Abstract
This article focuses on a particular aspect related to the permeability of the borders of communist Romania during the period 1967–9, that is, the increase in the number of Western citizens visiting Romania, as well as in the number of Romanian citizens travelling to the West. The celebration by the communist regime in Bucharest of International Tourist Year 1967 marked the beginnings of a brief period of increased permeability of communist Romania’s borders. During the same period, the communist authorities learned that a silent opposition to the regime existed as well. Many of those who opposed the regime did not dare to express their discontent publicly. Instead, they decided for the ‘exit’ option, and thus a growing number of Romanian citizens travelling to the West refused to return. Beginning in early 1969, the Securitate devised complex measures to control Western citizens travelling to Romania and to prevent Romanian citizens who travelled to the West from remaining abroad. This paper illustrates the discrepancy between Ceauşescu’s foreign and domestic policy, and contributes to a better understanding of the ‘political mind’ of the Romanian communists during the power-consolidation phase of Ceauşescu’s rule.
The present article discusses a particular aspect related to the permeability of the borders of communist Romania during the period 1967–9, that is, the increase in the number of Western citizens visiting Romania, as well as in the number of Romanian citizens travelling to the West. This article contends that the celebration by the communist regime in Bucharest of International Tourist Year 1967 marked the beginning of a short period of increased permeability of communist Romania’s borders. That period ended when a growing number of Romanian citizens travelling to the West refused to return. Beginning in 1969, the power elite in Bucharest took resolute measures aimed at curbing the phenomenon of Romanian tourists seeking asylum in Western countries.
Scholars of Romanian communism have emphasized some particular aspects of Ceauşescu’s first period in power (1965–9) which can be summarized as follows: (1) increased popular support, especially by significant strata of the Romanian ethnic majority, for the communist regime’s policies;
1
(2) the legitimating power of Ceauşescu’s 1968 denunciation of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia;
2
(3) a shift of emphasis, as far as the communist secret police, the Securitate, was concerned, from terror to prevention;
3
and (4) a gradual return to ideological orthodoxy after the year 1969.
4
At the same time, as Gail Kligman has shown, there existed a discrepancy between Ceauşescu’s foreign and domestic policy during the same period: Read from afar and through the lens of Western political vision, Ceauşescu’s policies in part served Western Cold War interests. When these policies were read from within, however, it became increasingly difficult to assert that they served the interests of the Romanian population.
5
The present study complements the argument set forth by Kligman by focusing on the issue of international tourism. Its purpose is twofold. On the one hand, it analyses the general context of the period 1967–9, which can be viewed as a period of rising expectations, and examines the major changes that occurred with regard to international tourism, especially in terms of legal framework and institutional development. The changes operated in 1967 led to an increase in the number of Romanian citizens travelling to the West, from 43,676 in 1967 to 65,067 in 1968. At the same time, the number of Western citizens who visited Romania grew from only 590 in 1956, to some 215,000 in 1966, and up to approximately 281,000 in 1967. 7 On the other hand, this article discusses the societal reaction to such measures and illustrates that during the period under scrutiny ‘exit’ prevailed over ‘voice’ by focusing especially on the most unwanted consequence for the communist regime, namely the increase in the number of Romanian citizens who travelled to the West as tourists and decided to stay abroad. 8 This second part also examines the response of the Romanian authorities to the phenomenon, including discussion at the highest Party levels. Beginning in early 1969, the Securitate devised complex measures aimed at thoroughly vetting passport applicants and enhancing its network of collaborators. Consequently, a significant number of people working in the tourism industry, such as national and international tour guides, receptionists, waiters and waitresses, national and international coach drivers, and so on, were included among the collaborators of the Securitate. After 1969, the tendency was to limit the number of Romanian citizens travelling to the West and thus the national borders of Romania became increasingly less permeable for Romanian tourists. Concomitantly, Romania became less and less attractive to foreign tourists due to the growing economic problems and increased surveillance by the Securitate.
The present study addresses the relationship between regime and society during the period 1967–9 from a political culture perspective, taking into consideration the policies devised by the regime in order to co-opt the population, as well as the way the population reacted to these policies, ranging from collaboration to attempts at fleeing the country. This author draws on Kenneth Jowitt’s distinction between regime and community political cultures. 9 In the terms of the present analysis, regime political culture is understood as the official political culture or the political culture of the Romanian communist regime. With regard to community political culture, this study addresses its particular subcultures, defined as the political cultures of resistance against the regime.
This article is based upon a variety of documentary sources, ranging from official Party documents to recently declassified files of the former Securitate. One should add that the topic of international tourism in communist Romania is still under-researched and information is scarce and unsystematic, due not least to the protracted process of opening the Securitate archives for research. 10
After his coming to power in March 1965, Ceauşescu continued the independent-path policies initiated by his predecessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, centred on industrial development and emancipation from Moscow. Ceauşescu benefited from Gheorghiu-Dej’s cautious distancing from Moscow and opening towards the West, which had culminated in the so-called ‘Declaration of April 1964’. That document epitomizes Gheorghiu-Dej’s policy of independence from Moscow, and is one of the most important official documents ever issued by the communist power elite in Romania. Simply put, the Declaration proclaimed that all communist parties were equal within the international communist movement and therefore they were free to choose their own path toward communism: It is the exclusive right of each communist party to elaborate independently its political line and specific objectives, as well as the ways and methods to reach them … There is no ‘parent’ party and ‘offspring’ party, ‘superior’ and ‘subordinated’ parties, but there is the large family of communist and workers’ parties having equal rights.
