American Defender of One Nigeria: James Meredith,the Nigerian Civil War and the Politics of American Intervention in the Global South

Introduction

In 1968, during the Nigerian Civil War, African-American Civil Rights leader James Meredith led a fact-finding mission to Nigeria to “find out the truth about [the] Nigerian crisis” (Agabo, 1968). The Nigerian government welcomed Mr. Meredith with a Press Release announcing the arrival of the “American defender of One-Nigeria in Lagos” (Fabunmi, 1968). Meredith and his entourage, spent about 2 weeks in Nigeria collecting information about the Nigerian conflict from people across political, economic, and social strata. At the end of his 12-day visit, Meredith addressed an audience comprising Nigerians and foreign nationals in Lagos. “I have, as far as humanly possible, traveled widely and had full discussions with high and low, including the privilege of an audience with His Excellency, Major-General Yakubu Gowon,” Meredith told his audience. “I find no evidence among Nigerians of a plan or desire to commit genocide against the Ibo.” Meredith found “neither moral, humane, or legal basis to support the fear upon which the rebels can justify the continuation of their secessionist activities.” (Meredith, 1968E)

James Meredith’s visit to Nigeria in 1968 was part of his pro-Nigerian activism in response to the pro-Biafran mobilization in the United States during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970). The conflict became internationalized following the allegation by the secessionist former Eastern region (renamed the Biafran Republic) that the Nigerian government was committing genocide against its civilian population. The attendant international outcry saw the emergence of many pro-Biafran groups in Europe and North America, particularly the United States, demanding not only humanitarian assistance for the starving and suffering Biafran civilians but also calling for the American government’s political intervention in the form of political recognition of the Biafran republic. “The maintenance of one Nigeria,” pro-Biafran group the American Committee to Keep Biafran Alive (ACKBA) argued, was “an act of genocide.” (McNeil, 2017, p. 318) Meredith’s pro-Nigerian activism, including his advocacy for One-Nigeria, counterbalanced the pro-Biafran mobilization in the United States for the American recognition of Biafra as a republic.

This paper examines James Meredith’s pro-Nigerian activism in the United States as part of the international dimension of the Nigerian Civil War. It also situates his advocacy for one Nigeria within the global black liberation movements in the long sixties. Scholarship on the international dimension of the Nigerian Civil War, particularly in the United States, has focused on the successes and failures of the pro-Biafran mobilization for humanitarian assistance and the recognition of Biafra as a sovereign nation. (McNeil, 2017). Also, historians of the Civil Rights movement have studied the significant contributions of James Meredith to the Black Liberation Movement of the long sixties (Doyle, 2003; Eagles, 2009; A. R. A. M. Goudsouzian, 2014; H. J. Meredith, 1966), but no one has examined Meredith’s pan-African activism beyond the United States or in connection to postcolonial Africa. By using Meredith as a critical example in his expanded background beyond his civil rights iconography and his active Pan-Africanism (transnational pro-Nigerian activities), this paper promotes a more nuanced understanding of the international dimension of the Nigerian Civil War, and calls attention to the unknown episode of the transnational history that situates the Nigerian Civil War within the global black movement of the long sixties.

This article addresses fundamental questions previously ignored in the transnational study of the black liberation movement in the long sixties. To what extent did Meredith’s background as a civil rights hero influence his decision to advocate for one Nigeria during the Nigerian Civil War? I examine Meredith’s integration of the University of Mississippi in the early 1960s and the pan-African solidarity from continental Africa, including the fellowship award by the Nigerian government to establish his status as a Civil Rights hero and his connection with the Nigerian government. I analyze Meredith’s public engagements, correspondences with Nigerian government officials, fact-finding visit to Nigeria, testimony during the U.S. congressional hearing and recent oral interviews, I demonstrate that Meredith’s background as a Civil rights icon and his pan-African ideology influenced his decision to defend one Nigeria during the Nigerian Civil War.

