Ernst Röhm versus General Hans Kundt in Bolivia,1929–30? The Curious Incident

‘Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?’

‘To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.’

‘The dog did nothing in the night-time.’

‘That was the curious incident,’ remarked Sherlock Holmes.

Arthur Conan Doyle, ‘The Adventure of Silver Blaze’ (1892) ¹

Ernst Röhm had a significant role in post-First World War German right-wing politics from the early 1920s on. In January 1931 Adolf Hitler appointed him Chief of Staff of the Nazi storm troopers, the Sturmabteilung (SA), an office Röhm held until he was purged on Hitler’s orders on 30 June 1934 and executed a day later. There can be no doubt of Röhm’s importance in the rise to power of Nazism. More recently, though, some historians of interwar Bolivia have claimed that Röhm also played a decisive military-political role in Bolivia in 1930. This article will investigate Röhm’s time in Bolivia, argue that the view he played a significant role in Bolivia is incorrect and suggest why, nonetheless, such a mistaken interpretation has developed. It will argue that Röhm’s political inactivity in Bolivia should also influence historians’ wider assessments of his character and politics.

From 1929 to 1930 Röhm had spent almost two years serving in the Bolivian Army. Here he worked for another senior German officer, General Hans Kundt, who was Chief of the Bolivian General Staff. German military officers had considerable influence on the Bolivian Army from 1911 to 1935, an influence ultimately judged by historians of Bolivia to have been of little benefit to either country.

Before the First World War Bolivia’s Liberal governments had tried to modernize and professionalize the army. At the end of 1910 President Eliodoro Villazón reached an agreement with Germany to send an official military mission to Bolivia. Major Hans Kundt headed a German mission of 13 men, five officers and 12 NCOs which arrived in 1911. Kundt and nine other members extended their contracts in 1913 but all returned to Germany at the outbreak of war. This official German mission concentrated on training. Kundt introduced a policy that illiterate recruits should be taught to read and write, thereby improving their employment prospects on release from the service and also qualifying them to vote, since literacy was a precondition for the franchise. The members of the mission themselves benefited from accelerated promotions and generous salaries. As a result of the mission’s influence, the Bolivian army was structured and trained on German lines. ²

After the First World War, Article 179 of the Treaty of Versailles prohibited the sending of German military missions overseas and required Germany to ensure that its citizens did not leave the country to serve in, or train, foreign armed forces. Nonetheless, since the Treaty also reduced the size of the German army, many former officers sought these opportunities. The government of Bolivia ratified the Treaty in 1920, but did not take such provisions seriously. ³

Hans Kundt was the first German officer who succeeded in resuming his military career in South America. Kundt had served as an infantry officer in the Prussian army from 1890. After service in the First World War, Kundt returned to Bolivia in June 1920, having renounced his German citizenship and taken up Bolivian citizenship. Initially he was appointed to a civil service position, but on 9 February 1921, the new Republican President Bautista Saavedra appointed him Chief of the Bolivian General Staff. Bolivia rejected French protests at this appointment. At least four other German officers followed Kundt’s lead and also took up positions in Bolivia in the early 1920s. ⁴

Both the British and US missions to Bolivia were more accepting of Kundt’s new position than the French and saw it as an assurance of discipline and efficiency. British diplomatic representatives considered Kundt to be more Bolivian than German in his reactions and loyalties and were generally relaxed about his role. Foreign diplomats generally judged Kundt favourably and he must have had considerable political skills to manoeuvre and survive in Bolivian public life. A later historian, though, has described him as dogmatic, imperious and eccentric. ⁵

Bolivian politics became more complex after 1920. The Liberal ascendancy was replaced by a multi-party system, with a greater level of political and social conflict. Parties also split because of personal rivalries. The economic situation worsened, partly due to the country’s economic vulnerability and partly due to overseas borrowing by the presidents of the 1920s, Saavedra and Siles. As chief of the Bolivian General Staff, Kundt was equal to the Minister of War and directly answerable to the President. Kundt’s position in Bolivia in the 1920s was therefore politicized in a way it had not been before the war. Successive presidents used him to protect them against opposition and he operated a system of espionage within the army itself. Kundt’s political role from 1920 on was significant, as historians have recognized. ⁶

