“Chipping Away at the Issues”

Introduction

In all but the simplest disputes, parties might choose to pursue a piecemeal approach whereby they address individual aspects of the dispute in successive partial agreements. An example of such an approach is the territorial dispute settlement process between Russia and China. Starting in the 1960s, the relationship between the two countries was plagued by open territorial conflict along the entirety of their boundary. Their dispute was resolved in the 1990s and 2000s in three separate agreements that settled different parts of their territorial claim. This piecemeal settlement strategy gradually chipped away at China and Russia’s territorial disagreements, decreased tensions between them, and culminated in the resolution of their last remaining border dispute in 2004.

The goal of this article is to examine how representative the case of Russia and China is: can partial settlements pave the way for comprehensive dispute resolution? To answer this question, I start from the premise that partial settlements are concluded when parties desire to make progress on resolving their dispute, but a full resolution is not (yet) possible. Building on the framework of two-level games (Putnam 1988), I argue that obstacles for dispute resolution may exist at the international level, as a result of a lack of trust between the parties, and/or at the domestic level, as a result of the public’s or elite’s unwillingness to grant concessions. Under either scenario, a piecemeal approach can prove useful: partial settlements signal a commitment to resolve aspects of the territorial dispute and may build trust between the adversaries and/or foster domestic support for compromise. We should thus expect partial settlements to be associated with the full resolution of the territorial dispute.

My theoretical argument conceptualizes partial settlements both as a signal of states’ willingness to make progress on settling their disputes and as a tool to shape the prospects for dispute resolution. Two logics might thus link partial settlements and comprehensive dispute resolution: (1) partial settlements may be a screening device for the political will to settle and (2) partial settlements might have an independent causal effect by changing international perceptions and domestic preferences regarding the desirability of further cooperation. Differentiating empirically between these two mechanisms is difficult with observational data, but it is at least possible to uncover evidence of whether the positive correlation between partial settlements and peaceful conflict resolution proposed by both mechanisms exists at all. Such a test is important in light of the broad-based skepticism about whether we should expect partial settlements to be associated with beneficial outcomes. Skeptics have raised a variety of concerns about the consequences of partial settlements. Some arguments suggest that partial settlements should not lead to any change in the parties’ relations (e.g., Iklé 1964; Morgan 1990) and others imply that partial settlements might actually be detrimental for further settlement efforts (e.g., Bose 2007; Blum 2007; Weiss 2003).

Given competing arguments about the consequences of piecemeal dispute resolution, a systematic assessment of this strategy is called for. In my empirical test, I rely on newly compiled data on partial settlements of worldwide territorial claims between 1919 and 2001. Partial settlements are peaceful and mutual attempts to substantively resolve a subset of the issues under contention while leaving other elements of the dispute for future consideration. Using these data, I find that partial settlements are associated with the peaceful settlement of remaining territorial disputes between claimants. In the short run, before the claim is fully resolved, partial settlements also correlate with a higher probability of peaceful talks and concessions between the parties, but there is only limited evidence that partial settlements reduce the incidence of militarized disputes. Overall, these findings provide support for the notion that, on average, partial settlements are connected to beneficial outcomes for the parties, especially in the long run. As we know from existing work, once all outstanding claims are settled, the parties can partake in all the benefits of regulated borders, including the lower risk for conflict and the greater potential for economic gains (Owsiak 2012; Schultz 2014; Simmons 2002).

The question of whether a stepwise dispute settlement procedure is associated with the ultimate resolution of remaining disagreements is important for both scholars and policy makers. Opinions on the benefits of such a strategy diverge significantly and are often based on generalizations from individual high-profile cases. Given persistent uncertainty about what to expect from piecemeal approaches, it is useful to investigate the consequences of partial settlements in a systematic fashion. This article formulates clear theoretical expectations and provides empirical evidence on partial settlements in the context of territorial claims. It thus provides the starting point of what can be a very useful line of inquiry for scholars and policy makers interested in understanding the ways the parties may design their settlement agenda to bring about the resolution of their dispute.

