A Case of Diplomatic Symbiosis: France,Israel and the Former French Colonies in Africa,1958–62

One of the clearest indications of the closeness and trust that characterized Israeli–French relations during the first period of Charles de Gaulle’s leadership (1958–69) was Israel’s relationship with francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. ¹ Two prominent aspects characterized this relationship: First, Israel felt it necessary, almost without exception, that France consent – or at least not object – to activities initiated by Israel in the African states. In the event that France forbade Israel to undertake a certain initiative, Israel felt an obligation to accede to this desire, even if the French objection had no substantial basis and this was liable to damage ties with the African states themselves. Second, France demonstrated great patience with Israel’s attempts to penetrate its former colonies. On many occasions France in fact encouraged this and, in a number of cases, even initiated these ties itself. These two central characteristics of the French–Israeli relationship are closely connected to the central argument of this article: during the period in question, Israel and France maintained an almost symbiotic relationship: by pursuing its own self-interests, each side fulfilled a function vital for the other.

A number of studies have discussed the Israeli initiatives in Africa during the 1960s. However, none of them have focused on Israel’s relations with the former French colonies, whose number and influence on the continent made them especially attractive to Israel. At the same time, studies dealing with Israel–France relations during this period largely ignore the African issue, which in fact carried considerable weight, as will be demonstrated below. Therefore, this study offers a multidimensional contribution: It sheds light on a largely neglected aspect of Israel’s enterprise in Africa, highlights the French strategy to maintain its control over its former colonies in Africa, and ultimately reveals an additional sphere in which the informal alliance between Israel and France in the late 1950s and early 1960s played a significant role.

The first part of this article contextualizes the development of French–Israeli cooperation in West Africa. It surveys the sudden blossoming of a ‘special relationship' between Paris and Jerusalem in the wake of the Algerian rebellion. It then proceeds to analyze both Israeli and French interests in Africa, as well as their respective policies in the continent, and following this presents its main argument. The second part of the article explores the close cooperation between the two states in West Africa in the period 1958–62. Following a general survey, it focuses on two illustrative cases: Israeli supply of arms to Mali and the Nahal project in Ivory Coast.

Until 1955, there was no special relationship between Israel and France. In fact, their connection was quite uneasy. The outbreak of the Algerian rebellion in late 1954 brought about a dramatic change in French–Israeli relations, entangling the interests of the two countries. Their new alliance was based on shared opposition to the aid given to Algerian rebels by Nasser’s Egypt and the Egyptian President's commitment to the struggle against Israel. The clearest manifestation of French–Israeli cooperation occurred during the Suez War. ² The two-year period between the Suez War and the end of the Fourth Republic was a honeymoon for the fledgling friendship between the two countries. The last government of the Fourth Republic ‘spoiled' Israel in a manner extremely rare in international relations: The defense establishments of the two countries enjoyed an exceptionally close, almost intimate, relationship; France supplied Israel with large quantities of arms, some of them free of charge; France offered Israel almost unqualified support in the United Nations; ³ France helped Israel economically despite its own meager financial resources during that period; and, finally, France supplied Israel with a nuclear reactor and, even more astonishingly, a plutonium extraction plant which was clearly intended for military purposes and thus could have created problems for France. ⁴ The extent of this aid was of course tied to French strategic interests, although this was not the only motivating factor. French support of Israel was fuelled by a powerful ideological and emotional component, as was noted by key figures in the French establishment.

Charles de Gaulle's return to power in June 1958 did not change France's support of Israel, at least until the Evian accord ended the Algerian War in March 1962. During the late 1950s and early 1960s Israel received a flow of weapons similar in quality and quantity to those supplied by France in the period before de Gaulle’s election. ⁵ In 1962, for example, Israel purchased 72 Mirage III-C fighters, the most sophisticated aircraft that France was able to offer. In addition to the supply of weapons, the general staffs of the two countries continued to maintain a close relationship: Their intelligence branches held joint meetings every six months to exchange information, the venue of which alternated between Israel and France. France and Israel also developed a plan for French military intervention in the eventuality of an attack on Israel. ⁶ In a similar fashion nuclear cooperation continued for some years, although ostensibly the decision had been made to end co-operation in this regard. In fact, although de Gaulle claims in his memoirs that he decided to end the ‘excessively' special relationship with Israel upon returning to power, ⁷ this in fact had no practical implications in the years 1958–61 and in several areas also until 1963, leading one to suspect that this statement was a post-June 1967 construction on de Gaulle's part. ⁸ In terms of military and political aid to Israel, the de Gaulle era in general, and in particular during the period 1958–62, continued the policies of the Fourth Republic's ‘golden age.’

Israel's dependence upon that military support made it vulnerable vis-a-vis France. This gave France a degree of leverage over Israel's actions, at least in fields which Israel did not perceive as crucial. Therefore, France felt confident that the Israelis would not dare to harm French interests, making Israel an ideal candidate to replace the French presence in West Africa.

