Wine,Beer,and Lotto: Black Community Mobilization Against Liquor Stores in Chicago

Abstract

Many studies find a higher density of liquor stores in urban communities with predominantly Black and/or low-income residents. Although these business establishments tend to fill commercial voids in these neighborhoods, residents complain that liquor stores often provoke serious problems. Scholars support these claims with findings showing evidence of strong correlations between liquor stores and crime, domestic abuse, and substance abuse. The present study focuses on determining whether liquor store density continues to be higher in Chicago’s low-income and Black communities. The results of spatial cluster analysis and geographically-weighted regression analysis run counter to expectations with liquor stores concentrated in wealthier areas and predominantly white communities. Further analysis show that low-income and Black communities mobilized to vote for local moratoriums on the establishments. These results (a) provide evidence of civic engagement and citizen-based political mobilization in low-income and Black communities as well as (b) reinforce the idea that “place matters” with the same institutions playing drastically different roles in different communities. The inequality of spaces perpetuates a system in which the same establishments trigger varying outcomes, thus reactions, according to neighborhood attributes.

Keywords

liquor stores alcohol outlets political mobilization spatial inequality Chicago Black neighborhoods

Introduction

Analyses of several American cities provide evidence of alcohol outlets acting as “hotspots” for crime and contributing to substance and domestic abuse as well as other problems in the surrounding community (e.g., loitering and open consumption of alcohol), especially in urban areas with larger proportions of Black residents (Bernasco & Block, 2011; Grubesic, 2013; Jennings et al., 2014; Lipton et al., 2013). Increased blight and poverty in an area exacerbates the adverse effects of liquor stores (Jones-Webb & Karriker-Jaffe, 2013; LaVeist & Wallace, 2000). This is especially problematic given the increased prevalence of liquor stores in impoverished communities and predominantly Black spaces across the nation, including Chicago, Illinois (Grunewald et al., 2006; Hendrickson et al., 2006; Jennings et al., 2014; Kwate & Loh, 2016; LaVeist & Wallace, 2000; Lipton et al., 2013; Snowden, 2016). These particular communities often experience higher levels of physical blight, economic distress, violent and drug-related crimes, substance abuse, and domestic violence (Hanson & Chen, 2007; Katz et al., 2013; Webster & Kingston, 2014). The potential additive effects of off-premise alcohol outlets on the safety and health of predominantly Black and low-income communities warrants serious concern.

In this study, we perform spatial cluster analysis and geographically-weighted regression analysis (GWR) to test whether a higher density of liquor stores existed in Chicago’s lower-income communities and areas in which underrepresented racial groups reside comprise the majority population in 2015. The findings, however, run counter to expectations. The results provide evidence of collective civic engagement in these communities with aid from the Mayor’s Office to remove these institutions. We also find evidence reinforcing the idea that “place matters” with the same institutions looking different and playing drastically different roles in communities according to racial and income demographcis of the neighborhood.

Literature Review

In Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect, Robert Sampson explains the severe social inequality that occurs across neighborhoods. Racial groups, particularly Blacks and Latinxs, as well as low-income families tend to reside in geographically isolated communities that suffer from concentrated disadvantage (e.g., poverty, higher crime rates, and health troubles). On the contrary, symbols of advantage exist at higher rates in wealthier communities and those areas with more white residents. Like most major American cities, the social stratification of neighborhoods according to race and income perpetuate a system of unequal spaces in Chicago. As stated by Sampson, “. . .[people] react to neighborhood difference, and these reactions constitute social mechanisms and practices that in turn shape perceptions, relationships, and behaviors” (Sampson, 2012, p. 13). This is particularly important for understanding varying levels and types of private investment across communities.

As a result of perceptions that investments in these spaces are riskier and less profitable, neighborhoods overwhelmingly populated by underrepresented groups and low-income families experience difficulties in attracting capital to strengthen their local economies (Moore, 2016; Sampson, 2012). After decades of extensive disinvestment and geographic isolation from centers of economic activity, these neighborhoods face commercial voids (Moore & Diez Roux, 2006; Morland et al., 2002). Blacks and Latinxs are considerably more likely to live in a food desert (Walker et al., 2010). Thus, liquor stores play a specific role in these urban neighborhoods (Grunewald et al., 2006). Liquor stores often represent the only establishment supplying residents with access to basic goods (e.g., groceries, cellular service, and financial services), albeit at a higher cost (Hendrickson et al., 2006). In effect, liquor stores act as an economic center. Many of these “convenience” or “corner stores” possess off-premise liquor licenses that authorize them to sell sealed alcohol to be consumed away from the business. Often, members of these particular communities resent that they must depend on these establishments for their grocery needs given the limited selection of goods, higher cost, and related social problems (Wiederholt, 2005).