For their part, native-born Bolivian officers resented his return, his extremely generous pay — he earned some $US100,000 between 1921 and 1930 — and his political influence. In 1923 President Saavedra had to back down from his plans to appoint Kundt as Minister of War after protests inside Bolivia. As testament to his growing political influence, in 1925 Kundt, this time supported by the officer corps, forced Saavedra to abandon an attempt to prolong his tenure in office and instead accept Saavedra’s own party’s candidate, Hernando Siles, as his successor as President. Hostility to Kundt flared up afterwards. By 1926 he was also unpopular with junior officers in the Bolivian Army because they believed he only cared about his personal interests. The German ambassador to Bolivia, Hans Marckwald, thought these criticisms may have been justified, since Kundt had also not done much for the other German officers. As a result, Marckwald reported, there was ‘no love lost between him and them.’ ⁷

From 1926 to 1928 Siles kept Kundt overseas in Germany on full pay, replacing him as Chief of the General Staff with Colonel José C. Quirós. By mid-1927 there were plans to recall Kundt, however, as tensions increased between Bolivia and Paraguay. ⁸ In wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Bolivia had lost territory to Chile and Brazil, including its access to the sea. In 1929 20 per cent of Bolivia’s budget was still spent on the military. The Bolivian army then numbered approximately 20,000 men in the active forces and up to 800,000 including all reserves. This army was racially divided with officers of European descent and recruits mainly of native Bolivian descent. ⁹

Military expenditure was high because of Bolivia’s continuing dispute with Paraguay over their conflicting territorial claims in the Chaco Boreal, a great plain in eastern Bolivia. The extreme climatic conditions of this largely uninhabited territory made it a desert in the dry season and a swamp in the wet season. Clashes between Paraguayan and Bolivian forces increased in 1927 and 1928. Both countries were building military forts in the area and on 8 December 1928 Paraguayan forces attacked the Bolivian Fortín Vanguardia. With strong public support for a firm reaction, President Siles ordered the recapture of Fortín Vanguardia and the capture of the Paraguayan Fortín Boquerón. After this action, President Siles accepted US mediation and refused to order general mobilization. In September 1929 both countries accepted an act of conciliation and Fortín Boquerón was returned to Paraguay. ¹⁰

The tensions with Paraguay led the Bolivian government to resume its practice of hiring German advisers for its armed forces. In 1926 there were a number of unsuccessful attempts to recruit officers directly in Germany. In an attempt to avert international protests, officers who were subsequently recruited were first transferred into the Danzig police force. A so-called ‘Danzig mission’ of 19 officers and NCOs entered Bolivia on 1 November 1927, despite informal protests from the British and French ambassadors. The mission failed due to disorganization on the Bolivian side. Three German sergeants taking part tried to spy for Paraguay to support themselves because of delays in paying the members of the mission. The subsequent treason trial at the beginning of 1928 discredited the mission, only seven of whose members still remained in Bolivia by September 1929. Since the three sergeants were ostensibly from Danzig, the Bolivian Government told the German ambassador Hans Marckwald that he had no legal standing to help them and the British Embassy had to assist them. This mission led Marckwald to suggest that it would be best for German–Bolivian relations if no further German officers were hired by Bolivia. ¹¹

Despite the bad experiences with the Danzig mission, President Siles nonetheless recalled Kundt as a direct consequence of the border clashes with Paraguay. Kundt’s return resulted in the hiring of more German officers. By May 1930 there were 13 officers of German origin in Bolivia. Kundt and Röhm travelled to Bolivia together in December 1928, arriving on 5 January 1929. Kundt was returning to Bolivia to resume his position as chief of staff of the Bolivian Army while Röhm had just signed a contract to serve as a lieutenant-colonel in the Bolivian army on a two year contract at US$357 (1000 bolivianos) a month. ¹²

Röhm had had an unremarkable career as a junior officer in the Bavarian Army before the First World War. Following distinguished frontline service and severe wounds, he spent the last two years of the war as a staff officer. After the war, in the Weimar Republic, his superiors in the army drew on his organizational skills to put him in charge of illegal weapons holdings in Bavaria. Röhm himself had been politicized by the German Revolution of 1918–19. He used his position to support right-wing paramilitary and extremist groups. In the course of this, from 1919 to 1923 he came to favour Hitler and the NSDAP over other right-wing organizations. In November 1923 he took part in the unsuccessful Nazi attempt to take over power in Munich, the so-called ‘Beer Hall Putsch’.