Resolving Territorial Conflict

Many of the ongoing international disputes with the greatest potential for escalation involve territorial issues, such as the South China Sea, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Kashmir, and Russia’s European borders. The dangers to international peace posed by territorial conflicts are well established in the international relations (IR) literature. Scholars have shown that states with territorial claims are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), see these disputes escalate to war, and develop rivalries (e.g., Hensel 2000; Kocs 1995; Leskiw and Vasquez 2001; Vasquez 1993). Even without active military conflict, territorial disputes take a toll on the involved states by depressing economic exchange and other mutually beneficial cooperation (Simmons 2005). Given the detrimental effects of persistent territorial conflict, it is useful to examine how and when these disputes can be settled.

There have been numerous studies investigating factors that facilitate or inhibit the peaceful management of territorial claims, including studies emphasizing issue salience (e.g., Hensel 2001), history of conflict (e.g., Hensel 2001; Hensel et al. 2008), regime type (e.g., Huth and Allee 2002), and the domestic and international legal environment (e.g., Huth, Croco, and Appel 2011; Powell and Wiegand 2010). A particular focus has been on the role of third parties in facilitating peaceful deals. Several scholars show binding third-party conflict management to be especially successful at bringing about a lasting settlement (Allee and Huth 2006; Gent and Shannon 2010; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Simmons 2002). Yet, as promising as it is, binding third-party conflict management is also quite rare. Only about 4 percent of territorial claim settlement attempts are the product of binding efforts, 24 percent result from nonbinding techniques, and more than 70 percent are bilateral. ¹ Given the frequency of bilateral efforts, it seems particularly important to examine how the claimants themselves can peacefully resolve their disputes.

One option the parties may choose is to fractionate their disagreements and deal with them in successive partial settlements. In territorial disputes, parties might start by assigning sovereignty over individual disputed areas, while leaving other claims initially unresolved, and then later moving on toward settling additional territories. Such sequential partial settlements occur in territorial claims with some frequency. Among the 236 dyadic territorial claims considered here, in 58 (25 percent) the parties opted for a piecemeal approach. In 85 cases (36 percent), the parties exclusively attempted to resolve their dispute in a single comprehensive settlement, and in 93 (39 percent) no peaceful settlement was reached.

While there is a large and sophisticated literature on conflict management, there are only few studies that consider piecemeal dispute resolution (Fisher 1964; Fisher and Ury 2011; Kratochwil, Rohrlich, and Mahajan 1985; Miall 1992; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Bose 2007). Unfortunately, even in these studies, references to the benefits and risks of this approach are mostly in passing and the focus typically lies elsewhere. The literature on issue linkage and gradualism in international cooperation provides a more focused discussion of the pros and cons of limited agreements (e.g., Abbott and Snidal 2002). However, these studies are often oriented toward international cooperation broadly and do not address incremental cooperation in the context of entrenched conflict. To my knowledge, there is no work that provides an in-depth theoretical treatment and empirical test of piecemeal approaches to conflict resolution. Yet, the question of whether proceeding in a piecemeal fashion leads to dispute resolution is clearly important in light of persistent territorial and other interstate disputes. Below I formulate a theoretical argument for why we should expect partial settlements to be associated with the resolution of outstanding disagreements.

The Promise of a Piecemeal Approach

At its most basic level, the conclusion of a partial settlement signifies that at least one of the countries is ready to make concessions on at least part of the territorial claim, and the other side is willing to accept the terms proposed. The fact that a settlement is concluded thus indicates that political will to make progress on resolving the territorial claim is present. At the same time, the negotiation of a more limited partial deal suggests that the complete resolution of the claim may not (yet) be possible. What obstacles might complicate the resolution of the territorial dispute, and how can partial settlements help the parties overcome these obstacles?

Building on the literature on international cooperation, I argue that, like other international negotiations, attempts to conclude territorial settlements are best conceptualized as two-level games (Putnam 1988). Agreements regarding the distribution of territory require approval both at the international level (level 1) by the countries’ representatives and at the domestic level (level 2) by the countries’ publics and elites. Because territorial settlements require approval at both levels, obstacles at either level can undermine a comprehensive deal.