The end of the 1950s heralded a new period which was a revolution in international relations: Within a short time span, in a process that was largely completed within only a few years, Africa shook off the yoke of colonialism and the former colonies began, one after another, to declare independence. Already at an early stage in this process, the Israeli leadership made a strategic decision to invest efforts and allocate some of the country's meager resources in order to exploit this dramatic development to its benefit. The aid that Israel provided to the new African states assumed a number of forms: dispatching experts to assist in building infrastructure; improving agricultural methods or fulfilling necessary functions, such as providing medical treatment; inviting Africans to undergo various courses in Israel, training them to fill positions in their countries with greater effectiveness; ⁹ establishing joint Israeli–African companies or encouraging Israeli companies to implement contractor projects; ¹⁰ and assisting in the establishment of pre-military frameworks, such as Nahal and Gadna ¹¹ as well as training elite military units and pilots. ¹² By fostering friendship with the new states, through the provision of aid and gestures of goodwill, Israel hoped to obtain a number of advantages. First, the significant increase in the number of new countries joining the United Nations (UN) could help Israel break out of its chronic isolation within the organization. Second, by acquiring the new states’ friendship, Israel hoped to reduce the influence of the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, on the continent. Third, from an economic perspective, Israel hoped to secure a rich source of the raw materials necessary to develop its industry (rough diamonds, for example), in addition to a large new market for is finished products and even its agricultural crops. ¹³ Fourth, the aid appeared to satisfy various psychological needs of the decision-makers and Israeli general public: the need for acceptance by the international community, and especially Third World states; the idea of being a ‘light unto the nations' – the desire to display the moral standard embodied by the Jewish nation and the Zionist movement; and the wish to export to under-developed, impoverished Africa social and economic institutions invented in Israel (such as Nahal) and which the Israelis believed to be an effective tool with universal application. ¹⁴ The success of Israeli institutions, methods, and ideals in Africa would prove Israel's genius.

In sum, Israel did not lack reasons to court the new African states. ¹⁵ However, what assets did Israel possess that could help it succeed in this endeavor? Its resources were very limited compared to the help that the great powers – or even medium-size powers such as France, Germany and Italy – could offer. In everything pertaining to economic aid, Israel’s possibilities were very restricted and its assistance almost never included loans or capital investments. ¹⁶ However, Israel enjoyed a number of advantages over the wealthier Western countries. First, Israel had no colonialist tradition and no suspicions of ‘imperialism in new clothing' accompanied the aid it offered. ¹⁷ The importance that newly independent African states ascribed to this ideological factor cannot be ignored. French colonies, for example, on more than one occasion preferred Israeli offers of help to those from France, despite the inferior conditions which accompanied Israeli aid, as a result of their desire to demonstrate independence from and sever ties with the former imperialist power. Second, many African countries perceived Israel in a positive light, as a small country independent of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, one whose people had suffered hundreds of years of persecution as a result of racial discrimination, similarly to the Africans. They also admired the fact that Israel was a socialist state, without following the Bolshevik model, seeking themselves to adopt a similar method. ¹⁸ Third, Israel’s situation was far more relevant and applicable to the African reality than that of the developed countries of the West: Israel was a young state with its economy largely based on agriculture, yet it was making impressive progress in developing new methods and advanced technology. ¹⁹ Israel’s rapid growth, which began under difficult conditions, aroused hope among the African countries that they too would be able to accomplish such feats. Ultimately, Israeli aid was quick and dynamic. It was received within a short time of the request and lacked the bureaucratic red tape which generally accompanied requests for support. The Israeli delegations to Africa were recognized to be diligent, innovative and professional, and also demonstrated the ability to find original solutions to problems that arose in the field.

Despite the tendency in the memoirs of French decision-makers to explain French policy in Africa at this time as basically philanthropic in nature, ²⁰ the political motivation behind it is evidenced by a reading of the period’s documents. ²¹ France attached great importance to maintaining influence over its African colonies. In 1944, a conference on the future of French colonies in Africa convened in Brazzaville, Congo. Although sometimes described as a turning point in French colonial policy, the resolutions made at the Brazzaville conference were relatively conservative and excluded any possibility of giving the African territories even limited self government:

the objectives of the work of civilisation accomplished by France in the colonies exclude any idea of autonomy, any possibility of evolution outside the French imperial bloc; the constitution of ‘self-government' in the colonies, even in the distant future, is to be excluded. ²²

As in the past, assimilation remained the ultimate goal of France's imperial endeavor. ²³ However, in the late 1950s the political gap between the French colonies in Africa and the old metropolitan began to widen. The awakening of African national consciousness, the global spread of anti-colonialist norms and the weakening of France's control over her empire – as manifested in the collapse of French rule in Indochina and the rebellion in Algeria – made the maintenance of the status quo impossible. ²⁴ It became clear that some measure of autonomy must be granted to the African colonies. ²⁵ The result was the Loi-cadre of 1956, according to which local government councils elected by universal suffrage were instituted in the African territories, allowing them a certain level of autonomy while maintaining Paris' control over matters of ‘high policy' such as defense, foreign policy, and customs. The primary objective of the Loi-cadre was to ensure that Black Africa remained in the sphere of French influence.