Released from prison while Hitler and other putsch leaders were still serving their sentences, Röhm led the SA in 1924–5 while simultaneously trying to set up an ‘umbrella’ paramilitary organization, the Frontbann. This attempt foundered not least on account of Hitler’s opposition to it. Röhm accordingly resigned his offices and returned to private life before resuming political activity for the Nazis in 1928. Röhm had initially put his name forward to go to Bolivia in 1926. Bolivian authorities had been planning to hire him from July 1928. ¹³

Röhm’s political reputation accompanied him to Bolivia and may actually have given him some added value in Bolivian eyes. Both the Chilean and Argentinean military attachés considered him to be dangerous. The French ambassador protested Röhm’s appointment both verbally and in four formal notes to the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to little avail. The British Ambassador noted that the Bolivian Government had little respect for the Treaty of Versailles and that such protests were useless. ¹⁴

When Röhm arrived in La Paz in January 1929 he was initially employed as a professor in the Bolivian military college, apparently to allow him to learn Spanish. By the beginning of April 1929 he described his written Spanish as quite good and claimed that he could make himself understood when speaking. Later that month he accompanied Kundt on his inspection of recruits. From June to September 1929 Kundt sent Röhm to inspect various infantry regiments outside the capital. Röhm claimed that ‘I directed the entire duty, designed all the large exercises, held war games, field discussions, inspections, in the closest agreement with the regimental commanders. I made high demands that were well and cheerfully fulfilled.’ ¹⁵ In September 1929 Röhm was appointed Chief of Staff of the First Division in Oruro under General Carlos de Gumucio. On 22 October, with Röhm commanding, the Blue Division won the annual Bolivian military war games. He remained at the Oruro divisional headquarters until August 1930. ¹⁶

Röhm’s relations with Kundt had deteriorated since his arrival, even though Röhm made friends easily in the German embassy, the German community and among his fellow officers, who remembered him as intelligent, cultivated and agreeable. One Bolivian officer, Colonel Luis E. Saavedra, claimed that Röhm had aroused Kundt’s jealousy and that Kundt sent him to Oruro to remove him from the General Staff: ‘He was undoubtedly more capable than Kundt and that was the origin of their rivalry.’ ¹⁷ Röhm himself did not acknowledge that Kundt was jealous of his ability, though he recognized that his relations with Kundt had worsened. In February 1929 he wrote to Hitler that he was getting on well with Kundt. By April 1930, however, he advised Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria that Kundt saw him as a Bavarian and therefore as second class. In addition Kundt resented Röhm’s many followers in Bolivia. Even though there was no open clash, there was no genuine understanding between them. Röhm could not be promoted without Kundt’s approval. Later – on 22 August – Röhm claimed to the Crown Prince that Kundt had tried everything to remove Röhm and that the plan only failed ‘as a result of the determined resistance of my followers in the War Ministry’. ¹⁸

Despite the international economic crisis and Röhm’s success in his Bolivian service, he wrote to Crown Prince Rupprecht in April 1930 that he did not intend to extend his contract when it came to an end at the end of the year, because of his concern that he was missing important political developments in Germany. Röhm’s letters to Germany showed his continuing links with National Socialism and his focus on political developments there. Significantly, they did not indicate any strong feelings about Bolivian affairs, where his comments were notable for their detachment. ¹⁹

President Siles’ term of office was due to expire in mid-1930 and his plans to extend his term were well-known. Röhm noted that, while he himself did not care who ran Bolivia, ‘General Kundt is considerably affected … for he stands and falls with the current President’. ²⁰ In March 1930, after lunching with Marckwald and Kundt, the British ambassador R.C. Michell reported that Kundt had informed Siles that he would not support any unconstitutional act, despite the risk this stance would have for Kundt’s personal standing. Marckwald believed that the German diplomatic bag had been tampered with in an attempt to intercept Kundt’s correspondence. In the German Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt) files there is no report by Marckwald either of the lunch or of this suspicion.