The Nigerian Civil War, the Genocide Question, and the Pro-Biafran Mobilization in the United States

The Nigerian Civil War was a military conflict between the Nigerian Federation and its former eastern region, renamed the Biafran Republic. (Moses & Heerten 2018; Heerten, 2017; World Peace Foundation, 2015; Abdulrahman, 2014; Crowder, 1982; Madiebo, 1980; Oyelele, 1981; Stremlau, 1977; Uche, 2008; Uchendu, 2007, 2007; Oyediran, 1981; Wiseberg, 1975. See also, Coleman, 1958; Ezera, 1964; Kirk-Greene, 1971). The Civil War broke out in 1967 due to the political instability that began shortly after the country’s independence in 1960, culminating in the collapse of the first republic in January 1966 and the consequent military coup and counter-coup. Attempts by the African leaders to solve the political conflict and forestall prevent the imminent crisis saw the Ghanaian Military Head of State J. A. Ankara, in January 1967, inviting the Biafran leader Ojukwu and the Nigerian Head of State Lieutenant-General Yakubu Gowon to Aburi, Ghana, to settle the political disagreements (Oyediran, 1981).

Agreements were reached at Aburi, but as soon as they returned to the country, Ojukwu and Gowon pronounced contradictory interpretations of the Aburi accord (Oyediran, 1981). The failure of the Aburi accord, coupled with the continued massacre of the Igbo in Northern Nigeria, resulted in the secession of the Eastern region which declared the Biafran republic on May 28. To return the Eastern region to the Nigerian Federation, the Nigerian government launched a “Police Action” to crush what it considered Ojukwu’s rebellion. (Abdulrahman, 2014, pp. 17–22) What the Nigerian government termed a “Police Action” would result in a full-blown war that lasted 30 months with heavy casualties on both sides.

Perhaps the most important highlight of the Nigerian Civil War was the allegation of genocide, with the international community becoming more interested in the prosecution of the war. The alleged killing of the Biafran civilian population, including through starvation, became the talking point. Global media played a crucial role in bringing the Nigerian Civil War into the European and American sitting rooms. The American public particularly became enraged when the gory images of “starving Biafran women and children with swollen stomachs, hollowed eyes, and matchstick legs” made the front pages of the major newspapers and television screens (McNeil, 2017, p. 318). The reported starvation and death of civilians aroused public sympathy, with the American public calling on the government to do something to alleviate the suffering in Biafra. As the American public became enraged, many humanitarian and religious groups emerged to champion the movement for the survival of Biafra.

The pro-Biafran groups began to pressure the American government and the reluctant United Nations into action. Framing the Nigerian Civil War as genocide, the pro-Biafran groups made the starving children in Biafra the focal point of their mobilization. A pro-Biafra sympathizer Nicholas Perna challenged the hypocritical United Nations, which condemned the United States’ aggression in the Far East but maintained “silence in the case of the poor children of Biafra” (Perna, 1968). Another pro-Biafran petitioner told President Lyndon B. Johnson, “In the 2 min or so that it will take you to read this ad, more than eight people will have died of starvation in Biafra. “Within 24 hr of the time you have read it, six thousand will have died. . .half of them children. . .dead of starvation.” “Mr. President, can you – with all the power of your office – sit back and wait while the nations negotiate. . .can we as Americans sit back and wait while nations negotiate?” ( Africa Today, 1968 , cited in Ngoh, 1982, p. 171).

The pro-Biafran campaign was very effective in the United States, forcing leading American politicians, including the 1968 presidential candidates, to acknowledge the humanitarian crisis during the Nigerian Civil War. The pro-Biafran groups in the United States which had initially focused their campaign on the humanitarian intervention soon shifted to pushing for the American political intervention in the Nigerian conflict. The American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive (ACKBA), the most influential and most vocal pro-Biafran groups asked the American government to intervene directly in the Nigerian crisis by “sending humanitarian reliefs into Biafra. . .with or without the consent of the Nigerian Government” and to also “call for an extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly to open the Nigerian civil war for international debate” (McNeil, 2017). Finally, ACKBA demanded the American government’s and the United Nation’s political recognition of the Biafran republic, insisting that the maintenance of one Nigeria itself was “an act of genocide” (McNeil, 2017, p. 331).

The success of ACKBA and other pro-Biafran groups in appealing to high-ranking officials in the White House in particular, alarmed the Nigerian Government, which was already suspicious of the American policy during the Civil War. “The United States’ attitude toward Nigeria Civil War had aroused suspicion and disappointed the government here,” declared the Nigeria’s Commissioner of Information Chief Anthony Enahoro. “Friends who desert you in your hour of need deserve that much less friendship afterward. . .when you are in difficulties, those who came to your rescue naturally have claims to your gratitude afterward,” he added. (The New York Time, 1968a).