At the international level, that is, level 1, the resolution of a territorial dispute may be complicated by a lack of trust between the parties. Leaders might be hesitant to conclude a comprehensive settlement that resolves the entirety of the dispute because they fear that (1) the adversary will fail to implement the agreement and thus the time and effort invested in negotiations will be wasted and domestic political punishment for policy failure may result, (2) the adversary will perceive concessions as weakness and will become emboldened to demand additional territory not previously disputed, and/or (3) the adversary will leverage its territorial gains to stage a military attack. Territory contains economic resources, individuals who can be recruited into the military and might even provide a strategic advantage in a military campaign. Territory thus serves as a source of bargaining power and a peaceful settlement might prove particularly difficult as a result of commitment problems (Fearon 1996).

When concerns about defection prevent a comprehensive settlement, the parties might opt for a partial deal: even if such a deal fails, negotiation costs and domestic punishment for policy failure should be more moderate; limited concessions are less likely to embolden the adversary; and territorial transfers tend to be smaller and thus minimize the potential for significant shifts in power. ² Furthermore, partial settlements can build trust between the parties and pave the way for more extensive cooperation.

The idea that smaller cooperative steps can foster deeper cooperation is well established in the literature (e.g., Axelrod 1984) and has also been applied to the emergence of cooperation among distrusted adversaries. Particularly useful in this context is Kydd’s (2007) model, which formalizes Osgood’s (1962) foundational insights on the graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction (GRIT) strategy. According to Kydd, cooperative gestures such as troop withdrawals can function as costly signals of a state’s trustworthiness. The key to the effectiveness of such gestures is that they be costly enough that a state with no real interest in rapprochement would not undertake them. If only states that want to improve their relationship with the adversary are willing to pay the costs associated with such gestures, then these gestures can reassure the opponent of the state’s intentions and illicit a cooperative response. Once the two states are confident that predatory behavior is unlikely, they can transform their antagonistic relationship into a more cooperative one.

Partial territorial settlements fit the parameters for effective costly signals well: surrendering control over a piece of territory or recognizing the adversary’s sovereignty over a disputed area undoubtedly entails costs (e.g., loss of resources, domestic criticism). The willingness to make such concessions thus signals to the opponent that the desire to improve the relationship is sincere. Furthermore, because partial settlements are bilateral they provide both sides the opportunity to signal their trustworthiness in the context of a single cooperative step. If concessions are mutual, both sides are sending a costly signal of their willingness to improve the relationship. If only one side makes concessions, the other side can still demonstrate its trustworthiness by following through on the agreement. The on-the-ground demarcation process that follows formal delimitation agreements often unearths additional quarrels about the exact location of a boundary, and if these are resolved in an amicable fashion the parties can move their relationship toward increasingly greater cooperation.

Besides a lack of trust between the adversaries, that is, enforcement concerns, territorial dispute settlement might also be hindered by disagreements on the terms of the deal, that is, bargaining problems (Fearon 1997). In the case of territorial conflict, the unwillingness to make concessions often derives from domestic political (level 2) dynamics. Broader public sentiment and elite opposition can pose significant obstacles to territorial settlements in both democracies and nondemocracies.

The benefits of settling territorial disputes are often substantial: increased trade, investment, and tourism; entry into international governmental organizations (IGOs) that mandate settled borders; and improved relations with third states previously aligned with the opponent (e.g., Simmons 2002). Yet, despite these benefits to settling territorial disputes, domestic publics and elites may be resistant to making the required concessions. Territory, irrespective of whether it is materially valuable or not, is often perceived to be a central component of the identity of the state and its citizens. Territorial claims thus inspire nationalism to an extent few other issues do (Vasquez 1993). While the willingness to grant territorial concessions might vary across different segments of the population, as long as there are influential actors that oppose a settlement, leaders will be hesitant to strike a deal. At minimum, detractors might impede the implementation of the agreement. At maximum, agitation over what is considered the selling out of national interests might put leaders’ ability to gain support for other policy initiatives and possibly their larger political fate at risk (Allee and Huth 2006).