Within two months Kundt’s position had changed. In April Siles announced that he intended to delay elections indefinitely. The next month Kundt issued a statement that Bolivia was threatened by capitalism, pacifism and caudillism and that the army was the only untainted sector of society. In retrospect, Marckwald judged that this statement undermined Kundt’s position as well as marking the beginning of the end for Siles. ²¹

British Ambassador Michell reported that Kundt had transferred £20,000 (272,000 bolivianos) to Germany to provide for his family in case he was killed. He believed that Kundt could not have saved this from his salary in two years and that the sum represented ‘the value of his support to Dr. Siles’, in other words a bribe. ²² Unsurprisingly the German embassy made no such report. Marckwald considered later Bolivian claims that Kundt had taken money for his support to be ‘disgraceful rumours’. ²³

Despite Kundt’s later assertions to the German Foreign Ministry and the press that he had not taken a political stance in Bolivia, he had in fact taken Siles’s side. On 28 May 1930 Siles turned over power to a Council of Ministers controlled by Kundt and Colonel David Toro. The Council of Ministers called for elections for a Constituent Assembly to amend the constitution to allow Siles to serve another term. Kundt believed that the army was firmly in the hands of its leaders, but he was wrong. These moves were strongly opposed within the officer corps and in the country generally. ²⁴

Student demonstrations against Siles’ extension in office began on 12 June 1930 and continued for 10 days. On 22 June in La Paz, the garrison was mobilized, soldiers fired on the demonstrators and one student was killed. Protests spread and on 24 June the garrison at Oruro declared itself against the government. Garrisons in Cochabamba, Sucre and Potosí followed suit. ²⁵

On 25 June in La Paz cadets of the military college (Colegio Militar) began an uprising. Some 300 were killed and wounded in fighting on 25 and 26 June. Colonel Toro and the ‘Ingavi’ Regiment repulsed a cadet attack on the city centre. After three days of fighting, the Council of Ministers and Kundt resigned. On 27 June Siles took refuge in the Brazilian Embassy, Toro and some other members of the Council of Ministers in the Chilean Embassy and Kundt and his family in the German Embassy. A military junta of officers led by General Carlos Blanco Galindo was formed on 28 June. The junta issued a decree the next day establishing mechanisms for elections and a return to civilian rule within six months. Kundt continued to stay in the German Embassy until the political situation was judged calm enough for his safe passage out of the country. ²⁶

Dunkerley notes that all German officers other than Kundt sided with the rebel forces. Two historians of Bolivia, Arnade and Brockmann, have accepted the claim of another German officer who had spent time in Bolivia, Adolf Röpnack, that only Röhm sided with the rebels. Further to this, Brockmann has asserted that Röhm’s consent was required for the rebellion of the First Division in Oruro. Röhm’s role, according to Brockmann, was therefore pivotal in the success of the coup. Both Arnade and Brockmann claim to have found a new source, an unpublished memoir by Röpnack, ¡Viva Bolivia! The relevant section of this memoir has already been publicly available in the Bavarian state archives. ²⁷

The historians who have used Röpnack’s testimony in his memoir accept it, although Brockmann at least acknowledges that Röpnack is a very problematic source. Röpnack’s testimony was all second-hand. Having left Bolivia in 1927, ²⁸ he was not an eyewitness to any of the events in 1930. As a strong supporter of Kundt (unusual for the German officers in Bolivia), his assertions may reflect Kundt’s continuing hostility to Röhm. They also suggest a desire to deflect criticism from Kundt to Röhm. In fact, it was Kundt’s decision to take the side of Siles rather than uphold the constitution, which precipitated the revolution.

There is no actual evidence, however, to support this claim, as Brockmann himself concedes. Röhm’s private and public comments at the time and later also give no backing for this interpretation. Röhm was never a modest man and tended, if anything, to exaggerate his achievements and influence. Had Röhm played a leading role in the June 1930 coup, he could have been expected to have revealed it at some time: he never did.