These establishments contribute to destructive behavior and create deleterious conditions that perpetuate neighborhood deterioration (Jones-Webb & Karriker-Jaffe, 2013; LaVeist & Wallace, 2000; Lipton & Gruenewald, 2002; Lipton et al., 2013). Communities with an abundance of liquor stores usually possess many other institutions also affiliated with community distress and socioeconomic disadvantage (LaVeist & Wallace, 2000; Romley et al., 2007). In economically distressed spaces, liquor stores often sell cheap high-alcohol content beer and wine, hard liquor packaged in smaller sizes reducing their price as well as cups. This may not seem problematic, except customers often illegally consume their purchases in the immediate vicinity of the store with the remnants of their goods littering the area and gang-related black-market activities often operate in the shadows of these establishments. Thus, these liquor stores act as “hotspots” for crime in Black and impoverished communities in several major U.S. cities (Britt et al., 2005; Franklin et al., 2010; Jennings et al., 2013; Lipton et al., 2013; Teh, 2008; Toomey et al., 2012). Neighborhood conditions, especially economic decline, amplify this negative effect (Grunewald et al., 2006; Lipton et al., 2013). In Baltimore, public health officials attempted to remove liquor stores from poor neighborhoods given these relationships (Cohn, 2012).

Some also cite tense relations between the residents and mostly non-local and non-Black/Latinx proprietors of these establishments (see Chang & Leong, 2017; Ryoo, 2005). The concern is that liquor store owners focus solely on profits and do not possess any social responsibility to the communities in which their businesses exist (Herd & Berman, 2015). Black customers complain about high prices, low quality food, advertising, and selling cigarettes and alcohol to minors as well as owners’ not hiring residents, bad customer service, racial profiling, and harassment (Chang & Leong, 2017; Herd & Berman, 2015; Pollack 1998; Stevenson, 2013; Washington, 2016). In some cities (e.g., South Central Los Angeles, CA and Ferguson, MO), hostile relationships between consumers and proprietors resulted in violence, fatalities, and rioting.

Across urban areas in the U.S., those communities where a majority of the residents identify with a racially underrepresented group or live below the poverty level exhibit higher densities of liquor stores (LaVeist & Wallace, 2000; Lipton et al., 2013; Moore & Diez Roux, 2006; Morland et al., 2002; Pollack et al., 2005; Romley et al., 2007). This includes Chicago between 1995 and 2008 (Kwate and Loh, 2016). Chicago, a city intensely segregated according to race and income, continues to struggle to improve the quality of life in these communities. The present study does not purport to examine the effect of liquor stores on neighborhoods. However, we do investigate the relationship between neighborhood demographics (e.g., racial composition and income levels) and the prevalence of off-premise alcohol outlets in Chicago in 2015. The findings help to understand if liquor stores continue to be unevenly distributed throughout the city, potentially creating problems in neighborhoods desperately in need of change.

Data and Methods

In spatial analyses, the reliance on larger geographic jurisdictions increases the odds for grouping neighboring, yet dissimilar groups and communities. For this reason, we employ the census block groups as the unit of analysis. Smaller in area than census tracts, the use of block groups helps to diminish the potential for aggregation bias (Jennings et al., 2013; Pridemore & Grubesic, 2012). This, in conjunction with the homogeneity of spaces that result from high levels of racial and income segregation, further reduces the risk.

The city of Chicago is composed of 2,335 block groups. We excluded six block groups from the study due to the lack census data as a result of having a total population equal to zero. The final dataset included 2,329 block groups. On average, Chicago’s block groups contained 1,311 residents and consisted of 0.26 square miles of land.