11
On 22 March 1965, Ceauşescu succeeded Gheorghiu-Dej, who had died of a galloping cancer just a few days before. Gradually, Ceauşescu turned the incipient nationalism of his predecessor into a comprehensive nation-building process aimed at creating an ethnically homogeneous ‘socialist nation’ in Romania. The suppression of the Prague Spring in August 1968 provided an unexpected support for the consolidation of the Ceauşescu regime. Due to his gesture of defiance on 21 August 1968, when he publicly condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ceauşescu was perceived as a ‘dissenter’ within the Soviet bloc. 13 Combined with an improvement in the general conditions of life, this permitted the Romanian communists to achieve a ‘limited legitimation through consent’. 14
Indeed, from the mid-1960s until the early 1970s ordinary people did experience a betterment of their economic situation as compared to the grim 1950s. The changes were especially visible in Bucharest, where the urban landscape underwent appreciable transformation. 15 The regime made considerable efforts to increase the pace of urbanization, as well as to augment the housing stock and to improve the quality of housing. 16 According to official data, the share of urban housing grew from 45.3 per cent of total housing in 1965 to 81.7 per cent in 1975. 17 Significant improvements occurred with regard to the habitational aspect of urban living. The number of newly built dwellings with three or more rooms increased, thus allowing more living space per person. 18 While in 1965 the number of dwellings with three or more rooms put into occupancy represented 25.9 per cent of the total, in 1975, the same type of dwellings made up 40.7 per cent of the total. Numerous families moved into new flats, rented from the state or bought with loans from the state through the Savings and Consignment Bank (Casa de Economii şi Consemnaţiuni – CEC). 19 Loans were also available for buying durable goods, from furniture to TV sets. Refrigerators and vacuum cleaners, as well as cooking, washing, and sewing machines entered the homes of a majority of the population. During that period, many Romanians bought their first radio or TV set.
The authorities encouraged a better use of leisure time by the population. Forgotten patterns of socializing with relatives and friends, not long before dubbed ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘petit bourgeois’ by the official propaganda, resurfaced.
20
Towards the end of the 1960s, the regime allowed the publication of books containing practical advice and tips for organizing parties and receiving guests for dinner and other events. The Caleidoscop (Kaleidoscope) series of small books, published by the Ceres Publishing House, featured prominently in this respect.
21
Very much as in other communist countries, the regime strove to organize leisure in the sense of channelling and controlling it. As Mary Fulbrook aptly observed in the case of the former German Democratic Republic: There was … a constant interplay of a surprisingly wide range of grass-roots activities and initiatives, and state efforts to channel, harness, foster and control popular interests, always with an eye to the wider international context and the potential political implications of the seemingly apolitical.
22
The regime promoted domestic tourism throughout the communist period, especially via educational tours organized by class instructors beginning in middle schools and continuing with groups from high schools, universities, factories and various other institutions. Beginning in the early 1960s, guided group trips to the ‘fraternal countries’ in East-Central Europe were encouraged more vigorously. 24 Self-guided tours became increasingly popular due to the development of infrastructure and the publication of guidebooks and tourist maps. The Tourist Almanac (Almanah Turistic), which was published annually from 1960, played an important role in fostering domestic, as well as international tourism. The first issue of the Scânteia Almanac, the offspring of the Party newspaper Scânteia, published in 1967, pays an appreciable attention to tourism, including cultural tourism. It contains among others useful lists of the most relevant museums, historical monuments and sites, spas and mountain resorts, chalets in the Carpathians, petrol stations and garages. The same almanac also contains an article entitled ‘What do you do in your leisure time?’ 25 For their part, pupils were encouraged to take part in Expediţiile Cutezătorii, that is, domestic expeditions organized from 1969 under the aegis of the magazine Cutezătorii (The Daring Ones), published by the National Council of the Pioneers’ Organization (Consiliul Naţional al Organizaţiei Pionierilor). Such domestic ‘expeditions’ to the countryside or into the mountains nurtured the spirit of adventure in middle schools throughout the country and inculcated a constant desire to travel. 26 Almanacs and albums, tourist maps and guidebooks for travellers proved to be instrumental in the spreading of a fragile culture of leisure in Ceauşescu’s Romania. 27
The increase in the number of private cars owned by the population created a basis for the development of tourism, both national and international. Until domestic automobile production was launched in August 1968, these were imported mainly from Soviet bloc countries, namely the Soviet Union (Volga and Moskvitch, later on Lada), Czechoslovakia (Škoda) and East Germany (Trabant and Wartburg). In the second half of the 1960s, the communist authorities also approved the import of French (Renault) and Italian (Fiat) cars. August 1968 saw the inauguration of the Piteşti Automobile Plant (Uzina de Autoturisme Piteşti – UAP), which started the production of cars under a licence purchased from the French manufacturer Renault. Much has been written on the emotional attachment of Romanians to the Dacia 1300 car, which first came off the assembly line in 1969. 28 Petrol was still cheap in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and thus numerous families spent their summer holidays on the Black Sea Coast or in the Carpathians with their first car, usually a Dacia 1300. 29 Consequently, publications that promoted tourism began to publish articles containing tips for motorized tourists. For instance, in the 1967 Tourist Almanac, one could find an article entitled ‘For your automobile’, which provided useful advice for those taking a longer trip in their private car. 30 More importantly, common people were allowed to take self-guided tours to the Soviet bloc countries, and even to the West. As a result, many took their first trip to the West during the period 1967–9.