Enahoro’s statement demonstrates Nigeria’s frustration with the American policy, but it also reveals Nigeria’s poor public relations in the United States. The success of the pro-Biafran groups owed less to their sophistication than to the Nigeria’s poor war publicity in the United States. As Adepitan Bamisaiye (1974) questions whether “the Biafran propaganda machinery” was so efficient in successfully misleading the international community or was it “the gross inefficiency of the Nigerian information service” that contributed to the “general ignorance about the complexity of the situation?” He noted that, facts of the Nigerian crisis were deliberately distorted by the Biafran officials or the international media (Bamisaiye, 1974, p. 34) Waters (2004) has similarly observed that for a significant part of the war, the Nigerian government “refused to provide information. . .from its perspectives and limited journalists’ access to the battle areas.” The consequence was that “nearly all of the gripping human-interest reports emanated from inside Biafra.” (Waters, 2004, p. 70). Yet, not everyone in the United States believed that the Nigerian government was committing genocide against Biafran civilians. As Samuel Fury Childs Daly (2023) has recently noted, Biafra’s allegation of genocide “was contested at the time, and it remains so in historical memory.” One of the people who rejected Biafra’s claim of genocide was James Meredith, an African-American civil rights hero who became prominent for his role in the integration of the University of Mississippi.

James Meredith’s Advocacy for One Nigeria and Pan-Africanism in the Age of Civil Rights Movement

The growing influence of ACKBA and other pro-Biafran groups in mobilizing support for Biafra in the United States not only alarmed the Nigerian government but also Nigeria’s sympathizers, including James Meredith. Born on June 25, 1933, in Kosciusko, Attala County, Mississippi, Meredith grew up in the Jim Crow era and experienced racial segregation and racism in Mississippi. Recounting his experience of the Jim Crow Mississippi, Meredith (1966) noted that “separation dominated my childhood completely.” (Eagles, 2009; H. J. Meredith, 1966, p. 207). A veteran serving in the United States Air Force between 1951 and 1959, Meredith was away when the Civil Rights Movement emerged in Mississippi in the 1950s (Eagles, 2009; H. J. Meredith, 1966, p. 2). However, he would later become an important figure in the Civil Rights Movement following his crucial role in integrating the University of Mississippi in the early 1960s.

Meredith’s integration of the University of Mississippi was not without resistance. It took the federal Marshals to enforce the Supreme Court’s judgment on Meredith’s right to education. Yet, he continued to face hostility and harassment from the racist students who taunted and asked him to “go back to Africa.” Meredith (1966) recounted his experience, “No student should have to be subjected to the sort of ordeal I had to undergo during the first semester.” (Meredith, 1966, p. 244). The attempt by the University of Mississippi to deny Meredith’s admission and the continuous harassment by the racist students attracted international outcry and condemnation. His ordeals in Mississippi particularly aroused pan-African sentiments and solidarity among people of African descent, mainly from continental Africa. Believing in shared political destiny, the continental Africans saw Meredith’s successful integration of the University of Mississippi as a success for all African-descended people worldwide. (Abdulrahman, 2023).

The Nigerian government also shared this pan-African sentiment. It should be noted that the anti-colonial movement in Africa in the postwar period reaffirmed the Pan-African ties between the continental and the diaspora Africans, resulting in collaboration, solidarity, and cooperation in the struggle against global racism and white supremacy. (Abdulrahman, 2022, 2023; Von Eschen, 1997). In response to the continued racial discrimination against him at the University of Mississippi, the Nigerian government offered Meredith a fellowship award for graduate study at the Nigeria’s foremost University of Ibadan. (Abdulrahman, 2023) Meredith and his family lived in Ibadan, Nigeria between 1964 and 1965, returning to the United States only a few months before the January 1 1966 coup, the first in the series of coups that ultimately inspired the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War. Meredith’s experience in Nigeria and connection with the Nigerian government would influence his decision to intervene in the Nigerian crisis.

