This essay reports on seventeen experiments that test the validity of the Core as a solution to n-person cooperative games in a nontransferable utility context. Money is used to induce preferences, but subjects are not permitted to negotiate about nor transfer money amongst themselves. Instead, using majority rule, subjects must negotiate over and choose some policy in a two-dimensional “issue” space. Five 5-person games are run in which the subjects' utility is a function of the Euclidean distance from their ideal policy. Twelve 3-person games are run using a city-block representation of preferences. Both series of experiments strongly support the Core as a solution concept when it exists.
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