To operate, off-premise alcohol outlets in Chicago secure a packaged goods liquor license, which authorizes the retail sale of manufacturer-sealed containers of alcohol for off-premise consumption (Section 5/6-31 of the Illinois Liquor Control Act). We downloaded geocoded data for the locations of businesses with packaged goods licenses from the Chicago’s online “Data Portal” (City of Chicago, 2015a; City of Chicago, 2015b). We excluded large and chain grocery stores from the analysis. Using the “join” function in ArcGIS, we merged these data with geocoded block-group census data, 2014 American Community Survey (5-year estimate), collected from TIGER/Line online data sets (U.S. Census, 2015). The “identity” function facilitated the ability to measure the number of outlets existing in each block group. We operationalized the dependent variable as the number of off-premise liquor licenses in a block group.

This study centers on the claim that the location of liquor stores is spatially dependent (Pridemore & Grubesic, 2012). In other words, geographic areas in close proximity share similar attributes in comparison to areas further away. We expected liquor stores to accumulate in those communities with higher proportions of non-white and low-income residents. To test this claim, we included two predictor variables, percentage of non-white residents (Figure 1) and poverty rate (Figure 2).

Figure 1.

Percentage of Non-white residents.

Figure 2.

Household poverty rate.

The analysis of Moran’s I facilitated the assessment of whether Chicago’s liquor stores reflect a pattern of even dispersion, random dispersal, or spatial clustering throughout the city, (Anselin, 2005). While Moran’s I provided insight into the global patterns of spatial correlation, the Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) test categorized the block groups according to whether they contained a significantly higher or lower density of outlets in comparison to other adjacent block groups (see Anselin, 2005). We evaluated the demographics of the various LISA groups to ascertain whether block groups with higher outlet densities consist of larger proportions of non-white and low-income residents.

Many studies on the distribution of alcohol outlets use general linear models that do not consider the role of geography and space. To control for the potential spatial autocorrelation within the data, we conducted a geographically-weighted regression (GWR) (Brundson et al., 1999). This local regression analysis accounts for spatial variations in the estimated relationships while non-spatial regression analyses estimate the overall effect of the independent variables on outlet density notwithstanding space (Cameron et al., 2016; Wheeler, 2014). Overdispersion in the data, specifically the considerable number of block groups with zero outlets, required the use of zero-inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB) analysis to understand the direction of the relationships between variables.

This study examines the total number of liquor stores in a block group, rather than the density of alcohol outlets. While a density measure standardizes the count of liquor stores according to either population size or geographic area, the estimated model uses a variable to account for systematic differences in population size. We included three other variables in the estimated models to control for various factors related to socioeconomic disadvantage that may contribute to the presence of liquor stores, including unemployment rates, median house value, and vacancy rates. At the time of this study, 64% of Chicago’s block groups existed in “dry” districts. This designation directly impacts the ability of business owners to establish liquor stores, thereby negatively impacting the dependent variable. For this reason, we also included a variable to denote whether the block group was designated a “dry” district.

Results

Across Chicago’s block groups, the number of businesses with off-premise liquor licenses ranged between zero and five outlets. On average, 0.31 alcohol outlets existed in Chicago’s block groups with a standard deviation of 0.62. Zero active off-premise liquor licenses existed within 76% of the block groups. Approximately 19% of the block groups possessed a single business operating with a license. Two liquor stores operated in approximately 4% of the block groups. Less than 1% of the block groups consisted of three establishments with off-premise liquor licenses. Only five block groups (0.21%) contained either four or five liquor stores.

The findings presented in Figure 3 suggest that block groups with more liquor stores existed in the northern half of the city, particularly in the downtown and areas directly to the north of downtown. These communities generally possessed more white residents and exhibited lower poverty rates while many of the west and south side areas, which contain a substantially large proportion of the city’s low-income residents and people of racially underrepresented groups, possessed no liquor stores.

Figure 3.

Off-premise alcohol outlets density in Chicago’s block groups.

The value of the Moran’s I statistic ranges from −1 (dispersion) to 1 (clustering) and represents the strength of the pattern. The z-score denotes the statistical significance of the spatial pattern. In this study, the Moran’s Index statistic equaled 0.062 (z-score = 13.62; p = .000), which indicates a moderate level of geographic clustering amongst liquor stores at the block group level. The likelihood that the clustering pattern resulted from random chance was <1%. We utilized the LISA function to identify those block groups with substantially higher or lower counts of off-premise alcohol outlets in comparison to their neighboring communities (see Figure 4).