Meredith’s background as a Civil Rights leader and his Pan-African ideology were also crucial in his decision to defend “One-Nigeria” in the United States. As an important figure in the Civil Rights Movement, Meredith understood the parallels and connections between (neo-) colonialism in Africa and Jim Crow in the United States. (Meredith, 2023a; See Von Eschen, 1997). Like other diaspora activists, including Malcolm X, Meredith regarded Nigeria as the “strongest black nation.” “Nigerian unity,” Meredith argued, “is an unmistakable symbol to African greatness” in the postcolonial period. (Meredith, 1968F). Affirming that “Nigeria increases my sense of Pride and dignity,” Meredith situated the Nigerian Civil War within the global black struggle. Beyond continental Africa, Meredith expressed that the situation in Nigeria had “the possibility of breaking the patterns of thoughts that have in the past condemned us to World servitude.” (Meredith, 1968F).

Meredith considered pro-Biafran mobilization in the United States, particularly their activities pressurizing the American government to support the separatist agenda of former Eastern Nigeria, as part of the larger Western destabilization agendas of neocolonial control in postcolonial Africa. In advocating for one Nigeria in the United States during the Nigerian Civil War, Meredith situated the neo-colonial control in postcolonial Africa within the larger global black liberation in the long sixties. To Meredith, the pro-Biafran campaign for the disintegration of Nigeria resonated with the destabilization agenda earlier witnessed in other African countries, including the overthrow and assassination of Patrice Lumumba in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early 1960s. (See Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2014; Abdulrahman, 2022). In challenging the pro-Biafran mobilization in the United States, Meredith rejected the allegation of genocide against the Nigerian government, labeling it as propaganda and a neocolonial conspiracy against the strongest black nation in recent times. (Meredith, 1968B)

Based on his previous understanding of “the friendliness and unity of the Nigerian people when I was studying at Ibadan University three years ago,” Meredith argued that a section of Nigeria could not commit genocide against another, (Meredith, 1968A). Convinced by his previous experience in Nigeria, Meredith believed that he was in a position to inform the American public about the Nigerian conflict. Rejecting the genocide claim, Meredith challenged the moral and humanitarian justifications upon which the pro-Biafran groups called for the American intervention in the form of political recognition of Biafra. For instance, when two groups of students representing Biafra and Nigeria respectively demonstrated in New York in 1968, Meredith only addressed the group supporting the Nigerian federation, praising the “Nigerian government for allowing food into Biafran territory by land.” He assailed “the rebel leaders for refusing such arrangement,” accusing them “of using the people they have starved as propaganda tools.” (The New York Time, 1968b).

Meredith’s public rejection of the genocide claim helped to neutralize the growing influence of pro-Biafran propaganda in the United States, but Nigeria’s lack of investment in war publicity continued to help the pro-Biafran “propaganda”. He feared that if nothing were done to counter the pro-Biafran groups, the American government and international bodies, including the United Nations, would be pressured into interfering in the Nigerian conflict. (Meredith, 1968B). In forestalling a situation that would warrant American intervention, Meredith moved from public speeches and direct engagements to collaborating with Nigerian government officials and representatives in the United States and Nigeria. Sharing intelligence and ideas, Meredith highlighted the growing danger of pro-Biafran mobilization in the United States. He suggested strategies that would help change the war narratives in the Nigerian government’s favor.

Taking the Battle to the Source: James Meredith and His Fact-Finding Mission to Nigeria

On August 10, 1968, James Meredith wrote a letter to the Nigerian Consul General in the United States, P. A. Afolabi, raising concerns about the Nigerian crisis. Citing his previous connection with the Nigerian government and his study at the University of Ibadan between 1963 and 1965, Meredith informed Afolabi, “I know a great deal about Nigeria," and “I want to bring a hasty end to the present crisis.” (Meredith, 1968A). He proposed “to visit Nigeria at the earliest possible time” to fully understand the conflict and " inform the American people” accordingly. (Meredith, 1968A)

Barely a week after the first letter, Meredith wrote another letter to the Consul General. Lengthier than the first one, Meredith described how Nigeria’s image was fast deteriorating in the United States. He stressed that “a certain group of highly articulate, highly influential American groups and individuals have been aroused against Nigeria.” (Meredith, 1968A). These highly influential individuals and groups, Meredith declared, had the “capacity to arouse the entire general public and sway it to their point of view.” He stressed the need to urgently block them from their “all-out program against Nigeria.” The war narrative was already shifting from the real political questions of the conflict, Meredith noted, with the pro-Biafran groups directing the public attention toward the humanitarian questions, including starvation, deaths, and other sufferings. The Nigerian government could still salvage the situation, Meredith informed the Consular-General, but only if urgent measures were taken to redeem Nigeria’s fast-deteriorating image in the United States. (Meredith, 1968B).