The Ceauşescu regime took advantage of the fact that 1967 was designated by the United Nations as International Tourist Year to present to the world the palpable effects of the independent-path policies that the power elite in Bucharest had been pursuing, especially since April 1964. That year, the Tourist Almanac celebrated International Tourist Year and displayed on page 1 the slogan: Turismul – Paşaport pentru Pace (Tourism – Passport for Peace). 31 In the same year, 1967, the regime decided to reorganize under their original names two institutions that had had a major role in the development of tourism in Romania before the communist takeover and had lost their national importance immediately afterwards: the National Office for Tourism (Oficiul Naţional de Turism – ONT) and the Romanian Automobile Club (Automobil Clubul Român – ACR). The ONT was initially established in 1936, through the Law for the Organization of Tourism in Romania, while the ACR was established in 1904. 32
More importantly, the visa regime was amended on the occasion of International Tourist Year 1967 in order to promote communist Romania as an international tourist destination. Thus, Article 1 of Decision no. 801 of 10 April 1967 stated that the requirement of a tourist visa for admission to, and exit from, Romania was cancelled during International Tourist Year 1967 in the case of tourists who proved at the border that they had an arrangement with the ONT. 33 Simultaneously, the authorities permitted a growing number of Romanian citizens to travel abroad. People could take part in group trips organized by the ONT or had the opportunity to organize self-guided tours. 34 Those who possessed a private car were able to organize car trips to famous, and until then almost intangible, tourist destinations in Western Europe.
These actions were taken while Ceauşescu continued to struggle to consolidate his power and influence. While promoting a cautious distancing from Moscow, Ceauşescu followed the example of the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev in denouncing the abuses of his predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej, against Party members. Thus, after a period of ‘collective leadership’, that is, late March 1965 to early April 1968, Ceauşescu staged a Plenum of the Central Committee (CC) of the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist Român – PCR) on 22–25 April 1968 during which he successfully applied the Khrushchevite model. The agenda of the Plenum was structured on six points, the sixth of which, the rehabilitation of a number of PCR activists, proved to be a key one because it triggered the adoption of the ‘Resolution of the CC of the PCR Regarding the Rehabilitation of Certain Party Activists’. 35 The Resolution of April 1968 resulted in the ‘post-mortem political rehabilitation’ of a number of prominent communist militants including Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and Ştefan Foriş; the revoking of the Party sanctions issued against other high-ranking Party members; and the dismissal of Alexandru Drăghici – who had headed the Securitate and subsequently the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1952 up to 1965 – from the CC of the PCR. 36 Drăghici, a prominent nomenklatura member and a close collaborator of Gheorghiu-Dej, was one of the major targets of the April 1968 Plenum. The ousting of Drăghici was a harbinger of the reorganization of the Securitate. Thus, Ion Stănescu, a Party activist quite close to Ceauşescu, was appointed as its head (May 1968–April 1972). The reorganization of the Securitate also meant the promotion of officers with higher education, as well as the inclusion of an appreciable number of intellectuals among its informal collaborators. 37
The Plenum of April 1968 had a major impact on the Party and the Securitate, for it showed that the period of ‘collective leadership’ was over and that Ceauşescu had become the undisputed leader of the Party, whom the Securitate had to obey absolutely. The establishment of a journal, entitled Internal Bulletin for the State Security Organization, neatly illustrated the changes undergone by the communist secret police. The editors made this clear in the foreword to the first issue of the journal, which was classified ‘secret’ (strict secret) and circulated solely within the Securitate apparatus. 38 The new leadership of the Securitate was eager to prove its loyalty to the Party and its supreme leader. With regard to the to the thorny problem of international tourism, the Securitate had to find the most appropriate solutions to control Western citizens travelling to Romania and to prevent Romanian citizens who travelled to the West from remaining abroad. From the articles relating to international tourism published by the Securitate journal, two problems that can best be described as control and prevention stand out as particularly relevant.
The problem of controlling foreign tourists, especially those coming from Western countries, was analysed in the first issue of the Securitate journal. An article entitled ‘Selection of Inimical Elements Among Foreign Citizens’ warned of the considerable opportunities for foreign intelligence services to dispatch undercover agents to Romania due to the unprecedented opening of the country towards the West in the mid-1960s. The author provided information on the influx of Western travellers: from 590 in 1956, to 215,000 in 1966 – of whom around 200,000 were tourists, and up to some 281,000 in 1967 – of whom over 260,000 were tourists. 39 The article concentrated on the problems in terms of personnel and equipment posed by the large number of Western tourists coming to Romania and argued in favour of a thorough selection of potential ‘inimical elements’ (elemente duşmănoase). 40 The rapid pace of infrastructure development, especially on the Black Sea Coast, and the large number of domestic as well as foreign tourists that were taking seaside vacations presented new challenges for the Securitate apparatus. An interview published in the second issue of the journal tackled the specific problems involved in the surveillance of Western tourists coming to the Black Sea Coast. Among the major difficulties faced by the Securitate in that particular area, the article mentioned the following: the large number of tourists, both from Romania and abroad (some 160,000 in 1967); the need to master several foreign languages; the rather short periods of stay (12–18 days); and the increased opportunities for foreigners to interact with the locals. 41 The opening of the borders of communist Romania for foreign tourists forced the Securitate apparatus to adapt itself to the new context and become more flexible in order to be able to keep under surveillance the growing number of foreigners who could travel relatively freely throughout the country. Surveillance and control of foreign tourists coming to Romania remained important tasks of the communist secret police up to the collapse of the regime in December 1989.