Figure 4.

Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) in alcohol outlets.

The high-high (HH) block groups include a large number of alcohol outlets and neighbor several block groups with similarly high levels of outlets. These areas accounted for 7.9% of the dataset and exhibited an average proportion of Black residents equal to 5.3% and 11.65% of the population lived under the poverty level. Only three majority-Black HH block groups emerged in the data. The low-high (LH) block groups represented 2.1% of the dataset and possessed a lower number of outlets than the surrounding block groups with considerably more liquor stores per capita. These block groups compose the spatial pockets of communities with outlet densities close to zero within a broader with considerably higher off-premise outlet densities. On average, the LH block groups were comprised of a population with 4% Black residents and 11% of the residents living in poverty. None of the LH block groups demonstrated a majority-black population.

Figure 4 also depicts several high-low (HL) block groups that include more off-premise alcohol outlets in communities where other block groups contain few, if any, liquor stores. The HL block groups constitute 2% of the sample. This subset of 46 block groups primarily exists in the southern portion of the city with nine positioned on the far north side. These block groups averaged a black population equal to 43.38% of the community and impoverished residents representing 20.46% of the block group. Nineteen of the HL block groups exhibited majority-Black populations with at least 90% of the residents identifying as Black. Half of the majority-Black HL block groups displayed poverty rates higher than the city’s rate of 19.6%.

The HH and LH block groups constituted a vast region that included some of Chicago’s most illustrious areas of the downtown and north side, including the Loop, Millennium Park, Magnificent Mile, Streeterville, River North, Lower West Side, Lakeview, Wrigleyville, Avondale, Bucktown, Wicker Park, and Logan Square. The communities are infamous for their mid- and high-rise luxury housing, corporate businesses, retail shopping, hotels, restaurants/bars, and nightlife/entertainment. Thousands of local shoppers and tourists frequent these parts of the city every year. Fewer non-white and lower-income residents inhabit these spaces. The eight HH block groups on the west side of the city include the Austin and Garfield Park neighborhoods. In contrast to the downtown/northside HH cluster, these communities contain very few white and high-income residents and suffer high rates of violent and drug-related crime. The majority of HL block groups occupy various south side and far south side neighborhoods.

The adjusted R² signified that the full GWR model explained 10.5% of the variance in the number of alcohol outlets in Chicago’s block group. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) provides a reliable goodness-of-fit measure for comparisons across local spatial and global models. The GWR model rendered an AIC value of −3514.95 while the AIC in the zero-inflated negative binomial model equaled 3278.754. The difference between the two values indicates that the GWR model performed at a higher level than the negative binomial regression model. Neither the global nor local regression model signaled problems associated with multicollinearity. In the GWR model, the condition number for each block group ranged from 10.64 to 19.97 failing to meet the threshold (less than 30) for multicollinearity. In the negative binomial regression model, all of the predictor variables displayed VIFs lower than the value of 2.4, which indicated that multicollinearity did not present a problem.

The map shown in Figure 5 depicts the Local R² of the estimated spatial model. Analysis of the map revealed strong regional variations in the performance of the regression model. Across the city, the Local R² ranged from 0.03 to 0.19 and averaged 0.06 (SD = 0.02). The estimated local regression model best fit the block groups near the city’s downtown as well as peripheral communities on the far south side and the community containing and surrounding the international airport. As the distance from the center of the city increases, the ability of the model to predict the number of liquor stores decreases. In effect, the global significance of some variables varied across the city. To better understand the factors contributing to these spatial patterns, we analyzed the direction of their influence on alcohol outlets in an estimated zero-inflated binomial regression model (see Table 1).

Figure 5.

Geographically-weighted regression results (Local R²).

Table 1.

Estimated Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model.