When de Gaulle returned to power in June 1958, he too perceived the continuation of French domination in Black Africa as an important national interest: in fact, it became one of the pillars of his policy of grandeur. ²⁶ French presence in Africa not only offered France strategic and economic assets, but also provided it with political influence in a region that was swiftly becoming an important part of what came to be known as the ‘Third War.’ In becoming the champion of this new group of states, France sought to gain prestige and even political leverage vis-a-vis the two superpowers. De Gaulle hoped that this would compensate for France's military inferiority. ²⁷ Therefore, France's wish to retain its influence in Africa was clearly one of the country's major foreign policy aims.

However, de Gaulle wisely did not insist on the form that this interest should take, but rather used France’s flexibility in terms of framework to sustain the content, that is, French authority in the spheres deemed to be most significant for its interests. ²⁸ These were, first, maintaining French culture in the former colonies, such as the French language, literature and education system; maintaining French patronage, which would provide the country with political and military advantages in Africa and the global arena; and economic privileges, which would enable France to exploit the natural resources of the former colonies and establish markets therein for French products. ²⁹ In order to achieve these objectives in an era of increasing decolonialization, de Gaulle decided not to attempt to stand firm, but rather to take preemptive action and grant the colonies what they sought, as an apparent gesture of generosity. In so doing, the French president hoped to prevent unnecessary antagonism towards France: ³⁰ ‘The whole genius of this scheme was that it institutionalized an overwhelming unbalanced relationship under a label of mutually shared sovereign equality.' ³¹ In September 1958, just a few months after his second rise to power, de Gaulle declared a radical constitutional change in the structure of the French Empire. The empire was to be disbanded with a French Community taking its place, membership of which would be voluntary and determined by referenda held in the various colonies. Of course, a dominant position within this framework was reserved for France, despite the attempts to cast its role as that of an equal. This reform, perceived as far-reaching, afforded France substantial rewards: All of the colonies except one voted in favor of entering the community. The only state to vote against participation and in favor of complete independence, Guinea, was punished immediately with a dramatic and immediate severing of all French ties. De Gaulle later regretted this step, which apparently resulted not only from a desire to deter other colonies from similar behavior, but in which his personal resentment also played a role. ³² Guinea, finding itself in great distress, immediately turned to the Soviet Union and became a bitter opponent of French presence and influence in Africa. De Gaulle internalized this lesson well: An attempt to oppose and punish former colonies seeking greater independence would only undermine French influence further and was therefore unwise. This lesson influenced the French willingness to accept Israel’s involvement in its former colonies in Africa.

The French Community did not survive for long. Internal quarrels concerning its form, together with anti-colonialist dynamics, led the Community's members – some enthusiastically, others more reluctantly – to full independence. De Gaulle preferred not to oppose this and amended the Community’s constitution, in effect enabling independent states to remain part of it. Later, he agreed to disband the Community completely, satisfying himself with the cooperation agreements that France signed with each new state separately. These agreements guaranteed France’s interests in those states, among them: exclusivity of the French language in the local education system; France's exclusive right to supplying weapons, establishing the local African military echelons, ³³ and maintenance of French military bases at strategic locations; advantages in the commercial sphere; and exploitation of local natural resources. Of course, France paid heavily for these privileges. It provided substantial aid to these states in terms of capital, technical training, managing various governmental systems, providing teaching aids and teachers and commercial gestures. This created a system of clear patron-client relations.

The African states, despite the significant advantages offered by France, in addition often sought out supplementary help from other countries. Occasionally, this was due to the weakness of French aid in a certain sphere or the result of a desire to demonstrate independence from the former metropolitan. This placed France in a challenging situation. On the one hand, France sought to prevent foreign players from penetrating spheres reserved for it at any price, assuming that as soon as other players entered the arena the dam would burst and France would quickly lose the exclusivity it enjoyed. On the other hand, France was aware that any attempt to prevent this by fighting the local governments was liable to have an effect the exact opposite of the one France hoped to achieve. The solution to this problem lay in appealing to the powers providing the aid to refrain from undertaking aid initiatives in spheres that clashed with French interests and refusing aid requests by the African states in these fields. This was one of the main issues to arise repeatedly in discussions with the USA in the early 1960s. ³⁴ The Americans were generally prepared to accede to the French requests and refrain from aid initiatives for two reasons: First, the USA did not consider West Africa to be a region of central strategic importance; and second, the USA was already involved in allocating tremendous resources to various countries all around the world and thus were pleased to let someone else bear the burden in West Africa. ³⁵ However, as time passed and the former colonies progressed toward full independence, the USA found it increasingly difficult to refuse repeated requests from the African states for military, economic, and technical aid, fearing that they would instead approach the Soviet Union. ³⁶ The French dismissed this argument and stubbornly maintained a hostile attitude toward almost any kind of US aid. ³⁷