What did Röhm’s chapter on his time in Bolivia in later editions of his autobiography indicate about the plot? He admitted that he knew of the plot ahead of time and claimed that he had been approached by a delegation of officers asking him to put himself at the head of the coup in Oruro. ‘I told the delegation, that as a German instructor I did not consider myself authorized to interfere in the internal affairs of the country and must leave it to Bolivians to straighten these out according to their own judgment.’ ²⁹ Röhm wrote that these views were completely accepted by his Bolivian comrades. In his autobiography, Röhm was generous about Kundt’s different stance, attributing it to his long period of service in the Bolivian Army and his friendship with President Siles. On his own testimony, Röhm did not take sides in the dispute. The well-informed reports of the German ambassador Marckwald also did not substantiate the claim that Röhm had any role in the events. Rather Marckwald argued that without Kundt, the Germans would have been completely uninvolved observers of the revolution.

In some of his comments, Röpnack acknowledged that Röhm had said he was not involved. He then proceeded to criticize Röhm for not letting Kundt know of the putsch plans and for not having resigned in solidarity with Kundt. He noted that in a similar case in Peru in 1928, all German officers in the Peruvian Army resigned when the Peruvian Government dismissed General Faupel. This case was different from the Bolivian case in two important details. First, only Faupel had a contract with the Peruvian government so the German officers he engaged stood in a different relationship to him than the German officers in Bolivia did to Kundt. Secondly, Faupel simply announced that the remaining German officers would be resigning along with him. They were not given a choice in the matter. ³⁰

The fact that no other German officer took the steps that Röpnack considered to have been the honourable course of action suggests that Röpnack’s assertion seems to have arisen from a combination of his (and Kundt’s?) hostility to Röhm, a reading of Röhm’s alleged ‘revolutionary’ stance of 1934 back into his actions in 1930 and his admiration of Kundt. Both Röpnack and the historians of Bolivia who have accepted his claim, either wholly or in part, give too much credence to Röhm’s reputation as a revolutionary. Rather, Brockmann uses Röhm’s political reputation in Germany and his later comments on German politics as suggestive evidence. It is striking that historians have placed so much weight on such an unreliable source. The possible reasons for this reliance will be discussed later.

In addition these claims further exaggerate the role and power of the German officers vis-a-vis their Bolivian counterparts. Why and how could Bolivian officers have been prevented from staging a coup by Röhm? All German officers, including Röhm, were in an awkward position during the coup attempt. If they took a strong stand either way, they were far more vulnerable than their Bolivian colleagues. It was far safer for them not to play a decisive role either blocking the plotters or taking their side.

The deteriorating economic conditions in Germany also made their continued employment in Bolivia more important. The reactions of the other German officers may also have been influenced by the kind of political change that the coup heralded. It has been described as a constitutionalist revolution. Like other coups in Bolivia in this period, the Bolivian Army intervened in politics only to uphold the constitution and enforce the transfer of power from one civilian government to another. ³¹

After the coup public hostility focused on Kundt not only for his support of Siles but also for his alleged role in ordering the firing on demonstrators on 22 June. Crowds shouting ‘Abajo Alemania’ (‘Down with Germany’) threatened the German Embassy. Kundt was not able to leave Bolivia until 28 July. The German business community felt compelled to publish a statement of loyalty to Bolivia in the press to appease public anger. The new government published details of Bolivia’s poor budgetary position and allowed the press to draw attention to the generous salaries of the German officers. By 23 July 1930 Marckwald assessed that the official influence of Germans in the government had collapsed. He expected that Germans employed in the civil service would be dismissed, although some officers would continue to be needed for their technical expertise. ‘Röhm is said to be aiming to succeed Kundt’, he noted. ³² The lengthy involvement of German military officers in the country had weakened rather than strengthened German influence, Marckwald concluded.

