brazilian census includes the categories Black, Brown, Yellow (Asians), White, and Indigenous. In this article, I am most interested in census category blacks and browns. When referring to Blacks and Browns together, I use the term Afro-Brazilian.

Researchers have shown that racial discrimination plays a negative role in the health of Afro-descendants and marginalized groups in the United States (Jackson et al., 1996; Paradies, 2006; Pascoe & Smart, 2009). More specifically, there is a negative relationship between perceptions of racial discrimination and the well-being of African Americans (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Broman, Mavaddat, & Hsu, 2000). In the Brazilian case, Gouveia, Souza, Luna, Souza, and Szwarcwald (2005) found that perceptions of discrimination including skin color, class, or gender had a negative impact on satisfaction with the health system. Pavão Ploubidis, Werneck, and Campos (2012) found that in Brazil, there is a positive relationship between perceptions of racial discrimination and physical morbidity and depression. Physical morbidity refers to a person’s physical health and well-being. That is, racial discrimination has a detrimental effect on a person’s physical health and well-being. These studies concern well-being in terms of physical and mental health. However, the impact of racial discrimination on perceptions of economic well-being is equally important because this factor shapes many aspects of life. This article explores the impact of racial discrimination on economic well-being.¹

Examining economic well-being along with racial discrimination is important to consider given Brazil’s economic fluctuations. The Brazilian economy is the eighth largest economy in the world. Its most recent economic boom was from 2003 to 2009. The economy began to fall into a recession in August 2014 and formally fell into recession in 2015 (Dyer, 2015). The downturn was at least partly due to the Petrobras scandal, a state run oil company that was implicated in providing kickbacks for politicians in return for political favors. Brazil hosted the World Cup in 2014 and the 2016 Olympics. These events helped bring more attention to the country. Brazil serves as a leader for Latin American countries because it has implemented policies for Afro-descendants and because political elites have addressed the issue of discrimination due to pressure from black movements. Much of the recent progressive legislation was supported by the leftist Worker’s Party.

Worker’s Party President Dilma Rousseff was impeached in 2016. Vice President, Michel Temer, who is now President, recently enacted measures such as not increasing spending on education to stabilize the economy. However, failure to increase spending on education will have an adverse impact on low-income people. Temer proposed an amendment to the constitution to establish a 20-year public expenditure cap. This also will be detrimental to low-income people. Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur for the United Nations, when referring to these measures, stated, “It will hit the poorest and most vulnerable Brazilians the hardest, will increase inequality levels in an already very unequal society, and definitively signals that social rights are a very low priority for Brazil for the next 20 years” (United Nations Human Rights, 2016). In this current climate, it is no surprise that all Brazilians may feel less optimistic about their economic well-being. For the purpose of this article, I focus on the year 2010, a year after the continued growth from 2003 to 2009, which highlights a time period in which Brazilians still enjoyed the impact of growth.

Economic growth is not equally shared by citizens. Development and gentrification of neighborhoods in Brazil have been devastating to low-income Afro-Brazilian communities and some development projects have been met with resistance from black women who perceive these projects as racist and classist (Perry, 2013). Gentrification in Brazil has taken the form of pushing out local residents in the name of developing neighborhoods where developers build housing and restaurants that are too costly for local residents who are forced to move because of the subsequent rise in the cost of living. When projects were underway to prepare for the World Cup and Olympics, citizens began to protest because of the increase in the cost of living. João Vargas (2016) showed that the 2013 protests, which began when citizens advocated for free bus fares, were largely white. Small-scale strolls or rolezinhos in shopping malls challenged the idea that black and brown youth did not belong in these semipublic spaces. Vargas argues that power is defined in direct contrast to blackness. Both former President Lula’s and former President Rousseff’s governments led to greater inclusion through their social and racial policies. These progressive policies went directly against the common ideology that blacks are neither fit for positions of power nor should they be fully included in society. The 2013 protests against rising costs mainly involved college-educated whites; black disidentification with these protests highlights many of the racialized structures in society. Whites were attacked by police at these protests but gained sympathy if they were attacked, while blacks did not gain such sympathy when attacked because of the role the state plays in everyday repression of black bodies. Both the protests and rolezinhos highlight the racial and racist structures in society. They are important to mention because they highlight the continuance of racial discrimination and how it structures aspects of daily life.