				N = 2,329
				Non-zero obs = 561
				Zero obs. = 1,768
				Log likelihood = #######
				LR chi-squared (8) = 50.33
				Prob > chi-squared = 0.000
						95.% C.I.
	Predictor variables	Coeff.	Std. error	z	sig.	Lower bound	Upper bound
DV = alcohol outlet	Predictor variables	Coeff.	Std. error	z	sig.	% Non-white	−0.003	0.284	−0.010	0.993	−0.558	0.553
	Poverty rate	−0.367	0.537	−0.070	0.946	−1.089	1.016
	Total population	0.000	0.000	5.710	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Area (sq. km.)	0.043	0.053	0.810	0.415	−0.061	0.147
	Unemployment rate	−1.442	0.562	−2.560	0.010	−2.544	−0.340
	Vacancy rate	2.049	0.465	4.400	0.000	1.137	2.961
	Median housing value	0.000	0.000	−0.050	0.957	0.000	0.000
	Dry district	0.029	0.101	0.290	0.775	−0.169	0.226
	(Constant)	−1.669	0.180	−9.280	0.000	−2.021	−1.317
DV = Zero count	% Non-white	7.519	4.071	1.850	0.065	−0.461	15.499
	Poverty rate	−9.594	4.750	−2.020	0.043	−18.903	−0.285
	Dry district	−0.548	0.858	−0.640	0.523	−2.229	1.133
	(Constant)	−6.301	3.871	−1.630	0.104	−13.888	1.287

Neither percent non-white or poverty rate predicted the number of alcohol outlets at a level of statistical significance in the global regression, yet presented negative coefficients. Total population and vacancy rate displayed positive and statistically significant (p < .001) coefficients. Unemployment rate reduces the number of liquor stores in a block group at a level of p = .010. The inflate option of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression analysis permitted the estimation of whether the block group contained zero liquor stores. Increases in household poverty rate decreased the odds that no off-premise alcohol outlets existed in the block group. This effect was statistically significant at a level of p = .043. Conversely, a stronger presence of racialized populations increased the likelihood of zero establishments in the block group at an insignificant level of p = .065.

Although the consideration of spatial processes in the GWR model strengthens the model, its mediocre performance along with the statistical significance of several predictors suggest that the model was underspecified rather than misspecified. Other non-spatial analyses of the distribution of liquor stores drawing on the same variables report similar R² values (see LaVeist & Wallace, 2000).

Majority-Black populations lived in 27% of Chicago’s block groups. The dataset included 629 block groups with majority-Black populations and 68% of them fell under liquor moratoriums. Zero liquor stores were present in 80% of these block groups (see Table 2). Only one establishment possessed a packaged goods liquor license in 17% of the majority-Black block groups with 80% of them being dry. Of this set of block groups, 3% included two liquor stores in their jurisdictions and 0.32% possessed three stores.

Table 2.

Number of Liquor Stores in Majority-Black Block Groups.

# of liquor stores	% of majority-black block groups	% Black (average)	Poverty rate	% Dry
0	80.00	90.58	29.21	65.8
1	16.85	91.26	34.62	80
2	2.86	96.39	29.41	72.22
3	0.32	86.78	39.27	100
Total		90.85	30.16	68

Table reflects the 629 majority-Black block groups.

Discussion

Irrespective of the area’s demographics, a vast majority of Chicago’s block groups contained no non-grocery store establishments with off-premise liquor licenses. While previous research shows an increased density of liquors stores in poor and Black communities across various large cities (Jones-Webb et al., 2008; LaVeist & Wallace, 2000; Lipton et al., 2013; Moore & Diez Roux, 2006; Morland et al., 2002; Pollack et al., 2005; Romely et al., 2006), this pattern did not exist in Chicago at this time of this study. The findings show that liquor store-free communities primarily existed in economically distressed neighborhoods and areas where the majority of the residents belonged to a racially underrepresented group. Very few of these neighborhoods contained more than one liquor store.

The results of the Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) test indicate that very few block groups with large proportions of Black or low-income residents contain a large number of liquor stores and are surrounded by block groups with several outlets. While most predominantly Black and low-income communities do not possess a liquor store, they also are not situated immediately next to block groups with several liquor stores. Less than 1% of the sample constituted a block group located in communities with substantial Black populations and more impoverished residents that possessed zero outlets but neighbored block groups with multiple liquor stores. These findings suggest that predominantly Black and low-income communities tend to contain zero liquor stores and very rarely neighbor another community with liquor stores. Liquor moratoriums existed in all of the three majority-Black block groups that contained a large number of liquor stores in comparison to neighboring block groups. This further indicates that Black Chicagoans mobilized against high concentrations of liquor stores.