Existing scholarship argues that one way to reduce the fallout from unpopular territorial concessions is by taking advantage of legal dispute resolution (e.g., Simmons 2002; Allee and Huth 2006). Another option is a piecemeal settlement procedure. ³ Partial settlements only address a subset of the disputed territory and often initially focus on less contentious claims. While such agreements might spawn resistance by some domestic actors, the lower stakes of partial settlements reduce the likelihood of large-scale mobilization. Furthermore, once a partial settlement is in place, the benefits generated by the agreement, such as increased economic activity in the settled territory and surrounding areas, can extol the virtue of territorial claim resolution to domestic skeptics. Partial settlements might not only soften up public and elite resistance to territorial concessions, they can also empower domestic actors who stand to gain from increased cooperation with the adversary. Like international cooperation more broadly, partial settlements generate “winners” that see their political power increased as a result of gains they have made. These winners—businesses and firms that profit from increased economic exchange in the wake of a partial settlement—might advocate that the government negotiate additional agreements (Blum 2007). Partial settlements thus create a domestic political environment that is favorable for further dispute resolution.

In some cases, territorial settlements may be complicated by both a lack of trust at the international level (level 1) and an unwillingness to make concessions at the domestic level (level 2), while in other cases the obstacle may lie mainly at one level or the other. In any of these scenarios, piecemeal dispute resolution might be a promising strategy: partial settlements can help build trust and goodwill with the other side and/or foster domestic support for compromise. In the parlance of policy makers, partial settlements can create “momentum” toward peaceful dispute resolution. A high-profile example is the case of the Israeli–Egyptian interim agreements that built confidence between the two sides and convinced domestic audiences of the viability and desirability of a peace accord. In former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’s (1979, 275) own words, “the subsequent moves towards achieving a peace treaty […] could never have come about were it not for the course my government adopted in signing the 1975 interim agreement” and “the 1975 agreement with Egypt […] was designed to advance the ‘momentum’ toward peace, and in that sense it has achieved its objective—no minor accomplishment in Middle Eastern Politics.”

As the case of Israel and Egypt demonstrates, limited agreements can pave the way for further cooperation between the parties and thus lead to the settlement of remaining disagreements. It is important to note that the Israeli–Egyptian example as well as my broader theoretical argument suggests two basic logics by which partial settlements may be connected to beneficial outcomes: (1) partial settlements may function as screening devices that identify situations where political will for peaceful dispute resolution exists or (2) they might also have an independent causal effect by changing perceptions and preferences of international and domestic actors. While these are two distinct logics, both imply that partial settlements should generally be associated with peaceful dispute resolution. Interestingly, however, the view that partial settlements lead to conflict resolution is contested by scholars and policy makers.

Counterarguments: The False Promise of a Piecemeal Approach

Looking at entrenched territorial conflicts, Bose (2007, 202), for example, cautions that “the incremental approach to making peace has its limitations, even perils.” Several scholars have raised quite diverse concerns about proceeding in a piecemeal fashion. Many of these arguments take for granted that the disputants want to make progress on resolving their conflict, but these arguments suggest that partial settlements may lack efficacy or may even be detrimental for this goal.

The first set of criticisms builds on the idea that partial settlements typically address minor disagreements, while sweeping more contentious issues “under the carpet” (Iklé 1964). If partial settlements focus on the “easy” part of a territorial claim, they should not generate enough trust and produce sufficient benefits to lead to the resolution of more complex elements of the underlying dispute. According to Morgan (1990, 318), “it is unlikely that settling minor issues will greatly reduce the impression of a large-scale conflict or make the parties more willing to make concessions on remaining issues just to preserve agreements already reached.” Thus, this line of argument implies that partial settlements should not be associated with the resolution of remaining disputes.

Other scholars go further and propose varied reasons for why a stepwise approach may actually be harmful. First, Blum (2007, 47) points to the possibility that limited agreements increase conflict as a result of a “pressed balloon effect”: the resolution of individual aspects of the dispute may lead opponents to shift their focus to other disputed areas, exacerbating tensions on these unresolved issues. Second, reaching a limited deal might make the “hurting stalemate” go away and thus remove pressures for a more comprehensive agreement (Blum 2007; Telhami 1990). Third, because a piecemeal approach unfolds over time, spoilers have ample opportunity to mobilize and undermine further steps in the settlement process (Weiss 2003; Abbott and Snidal 2002; Bose 2007). Fourth, if parties decide to move ahead on some disputed issues but leave other aspects of the dispute for future consideration, this might entrench the narrative that some issues are intractable. As a result, the parties may refrain from any serious attempt to negotiate for fear that failure is all but guaranteed (Blum 2007; Weiss 2003).