In suggesting ways for the Nigerian government to end the war, Meredith espoused “Black Power” rhetoric that defined his militant approach to the Civil Rights Movement. (Eagles, 2009) As noted by A. Goudsouzian (2011), Meredith’s political philosophy was rooted in “his vision of black manhood,” revolving around “self-reliance, courage, patriarchy, [and] self-defense.” Relying on the same political philosophy, Meredith called on the Nigerian government to focus its publicity on the political question of the conflict to counter the humanitarian narrative being sponsored by the pro-Biafran propaganda. Recommending a quick and decisive end to the conflict, Meredith maintained that the “end should come through [the] military defeat of the rebels.” Meredith argued that, as a “militaristic state,” the United States only “has respect for strong nations” and “sympathy for the downtrodden and underdog.” (Meredith, 1968B) He challenged Nigeria’s government to earn America’s respect not through sympathy but through strength and courage, which could only be demonstrated in the military defeat of the Biafra.

Meredith called for a decisive military defeat of Biafra, but was also sympathetic of the Biafran civilian population. He separated the civilian population from Biafran military “rebels.” He criticized the latter for using “the people they have starved as propaganda tools” and refusing an “arrangement in which the Nigerian government allowed food into Biafran territory by land.” (The New York Time, 1968a, 1968b). He advised the Nigerian government to do do everything to protect the civilians in the recaptured areas and work toward changing the headlines from those that popularized genocide promoted “one Nigeria.” For instance, the headlines should change from “Biafra-Starving Children-Nigeria” to “Nigeria-Suffering-Rebels.” (Meredith, 1968B). But this could only be achieved if the Nigerian government chose a “colorful and vibrant spokesman” to project Nigeria’s image in the United States. The failure to do so, warned Meredith, could do more damage to Nigeria’s image. (Meredith, 1968B).

Given his background as a civil rights giant and his previous pan-African connections with the Nigerian government, Meredith considered himself the best to promote Nigeria’s image in the United States. When Afolabi, the Consul General of Nigeria in the United States, finally replied to Meredith on August 16^th, he acknowledged Meredith’s pro-Nigerian activism, praising him as a “sincere friend of Nigeria and its people.” He shared Meredith’s view that the “rebellion is a creation of imperialists,” and has done “considerable damage to the African image all over the world.” (Afolabi, 1968). The Consul General supported Meredith’s plan to visit Nigeria to gather the information he needed to promote the country’s image in the United States, pledging the Nigerian government’s cooperation and support.

Meredith and his team arrived at Lagos on September 13 to the delight of the Nigerian government officials, who declared him the “American defender of One-Nigeria.” (Fabunmi, 1968). From the Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, to the military Governors, high-profile administrators were ready to discuss the Nigerian Civil War with Meredith. Gowon dismissed the genocide’s claim and instead blamed Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, whom he referred to as “one of the two most dangerous officers in the army.” (Box 35, Folder 23, JHM Papers). He told Meredith that the declaration of the Biafran republic was self-serving, stressing that Ojukwu “wanted to be on top of ruling source of power.” Demonstrating that he was not the lover of bloodshed that the Western Media painted; Gowon told Meredith that he “had troops loyal to me in Enugu. . .but I thought there was already too much bloodshed and so I withdrew the troops,” Gowon added. (Box 35, Folder 23, JHM Papers). Meredith’s discussion with Gowon is significant because, as the Head of State, he was the chief image maker of Nigeria. Equally significant is the fact that the Nigerian Civil War was partially framed as a personality clash between Gen. Gowon and Gen. Odumegwu Ojukwu, the leader of the Biafran Republic. (See, Oyediran, 1981; Abdulrahman, 2014).