The public denunciation by the supreme leader of the Romanian communists of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 brought him unprecedented popular support. At the time, many were convinced that this was just the beginning of a period of political liberalization, cultural openness and increased consumption. However, as the authorities would soon discover, alongside the wave of sympathy towards the PCR and its general secretary, a silent opposition to the regime existed as well. In spite of the apparent enthusiastic support for the policies of the PCR, an appreciable number of Romanian citizens were determined to flee the country and settle in the capitalist West.
The Securitate apparatus was concerned about the Romanian citizens who had decided not to return home after taking a trip to a capitalist country. Proof in this respect is Order 99 of 28 January 1969 issued by the Council for the State Security Organization.
42
Classified ‘top secret’ (strict secret de importanţă deosebită), this order set forth a series of measures to prevent Romanian citizens from remaining abroad. The preamble of Order 99/1969 reads as follows: Foreign intelligence agencies and certain hostile organizations in the West are intensifying their actions on Romanian citizens who travel abroad on official missions or for private purposes, attempting to determine them to remain abroad or attracting them to activities inimical to our state. The analysis of the cases of specialists who have recently remained abroad has led to the conclusion that many of these could have been prevented if efficient action had been taken in terms of a thorough vetting of the individuals in question.
43
Data collected by the ubiquitous Securitate concerning the number of Romanian citizens who had travelled abroad and refused to return stirred concern at the highest levels of the Party, and ultimately led to the calling of a meeting of the Secretariat of the CC of the PCR on 8 April 1969. Chaired by Ceauşescu himself, the meeting discussed a report prepared at the direct request of the Party leadership and accompanied by a table concerning the Romanian citizens who had left the country after receiving permission to take a trip abroad. The high-ranking officials present at the meeting concentrated on two major issues: (1) the causes of the phenomenon, and (2) the immediate measures to be taken to stop it. 45 When analysing the reasons why a growing number of Romanian citizens were deciding to flee to the West, the participants mentioned as the main causes: Western propaganda, purposive actions by ‘organized groups’ in the West aimed at recruiting specialists and skilled workforce from communist countries and a certain fascination with the capitalist way of life.
The participants also discussed a table relating to the contingent of people who had fled the country in 1968 and the first quarter of 1969, analysed according to: profession; age group; nationality; sex; marital status; purpose of travel; country of initial destination; and political membership. For the period under discussion, the situation regarding the Romanian citizens who had travelled to Western countries and refused to return was the following: in 1967, out of a total of 43,676 travelling to the West, 186 had not come back; in 1968, out of 65,067, 644 had not come back; in the first quarter of 1969, out of 8657, 239 had not come back. 46 One of the nomenklatura members present at the meeting considered that a particular cause for concern was the relatively high number of workers, technicians and engineers who had remained abroad. 47 Furthermore, the data collected indicated that the bulk of those who had fled the country were not individual tourists, but members of tour groups organized by the ONT. As one of the participants stated, in 1968 some 28,800 Romanian citizens had taken car trips to the West in small groups, usually composed of husband and wife, and only 100 had refused to return, while out of the approximately 4700 who had gone on an organized trip to the West, around 500 had remained abroad. It turned out, therefore, that trips involving large, heterogeneous groups organized by the ONT represented a major avenue for those intent on fleeing the country. 48
In general, Party members or married persons travelling alone could more easily obtain approval to travel to the West. However, as was emphasized during the same meeting of 8 April 1969, over 50 per cent of those who had fled were married and many of them had children. Furthermore, almost 50 per cent of those who had not returned were either members of the Party or members of the Union of Communist Youth (Uniunea Tineretului Comunist – UTC). 49 In terms of geographical distribution, the capital city Bucharest, Transylvania and the Banat were the main reservoirs of emigration. Out of the 644 who had fled in 1968, as many as 450 came from the following areas: Bucharest (256), Timiş county in the Banat (61), and three counties in Transylvania, namely Braşov (53), Bihor (41) and Cluj (39). As for the countries of initial destination, Austria and Turkey featured prominently: of the 644 who had left the country permanently in 1968, 205 had travelled to Austria and 209 to Turkey. 50
During the same meeting of 8 April 1969, the Secretariat of the CC of the PCR examined five proposals for measures intended to limit drastically the number of people planning to flee the country. All these measures were aimed at tightening the control of the Party and its main instrument of surveillance and repression, the Securitate, over individuals and groups that wished to take a trip abroad. The set of preventive measures envisaged the selection, vetting and political education of Romanian citizens applying for an exit visa to take a trip abroad, especially to capitalist countries. In addition, the authorities decided upon an intensification of political education and anti-Western propaganda actions at all levels with the contribution of the organizations of the Party, communist youth and trade unions. Another major objective was to keep foreign tourists who visited Romania under strict surveillance in order to counteract the actions of those who were attempting to recruit Romanian specialists and help them flee the country. As shown above, a particularly high number of Romanians had left the country via group trips organized by the ONT. Consequently, a first measure was to request that the ONT organize trips involving more homogenous groups, composed of people from the same enterprise, institution or industrial branch. The primary objective was to prevent individuals from leaving the group and asking for asylum. Therefore, a simple but effective measure was to organize groups made up of people who knew each other. In this way, the group leader could watch over the group and inform the tour guide in due time if somebody was missing. The Securitate apparatus had to carry out thorough checks on Romanians applying for an exit visa in order to travel abroad, especially to Western countries. Thus, the time span between the issue of the exit visa and the actual departure had to be of no less than 30 days in order to permit the vetting of individuals leaving the country. 51
As already mentioned, in the second half of the 1960s, ordinary Romanians were increasingly optimistic with regard to the prospects of further liberalization and openness towards the West. A large majority of the population was not aware of how limited the liberalization process they were witnessing actually was. The concluding remarks by the supreme leader of the Party concerning the issue of the Romanian citizens who had remained abroad were nevertheless telling as regards the limits of the process of ideological relaxation. Speaking of the need to limit the travel of Romanian citizens to the West, Ceauşescu stated bluntly: I am for a substantial reduction in the number of trips abroad to the West, even for activists … . I am asking for a reduction in the amount of hard currency allotted to tourism; this should be reduced to 25 per cent, because we cannot waste hard currency abroad … . We are short of hard currency and we have organized this kind of tourism in order to bring tourists and hard currency into the country, not in order to waste our hard currency abroad.