Röhm was a friend of Colonel Filiberto Osorio, the guiding force in the new junta. Shortly after the coup Röhm was recalled to La Paz and in August he was appointed expert adviser in the General Staff. His new responsibilities included drawing up the army budget and making the necessary economies in face of Bolivia’s large deficit. This would require the retrenchment of some of the German officers. As a result Röhm appeared to waver in his resolution to return home, noting in August 1930 to the Crown Prince that he had more scope for his role in the General Staff through Kundt’s departure. He told the Crown Prince that he was the first adviser in the General Staff and recognized that the Chief of Staff had to be a Bolivian. ³³

Yet by October Röhm had demanded the position of deputy Chief of Staff, had been refused and as a result was leaving for Germany. In mid-October Marckwald reported to Berlin that apart from Röhm, his friend Friedrich Scherlau and one other officer, all German officers remaining in the Bolivian Army had either been given notice or been urged to dissolve their contracts. Financial reasons were given as the explanation. Marckwald observed:

They dearly wanted to keep Lieutenant Colonel Röhm himself here in order to have at least one man who understands the work and also gets it done. Röhm however was only willing to stay if he was given the position of deputy (stellvertretende) Chief of the General Staff. Since in the current conditions this was not possible at the moment, he then preferred to follow the call of his National Socialist friends at home.’ ³⁴

In August Röhm showed a keen awareness of exactly those domestic political factors in Bolivia that made his demand in October impossible to satisfy. This suggests that he may deliberately have pitched his demands too high, possibly to ensure either that he could return to Germany or that he would have an authority equivalent to that of Kundt if he stayed on. Maybe he let the Bolivian junta decide his fate for him. In any case Röhm left for Germany in mid-October 1930, returning to Germany in November. In January 1931 Hitler appointed him chief of staff of the SA. ³⁵

By the end of 1930, both Kundt and Röhm had left Bolivia. Bolivian authorities though, strangely given their earlier standpoint, sought the return of both men. In March 1931 and again possibly in January 1932 there were attempts by the Bolivian General Staff to recall Röhm to Bolivia. ³⁶ Had Röhm returned to Bolivia, he would have become involved in the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, which was launched by the newly elected Bolivian President, the Genuine Republican Daniel Salamanca. Salamanca was an austere politician who supported a hard line on the Chaco. As his administration came under increasing political and economic pressure, on 18 July 1932, Salamanca escalated a minor border incident into a war, ordering an immediate attack on Paraguayan positions against the advice of his general staff. ³⁷

Röhm himself claimed that while in Bolivia he had recommended to the Minister of War that Bolivia seek an agreement with Paraguay over the Chaco. In his opinion the territory was not essential for Bolivia and was too difficult to defend. ³⁸ The memorandum he claimed he wrote along these lines can no longer be found in the Bolivian archives. Since Röhm made this claim publicly before the outcome of the war was decided and at a time when it could have been contradicted by Bolivian authorities, it can be assumed that he did in fact give advice along these lines.

Had Röhm played a role in the Bolivian campaign, it is unlikely that he would have done any worse than Kundt. After initial Bolivian defeats, Salamanca recalled Kundt from Germany as commander-in-chief in October 1932. Against the express counsel of the German Government, Kundt returned to Bolivia by December 1932 and took command. He refused to listen to advice from the remaining German officers who warned that his penchant for frontal attacks was disastrous. As a result, in his one year of command, his policies resulted in defeat after defeat. ‘Kundt’s tenure as chief of the Bolivian Army had proved an unparalleled disaster for the army’. ³⁹ Kundt was dismissed in December 1933. After a lengthy period under house arrest, he returned to Europe for the last time in 1935.

When a cease fire was achieved on 14 June 1935, Bolivia had been defeated by a smaller nation with a smaller army. It was not just Kundt’s disastrous policy that resulted in Bolivia’s defeat. The army also failed before and after his periods as commander, nor was its failure solely the result of inappropriate training by its German instructors. Bolivia’s conduct of the war was made more difficult by the harsh terrain, Bolivia’s extended supply lines and the skills of the Paraguayan commander, José Felix Estigarribia. The war resulted in a further loss of territory by Bolivia as well as heavy population losses. Over 52,000 men had been killed; Bolivia lost 2 per cent of its population. ⁴⁰

The defeat was understood both by contemporaries and historians to be a failure of the entire Bolivian political and social system. Native Bolivians in the ranks were not motivated to fight for national defence but rather saw it as a foreign war; the officer corps as a whole failed and the nation’s elite left the fight to the indigenous population. This defeat was the decisive turning point in twentieth century Bolivian history, discrediting the dominance of the European elite, radicalizing many officers and leading to the Bolivian revolution of 1952, with its programme of granting universal suffrage, nationalizing the tin mines, land reform and integrating the indigenous population into the Bolivian state. ⁴¹