Other government officials and military officers in Lagos and other regions controlled by the Nigerian government, largely echoed Gowon’s position and dismissed the genocide allegation. (Box 35, JHM Papers, Folder 23). Demonstrating that the war was for national interest and not motivated by religious, ethnic or regional animosity as being painted in the West, Audu Bako, the military Governor of Kano, explained that Igbo people who had earlier left (for Biafra) due to the Nigerian crisis that began in 1966 were now back in Kano. Bako stressed that the properties they abandoned when they fled had been returned to them, contrary to Biafra’s claim that the Igbo people and properties were unsafe in Northern Nigeria. (Information Bulletin, 1968, Box 35, Folder 13, JHM Papers) To confirm Bako’s statement, Meredith and his team visited the Police headquarters in Jos, discussing with the State Abandoned Properties Committee, which confirmed Bako’s claim that the Igbo’s properties earlier abandoned in Northern Nigeria had now been returned to them.

Meredith’s fact-finding mission also incorporated perspectives from civilians and academics but in the regions controlled by the Nigerian government. Transcending Nigeria’s top administrators and military officers, Meredith sought to understand the Nigerian Civil War from academic and intellectual perspectives by visiting top Universities in Nigeria, including Ahmadu Bello University and the University of Ibadan. Meredith met with the Vice Chancellor of Ahmadu Bello University, who gave “a very honest and intensive account of what happened” during the war. (Meredith, 1968E). He also discussed the Nigerian conflict with the academic community at the University of Ibadan, where he earlier did his Masters. Merdith returned to Ibadan “not just to renew old acquaintances” but “to determine how the present crisis an[d] conditions are viewed by the intellectual community in Nigeria” (Meredith, 1968C, 1968D)

It is problematic that Meredith did not visit Biafra to incorporate the perspectives of the Igbos who were in the thick of the war, but this does not erode the integrity of his fact-finding tour. In fairness to Meredith, his initial plan was to “visit the various areas of Nigeria, including the battle zone.” Meredith had stated in his August 10 letter to the Consul General in the United States: “I will like to know if I can expect cooperation . . . to visit the areas I want to visit. . .in order to get a complete and thorough picture.” (Meredith, 1968A). Given that the Nigerian government could guarantee cooperation with and safety of Meredith only in areas under its control, it is understandable that Meredith could not eventually visit Biafra even if he had wanted to (The Washington Post, 1968).

J. Meredith (2023a) noted in a recent interview that he could not go to the Biafran region because his safety could not be guaranteed in Biafra under the control of General Ojukwu (Meredith, 2023a). To incorporate the perspectives of the Igbo people however, Meredith discussed with Mr. Obi in Lagos. Obi gave valuable insights into the problems of Igbo reintegration, claiming that General Ojukwu was able to maintain the loyalty of the Igbos through manipulation (Meredith, 1968E). Obi discussed the Nigerian Civil War from the perspective of an Igbo living outside Biafra. But given that Meredith did not visit Biafra, Obi’s testimony serves as a rare Biafran voice in Meredith’s fact-finding report.

James Meredith’s Testimony Before the U.S Senate Committee

James Meredith returned to the United States on September 26th, 1968. Armed with fresh facts from his fact-finding mission to Nigeria, he was ready to battle pro-Bifaran groups calling for the American government’s intervention in the Nigerian crisis. The battle was eventually taken to the United States Congress, where Meredith testified before the sub-committee on African Affairs on the Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation. At the congressional hearing, the Pro-Biafran organizations stressed the question of genocide, condemned the Nigerian government’s handling of the war, and indicted the American government for not doing enough to help Biafra. In challenging pro-Biafra groups, Meredith rejected genocide claims, accused Western powers of plotting the collapse of Black Africa by undermining Nigeria’s sovereignty, and warned the American government against the danger of interfering in Nigerian internal affairs in the age of the cold war.

On October 4^th, 1968, barely a week after Meredith returned from Nigeria, the United States Senate Committee on African Affairs held a hearing on the Nigeria-Biafran war (Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation, 1968, pp.55–56). The pro-Biafran organizations at the hearing included the Food for Biafra Committee (FBC) and the Catholic Relieve Services (CRS). CRS representative M. Kinney called for more American dedication to the relief assistance of the Biafrans. He urged the American government to caution against “those governments abetting, or even permitting, the shipment of arms and ammunition to either side,” arguing that “without armaments, [the] war would soon end” (Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation, 1968, pp. 55–56).