This article’s focus on racial discrimination highlights how racism structures perception of economic well-being. Given the role that racial discrimination plays in the lives of African descendants, I expect racial discrimination to play a negative role in the assessment of one’s economic situation. I rely on national data available from the 2010 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) based at Vanderbilt University. The article is organized in the following way. First, I discuss race, racism, racial inequality, and black activism. I refer to black activism as mobilization that seeks progressive rights for Afro-Brazilians such as challenging negative stereotypes of blacks, seeking changes in state policy such as the successful affirmative action legislation, and seeking basic rights in local communities such as clean water and the right to land. Second, I examine changing economic conditions. Third, I briefly discuss the methodology and descriptive statistics. Fourth, I discuss my results.

Race, Racism, and Racial Inequality

Before discussing racism and racial inequality, I briefly examine race in Brazil. Historically, notions of race in the United States and Brazil were different. In Brazil, it is more common for people to refer to skin color rather than race. However, race is increasingly employed in mainstream media. It is also important to note that skin color is racialized as those with darker skin are viewed negatively and are associated with negative attributes such as being less intelligent, criminal, and unattractive. On the contrary, those with lighter skin are viewed as intelligent and attractive. In Brazil, race is different than the United States because one’s social status can have an impact on how others identify an individual’s race or color. Edward Telles (2004) found that high-status self-identified preta women are less likely to be identified as preta by others. Another difference is that hair texture, nose, and lip size also determine an individual’s race. Traditionally, in the United States, race is determined by ancestry. However, determining one’s race is changing in the United States particularly among those who see themselves as biracial (Khanna & Johnson, 2010). There is evidence that biracial African descendants in the United States identify differently according to context. Khanna and Johnson (2010) found that biracial Americans having a white and black parent most often identify as biracial but also may choose exclusively to be Black or White identified. Others may change their racial identification depending upon the context; in some settings, they may identify monoracially often representing themselves solely as black but sometimes representing themselves solely as White (Rockquemore & Arend, 2002).

Racial discrimination against Blacks and Browns has been documented in anthropological and sociological scholarship (Goldstein, 1999; Guimarães, 2004; McCallum, 2005; Sheriff, 2001; Twine, 1998; Vargas, 2004). Telles and Bailey (2013) found that, unlike Bailey’s (2002, 2009) past work where most Brazilians attributed racial inequality to class, race was significant in explanations of racial inequality. This change in attitudes can be attributed to Black movement activists’ discourse focusing on racial discrimination and public policies meant to address racial inequality. If Black and Brown Brazilians attribute racial inequality to race rather than class, their perceptions of their economic well-being may not simply be a function of class but may be based on perceptions of racial discrimination.

Racial discrimination occurs in both the private and public spheres. In the public sphere, racial inequality in education, income, health, and treatment has been documented by government bodies. Scholars such as Florestan Fernandes (1965) have documented racial discrimination in Brazil since the 1950s. Similarly, Carlos Hasenbalg (1978) showed differences in social mobility by race in the late 1970s. Carlos Hasenbalg and Nelson Valle do Silva (1999) found that inequality is present between whites and Afro-Brazilians because Afro-Brazilians face racism that prevents them from having the same opportunities as their white counterparts. They disagree with the claim that inequality is simply due to class. France Winddance Twine (1998) observed that despite the near absence of a discussion on race and racism, racism was rampant in social interactions where light skin was preferred to darker skin and in educational settings. In the contemporary context, Marcelo Paixão finds that although income inequality between Afro-Brazilians (pretos and pardos) and whites decreased from 2003 to 2010, inequality still remains. On average, white workers still make 1.8 times more than Afro-Brazilians (Paixão & Rossetto, 2011). Statistical comparisons of infant mortality show that in 2005, infant mortality was higher for Blacks and Browns (24.4%) than whites (23.7%) (Paixão & Carvano, 2008). The number of whites attending university was over 4 times the number of blacks and browns attending university in 2006 (Paixão & Carvano, 2008). M. Mitchell and Wood (1998) found that darker skinned men report a higher incidence of police brutality. In their study, police brutality is defined as being assaulted by the police. Silva and Reis (2011) and Angela Figuredo (2010) found that black and brown professionals in prestigious positions (e.g., engineers, lawyers, and doctors) face racial discrimination at work, usually by strangers. They usually believe perpetrators of discrimination are not well mannered (mal educado) so do not take formal action against these individuals who perpetuate racism.