Contrary to other studies providing empirical evidence of a correlation between liquor stores and “broken windows” as well as other characteristics of community distress, the highest propensity for off-premise alcohol outlets existed in the city’s downtown, entertainment and tourism districts as well as wealthier residential and commercial communities that contained majority-white populations. This significant reversal of trends in liquor store distribution seems to be rooted in community activism.

Arguably, the community members’ grievances could be rectified by local government placing sanctions on problematic liquor stores, revoking liquor licenses, and rejecting liquor license applications. Drawing on a policy unknown to most since its inception in the year following the repeal of Prohibition, residents, city council members, and church leaders in Chicago’s lower-income and Black communities actively mobilized against these establishments since the late 1990s (Conklin, 2002; Johnson, 1998; Pollack, 1998; Slater, 1998; Washburn, 1998). To obtain a moratorium on liquor licenses, 40% of residents must sign a petition to place the initiative on the ballot and then 25% of the ballot vote must approve changing the precinct into a dry district. As shown in Figure 6, a large proportion of dry districts exist in low-income communities and neighborhoods composed primarily of members of racially underrepresented groups on the cities’ west and south side representing an organized citizen-based political initiative.

Figure 6.

Chicago “dry” districts.

In Chicago, black proponents for dry districts referred to the establishments as symbols of blight and “a magnet for the pathologies we fight every day” (Washington, 2016). As stated by a black journalist and lifelong resident of Chicago, “If you are looking for crime, dysfunction and the dregs of society, look for the liquor store. In our neighborhoods, it seems there’s one on every corner” (Washington, 2016; see also Pollack, 1998). Community stakeholders argue that these businesses further perpetuate the complex social, health, and economic problems that already occur at higher levels in these spaces (Jones-Webb & Karriker-Jaffe, 2013; LaVeist & Wallace, 2000; Toomey et al., 2012). Throughout his tenure as Chicago’s top politician, Mayor Richard M. Daley, actively supported residents’ efforts to rid their communities of problematic bars and liquor stores. In 1998, the New York Times published an article “Temperance Movement Grows in Chicago, a Precinct at a Time” in which the author details the Mayor’s “vote dry” campaign and commitment to use local government resources, specifically City Hall lawyers, to aid citizen groups in petitioning City Council to adopt moratoriums on the provision of liquor licenses. In a speech to residents at the southside Salem Baptist Church, a “megachurch” with a predominantly Black congregation, the mayor stated that “If you decide in your precinct to do this, you will have the full support of my administration” (Johnson, 1998). “These precinct-based referenda [were] around since the repeal of Prohibition but were used sparingly until Daley came to power” in 1989 and triggered an era referred to as the “New Prohibition” (Pollack, 1998).

In the same year that Mayor Daley committed city resources to support citizen-based initiatives to remove problematic liquor stores, the city sponsored numerous meetings in which city employees provided step-by-step tutorials for effectively passing liquor moratoriums (Washburn, 1998). This provoked the adoption of moratoriums later in the year that led to the closure of forty-two liquor stores located primarily in south side communities making it the “driest election in years” (Conklin, 2002). Salem Baptist Church’s Reverend James Meeks led a citizen-initiated campaign that successfully removed approximately thirty establishments from the surrounding predominantly black Roseland south side neighborhood (Pollack, 1998; Slater 1998).

Many of Chicago’s black residents willingly supported the “vote-dry” effort in various neighborhoods (Pollack, 1998; see also Guiterrez, 2011; LISC Chicago, 2010). In the 5 years following Daley’s policy-changing speech, newly adopted dry districts affected 75% of Chicago’s block groups with some block groups seeing one to three different dry districts emerge. The majority of the residents belonged to racially underrepresented groups in 68% of these block groups. More specifically, Blacks constituted at least 51% of the population in 30% of the dry block groups. Approximately forty-five percent of the dry districts exhibited poverty rates higher than the city’s rate of 19.6%. These trends remained consistent in 2015 when at least one dry district existed in 97% of Chicago’s block groups.