However, the French stance on the aid that Israel provided to its former colonies was completely different. Unlike the United States of America, the Soviet Union or China, Israel was not perceived as a threat to French influence in Africa. Hebrew did not threaten the hegemony of the French language as English did, for example. Moreover, from a certain perspective, Israel's help was even to be desired. If the new states in Africa were to receive assistance from countries other than France, Israel constituted a convenient default since, more than any other country, it could be expected to show sensitivity to the French interests there, to take care not to exceed the limits set by France, and to coordinate its plans with the French government. ³⁸ This cold, sober, and farsighted political logic was not always understood by the French civil and military officials in place, who often expressed anger over the competition from a party that owed so much to France. ³⁹ From Israel’s standpoint, providing aid to West Africa presented the country with a great opportunity, affording Israel a kind of exclusive role in supplementing French aid to its former colonies: France removed any possible competition and made Israeli assistance even more attractive to the Africans. In this manner France and Israel’s joint ventures in Africa during this period maintained a kind of symbiosis: While ensuring its own self-interest, each of the partners played a vital role in fulfilling the other’s objectives. The friction between the two governments which was evident at certain points should not be viewed as countering this fundamental trend.

In March 1958, Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir embarked on a visit to African countries, accompanied by Israel’s ambassador to Ghana, Ehud Avriel, who would become one of the architects of the Israeli aid enterprise in Africa. On her tour, the Foreign Minister also passed through two French colonies – Senegal and Ivory Coast – accompanied by Israel’s ambassador to France, Jacob Tsur. In the wake of the visit, Meir decided to establish a consulate general in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, which would constitute an Israeli legation in West Africa. To the surprise of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this initiative encountered opposition on the part of the Quai d’Orsay [French Foreign Ministry]. The latter was not at all disturbed by the possibility of Israeli action in the region, quite the contrary. However, Quai officials perceived in this a threat to French interests in Africa, since it would set a precedent according to which Arab states – following the renewal of relations with France – would demand similar rights. ⁴⁰ Syria, for example, had far more reason than Israel to request a representation in Senegal, on account of the number of Syrians living there. Yet, the Quai did not oppose the establishment of an Israeli commercial office in Dakar, which would also serve as a point of contact for the other African states in the region. ⁴¹ At around the same time, an additional dispute arose between the Quai d’Orsay and the Israel Foreign Ministry concerning the visit of a French–Sudanese delegation to Israel. In fact, Israel had coordinated the visit with the Ministry of Overseas France, but news of it had not reached the Quai, which saw fit to make a protest regarding the visit to the Israelis and demand that they be informed of any similar events in the future. ⁴² In this case, the Quai’s protest should be viewed against the backdrop of the struggle it was at the time waging against the Ministry of Overseas France (and later, the Ministry of Cooperation) regarding responsibility for handling the African states’ affairs. These two initial cases, which seem to indicate the Quai’s opposition to Israeli action in French Africa, actually demonstrate the precise opposite. The Quai’s reservations in both instances were unrelated to the actual Israeli involvement but rather concerned other problems stemming from it; it made this abundantly clear to the Israeli side. For its part, Israel was careful to coordinate its policy with France and to obtain prior consent for any move. Likewise, Israel tended to wait for African requests, taking little initiative of its own.

A similar pattern may be identified in the affair surrounding recognition of Guinea. As was mentioned above, Guinea was the only colony that voted not to join the French Community at the referendum held in September 1958, preferring full independence. Some days after the results were announced, the Guinean President Sekou Toure declared independence, sought recognition by the international community, and embarked upon attempts to establish diplomatic relations with various countries. Since Israel viewed Guinea as an important African state, the government was very interested in responding positively and establishing beneficial ties with it. However, the French – for the sake of the principle and perhaps also out of spite – vigorously opposed full recognition of Guinea before President Toure would negotiate with France an orderly transfer of sovereignty. Israel yielded to the French desire. The Israeli letter of response to Toure was worded in a friendly manner, but not in a way that could be interpreted as official recognition. ⁴³ Similarly, Israel delayed an unofficial visit by its representative to the Guinean capital, intended to forge preliminary ties with the government, until receiving French permission to go ahead. ⁴⁴ For its part, France attempted to take its allies’ interests into consideration and not to insist that Israel adopt a position that was too uncooperative and would be liable to harm its relations with the new state (meanwhile, many countries from the Eastern bloc and Third World were quick to satisfy Sekou Toure’s request in full). ⁴⁵ Israel received approval to grant Guinea official recognition, but not to send a diplomatic representation at this stage. In early December 1958, Meir contacted the French and raised with them the importance of dispatching an unofficial Israeli emissary to Conakry, the Guinean capital. East Germany and Czechoslovakia had already done so, the Foreign Minister argued, and Israel was liable to be left behind. Establishing good relations between Israel and Guinea would also be beneficial to France, she argued, ‘but we would be willing to leave out any subject that would not be acceptable to France.' ⁴⁶ The Quai gave its consent.