In private life, racial discrimination can be found in families. Chinyere Osuji (2013) found that, despite Brazil’s reputation as a racial paradise with many interracial couples, it was challenging to find interracial couples in her research in Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, when she did study these couples, many revealed that their families hold prejudice against Afro-Brazilian partners. Both Marcos Rangel (2015) and Elizabeth Hordge-Freeman (2015) found that within families, children are treated differently according to their skin color. Rangel found that parents invest more in lighter skinned children than their darker skinned siblings. Hordge-Freeman found that parents praise lighter skinned children’s physical features and some show less affection to their darker skinned children. Yet she also found evidence of resistance when parents embrace blackness. All of these examples demonstrate that even in the private sphere, racial prejudice has a negative impact on Afro-Brazilians.

Black Activism and Public Policy

Black activists have responded to public sphere and private sphere racial discrimination. Black activism consists of challenging the prevailing notion of racial democracy, advocating for racial policies, and at the local level advocating for basic rights in local neighborhoods. Racial democracy is the idea that racism is not prevalent in Brazilian society because of its racially mixed population. Racial mixture is understood as proof that racial intolerance does not exist and that no distinct races exist making racism impossible. Racial democracy is largely understood as a myth in many academic circles. However, some Brazilians continue to hold on to this belief. Policies such as affirmative action are proof that the state has acknowledged that racism prevails in society despite the myth of racial democracy. Although affirmative action policies based on racial quotas were first implemented in Brazilian universities in 2002, President Dilma Rousseff passed legislation in 2012 requiring all federal public universities enact quotas. In addition, Federal law 10.639/03 was passed in 2003, requiring public schools to teach African and Afro-Brazilian history. Black movement activists supported and pushed for such policies, while encouraging Afro-Brazilians to embrace a negro racial identity. Blackness is often associated with negative stereotypes. They encourage blacks and browns to disassociate negative stereotypes with blackness by embracing the term negro. Black activists embrace positive notions of blackness and reject prevailing stereotypes of blackness and black and brown people. The racial category, negro, is employed by black activists and even mainstream media to denote blacks and browns. By using the umbrella term negro, Black activists seek to unify blacks and browns.

Black movement activists have long sought to raise the visibility of racism in society resulting in the implementation of public policies to address racial disparities (Hanchard, 1994). Activists and black politicians have been effective at advocating for public policies to address racial inequality (Johnson, 2006). Black activists have been vocal about the issue of racial discrimination in formal organizations such as Abdias do Nascimento’s Black Experimental Theater (Teatro Experimental Negro). Among the first organized groups to publicly challenge racism through protests and theatrical productions are the Black Brazilian Front (Frente Negra Brasileira) and the United Black Movement (Movimento Negro Unificado). Grassroots activism, especially women-led activism, has been key to racial consciousness today. Hip Hop music and artists have also aided in disseminating racial consciousness (Pardue, 2004; Santos, 2010). Political campaigns serve as a means of racial mobilization and teaching racial consciousness (G. Mitchell, 2009). Cultural groups aid in promulgating black consciousness. Christen Smith’s (2016) work on Culture Shock, a local theater group of black youth, demonstrates how they politicize racial issues such as police brutality in Salvador, Bahia. Women-led grassroots activism serves as another site of activism (Caldwell, 2007; Perry, 2013). Digital media such as YouTube, Blogs, and Facebook also serve as means of disseminating stories of racial discrimination and mobilization around such issues. Black activists continue to make the Afro-Brazilian community aware of racial discrimination which demonstrates why many Afro-Brazilians are still likely to deny racial discrimination in their lives.

. . . Brazil is a racially prejudicial society without either conscious perpetrators or conscious victims. (Nobles, 2000, p. 125)

Perceptions of Racial Discrimination

Despite empirical evidence of color discrimination, the implementation of affirmative action policies, and efforts by black movement activists, many Afro-Brazilians continue to say they have never experienced racial discrimination. Many discriminatory acts among friends and family members are understood as jokes rather than acts of discrimination. Anyone who complains is seen as not having a good sense of humor (Caldwell, 2007; Goldstein, 1999; Sheriff, 2001; Twine, 1998). Yet, there are cases where racially conscious Afro-Brazilians are aware of racial discrimination and those with dark skin are more likely to perceive discrimination.