Over the years, minorities in other major cities also mobilized against liquor stores. In their analysis of inner-city community activists’ experiences with social movements for alcohol-related policy change, Herd and Berman (2015) find that residents’ grievances with the establishments rather than religious or moral-based concerns were primarily to blame for the mobilization. Residents considered the alcohol outlets in their communities to be “the epicenter of an upsurge in violent crimes, drug sales and use, public drinking and nuisance problems—all believed to undermine neighborhood safety, social life and civility, and economic well-being” (p. 336). When examining residents’ desires regarding economic development after Hurricane Katrina, Hong and Farley (2008) find that blacks in New Orleans rated the absence of liquor stores higher as a vital neighborhood feature in comparison to whites.

In Chicago, the lack of citizen-supported moratoriums in wealthier communities with larger white populations suggests that the residents of these spaces do not perceive the businesses to be problematic. These spaces benefitted from a wave of new establishments operating with off-premise packaged goods licenses. As stated in one of Chicago’s mainstream local news outlets:

“In recent years, Chicago has seen a blossoming of boutique wine, beer and liquor stores. . .No longer do the large warehouse stores or corner shops dominate sales. In nearly every neighborhood, residents can find inviting storefronts with interesting designs and knowledgeable staff, welcoming customers in and sharing tasting experiences with them, making the best liquor stores in Chicago also great places to hang out.” (CBSChicago, 2010).

Many of the off-premise alcohol outlets located within the downtown-northside spatial cluster forgo the selling of any food and “cheap liquor” to act as specialty stores that offer higher-end goods. Several of these establishments also have licenses authorizing on-premise consumption of their packaged goods to support communal interactions. Residents in less distressed communities maintain different expectations for their neighborhood liquor store. White gentrifiers in historical black mecca of Harlem, New York complained that a newly established liquor store possessed a “look and style [that] recalls the bad old days of the 1970s and 1980s” with “its roll-down steel gate, its bulletproof plexiglass to guard against robbers and drunken vagrants. . .” (Berger, 2011; Mays, 2011). This rhetoric reflects differences in individuals’ expectations for off-premise alcohol outlets in communities primarily populated by racially underrepresented groups or low-income families (or the “bad old days”) and wealthier areas with fewer residents of color. The unequal production of space leaves low-income residents and people of color to depend on these businesses that most consider inappropriate for other spaces where higher quality liquor stores that promote positive social relations exist.

Conclusion

As it relates to the distribution of liquor stores in urban areas, Chicago does not fit the traditional narrative. The increased presence of Black and Latinx residents as well as higher poverty rates did not correlate to the number of liquor stores at a level of statistical significance, yet the variables correlated to an increased likelihood that a block group contained no outlets. The absence of liquor stores in many low-income and Black communities did not result from city-level decision-making, instead residents contradicted long-held beliefs that these specific communities often lack the social organization needed to promote civic life and address neighborhood-level problems.

As stated by Herd and Berman (2015): “The grassroots alcohol-related policy movement is one of many diverse social movements in the USA that varies in scale and temporal consistency, yet has been largely overlooked in the literature” (p. 331). These neighborhood-level movements involve the interaction of various local stakeholders (e.g., neighborhood residents, religious leaders, city councilmembers, community organizers, and attorneys) and require social, economic, and political resources (Herd & Berman, 2015). Community-level political mobilization against liquor stores offers scholars another opportunity to study political behavior in urban Black communities.

The citizen-initiated moratoriums on liquor stores did not erase the unequal distribution of liquor stores found in earlier studies, but reversed the pattern. Now, the highest density of liquor stores occurs in communities with higher incomes and large proportions of white residents. In these spaces, liquor stores do not present the same problems for their surrounding communities which do not suffer from the social ills found in the other areas. The inequality of spaces perpetuates a system in which the same institutions trigger different outcomes according to neighborhood attributes.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Twyla Blackmond Larnell

Author Biographies

Twyla Blackmond Larnell is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago. Her research examines local politics and policy with an emphasis on race, gender, and equity in government and economic development.

Christina Campbell is an assistant professor in the School of Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati. Her primary research interests include delinquency prevention, risk assessment, juvenile justice policy, and neighborhood ecology.

Jordan Papp recently completed his doctoral degree in Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati. His research centers on corrections policy and statistical methods.

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