The Guinea affair was not the only instance during this period of Israel endangering its relations with an African state in order to placate France. In early 1959, the UN debated who would supervise the elections in French Cameroon before the country became independent. Israel hoped that it would be permitted to abstain in the vote and thus reduce criticism of Israel by the African states, particularly since the Israeli vote was not expected to alter the results. However, the Quai made it very clear that this would be unacceptable, precisely due to the moral standing that Israel enjoyed among African states. ⁴⁷ Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s decision was unequivocal: Israel should vote with France. ⁴⁸ In addition to its silent acquiescence to the Israeli enterprise in Africa, France occasionally even actively initiated steps in this direction. A scientific-technical seminar in Ivory Coast, intended to enable African leaders at the highest levels to meet with French statesmen and scientists, corporate executives, technicians, and others was planned for early February 1959. The conference organizer suggested that Israel send an unofficial representative to the conference, who would use the opportunity to forge ties with the new African leadership. In this respect Israel was truly privileged, since the conference was closed to any other foreign country. It was agreed that approval was needed from the Quai and the latter indeed gave its blessing. ⁴⁹

Further evidence is the general opinion voiced at the time in both French and Israeli circles that Israel would represent French interests in Ghana if the latter severed relations with France in the wake of nuclear tests in the Sahara. ⁵⁰ However, perhaps the most instructive confirmation is offered by a conversation between an official at the Israel embassy in Paris with his colleague, the representative of Mali (the union between French Sudan and Senegal that was established in the summer of 1960). When the Israeli official asked how the French regarded the arrival of Israeli experts in Mali, his interlocutor replied that, in fact, the moment that the French learned that they were Israelis ‘they immediately calmed down.' He added that Mali was fortunate that its ties with Israel enabled it, on the one hand, to advance toward independence, while on the other hand they did not irritate the French, since the latter preferred Israel to any other party. ⁵¹

Even after 1960, when the French Community disintegrated and its former members declared their desire to become fully independent, Israeli political leadership remained committed to coordinating its African policy covertly with the government in Paris. Ben-Gurion attributed the utmost importance to receiving France’s blessing for Israeli undertakings and he frequently raised this issue in conversations with the French. He hinted to the French ambassador to Israel that his country would be able to play a positive role in the relations that France sought to establish with its former colonies, since both Israel and the African states possessed a progressive orientation that did not identify with either Western capitalism or the Eastern revolutionary appetite. ⁵² It was no coincidence that Africa was the first subject that Ben-Gurion raised in his opening conversation with de Gaulle during his first visit to Paris in June 1960. The Israeli Prime Minister was determined to obtain the French head of state’s explicit consent to Israel’s activities in Africa. The arguments that Ben-Gurion presented in order to convince de Gaulle of the Israeli enterprise's importance reveal that the Israeli premier completely failed to understand the motives behind the French President's support of it. Ben-Gurion focused on the danger of the African states falling into the hands of the communist camp, emphasizing the positive role that Israel could play in preventing this eventuality. ⁵³ However, de Gaulle doubted the Soviet Union’s commitment to promoting world revolution and tended to view its penetration of Africa as a result of Russian national interests. No less concrete and dangerous to him was the danger of US penetration. For de Gaulle, Israel’s involvement in Africa was important because it filled a void that would otherwise present an opportunity to France's rivals. Therefore, de Gaulle acceded to his guest’s desire and noted at the end of the conversation that he understood Israel’s wish to forge ties with African states and its ability to fulfill a political and moral mission on that continent. Ben-Gurion received additional confirmation of France's positive stance toward Israeli activity in Africa from the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, in a conversation on 14 June 1960. ⁵⁴ Thus, Israel finally received approval from the highest level in Paris for its African endeavors. At the cabinet meeting in which Ben-Gurion reported on his visit to France, he highlighted the prevailing understanding between Israel and France regarding the African sphere, which was based on the two countries' common interest in Israel’s penetration of that continent. ⁵⁵