52
The speakers focused on prevention and control with regard to Romanian citizens travelling abroad, as well as on surveillance of foreign citizens coming to Romania. The high-ranking officials observed that the number of workers, technicians and highly trained personnel (engineers, architects, medical doctors, pharmacists) who had refused to return to Romania was still significant. As one of the participants stated: ‘Attention must be paid to the higher and medium qualified cadres: engineers, technicians, professors, medical doctors. We cannot close the borders, but more attention should be paid to the qualified cadres’. 55
The Secretariat of the CC was presented with a series of measures, which envisaged a continuation of the strategy devised in April 1969 and consisted of: (1) prevention through propaganda and political education; (2) thorough selection and vetting of exit visa applicants; (3) increased control of group trips organized by the ONT and restriction of travel to capitalist countries by means of strict limitation of the hard currency allocated for individual or group trips; and (4) the use of various channels, including diplomatic ones, to influence those Romanian citizens who had fled the country to return. At the same time, several high-ranking officials emphasized the need to put under surveillance foreign citizens coming to the country and suspected of influencing Romanian citizens to flee. 56 With regard to the phenomenon of Romanian citizens taking trips to capitalist countries and seeking asylum, general secretary Ceauşescu concluded: ‘This shows that the political education work is weak, that political education work is not being carried out to fight such a phenomenon, to view it as betrayal of one’s country. Refusals to return home have become something normal’. 57 Following Ceauşescu’s blunt statement, according to which those who attempted to flee the country were ‘traitors’, the Securitate was called upon to curtail the phenomenon.
In this respect, surveillance and control of foreign tourists coming to Romania remained fundamental tasks of the communist secret police and this was reflected in the articles published by the Securitate journal. The journal also addressed the problem of the Romanian citizens who intended to flee their country in an article entitled ‘Preventing Romanian Citizens from Remaining Abroad: An Important Mission for the Securitate Structures’. The article stressed the importance of preventive vetting, as called for by Order 99/1969. The author insisted on the need to identify preparatory actions by the individuals under suspicion, but at the same time warned against an indiscriminate refusal to grant exit visas to specialists who were supposed to travel abroad on official missions, which could affect the fulfilment of Plan tasks. The same article identified a series of preparatory actions which indicated that a person was intending to flee the country: preparation of legalized copies of personal documents; sale of houses or expensive objects; withdrawal of large amounts of cash from the Savings and Consignment Bank; or organization of farewell parties. 58
The Securitate claimed that the measures devised during 1969 proved satisfactory. Apparently, the increased control by the Securitate of tourist visa applicants contributed to a reduction in the number of Romanian citizens who remained abroad. This argument was developed in an article published in 1970 and entitled ‘A Qualitative Leap in the Resolution of Applications for Travel Abroad’. According to the author, the data collected for the first and second quarters of 1970 indicated that the number of Romanian citizens who had remained abroad was approximately seven times smaller as compared with the similar period of the previous year. 59 At the same time, the author pointed to a series of new situations to which the Securitate had to adapt. For instance, the increased control of the visa regime regarding citizens travelling abroad for private purposes was leading to an increase in the number of people attempting to cross the border illegally. Similarly, the number of citizens travelling to capitalist countries on official missions and refusing to return had increased as well. 60 Nevertheless, one can argue that the measures set out by the top secret Securitate Order 99 of January 1969 marked the beginning of a gradual closure of the borders of communist Romania to Romanian citizens wishing to travel to capitalist countries, combined with a clear tendency to keep large segments of the population under strict surveillance.
After his coming to power in March 1965, Ceauşescu made considerable efforts to consolidate his power and influence within the Party and to promote the image of a communist leader close to the people. The 1968 Soviet-led military intervention in Czechoslovakia and the suppression of the Prague Spring provided an unexpected support for the communist regime in Romania. Ceauşescu’s gesture of defiance of 21 August 1968, when he publicly condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia, combined with an improvement in the general conditions of life, permitted the Romanian communists to achieve a ‘limited legitimation through consent’. Moreover, during the period 1968–71 Ceauşescu consolidated his image of a ‘maverick’ among the Soviet bloc leaders and received official recognition from powerful leaders in the Western world.
