Abstract

Haynes, Kyle. 2019. “A Question of Costliness: Time Horizons and Interstate Signaling.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 63 (8): 1939-1964. (Original doi: 10.1177/0022002718822719)
In the above article, the initial version of “A Question of Costliness: Time Horizons and Interstate Signaling” (Haynes 2019) published Online First contained an error in defining an important cutpoint. This error is corrected below, along with an updated figure. The Online First manuscript also presented three inequalities that incompletely defined the parameter spaces delimiting certain equilibria. These inequalities are presented in a more complete way here. These errors and omissions do not affect the paper’s results.
1. Due to a simple mathematical error, Equation (1) was initially misspecified, including an extra term in the denominator. Equation (1) should read:
2. As a result of the correction to Equation (1), Figure 1 should depict two distinct cutpoints along the horizontal axis.
The corrected version of Figure 1 still reflects the theoretically important insight, that mutual cooperation across both rounds of the game is only possible under unidimensional uncertainty when p1 > p*.
3. Inequalities (2), (4), and (6) in the original manuscript were incomplete. Because the surrounding narrative focused on P1’s first round incentives, the Online First version of the manuscript only reported the cutpoints defining P1’s first round strategy. Fuller expressions of the conditions defining these equilibria are given below.
Inequality (2) should read:

Equilibria When Time Horizons are Common Knowledge

Time Horizons and the Possibility of Sustained Cooperation
Inequality (4) should read:
Inequality (6) should read:
4. Finally, Figure 4 should be updated to reflect the change to inequality (2) described above. The purpose of Figure 4 is simply to demonstrate that the equilibrium in the light gray parameter space exists. The Online First version of the manuscript depicted only one of the two cutpoints that establish the lower limit of the parameter space supporting this equilibrium. The figure presented below depicts both cutpoints specified in inequality (2), and thus more accurately reflects the parameter space delimiting the equilibrium. My main theoretical claim – that the multidimensional uncertainty game supports multi-round mutual cooperation across a wider range of p1 values than the unidimensional uncertainty game – still holds.
The original article has also been corrected.