Since it relates to an issue most sensitive to the French – defense aid – the affair regarding the provision of weapons to Mali provides further solid evidence of the special regard for Israel among the highest echelons of government in Paris. ⁵⁶ As was mentioned above, the French maintained a monopoly on the supply of weapons to their former colonies, and jealously guarded their rights in that sphere. In January 1960, France and Mali signed an agreement for military cooperation, within the framework of which French would supply the country’s military needs. In June 1960, Mali declared independence, yet in August of the same year the union between French Sudan and Senegal collapsed, due to a struggle over political control. ⁵⁷ Mali viewed France as responsible for the breakdown of this union and began to distance itself from the former Imperial power, approaching external sources – mainly in the Eastern bloc – for assistance. In September 1960 it contacted Israel, with which it maintained close ties in the spheres of agricultural development and technical training, ⁵⁸ seeking to procure an impressive quantity of weapons: 3000 submachine guns, 500 machine guns, 5000 rifles, 8000 grenades, 20 jeeps, 20 trucks, 15 motorboats, and more. ⁵⁹

Israel contacted France in order to obtain its consent to this deal and in addition forwarded to Paris an intelligence report that it had received: If Israel would not supply these weapons, Mali intended to turn to the Czechs; in fact, contacts had already been established. Unsurprisingly, the French were not overly pleased with this idea, delaying their response and clarifying to the Israelis the fundamental problem they saw in the other country entering a sphere reserved for France. However, the fact that they did not reject the request outright and were willing to accept the argument that it was in France's interest that Israel, rather than another party, supply the weapons was fairly impressive. The delay in the French response worried Israel, which was under pressure by Mali for an answer. At the time, a Czech delegation was visiting Bamako, the Malian capital, and the Sudanese hinted that the first to respond positively would secure the deal. ⁶⁰ The French, however, were in no hurry and requested more information: Was this a grant or an economic transaction? If it was a transaction, what were its conditions? It angered the government in Paris that the considerable French economic aid to Mali was being used to purchase arms from another country when France could sell Mail weapons. ⁶¹

In early October the French government discussed the matter, deciding that ‘France understands the political aspect, and therefore Israel may act according to its considerations.' Jean Sauvagnargues, director of the Africa-Levant Department, sent the government’s decision to the Israeli ambassador, adding that the deal, should Israel decide to go ahead with it, would not cause a disagreement between Israel and France. ⁶² In effect, the French government gave its informal approval to the arms deal between Israel and Mali, an unprecedented move and one of great significance which indicates that the French political leadership, first and foremost de Gaulle, viewed Israel as a default for the presence of France itself – if a vacuum was being created, it was best that Israel fill it. ⁶³ It is interesting that a month after Israel supplied the weapons to Mali, the United States of America declared its intention to supply Mali with non-weapon military equipment: parachuting equipment, tents, mobile kitchens, etc. The opposition that France expressed to this greatly exceeded that which it had demonstrated vis-a-vis the Israeli aid, which was of a much more serious character. ⁶⁴

However, supplying arms, even by Israel, was perceived as too gross an act of trespassing on France’s ‘preserve' in Africa. In June 1961, Ben-Gurion made a second visit to Paris. In a conversation with de Gaulle, the Israeli Prime Minister again asked for de Gaulle’s blessing for the Israeli undertaking in Africa. De Gaulle responded positively to him, but noted that France preferred that Israel refrain from selling arms to Community states. He told the Israeli premier that he welcomed any Israeli endeavor in French Africa, on the condition that it would be limited to the economic and cultural spheres. ⁶⁵ This left Israel a wide berth for action.

In the summer of 1961 there was a significant increase in the Israeli presence in French Africa following the conclusion of three technical cooperation agreements – with Togo (July), Madagascar (August), and Dahomey (September). In 1962, this process was accelerated further and Israel signed similar agreements with Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic, Gabon, and Niger. In order not to harm the good will that France had demonstrated toward Israel on the African issue, Israeli decision-makers decided not to repeat the Mali precedent and refrained from competing with France in the military sphere, recognizing that this was a sensitive arena. However, the military sphere notwithstanding, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt free to develop the relations with the Community states according to its interests, even when they competed with those of France. It received the impression that the government in Paris welcomed Israeli activity and viewed it as an important service to France. Yet at the same time it was evident that this perception was not universal and therefore the Israelis did not seek approval for every action, rather providing the French with a general update, occasionally after the event. Israel was in particular determined not to involve the French officials in the African states themselves. The Israelis did not wish to be seen as cooperating with them as this would sabotage relations with the Africans. Since Israel enjoyed the support of the French political leadership, the Israelis felt themselves relatively safe from harm by French military and administrative personnel, whose approach vis-a-vis Israeli competition differed to that of Paris. The Israelis assumed that if matters came to a head, they could use the support Israel had received from the presidential palace, the Ministry of the Community, and the Quai to silence any outcry in the field. This approach proved to be overly optimistic, as becomes evident from a look at the case of the Nahal project in Ivory Coast.