The present article has concentrated on a particular aspect related to the permeability of the borders of communist Romania during the period 1967–9, that is, the increase in the number of Western citizens visiting Romania, as well as in the number of Romanian citizens travelling to the West. The celebration by the communist regime in Bucharest of the International Tourist Year 1967 marked the beginning of a short period of increased permeability of communist Romania’s borders. During this period, the communist authorities in Romania learned that a silent opposition to the regime existed as well. True, those who opposed the regime did not dare to express their discontent publicly. Instead, many of them decided for the ‘exit’ option, and thus a growing number of Romanian citizens travelling to the West remained abroad.
It is still generally believed that Ceauşescu decided to return to ideological orthodoxy and cultural autarky after his state visits to China and North Korea on 1–15 June 1971. Nevertheless, as one can grasp from the analysis of the top-secret Securitate Order 99 of January 1969, the Party was irritated by the increasing number of Romanians who were taking trips to capitalist countries and not coming back. Thus, in November 1969, well before his visits to China and North Korea, Ceauşescu stated bluntly that those who remained abroad were traitors to their country. Furthermore, Ceauşescu set forth his view on the role of international tourism, which the Party promoted in order to bring hard currency to the country and not to ‘waste hard currency abroad’. By focusing on an apparently minor event, namely the celebration of the International Tourist Year 1967 by the communist regime in Romania and the related measures aimed at putting the country on the map of international tourism, this article has emphasized the discrepancy between Ceauşescu’s foreign and domestic policy. The evidence that has come to light from the Securitate archives, incomplete as it is for the time being, contributes nevertheless to a better understanding of the ‘political mind’ of the Romanian communists during the power-consolidation phase of Ceauşescu’s rule.
Footnotes
1
With regard to Ceauşescu’s popularity over the period 1965–9, Shafir states: ‘Owing to positions adopted on occasions such as the May 1966 speech delivered on the occasion of the party’s anniversary, and the denunciation of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, as well as to the not yet fully transparent aspects of simulated change introduced between 1965 and 1969, his popularity seemed to be genuine’. M. Shafir, Romania. Politics, Economics and Society: Political Stagnation and Simulated Change (London 1985), 81.
2
Writing on the main features of Ceauşescu’s regime in the late 1980s, Gilberg observes: ‘The enormous (and growing) discrepancy between the expanding personality cult and the totally unsubstantiated claims to achievement, on the one hand, and the reality of decline and pauperization, on the other, has removed any vestige of political legitimacy that the regime may have had in earlier periods, such as the summer of 1968, when Ceauşescu’s angry defiance of the Warsaw Pact during the invasion of Czechoslovakia rallied the masses around him’. T. Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceauşescu’s Personal Dictatorship (Boulder, CO 1990), 57.
3
As Deletant notes: ‘After 1964, Romanians were marked by fear rather than terror of the Securitate, for the Ceauşescu regime, for all its appalling abuses of human dignity and disrespect for human rights, never repeated the tactics of mass arrests and wholesale deportations which were a feature of most of Dej’s rule’. D. Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965–1989 (London 1995), 1–2.
4
Tismăneanu underlines the change of Ceauşescu’s leadership style after 1968: ‘For Ceauşescu and his supporters, the Prague Spring’s failure served to justify the dogma of the indestructible unity of party, leader, and nation … In August 1969, Richard Nixon went to Bucharest, where an increasingly self-enamoured Ceauşescu triumphantly received him. Glossing over his growing dictatorial propensities, many Western analysts naïvely bought the myth of Ceauşescu as a maverick super-negotiator and the only trustworthy communist leader, which later helped him portray dissidents as traitors’. V. Tismăneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley, CA 2003), 203.
5
G. Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceauşescu’s Romania (Berkeley, CA 1998), 21–2.
6
Ibid., 22.
7
See Notes 39 and 46 below.
8
Hirschman analyses the three ways in which members of a given organization could respond to a perceived decline in the benefit of being members of that organization: exit (termination of membership), voice (expressing discontent) or loyalty (preservation of membership). Hirschman also examines the ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ options in the case of the citizens of former German Democratic Republic. See A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA 1970) and A.O. Hirschman, ‘Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History’, World Politics, 45, 2 (1993), 173–202.
9
Jowitt defines the two varieties of political culture as follows: ‘Regime political culture’ is ‘a set of informal adaptative (behavioural and attitudinal) postures that emerge in response to the institutional definition of social, economic, and political life’, while ‘community political culture’ is ‘a set of informal adaptative (behavioural and attitudinal) postures that emerge in response to the historical relationships between regime and community’. See K. Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley, CA 1992), 51–2 and 54–6.
10
Until March 2005, the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii – CNSAS) in Bucharest hosted only 9442 files. Over the period March–December 2005, a total number of 1,298,960 files were transferred to CNSAS and subsequently released for research. See the CNSAS Annual Report 2005. Available at: 
(accessed 12 May 2013).
11
See Declaraţie cu privire la poziţia Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele mişcării comuniste şi muncitoreşti internaţionale, adoptată de Plenara lărgită a CC al PMR din aprilie 1964 (Bucharest 1964), 55.
12
R. Rusan, Cronologia şi geografia represiunii comuniste din România: Recensământul populaţiei concentraţionare, 1945–1989 (Bucharest 2007), 35.