Food for Biafra Committee representative Robin Jordan was less diplomatic and more critical of the American government’s indifference in the face of the humanitarian crisis. Jordan criticized unnecessary debates, arguing that “One Biafran baby is more precious than all the words testified today, and one Biafran baby is more precious than all the textbooks anybody can quote.” (Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation, 1968, pp. 44–45). She rhetorically asked, “How can we intellectualize and rationalize and justify our passive role in this tragedy?” (Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation, 1968, pp. 44–45). Questioning politics and international law with babies dying in Biafra, she charged the American government to abandon its respect for international law and politics and take decisive actions in helping the cause of Biafra.

Jordan was not the only militant pro-Biafran advocate at the Senate Hearing. Another pro-Biafran advocate Richard N. Henderson, an Associate Professor at Yale University, was even more critical of the American indifference during the Nigerian Civil War. “Perhaps our State Department finds it necessary to minimize, justify and dismiss the situation [genocide],” Professor Henderson told the Committee. Like Jordan, Henderson questioned America’s political will to end the Nigerian crisis. Doubting the capability of the American government to interfere decisively and end the suffering in Biafra, Henderson asked the government to refer the Nigeria crisis to the United Nations. “Although our Government has made no effective efforts to stop the fighting,” Henderson submitted, recommending that the American government “can still try to minimize the final slaughter by bringing the case decisively before the United Nations as a matter requiring urgent humanitarian international actions” (Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation, 1968, pp. 51–54).

As the leading pro-Nigerian supporter at the congressional hearing, James Meredith condemned the previous pro-Biafran speakers who spoke before him, calling them racists. “I would term what I have heard here” since over two hours “as simply. . .racism in disguise, in the disguise of humanitarianism,” Meredith stated. (“Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation,” pp. 51–54). Boasting the “credibility” of his testimony, Meredith explained that, he had just returned from a 2-week fact-finding mission to Nigeria, where he “collected 700 pages of transcripts and notes.” (Meredith, 1968E). Relying on the evidence from his fact-finding visit to Nigeria, Meredith dismissed the claim or fear of genocide. He maintained that there was no moral, humane, or legal basis “upon which the rebels can justify the continuation of secessionist activities.” Meredith regarded pro-Biafran mobilization in the United States as part of the Western neocolonial agenda to disintegrate and undermine a Black country under the pretext of humanitarian intervention. (“Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation,” pp. 51–54; See Stremlau, 1977). (Meredith, 1968F).

Meredith informed the committee that he found “No evidence of a plan or desire to commit genocide against the rebels existing among loyal Nigerians’’. He also stressed that “abandoned properties [belonging to the Igbo in the northern region] have been identified, secured, and will be returned to the proper owners upon their returns.” He confirmed that he saw “some of these people who had returned and reclaimed their property during his visit to Nigeria.” Meredith blamed the loss of lives and starvation among the civilian population on the Biafran leadership. He criticized the Biafran leadership, particularly General Ojukwu, for “setting out to fight a war when they cannot feed the people expected to fight in the war. . .[but] expect[ed] the rest of the World to feed those people.” (Meredith, 1968E, Folder 5, JHM Papers, p. 57). He cautioned the American government and pro-Biafran groups against undermining Nigeria’s sovereignty in the name of humanitarian works. He concluded that no group or nation “could have a greater compassion or a greater desire to see that the suffering stops than the Nigerian people themselves.” (Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation, 1968, pp. 55–56).

Finally, Meredith invoked the rhetoric of the Cold War to demand favorable American policy toward Nigeria. He called on the American government to ignore Senator Kennedy’s proposal to place the Nigerian Civil War on the United Nations agenda, warning that doing so during the age of the Cold War was dangerous. Having “found America’s image to be very favorable in Nigeria,” Meredith warned that the United States “would be making a grave mistake if it fails to review its African foreign policy [toward Nigeria].” (Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation, 1968, pp. 55–56). On a final note, Meredith urged the American government to change its position on arms sales to the Nigerian government since the claims of genocide were unfounded.

