Integrative Complexity of Communications in International Crises

Abstract

Diplomatic communications during international crises that resulted in war (1914 and 1950) and crises that were settled peacefully (1911, 1948, 1962) were scored for integrative complexity. This is a dimension of information processing characterized at one pole by simple responses, gross distinctions, rigidity, and restricted information usage, and at the other by complexity, fine distinctions, flexibility, and extensive information search and usage. Complexity of the messages produced by governmental leaders was significantly lower in crises that ended in war. As the crisis approached its climax, complexity declined in 1914 and increased in 1962. The results demonstrate the usefulness of information processing complexity, which can be measured objectively in a wide range of materials, for analyzing political and diplomatic events.

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