In summary, there are compelling reasons why a piecemeal approach should be associated with comprehensive dispute resolution, but there are similarly compelling arguments why partial settlements might not be a good idea. To adjudicate between these two conflicting views, a systematic empirical test is called for. I evaluate partial settlements on their own merits rather than comparing them to the alternative strategy of comprehensive deals that settle the entire dispute in one step. The studies reviewed above raise fundamental objections to piecemeal approaches rather than questioning their virtue compared to pursuing one-step comprehensive dispute resolution. My goal is to assess whether these objections are warranted. Sometimes states are unable to reach a comprehensive settlement immediately, and the question then becomes whether they are better off holding out for a comprehensive deal in the future or concluding a partial agreement now. My analysis provides insight into the consequences of partial settlements and thus speaks to the question of whether parties may be better off waiting for a one-step comprehensive settlement.

Research Design

For the empirical test, I build on territorial claims data by Huth and Allee (2002) and Huth, Croco, and Appel (2011). I modify their data in two ways. First, I combine multiple claims over different territories disputed between the same pair of states into one overarching dyadic territorial claims case whenever the claims either overlapped in time and thus could have been dealt with together or concerned the same piece of territory at different points in time, and the reemergence of the claim thus speaks to the effectiveness of the initial settlement attempt. ⁴ Second, I split claims that involve colonies that later gain independence into distinct dyadic claims. These two modifications produce 236 worldwide dyadic territorial claims and 5,260 dyadic territorial claim years (without missing data) between 1919 and 2001.

Empirical Analysis

Table 1 displays results from a Cox proportional hazards model of complete peaceful claim resolution. ¹⁷ Positive coefficients indicate that a variable is associated with an increased risk of peaceful claim resolution, while negative coefficients suggest the hazard of claim resolution is reduced. The coefficient for partial settlement is positive and statistically significant, indicating that partial settlements are correlated with a heightened risk of peaceful comprehensive claim resolution. Compared to territorial claim dyads without a partial settlement, the hazard of full peaceful claim resolution is 116 percent higher for claim dyads with a partial settlement in place. The fact that the estimated effect of partial settlements is not only statistically but also substantively significant provides support for my theoretical argument that partial settlements are associated with comprehensive dispute resolution. Concerns by skeptics that partial settlement might impede dispute resolution are not supported.

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Table 1.

Cox Proportional Hazards Model of Complete Peaceful Claim Resolution.

	Coefficients (SE)	Percentage change in hazard rate
Partial settlement	.768*** (.261)	116% Increase
Ethnic salience	.341 (.228)	ns
Economic salience	−.375* (.218)	31% Decrease
Strategic salience	−.564** (.278)	43% Decrease
No. of disputed areas	−.437*** (.137)	35% Decrease
Past territorial conflict	−.146 (.118)	ns
Strategic rivalry	−.714** (.278)	51% Decrease
Joint democracy	.271 (.297)	ns
Relative capabilities	−.247*** (.069)	16% Decrease
Leader transition	−.366* (.188)	31% Decrease
Economic turmoil	−.001 (.002)	ns
N (events)	5,260 (106)
Log likelihood	−457.510

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on the territorial claim case. Percentage change in hazard is based on one-unit increase in the variable. For relative capabilities, the effect of moving from balanced power to the stronger state being twice as strong is shown.

***p < .01.

**p < .05.

*p < .10.

With regard to the control variables, I find that territories with strategic value and possibly with economic importance experience a lower risk of peaceful comprehensive claim resolution, while ethnic salience is not a significant predictor of claim duration. Claimants also find it more difficult to resolve territorial disputes that encompass a greater number of disputed areas. In terms of the relationship between the claimants, unsurprisingly, strategic rivals have difficulty resolving their claims peacefully. However, the number of territorial MIDs in the last ten years does not appear to affect peaceful claim resolution nor does joint democracy. Contrary to the expectations, the findings suggest that a greater asymmetry in power reduces rather than increases the risk of peaceful claim resolution. I also find that economic turmoil does not affect peaceful comprehensive claim resolution and that recent leader transitions decrease rather than increase the risk of claim resolution.

