Did 3G Make Afghan Insurgents Fight More Effectively? A Disaggregated Study

Abstract

Studies on the impacts of communication technologies on civil conflict often focus on the presence of cell phone networks and draw mixed conclusions. Meanwhile, communication technologies have been advancing and the nature of telecommunication has changed. I argue that the richness of information exchange marked by the introduction of 3G mobile technologies provides an opportunity to push the debate forward, by leading to an increase in the violence of insurgent groups in a high-intensity episode. I focus on Afghanistan as a tough test for my argument. Analysing the effect of introducing 3G network in existing 2G network areas using matched wake analysis and spatial models, I find that the introduction of 3G is associated with an increase in the number of violent events, IED attacks, and coordinated multiple attacks perpetrated by Afghan insurgents. The results are robust to different sizes of spatial units, placebo tests, and less likely to suffer from reporting bias.

Keywords

asymmetric conflict civil wars conflict conflict management terrorism capabilities internal armed conflict

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