13
Recollections by individuals who after 1977 became dissidents or political opponents of Ceauşescu support such an assertion. The statements by writer Paul Goma, the initiator of the 1977 Goma movement and the most famous Romanian dissident, and journalist Neculai Constantin Munteanu, one of the most acerbic critics of Ceauşescu’s dictatorship as part of the Romanian desk of Radio Free Europe during the 1980s, are telling in this respect. See P. Goma, Amnezia la români (Bucharest 1992), 54 and N.C. Munteanu, Ultimii şapte ani de-acasă: Un ziarist în dosarele Securităţii (Bucharest 2007), 120.
14
As defined by D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London 1991), 117.
15
Over the period 1966–70 the regime devised large housing projects, such as the development of the Balta Albă-Titan district (initiated in 1966). Monumental public buildings, such as the Romanian Television building, Intercontinental Hotel and National Theatre were inaugurated in 1969, 1971 and 1973 respectively. A new airport, the Bucharest-Otopeni international airport, was opened officially in 1970. See C.C. Giurescu et al. (eds), Istoria României în date (Bucharest 1972), 442, 447 and C. Olteanu et al. (eds), Bucureşti: Omagiu Marelui Erou (Bucharest 1988), 159.
16
See Table 6.8, Urbanization in Romania, 1930–1985 and Table 6.15, Housing Construction in Romania, 1950–1985, in Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania, 124 and 132.
17
See Table SA8.7, Housing Turned over to Occupancy, 1965–1976, in A.C. Tsantis and R. Pepper (eds), Romania: The Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy Under Socialist Planning (Washington, DC 1979), 666–71.
18
See Table 12.12, Housing Put into Occupancy, by Number of Rooms and Sources of Funds, 1965–1975, in Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 298–9.
19
Regarding the terms and conditions of loans for the purchase of apartments built by the state see Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 291–2.
20
On the Sovietization of Romanian culture and the official attacks on ‘cosmopolitanism’ during the Gheorghiu-Dej period see V. Tismăneanu, Arheologia terorii (2nd edn, Bucharest 1996), 204–15. See also V. Tismăneanu and C. Vasile, Perfectul acrobat: Leonte Răutu, măştile răului (Bucharest 2008).
21
See Invitaţie la revelion: 1001 idei practice şi amuzante pentru revelion (Bucharest 1970) and S. Sburlan, Mâine avem invitaţi (Bucharest 1971).
22
M. Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven, CT 2005), 86.
23
Some clubs were particularly popular because they involved outdoor activities in natural settings. Among these may be mentioned Cercul radio (Radio amateurs’ club), which organized ‘fox hunting’ contests, and Cercul de orientare turistică (Orienteering club) (accessed 5 February 2012).
24
See for instance the tiny travel guide published in the early 1960s and dedicated to group trips organized to the fraternal countries in the Soviet bloc, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and the USSR, Cu ONT ‘Carpaţi’ peste hotare (Bucharest n.d.).
25
Almanah Scânteia 1967 (Bucharest), 257–68, 305–52 and 380–92.
26
C. Diac, ‘Expediţiile Cutezătorii’ in Jurnalul Naţional (25 July 2009). Available at: http://www.jurnalul.ro/jurnalul-national/expeditiile-cutezatorii-515705.htm (accessed 5 February 2012) and E. Mihalcea, ‘Expediţiile Cutezătorii, tabere la munte’ in Jurnalul Naţional (3 August 2009). Available at: (accessed 5 February 2012).
27
See the guidebooks published by the Meridiane Publishing House such as D. Berindei et al., Bucureşti: Ghid (Bucharest 1963), C. Ştefănescu, Staţiuni balneare şi climaterice din România: Ghid (Bucharest 1967), and A. Puiu and I. Istrate, 20 de zone turistice din România: Ghid (Bucharest 1969).
28
Production was inaugurated with the Dacia 1100 model, the Romanian version of the Renault 8. It continued from 1969 onwards with the Dacia 1300, the Romanian version of the Renault 12, and its subsequent variants. For more on the Piteşti enterprise in its early stages of development see C. Ştefănescu, C. Moroşan and I. Soare, Monografia Uzinei de Autoturisme Piteşti (Piteşti 1972).
29
The price of petrol was raised in 1973 because of the oil crisis. The price of premium petrol was raised from 2.50 lei/l to 4.50 lei/l while the price of regular petrol was raised from 1.75 lei/l to 4.30 lei/l. Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 345.
30
P. Cristea and A. Teodorescu, ‘Pentru automobilul dumneavoastră’, in Almanahul Turistic 1967, edited by the National Office for Tourism, 14–15.
31
Ibid., 1.
32
Decret nr. 32 din 27 ianuarie 1967 pentru înfiinţarea, organizarea şi funcţionarea Oficiului Naţional de Turism al Republicii Socialiste România, Buletinul Oficial, 11 (2 February 1967). Available at: http://www.lege-online.ro/lr-DECRET-32-1967-(21163).html (accessed 3 March 2012) and Hotărâre nr. 614 din 21 martie 1967 privind autorizarea înfiinţării asociaţiei ‘Automobil Clubul Român’, Buletinul Oficial, 27 (23 March 1967). Available at: (21208).html (accessed 3 March 2012).
33
34
For more on transnational tourism in Ceauşescu’s Romania see C. Petrescu, ‘Entrepreneurial Tourism in Romania: A System-Stabilizing Factor?’, in W. Borodziej, J. Kochanowski and J. von Puttkamer (eds), ‘Schleichwege': Inoffizielle Begegnungen sozialistischer Staatsbürger zwischen 1956 und 1989 (Cologne 2010), 115–33.