In August 1961, the Ivory Coast Defense Minister visited Israel. He was very impressed with the Israeli Nahal method, within the framework of which part of soldiers' military service is spent in settlement enterprises, including working in agriculture. The Ivory Coast Defense Minister decided to adopt this model in his country; it would be run by Israeli experts who would lead the organization and training. Israel was interested in strengthening relations with Ivory Coast due to its senior standing within the Entente Group (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Niger) and the personal prestige enjoyed by its leader, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, in Africa. ⁶⁶ The two had already signed a trade agreement and various economic ventures were also under way. It seemed that the Nahal project would afford Israel great influence in Ivory Coast, since according to the plan the project would involve about half the country's military. The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not feel that this project constituted any sort of breach of its agreement not to interfere in the military sphere, which was reserved for the French. It was an agricultural project and had no connection to training military forces or the command cadre. However, the French military viewed the endeavor in a different light, having itself developed a program of agricultural service similar to the Nahal model, which it was interested in implementing. ⁶⁷ It should be noted that Ivory Coast was not the only country under discussion, but rather all of the Entente Group states were expected to adopt a similar military-agricultural project. If Israel won the prize of Ivory Coast, it would be well-positioned to manage the projects in the other Entente states as well and, quite naturally, also in additional Community states. For example, it was known that Israel was already engaged in advanced negotiations concerning a similar agreement with the Central African Republic. An additional reason for French opposition to the Israeli venture was the Israeli experts’ conditions of employment, which were extraordinary and for the most part covered by Ivory Coast's budget, which was supported by France. The French military personnel failed to understand why France needed to finance an expensive project for Ivory Coast that they could implement themselves. They were also concerned that other foreign advisers would seek to equalize their conditions to those of the Israelis, which would further burden the French treasury. The wrath of the French officers on the ground increased further when the Israeli officers who arrived in Ivory Coast were unwilling to update them regarding activities and plans for the future. ⁶⁸

In light of this situation, the French military decided to establish a delegation to develop an alternative to the Israeli plan and market it to the Entente Group states. This delegation, which began operating in January 1962, exerted heavy pressure on Houphouët-Boigny not to conclude the agreement with Israel which was to be signed a month later. Meanwhile, the Israeli embassy in Paris began receiving signs of dissatisfaction from the Quai and the Ministry of Cooperation, both of which had heard about the Israeli program from their people in Africa and complained about Israel's failure to keep them informed. However, they did not express any reservations regarding the Israeli program itself, but rather the opposite – in principle they expressed support for it. ⁶⁹ Walter Eytan, Israel's ambassador in Paris, who held a series of talks with the most senior political leadership – Minister of Cooperation Jean Foyer, the Secretary General of the State Presidency for African Affairs and de Gaulle’s confident, Jacques Foccart, ⁷⁰ and George Gorse, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs – heard similar things from all of them: There were no problems whatsoever between France and Israel concerning African affairs. Rather, France supported and welcomed the Israeli activity. Any grievance originated with officials on the ground who were jealous of Israel and concerned for their personal futures. ⁷¹ In light of the sweeping support that Israel received from the leadership in Paris, the Israeli Foreign Minister decided not to depart from the lines of activity that had been implemented thus far – in other words, on the one hand the Israelis must ensure that the project not go beyond civilian training and spill over into military spheres, while on the other hand they should not cooperate with the French officials and military personnel on the ground, so that the Africans would not become suspicious that the Israeli activity was coordinated by and planned with the French. ⁷²

Meanwhile, the French military delegation continued working apace in Ivory Coast, in order to convince the President that there was no need for Israel's services. In early March 1962, a compromise formula was raised and seriously considered, according to which the Ivory Coast army would undergo two periods of civilian service – one with French training and the other with Israeli training. However, there was no objective justification for this duplication and the idea was scrapped. At this point, the Ivory Coast government decided to choose the Israeli program, which received the full support of the Defense Minister and apparently of the President as well. The French military personnel in Ivory Coast refused to accept this defeat and fired off sharp protests to Paris. They argued that the Israeli program involved heavy expenses and did not fit with the agreements that France and Ivory Coast had previously signed. ⁷³ At the same time, the French ambassador in Abidjan contacted his Israeli counterpart and hinted that it would be to the benefit of all parties if now, after Israel had won the battle, it would agree to act generously and see fit to include the French military in the project. ⁷⁴ However, Israel’s local representatives and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem were not willing to share the fruits of victory. In the past, the French delegation, overly confident in its ability to influence the authorities in Ivory Coast, had attempted to cut Israel out of the project completely. Only now, following its failure, did it suddenly express readiness to cooperate. Similarly, so long as Israel received the support of the higher governing echelons in Paris, it had no special motivation to make concessions.