Blacks are more likely than browns to admit to experiencing discrimination based on skin color. The percentage of pretos reporting they never experienced racial discrimination increased from 1995 in the DataFolha survey to 2003 in a survey conducted by Fundação Perseu Abramo and the Nucleo de Opinião Pública but decreased from 2003 to 2010 (LAPOP’s survey). Based on the 1995 DataFolha survey conducted by the Folha de São Paulo newspaper, 64% of Blacks and 84% of Browns said they never felt discriminated against (Nobles, 2000). A 2003 survey conducted by the Fundação Perseu Abramo and the Nucleo de Opinião Pública found that 70% of Blacks and 88% of Browns said they never felt discriminated against because of their color or race. However, according to the 2010 LAPOP survey, 57% of Blacks and 88% of Browns said they have never been treated badly or in an unjust manner based on skin color. In contrast, during the period 1995 to 2010, the percentage of pardos saying they never experienced racial discrimination remained relatively stable, hovering over 80%. This finding demonstrates that the increase in acknowledgment of color discrimination among Blacks and Browns is primarily among those identifying as preto. While it is true that Brazil is a “pigmentocracy” where life chances are shaped by skin color, empirical studies show greater income disparity between black and brown Brazilians than there is when comparing whites with blacks and browns (Telles, 2004). This empirical evidence of economic inequality stands in stark contrast to individuals’ perceptions of racial discrimination.

Changing Economic Conditions

Marcelo Paixão and Irene Rossetto (2011) have shown that during President Luis Ignacio “Lula” da Silva’s time in office, from 2003 to 2011, there was a general increase in the number of Afro-Brazilians moving out of poverty. However, income inequality still remained between black and brown Brazilians and whites. Between 2003 and 2009, the average rate of economic growth was 2.88%. Between 2001 and 2009, average income growth rate per capita between racial groups was 44.6% for pretos (blacks), 48.2% for pardos (browns), and 21.6% for brancos (whites). In 2009, the proportion of Afro-Brazilians in Classes A, B, and C was 50% compared with 72.4% of whites. Class A is the wealthiest class, followed by Class B. Classes D and E are lower income categories. In the period of the economic boom, Afro-Brazilians in Classes A, B, and C rose 198.8% more than Whites. In Class A, the difference is 213.1%. This is due both to more people reporting they are preto and pardo and more income growth of these groups (Neri, 2011).

Despite such huge gains, income inequality between Afro-Brazilians and non-Afro-Brazilians persists. Considering the poorest 10% of the population from 2001 to 2011, black and brown Brazilians made up 67.3% of this segment in 2001. This increased to 70.3% by 2011. In 1995, whites made 2.1 times more than black and brown Brazilians. In 2014, whites made 1.7 times more than Black and Brown Brazilians. The average real monthly income for Afro-Brazilians in 2014 was R$1,195.6 compared with R$2,058.9 for whites (Table 1).

Table 1.

Average Monthly Income From All Sources for the Working Population 16 Years or Older by Color/Race (Brazilian Reais).

	Monthly Income of Pretos/Pardos	Monthly Income of Brancos
1995	784.7	1,643.4
1996	807.5	1,706.2
1997	794.1	1,706.7
1998	790.5	1,689.8
1999	738.6	1,548.8
2001	755.2	1,542.7
2002	744.8	1,497.2
2003	687.2	1,409.7
2004	715.9	1,391.5
2005	750	1,453.1
2006	809.5	1,572.1
2007	863.3	1,616.6
2008	905.7	1,647.8
2009	953.6	1,674.8
2011	1,069.2	1,834.4
2012	1,124.1	1,972.7
2013	1,172.7	2,051.6
2014	1,195.6	2,058.9

Source. “Retrato das Desigualdades de Genero e Raça” (n.d.): Based on the Institute Applied Economic Survey (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada).

As wages increase, so does the difference in earnings between whites and black and brown Brazilians (Arias, Yamada, & Tejerina, 2004; Bailey, Loveman, & Muniz, 2013; Telles & Lim, 1998). This difference demonstrates the “elite profile of discrimination” against Black and Brown Brazilians (Silva & Reis, 2011). Those with higher incomes and more prestigious jobs face barriers despite having equivalent or superior credentials to their white peers. Black and Brown professionals such as engineers, lawyers, and doctors in Rio de Janeiro work are a minority in white-dominated environments. Respondents typically pointed to the workplace and the public sphere as the most common sites of discrimination. A study conducted by Arias et al. (2004) reveals that the largest discriminatory wage penalties for Afro-Brazilians exist in the highest paid occupations. Paixão and Carvano (2008) showed that blacks and browns who have finished college are 1.2 times more likely to be unemployed compared with whites with the same schooling. Paixão (2015) also found that Afro-Brazilian entrepreneurs report experiencing racism.