How was Röhm affected by his almost two years in Bolivia? Some contemporaries argued that it widened his outlook and gave him a more realistic view of Germany’s relations with the outside world than other Nazi leaders had. Yet since the German community in Bolivia had not adjusted to the changes in Germany after 1918, Röhm’s time in Bolivia tended to reinforce his own political views. ⁴² Röhm also gave hostages to fortune while he was away. Far from home and away from German politics Röhm wrote frankly about his sexuality in a series of letters to Dr. Hans-Günther Heimsoth, a fellow radical right wing political activist and campaigner for homosexual rights. After he returned to Germany these letters would be made public and would cause political problems both for Röhm and for the NSDAP. ⁴³

Röhm’s experiences in Bolivia and the example of Kundt’s career there may have encouraged his hope that he could play a leading role in the German army after the Nazis came to power. On his return he made it clear that he aspired to the position of Reichswehr Minister in a National Socialist government. Kundt had de facto held a similar position in Bolivia and measuring himself against Kundt may have encouraged Röhm to believe that he was capable of filling the position. It may therefore have helped lead him to make the claims for a military role for the SA which ultimately led to the purge of the SA and his killing in 1934.

Röhm’s service in Bolivia also gave him a continuing alternative to his life in Germany – a ‘Bolivian option’. Until the end of his life he was technically on unrestricted and extended leave from the Bolivian Army and he maintained close ties with the Bolivian embassy in Berlin. He punctiliously advised the embassy each time his leave needed to be extended. He made his support for Bolivia in the Chaco War publicly known despite Germany’s official neutrality. ⁴⁴

From 1931 to 1933 to counter the campaigns against him publicizing his homosexuality and using the Heimsoth letters, Röhm and Nazi publicists were prone to exaggerate his role in Bolivia and even claim that he was offered the position of Chief of Staff of the Bolivian Army. ⁴⁵ This strengthened his position by emphasizing that he had other options if he was not backed by Hitler against his internal and external enemies.

Röhm’s Bolivian option ultimately helped blind him to the dangers he faced in Germany, a miscalculation that contributed to his death in 1934. In an extremely incoherent account to the German Cabinet of why he moved against Röhm, Hitler claimed on 3 July 1934 that by asking Hitler to approve his resignation as Chief of Staff of the SA, Röhm had been blackmailing him. ⁴⁶ Röhm’s comments to his friend Robert Bergmann in May 1934 suggest that he had been seeking a way out of the impasse he found himself in by contemplating a return to Bolivia. ⁴⁷ Instead he was shot on Hitler’s orders on 1 July 1934. The thirty-odd year German–Bolivian military relationship ended in 1935 with Hans Kundt’s return to Europe. Kundt died in 1939. Neither country had lastingly benefited from the cooperation.

It has been shown that the main source for Röhm’s significant role in the Bolivian coup in 1930 is dubious. Attempts to argue that Röhm played a major role in a Bolivian takeover of power as well as in German politics contradict the reports of well-informed contemporary witnesses and are not based on any reliable evidence.

This raises the questions of why historians continued to use this source and why these claims had such currency? It may be based in part on a desire to see developments in Bolivia as part of the wider clash of ideologies of the 1930s. It may also be the result of Röhm’s notoriety and importance in German history. This leads historians of Bolivia to assume that he must have played the same role in Bolivia as he was mendaciously alleged to have played in Germany in 1934 – plotting a revolution. Unfortunately, this is based on a complete misunderstanding of Röhm’s own attitude to his time in Bolivia.

While Hans Kundt had played a major role in the history of Bolivia for over 20 years and the outcome of the crisis over the presidential succession in 1930 was vital to him, for Ernst Röhm his stay in Bolivia had only been an interlude. Throughout the crisis in Bolivia in 1930 his focus was on political developments in Germany. In Bolivia in 1930 he demonstrated an ability to stand aside from political intrigues. The nature of his death has led historians to see him as a born revolutionary and conspirator. The significance of Röhm’s detachment in the Bolivian political crisis of 1930 and subsequent coup is that it demonstrates that Röhm was not always hungry for power and for revolution. As such this curious incident provides further evidence that it is false to understand Röhm as a political revolutionary.