Next I examine whether claimants are less likely to experience military conflict and/or more likely to hold peaceful talks after a partial settlement has been concluded but before the territorial claim is fully settled. This analysis thus sheds light on whether partial settlements might lead to an improvement of the parties’ relationship in the shorter run and also provides evidence as to whether partial settlements generate momentum toward peaceful conflict resolution.

Columns 1–4 in Table 2 display the results for the analysis of the effect of partial settlements on the likelihood of any MID or a violent MID. ¹⁸ In addition to pooled analysis, I also estimate conditional logit fixed-effects models to correct for potential heterogeneity in the propensity for militarized conflict among different claim dyads. The coefficients in the fixed-effects models capture the average within-unit variation. Note that including claim-specific fixed effects leads territorial claim cases that never experienced a (violent) MID to be dropped from the analyses—91 claims and 1,219 (24 percent) dyad years are dropped in the general MIDs model and 107 claims and 1,595 (32 percent) dyad years in the violent MIDs model.

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Table 2.

Logistic Regression Analysis of All Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), Violent MIDs, and Peaceful Talks.

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Any MID—pooled	Any MID—fixed effects	Violent MID—pooled	Violent MID—fixed effects	Talks—pooled	Talks—fixed effects
Partial settlement		.056 (.144)	−.312 (.230)	−.063 (.174)	−.687*** (.240)	.417*** (.115)	.571*** (.198)
Ethnic salience		.273* (.155)	.756 (.467)	.336* (.183)	.639 (.556)	.223** (.098)	−.504 (.668)
Economic salience		.210 (.133)	.385 (.402)	.222 (.153)	−.003 (.520)	.073 (.103)	.283 (.388)
Strategic salience		.425*** (.146)	−.224 (.445)	.366** (.159)	.032 (.469)	.128 (.092)	.162 (.240)
No. disputed areas		.037 (.050)	.174 (.171)	.010 (.058)	.055 (.197)	.058* (.032)	.469*** (.101)
Past territorial conflict		.231*** (.042)	.113* (.062)	.211*** (.048)	.117 (.073)	.002 (.026)	−.056 (.043)
Strategic rivalry		.680*** (.166)	1.722*** (.279)	.665*** (.188)	1.497*** (.387)	.111 (.116)	.371 (.272)
Joint democracy		−.359 (.224)	−.333 (.284)	−.526** (.242)	−.524* (.315)	.311*** (.120)	.350* (.184)
Relative capabilities		−.058 (.050)	−.206 (.201)	−.065 (.056)	−.064 (.252)	−.008 (.034)	−.283** (.132)
Leader transition		.042 (.088)	.083 (.101)	.041 (.096)	.128 (.112)	.060 (.078)	.107 (.079)
Economic turmoil		−.001 (.001)	−.002 (.001)	−.002 (.001)	−.002 (.002)	−.001 (.001)	−.001 (.001)
Land contiguity		−.088 (.159)	.107 (.874)	−.149 (.179)	−.070 (.765)	___	___
Alliance ties		−.033 (.132)	.531** (.207)	−.125 (.153)	.285 (.250)	___	___
Constant		−1.927*** (.317)		−2.036*** (.401)		−.849*** (.166)
N		5,026	3,807	5,026	3,431	5,206	4,982
Groups		234	143	234	127	236	200
Log likelihood		−1,596.880	−1,162.184	−1,299.981	−925.121	−2,700.866	−2,170.492

Note: All models include time since last event polynomials (not shown out of space considerations). Robust standard errors clustered on the territorial claim case. MIDs = militarized interstate disputes.

***p < .01.

**p < .05.

*p < .10.