It is clear that income disparities exist between black and brown Brazilians and whites. Some of these differences can be explained in terms of human capital such as parents’ education and an individual’s capital. However, even considering these factors, there are still differences that may be better explained by racial discrimination. There are also differences in income based on gender. Lovell (1999) found that Afro-Brazilians and women make less than white men. In 2014, although there was a decrease in the wage gap, negra women still earned 40% less than white men (“Mulher Negra Ganha,” 2016).

Wage inequality shows there is racial inequality but it is not clear that most Afro-Brazilians perceive this inequality as racial discrimination. The segment of the Afro-Brazilian population who are aware of economic inequality is also aware of how changes in the economy adversely affect Afro-Brazilians. The economic downturn has been particularly harmful to black and brown Brazilians as the Brazilian Real is at a low point while the price of goods has risen due to the economic boom combined with the current economic downturn. Although average salaries of Afro-Brazilians rose 51.4% between 2003 and 2013 compared with 27.8% for whites, Afro-Brazilians incomes only correspond to 57.4% of whites’ incomes (Lisboa, 2014). In 2015, in the three largest Brazilian cities, black and brown workers in Salvador received only 48% of what whites earned. In Rio de Janeiro, Blacks and Browns received 55.5% of white earnings and in São Paulo, they received 59.4% of what whites earned (O Fosse Entre Branco e Negros, 2016). Considering these differences and the fact that many black and brown Brazilians do not acknowledge discrimination, I will test whether those who have experienced discrimination have a more pessimistic economic outlook than do those who do not admit to experiencing racial discrimination.

Method

I rely on the 2010 LAPOP survey. The LAPOP survey is based at Vanderbilt University and is a nationally representative sample covering five main geographic regions: north, northeast, central-west, southeast, and south. These regions were substratified by the size of the municipality and whether it was urban or rural.² The 2010 LAPOP survey includes a general question about racial discrimination (operationalized as discrimination based on skin color, economic perceptions, and demographic variables such as race, income, education, and gender).

Results and Analysis

My hypothesis is that as blacks and browns perceptions’ of racial discrimination increase, so does the likelihood they will view their economic situation pessimistically. To test this, I conduct an ordered logistic regression analysis. My dependent variable is perception of economic well-being, and my independent variables are perception of racial discrimination, income, education, age, gender, and racial identification. Before conducting this analysis, I provide descriptive statistics of variables in the model.

Economic Situation

The survey question asked, “In general, how do you evaluate your economic situation? Is it very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?” Forty-seven percent of Blacks and forty-eight percent of Browns were most likely to believe their economic situation is neither good nor bad. Thirty-seven percent of Blacks and 39% of Browns believe their economic situation was very good or good. Thirty-five percent of browns and blacks believe their situation is good. Only 5.65% of Blacks believe their situation is very bad. The situation is similar for Browns; 5.28% believe their situation is very bad. Ten percent of Blacks and 8% of Browns believe their economic situation is bad. Over one third of Blacks and browns felt optimistic about their economic well-being. What is interesting is that Blacks and Browns are similar when considering socioeconomic indicators and economic perceptions, but differences emerge when considering racial discrimination.

Experiencing Racial Discrimination

The survey question asked, “Thinking about the last 5 years, have you ever felt discriminated against or treated badly or in an unjust manner because of your skin color?” Thirteen percent of Blacks say they have felt discriminated against much of the time compared with only 2% of Browns. Eighty-eight percent of Browns say they have never faced racial discrimination compared with 57% of Blacks. Fourteen percent of Blacks say they have been discriminated against sometimes compared with only 4% of Browns. Finally, 16% of Blacks say they have been discriminated against a few times compared with only 6% of Browns. Differences in reporting racial discrimination between Browns and Blacks may be the result of the endogenous nature of identification and reporting discrimination. Acknowledging discrimination is sometimes due to how one identifies, which results in more Blacks acknowledging discrimination. However, those who acknowledge discrimination may be more likely to claim a Black identification. Thus, identification and discrimination are endogenous (Mitchell-Walthour & Darity, 2014).