35
Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român din 22–25 aprilie 1968 (Bucharest 1968).
36
Hotărârea CC al PCR cu privire la reabilitarea unor activişti de partid. Ibid., 64–76.
37
E. Neagoe-Pleşa, ‘1968–Anul reformării agenturii Securităţii’, in Caietele CNSAS (Bucharest), 1, 1 (2008), 19–22. On the political biographies of Alexandru Drăghici and Ion Stănescu see F. Dobre et al. (eds), Membrii CC al PCR, 1945–1989 (Bucharest 2004), 231 and 545.
38
‘În sprijinul muncii de securitate’, Buletin intern pentru aparatul Securităţii Statului, 1, 1 (1968), 5–7. Hereafter quoted as Internal Bulletin for the State Security Organization; in 1969, the main title of the journal became Securitatea, while Internal Bulletin for the State Security Organization remained its alternate title. The entire collection of the journal became available for research after the transfer of the Securitate files to the CNSAS. See Note 10 above.
39
Lieutenant Colonel V. Drăgoi, ‘Selecţionarea elementelor duşmănoase din rândul cetăţenilor străini’, Internal Bulletin for the State Security Organization, 1, 1 (1968), 31.
40
Ibid., 32–4.
41
See, ‘Particularităţi ale urmăririi turiştilor străini suspecţi de spionaj, aflaţi pe litoral’, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Victor Burlacu, Internal Bulletin for the State Security Organization, 2, 2 (1968), 53–5.
42
Archive of the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (ACNSAS), Fond MAI, Direcţia Judiciară, Nr. inv. 3627, Vol. 5, ff. 76–82.
43
Ibid., f. 76.
44
Ibid., ff. 76–8, f. 81.
45
‘Stenograma şedinţei Secretariatului CC al PCR din ziua de 8 aprilie 1969’, in D. Dobre and D. Taloş (eds), Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora: Documente din fosta Arhivă a CC al PCR (Bucharest 2006), 165–98. The minutes of the meeting had two appendixes. Appendix 1: ‘Notă privind situaţia rămânerilor în străinătate a unor cetăţeni în cursul anului 1968 şi trimestrul I/1969’, jointly devised by the Section for Activity Control at the Ministry of Armed Forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Justice of the CC of the PCR and the Secretariat of the Commission for Passports and Visas of the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Council for the State Security; and Appendix 2: ‘Situaţie cu cetăţenii români rămaşi în străinătate în anul 1968 şi în primul trimestru al anului 1969’.
46
‘Notă privind situaţia rămânerilor în străinătate a unor cetăţeni în cursul anului 1968 şi trimestrul I/1969’, in Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 188.
47
Statement by Paul Niculescu-Mizil in ‘Stenograma şedinţei Secretariatului CC al PCR din ziua de 8 aprilie 1969’. Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 179.
48
Statement by Alexandru Sobaru. Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 174.
49
Statement by Cornel Onescu. Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 175. Out of a total of 644 Romanian citizens who refused to return in 1968, 183 were married without children, while 178 were married with children. In the first quarter of 1969, out of a total of 239 citizens who fled the country, 55 were married without children, while 62 were married with children. See ‘Situaţie cu cetăţenii români rămaşi în străinătate în anul 1968 şi în primul trimestru al anului 1969’. Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 196.
50
Ibid., 197–8.
51
Statement by Ion Stănescu and ‘Notă privind situaţia rămânerilor în străinătate a unor cetăţeni în cursul anului 1968 şi trimestrul I/1969’, in Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 178, 191.
52
‘Stenograma şedinţei Secretariatului CC al PCR din ziua de 8 aprilie 1969’. Ibid. 181.
53
‘Stenograma şedinţei Secretariatului CC al PCR din ziua de 11 noiembrie 1969’, in Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 199–269.
54
Appendix 2: ‘Situaţia persoanelor rămase în străinătate’ to ‘Stenograma şedinţei Secretariatului CC al PCR din ziua de 11 noiembrie 1969’. Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 213.
55
Statement by Gheorghe Stoica. Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 199.
56
Statements by Ion Stănescu, Cornel Onescu and Ion Iliescu. Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 201; 202–203; and 203–204. See also Appendix 1: ‘Informare privind rămânerea în străinătate a unor cetăţeni români în perioada 1 ianuarie–30 septembrie 1969’ to ‘Stenograma şedinţei Secretariatului CC al PCR din ziua de 11 noiembrie 1969’, in Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 211–2.
57
Statement by Nicolae Ceauşescu. Dobre and Taloş, Români în exil, emigraţie şi diaspora, 200.
58
Lieutenant Colonel Ion Nardin, ‘Prevenirea rămânerii în străinătate a unor cetăţeni români: Sarcină importantă a organelor de Securitate’, Internal Bulletin for the State Security Organization, 5, 1 (1969), 57–9. See also I. Nardin, ‘Identificarea şi urmărirea suspecţilor care călătoresc peste hotare’, Internal Bulletin for the State Security Organization, 7, 3 (1969), 16–17.
59
Colonel G. Pele, ‘Salt calitativ în rezolvarea cererilor pentru călătorii în străinătate’, Internal Bulletin for the State Security Organization, 10, 2 (1970), 46–7.
60
Ibid., 44, 47.