The coefficient for partial settlement is not statistically significant in the pooled and fixed-effects models for all MIDs (i.e., models 1 and 2) and also not in the pooled model for violent MIDs (i.e., model 3). Only in model 4, the violent MIDs fixed-effects model is the coefficient for partial settlement statistically significant and negative. These findings thus suggest that partial settlements do not reduce the likelihood of all MIDs between the claimants and that claimants with a partial settlement are also no less likely to have violent conflict than claimants without such a settlement. However, it appears that claimants that experience violent MIDs may be less likely to have such MIDs after they conclude a partial settlement compared to before they reach the agreement—the probability of a violent MID decreases by 8 percent. While any short-term conflict-reducing effect of partial settlements would thus appear to be quite limited, we know from existing work that once all outstanding claims are settled, militarized disputes become much less likely (Owsiak 2012; Schultz 2014).

Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2 display results for the effect of partial settlements on peaceful territorial negotiations. Both the pooled model (model 5) and the fixed-effects model ¹⁹ (model 6) show that partial settlements are positively and statistically significantly correlated with talks between the parties. Based on model 5, the predicted probability of peaceful negotiations increases by 10 percent for parties that have a partial settlement compared to those that do not. In an additional analysis (not shown), I also find that a higher proportion of talks yield territorial concessions by one or both parties when a partial settlement is in effect than when it is not (p = .000). These findings are thus in line with the idea that partial settlements might pave the way for an improved relationship between the parties and generate momentum for dispute resolution.

As for the control variables, I find some evidence that claimants are more likely to experience MIDs and to hold peaceful talks regarding ethnically salient territory and that they are also more likely to fight over strategically important territory, while economically valuable territory is not systematically related to the likelihood of either MIDs or talks. Furthermore, a greater number of disputed areas increases the probability of talks but does not affect the likelihood of conflict. By contrast, hostile relations, as reflected by the dyad’s history of territorial conflict and the existence of a rivalry, increase the probability of MIDs but do not affect peaceful talks. As expected, joint democracy decreases the probability of MIDs, at least violent ones, and increases the probability of peaceful talks. Relative capabilities, leader transitions, contiguity, and alliances do not appear to be systematically related to the outcome variables.

Discussion

The results reveal a positive relationship between partial settlements and the peaceful comprehensive resolution of remaining territorial disagreements. In the short term, partial settlements are also correlated with an increased likelihood of peaceful negotiations and concessions, and there is some limited evidence that partial settlements correlate with a lower propensity for violent conflict within the territorial claim dyad. While the findings regarding MIDs are weaker than expected, overall the results are in line with my core theoretical argument that partial settlements can create momentum for comprehensive dispute resolution. Finding a positive correlation between partial settlements and the full resolution of territorial claims is particularly informative in light of the persistent debate among scholars and policy makers as to whether partial settlements may actually be more harmful than helpful. The evidence here suggests that, on average, partial settlements are connected to beneficial outcomes for the parties.

A natural question that emerges is whether the correlation between partial settlements and complete claim resolution is driven entirely by a screening logic or whether partial settlements also have an independent causal effect. My theoretical argument explicitly recognizes that political will for settlement needs to be present for parties to pursue a piecemeal approach, but I also propose that partial settlements might shape parties’ preferences and behavior. Unfortunately, distinguishing between these two logics is notoriously difficult with observational data, but it is possible to probe the results both conceptually and empirically in order to gain some insight into this question.

On a conceptual level, it would appear that if political will for settlement were strong, the parties would have opted for a comprehensive accord right away rather than pursue a piecemeal strategy. Comprehensive settlements are a clear sign of the desire to improve relations; partial settlements suggest that the will to settle was probably limited at least initially. Furthermore, the weak findings regarding MIDs also do not fit a screening-only dynamic: if there is a strong desire to settle the dispute, the parties should also be significantly less likely to experience MIDs, since conflict undermines the underlying goal of improved relations.

On an empirical level, I use coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012) to more effectively remove potential differences in observable indicators of political will among cases. I match partial settlement cases with control cases (dyad years with no partial settlement) that are similar on the values of the control variables and examine whether the complete resolution of the claim is more likely within ten years. The postmatching results continue to show a significant positive relationship between partial settlements and claim resolution. In a second analysis, I also match on whether at least one of the claimants peacefully resolved a territorial dispute with another country in the last five years. Previous settlements may indicate a desire to settle the country’s borders more generally. The findings are similar.