In addition, those with darker skin color face more color discrimination than those with lighter skin (Caldwell, 2007; Hordge-Freeman, 2015; Telles, 2004; Twine, 1998). Although not all self-identified pretos are dark skinned and not all pardos are light skinned, it is generally true that Blacks (pretos) have dark skin and pardos have light skin (Mitchell-Walthour & Darity, 2014; Silva & Paixão, 2014).

Age and Gender

The sample is 52% female and 48% male. The average age is 39 years old. All salaries were converted to U.S. dollars based on the purchasing power parity rate set by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in 2010 (US$1.386). In the 2010 LAPOP survey, 32% of brown and 35% of Black families are situated in the approximately US$367.97 to US$735.93 monthly income bracket. Twenty-one percent of Blacks are within the US$735.94 to US$1,103.90 bracket compared with 16% of Browns. This category is considered Class C (lower middle class). Twenty-nine percent of browns and 19% of Blacks receive less than US$367.97 per month. Sixteen percent of browns and 19% of Blacks belong in the US$1,103.90 to US$1,839.83 monthly family income bracket. In this sample, blacks are slightly better off than Browns.

To gain a grasp of the cost of living, I report the monthly cost of a basic basket of goods or the cesta basica, which includes essential products such as beans, milk, bread, oil, and tomatoes. In 2010, based on data from the Inter-Labor Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE; 2010), the monthly cost of purchasing these items in the largest cities in Brazil was as follows: São Paulo, US$191.31; Brasilia, the country’s capital, US$168.59; Rio de Janeiro, US$175.09; and Salvador, US$145.53. I converted all costs to U.S. dollars by relying on the OECD’s purchasing power parity rate of US$1.386.

Education

Only 8% of Browns and Blacks have some university education. In both groups, most have a primary education. Forty-seven percent of Browns and 50% of Blacks have only a primary education. Forty-five percent of Browns and 42% of Blacks achieved a secondary education. As can be seen from these statistics, the income and education levels of Blacks and Browns do not greatly differ.

Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis: Examining Perceptions of Economic Condition and Racial Discrimination

My hypothesis is that Black and Brown Brazilians who have experienced racial discrimination are more pessimistic about their economic situation than are those who do not experience discrimination. The ordered logistic regression will allow me to examine the relationship between the two while considering other demographic variables. I code the responses to the survey question on economic perceptions on a scale from “very good” (0) to “very bad” (1). My independent variables include education, gender, income, age, racial identification (black or brown), and racial discrimination. The question regarding how often a respondent has experienced racial discrimination is coded as “a lot of times” (1), “sometimes” (.66), “a few times” (.33), or “never” (0). Age is a continuous variable. Incomes are categorized in 11 categories from no income to a monthly family salary of more than US$7,359.31. Education is measured in years of schooling.

Logistic Regression Model

The variables racial discrimination and income are statistically significant. Odds ratios of the ordered logistic regression analysis reveal that black and brown Brazilian respondents who admit they experienced racial discrimination are more likely to view their economic situation pessimistically (Table 2). For a one-unit increase in experiencing discrimination, the odds of perceiving one’s economic situation as “very bad” versus the combined “bad,” “neither good nor bad,” “good,” and “very good” categories are 1.60 times greater, given that all the other variables in the model are held constant. The regression analysis also shows that for a one-unit increase in income, the odds of perceiving one’s economic situation as “very bad” versus the combined “bad,” “neither good nor bad,” “good,” and “very good” are 0.85 times less likely. Finally, for a one-unit increase from rural to urban, the odds of a respondent perceiving one’s economic situation as “very bad” versus the combined “bad,” “neither good nor bad,” “good,” and “very good” categories are 2.35 times greater. This means that respondents in urban areas are more likely than those in rural areas to view their economic situation pessimistically.

Table 2.

Odds Ratio From Ordered Logistic of Perception of Economic Well-Being (n = 1,339).