Three months after Meredith’s testimony before the United Senate Committee on Africa Affair, some American politicians and government officials began to criticize the leadership of Biafra openly. For instance, Senator Edward V. Brooke’s statement condemning General Ojuku’s inordinate ambitions to rule at the expense of innocent Igbo people demonstrates that pro-Biafran groups did not succeed in influencing all American politicians and government officials. (The New York Time, 1968a, 1968b). Furthermore, on July 20th, 1969, the Nixon administration announced that the American government had decided “against official recognition of Biafra” and would confine any direct involvement to the humanitarian relief efforts.

The American government’s rejection of political recognition of Biafra and political intervention during the Nigerian Civil War aligned with James Meredith’s campaign for “One Nigeria” in the United States. Meredith’s pro-Nigerian activism was significant in counterbalancing and neutralizing the pro-Biafran campaign, given the Nigerian government’s lack of effective public relations in the United States. The American government’s decision to focus on humanitarian relief instead of political recognition of Biafra represented a triumph of Meredith’s pro-one Nigeria advocacy. On the other hand, it marked the failure of the pro-Biafran organizations and the end of pro-Biafran pressure on the American government into direct political interventions in the form of recognizing the Biafran republic.

Pro-Biafran groups “mourned” the American government’s decision not to recognize Biafra, calling it the “death of humanity.” (McNeil, 2017). To the pro-Biafran groups, particularly the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive (ACKBA), Biafran identity was synonymous with the Biafran state, making the maintenance of one Nigeria an act of genocide. (McNeil, 2017). The American government’s decision marked the defeat of a struggle that had moved from the quest for humanitarian interventions to the American government’s political action in the form of recognition of the Biafra Republic.

Conclusion

Fifty three years after the Nigerian Civil War, Meredith declared that keeping Nigeria as one country “was my greatest accomplishment.” (Meredith, 2023b). With the Nigerian government’s war mantra of “to keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done,” some may argue that Nigeria today owes its existence as one unified country to the then military Head of State General Yakubu Gowon (Rtd.) and his team, particularly Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo, who was instrumental in the collapse and surrender of Biafra on January 14, 1970. Yet Meredith believed that he was actually the one who kept “One Nigeria,” citing his advocacy for One Nigeria in the United States. (Meredith, 2023b) In the face of the Nigerian government’s lack of investment in war publicity in the United States, Meredith’s advocacy for one Nigeria was a counterbalance to the pro-Biafran mobilization and pressure on the American government to recognize Biafra as a sovereign country. In advocating for one Nigeria, Meredith connected the Nigerian Civil War to the Civil Rights movement in the United States, situating both within the global black movement of the long sixties.

Recently, studies on the global black movement of the long sixties have begun to consider postcolonial Africa from transnational perspectives. However, these transnational studies of black internationalism have largely focused on Ghana and Tanzania, with diaspora activists/leaders such as Malcolm X, W.E.B Du Bois, and the Jamaican Rastafarians forging trans-national Pan-African relationships with foremost continental pan-Africanists and postcolonial African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. (Walters, 1997; Von Eschen, 1997; Markle, 2017; Bedasse, 2018). This study situates Nigeria in the conversation about the transnational history of the global black liberation movement in the long sixties. Considering his status as a Civil Rights icon, Meredith’s declaration that his greatest accomplishment was keeping Nigeria one during the Nigerian Civil War showcases him as one of the important Pan-Africanists of the postcolonial period.

Meredith’s advocacy for one Nigeria aimed at challenging the neocolonial destabilization agenda in Africa, particularly the calculated attempt to disintegrate and destroy Nigeria, the country Meredith considered as “the symbol of African greatness.” It is noteworthy that Meredith’s pro-One Nigerian advocacy aligned with the dream of the continental Pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah, who also discouraged African ethnic group division and identification that would supersede and displace an African united front. Advocating for a “United States of Africa,” Nkrumah and other postcolonial African leaders frowned against the balkanization of African countries and maintained that no single African continental ethnic group or society is better than or should take a dominant stage over the totality of its parts. Meredith’s advocacy for “one Nigeria,” therefore, sought to accomplish the “proper” installation of a Pan-African (continental) mission advocated by Nkrumah and others.