It is important to note that there could be (unobserved) factors that lead parties to want to settle their territorial disputes that are not accounted for in my models. ²⁰ With observational data, it is unfortunately not possible to determine conclusively whether partial settlements do more than screen. However, some descriptive patterns in the data suggest that an explanation based entirely on screening may be unsatisfying. If underlying political will accounts for the partial settlement and the ultimate resolution of the claim, we should plausibly expect that typically both decisions are made by the same leaders. Interestingly, in 87 percent of cases in which a partial settlement led to a final peaceful resolution of the claim, there was a leader transition in at least one of the countries between the time the initial partial settlement was concluded and the time the parties settled the last of their territorial disputes. This suggests that even when new leaders come to power—leaders who might not necessarily share their predecessor’s preferences for settlement—a piecemeal approach can still pave the way to final resolution of the claim. It also suggests that partial settlements might help build trust and goodwill not only between individual leaders but between the ruling elites of the two countries, and they might generate large enough economic benefits to convince new leaders to take further steps in the settlement process. ²¹

As a final check, it is important to investigate whether the positive correlation between partial settlements and claim resolution may be driven by third-party efforts rather than by the decision to parcel out the issues. Existing research shows that especially binding third-party techniques are strong predictors of success in dispute resolution (e.g., Gent and Shannon 2010). When I drop dyadic territorial claim cases in which at least one partial settlement was the result of an arbitration/adjudication award, the findings hold. When I further drop mediation cases, the results are also similar. ²² This suggests that even when parties do not benefit from binding or nonbinding conflict management, partial settlements are associated with comprehensive dispute resolution.

Conclusion

In many conflicts, the contentious issues are complex and varied enough that the parties might consider a stepwise approach to dispute resolution, chipping away at underlying disagreements a few at a time. But how viable is a piecemeal strategy? I argue that the conclusion of an initial partial settlement functions as a signal of the parties’ desire to make progress on settling their dispute and can lay the foundation for additional cooperation by building trust internationally and/or by demonstrating the benefits of dispute resolution to reluctant domestic audiences. As a result, partial settlements should lead to the resolution of remaining disagreements. This optimistic view of partial settlements, however, is not without its detractors. A number of concerns have been leveled against piecemeal approaches, and a systematic empirical test is thus called for.

My analysis of newly collected data on partial settlements in worldwide territorial claims between 1919 and 2001 reveals a strong positive correlation between partial settlements and the peaceful resolution of remaining disagreements. In the short term, partial settlements are also correlated with an increased probability of peaceful talks and concessions, but there is only limited evidence that they might reduce conflict in the dyad. A determination of whether the effect of partial settlements is mostly the result of screening or whether partial settlements also have an independent causal effect is difficult, given the observational nature of the data. Nevertheless the findings are encouraging. While in some cases the concerns of skeptics of piecemeal approaches may well be correct and a partial settlement might be harmful, it appears that, on average, partial settlements are associated with beneficial outcomes for the parties, especially in the long run. Once the claim is fully settled, as a result of a piecemeal approach, the parties can benefit from a reduction in hostility and an increase in trade (Owsiak 2012; Schultz 2014; Simmons 2002). As demonstrated by the Chinese–Russian case, it appears that, especially when a comprehensive settlement is not immediately feasible, a stepwise strategy may be a useful policy option.

In addition to providing policy-relevant insights on the consequences of piecemeal approaches to dispute resolution, this article also opens up avenues for future scholarly research. In particular, it will be worthwhile to delve deeper into the details of stepwise approaches. This article effectively treats partial settlements as uniform, but they may vary in their scope and the difficulty level of issues they address as well as in their spacing across time. An analysis of different types of partial settlements might provide additional information on when piecemeal approaches are most successful. Future work might also examine how partial settlements compare to, or might be combined with, other tools of conflict management, such as third-party techniques and procedural or functional agreements. Finally, scholars might consider how piecemeal approaches work in other types of conflicts. Many of the arguments presented here may be generalizable to disputes over issues other than territory, but more careful theoretical and empirical assessments are called for. Studying the agenda and design of settlement efforts can not only provide scholars with a more complete understanding of conflict resolution but might also form the foundation for potentially useful advice for policy makers.