Independent variables Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Racial identification (brown or black)	1.00 (0.15)
Income	0.85*** (0.03)
Education	1.01 (0.02)
Gender	1.14 (0.12)
Age	1.00 (0.02)
Urban/rural	2.35*** (0.36)
Racial discrimination	1.60* (0.36)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Pseudo-R² = .0172.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Class Discrimination

Considering that those who experienced racial discrimination were more likely to have a pessimistic outlook on their economic well-being, I am now interested in perceptions of class discrimination. In this article, class discrimination is measured and defined as treating an individual badly or unjustly because of his or her perceived class status. In order to test whether class discrimination has an effect similar to racial discrimination, I ran an ordered logistic regression analysis substituting class discrimination. The variables income, urban/rural, and discrimination are statistically significant. I find that as perceived class discrimination increases, there is a higher likelihood that the respondent will feel pessimistic about his or her economic outlook. A one-unit increase in experiencing class discrimination increases the odds of perceiving one’s economic situation as “very bad” versus the combined “bad,” “neither good nor bad,” “good,” and “very good” categories by 0.63 times, when all the other variables in the model are held constant (Table 3). In contrast, a one-unit increase in income decreases the odds of perceiving one’s economic situation as “very bad” versus the combined “bad,” “neither good nor bad,” “good,” and “very good” categories by 0.15 times, when all other variables in the model are held constant. A one-unit increase from rural to urban increases the odds of perceiving one’s economic situation as “very bad” versus the combined “bad,” “neither good nor bad,” “good,” and “very good” categories by 0.87 times.

Table 3.

Odds Ratio From Ordered Logistic of Perception of Economic Well-Being (n = 1,336).

Independent variables Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Racial identification (Brown or Black)	1.05 (0.15)
Income	0.86*** (0.03)
Education	1.01 (0.02)
Gender	1.15 (0.12)
Age	1.00 (0.00)
Urban/rural	2.46*** (0.38)
Class discrimination	1.88*** (0.32)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Pseudo-R² = .0204.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

In sum, racial discrimination and class discrimination have a negative impact on economic perceptions. Black and Brown respondents with higher incomes are more optimistic about their economic situations than those with lower incomes. However, experiencing discrimination has an adverse impact on perceptions of one’s economic situation. While it is intuitive that class discrimination would have a negative impact on economic perception, it is noteworthy that racial discrimination also has an impact on perceptions of economic well-being. Considering that most Black and Brown Brazilians do not acknowledge racial discrimination, I am interested in the characteristics of those that do. In the next section, I will examine these determinants.

Determinants of Racial Discrimination

Using an ordered logistic regression analysis, I find that blacks and more educated people are more likely to say they experienced color discrimination. The gender variable approaches statistical significance but not at the p < .05 level. My findings are consistent with Layton and Smith’s (2016) findings that consider all Brazilians. They reveal that those with darker skin tones are more likely to perceive class, gender, and race discrimination. When considering racial discrimination, age is negatively associated with perceived discrimination and education is positively associated with perceiving discrimination. Lower levels of income are positively associated with perceived class discrimination. Similarly, darker skin tones are positively associated with perceived class discrimination. For women, those with darker skin tones are more likely to report gender discrimination. These women also face race discrimination. For each one-unit increase or from Brown to Black, the odds of experiencing racial discrimination “a lot” versus the combined “sometimes,” “a few times,” and “never” are 6.50 times greater, when holding the other variables in the model constant (Table 4). For a one-unit increase in education, the likelihood of experiencing racial discrimination “a lot” is 1.05 times more than those saying “some,” “a little,” and “never” holding all other variables constant.

Table 4.

Odds Ratio From Ordered Logistic of Acknowledging Racial Discrimination (n = 1,346).

Independent variables Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Racial identification (Brown or Black)	6.50*** (1.08)
Income	0.91 (0.05)
Education	0.06* (0.02)
Gender	1.31 (0.20)
Age	0.99 (0.01)
Urban/rural	1.51 (0.39)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Pseudo-R² = .0800.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Perhaps Afro-Brazilian women are acutely aware of color discrimination because of the multiple oppressions they face. The positions Afro-Brazilian women hold in society may open them to experience inequality in particular ways that make them more aware of various discriminations (Rezende & Lima, 2004). Both paradigm intersection (Hancock, 2012) and structural intersection (Crenshaw, 1991) show how intersectional identities explain the position of individuals within societal structures and how one’s life chances are shaped. In the case of Black and Brown Brazilian women, the societal placement of Black and Brown women gives them insight into what impact various discriminations, including color discrimination, have in their lives. This is similar to Patricia Hill Collins’s (2000) notion of an outsider-within perspective. This is especially true for Black women. Layton and Smith’s (2016) work shows that dark skinned women are more likely to acknowledge experiencing racial and gender discrimination compared with other groups.

Conclusion

Brazil experienced an economic boom from 2003 to 2009 when racial and social policies were enacted. Combined economic and policy changes improved the economic well-being of many Black and Brown Brazilians especially those who were most economically marginalized. Yet improving one’s economic status does not ensure less discrimination. In fact, there is an elite profile of discrimination where income inequality between whites and Black and Brown Brazilians increases along with occupational prestige and income. Understanding the role of racial discrimination in daily aspects of one’s life, including economic well-being, contributes to the literature on the broad role of racism as one’s economic condition shapes one’s life chances. Brazilians are living in an era where they have experienced more visibility internationally because of their growing economic influence; yet the current political and economic instability have also brought challenges.

When former President Lula made and won his bid for the Olympics, this signaled to the world, Brazil’s growing influence. However, the Olympics and the World Cup had a negative impact on black and brown communities as low-income residents were pushed out of their communities in the name of development. In addition, in cities such as Rio de Janeiro, military police units created “pacification units” which went into low-income neighborhoods with the supposed goal of ridding these communities of crime and drug dealers. However, many innocent Black and Brown Brazilians were killed as units came into neighborhoods and shot at neighborhood members indiscriminately. The problem of low-income Afro-Brazilians in these communities being assaulted and killed continues. This is another example of racial discrimination against black and brown Brazilians. Groups such as Mothers of May (Mães de Maio) and React or Be Killed (Reaja ou Será Morto) are fighting against police officers and secret police squads who kill citizens by bringing domestic and international awareness to these issues.

Currently, Brazil is experiencing a political and economic downturn. With economic and political instability, those who will suffer most are those most vulnerable to disadvantageous changes in racial and social policies. Restricting spending on health and education is particularly threatening to marginalized communities. The impact of the current climate on low-income black and brown Brazilians is a future area of research. The current climate may open up more opportunities to make mobilization efforts that challenge the marginalized status of black and brown Brazilians even more visible. Social media also serve a role in activism. Brazilian YouTubers such as Nataly Neri of Afros e Afins and Maristela Rosa and Natalia Romualdo of “Papo de Pretas” or “Black Women’s Chat” serve as digital activists who discuss black empowerment and racial discrimination. In addition, Marques Travae, an African American, translates articles from Portuguese to English on the blog “Black Women of Brazil” about incidences of racial discrimination and mobilization in Brazil. All of these platforms serve to raise racial consciousness. The current political situation may present a unique challenge or opportunity to raise racial consciousness in a more conservative environment where those receiving social benefits are seen as less deserving. One potential resolution to racial discrimination is at the policy level and at the societal level. Black movement activists in Brazil have been successful at advocating legislation such as affirmative action and the teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian history in schools. Both of these policies were implemented. They both have the potential to raise racial consciousness and to democratize education by increasing the presence of blacks and browns and by showing the value of Afro-Brazilian history. Activists continue to push for affirmative action in employment hiring, another site of racial discrimination. In addition, grassroots organizing and alternative activism such as digital activism via YouTube serve as nontraditional sites of raising racial consciousness.

The discourse and efforts of black movement activists are important to consider when other countries look to Brazil for strategies to raise racial consciousness in increasingly less progressive climates. Mark Sawyer’s (2005) work on racial cycles shows how economic cycles resulted in different uses of Afro-Cuban culture as well as the role of discrimination in Cuban society. Sawyer’s work along with my work shed light on the relationship between discrimination and economic conditions. Considering changes in perceptions of discrimination during economic downturns and upturns is applicable to examining African descendant populations in Brazil, Latin America, and the United States where a conservative climate may have an impact on how people conceptualize racial discrimination along with other forms of discrimination such as xenophobia, sexism, and homophobia.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I thank all participants for their comments and suggestions.

Author’s Note

An early version of this article was presented at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee’s Department of Africology Seminar.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Gladys Mitchell-Walthour received her doctoral degree in political science from he University of Chicago. She is a visiting assistant professor of Public Policy and Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee. Her research focuses on racial and social policies, Afro-Brazilian political opinion, and discrimination in Brazil.

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