However, the Israeli Foreign Minister very quickly became aware that Israel too had made an overly confident assessment of the cards in its hand. Slowly, missives began arriving from the Quai and other ministries in the French administration demanding that Israel arrange matters with the French on the ground to both parties’ satisfaction. This change of policy by the bureaucrats in Paris was not motivated so much by the bitter letters sent by French colonels in Ivory Coast as it was the result of another affair that exploded at the same time. One of Israel’s leading export branches in the early 1960s was polished diamonds. In order to sustain it, Israel needed a regular supply of rough diamonds, for which there was great competition in the global market. In early 1962, an Israeli representative in the Central African Republic (CAR) succeeded in establishing a joint Israeli–CAR company that, in practice, enjoyed a near monopoly on the rights to produce rough diamonds in that country. The French, who learned of the agreement’s existence only after it was signed, were very angry. ⁷⁵ They saw the maneuvers of the Israeli company to win the tender as an improper exploitation of the freedom that France had granted Israel to act in the states of its Community. The Quai now demanded that Israel repair the distortion not only in the CAR but also in Ivory Coast and award the French military a portion of the Nahal project. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which suddenly faced an unexpected crisis, proposed sending Ehud Avriel, the former ambassador to Ghana who was then serving as the Deputy Director General of the Ministry, to settle the disagreements and coordinate policy in Africa between the two countries. However, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville refused the Israeli request. He notified the Israelis that they must first reach an arrangement with the French administration in Africa, and only afterward would a senior Israeli official be allowed to attend general talks in Paris. ⁷⁶

Ultimately, Israel was forced to concede. The Israeli emissaries in Ivory Coast met with their colleagues from the French military and the parties reached an agreement regarding the division of the civilian service ‘pie': the Israeli team would focus on field crops, vegetable garden industry, farm animals, and irrigation, while the French would assume responsibility for roads and bridges, orchards (cacao, coffee, coconut, rubber, pineapple, and so on), mining, and forestry. It was further agreed that the Israelis would assist in convincing the Ivory Coast Defense Minister to accept the joint agreement. ⁷⁷ Israel did not want active and open cooperation with the local French officials, but it was willing to restrain its activity and recognize the spheres reserved for the French; ⁷⁸ indeed, the agreement held despite the occasional friction between the two parties. ⁷⁹ In May 1962 an officers-instructors school officially opened in Ivory Coast and two agricultural schools were established. Later another three farms, intended for settling soldiers at the end of their service, were also established. Hundreds of instructors and thousands of students underwent training on those farms. ⁸⁰ The ties between Israel and Ivory Coast continued to grow stronger in the following years. By 1967 Israel had conducted more than 20 courses in various fields and opened five agricultural farms; 188 Israelis worked there on short and long term missions. ⁸¹

An examination of the Nahal affair in Ivory Coast and the Mali arms supply affair clearly shows that there was not always complete overlap between Israeli and French interests in Africa. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the two countries competed with each other over spheres of influence, economic advantages, and ties with the local governing authorities. At the same time these affairs illustrate, on one hand, the degree of good will that Israel enjoyed in Paris within the context of its enterprise in Africa, and on the other hand Jerusalem's decision, in principle, not to take any action that would arouse the ire of the French political leadership. It is hard to imagine the French government taking a similar position vis-a-vis Soviet or US interests in acquiring a position of influence among its former colonies similar to that of Israel. Therefore, the two affairs reflect – precisely because of and despite the interests which arose in connection with them – the basic understanding that existed between the two countries around their activity in Africa in that period.

An additional insight arising from this study regards the competition between Israelis and France's agents (the French administrative personnel in Africa) to conquer the hearts of the authorities in Paris. Unexpectedly, it was actually the Israelis that usually emerged victorious from this struggle. In most cases the Israelis succeeded in overcoming the obstacles that French officials and military personnel placed in their path by appealing to circles sympathetic to them in the French government. However, the French officials and military personnel in Africa retained effective leverage in Paris and occasionally the Israelis were forced to concede. The Israeli successes may be explained by the differences in perception between the French government in Paris and the French administration in Africa in everything pertaining to the Israeli aid. While Paris considered this aid to be in keeping with France's interests and therefore welcomed it, the field echelons viewed it as a threat to their position, and therefore fought against it. Since the deciding authority was the government in Paris, the Israelis were usually successful.

Finally, it is interesting to note the impact of French–Israeli cooperation in Africa in the period after June 1967. As mentioned above, this cooperation had flourished in a specific context: France's detachment from the Arab world, Soviet animosity toward France, and the country's close relations with Israel. By 1967 the international climate had changed dramatically. France had renewed its good relations with the Arab states, including Nasser's Egypt. France had also established very good relations, and even tried to reach a diplomatic entente, with the USSR. At the same time, French relations with Israel cooled considerably as a consequence of the Six Day War. France placed an embargo on arms sales to Israel and adopted a critical stance regarding occupied territories. At this point France paid the full price for cultivating relationships between her former African colonies and Israel, since its ability to use the former against Israel was significantly compromised. For example, during the Middle-Eastern crisis of May–June 1967, France failed to persuade Ivory Coast to oppose Israel on the issue of free maritime passage in Aqaba. ⁸² Another example is the Soviet consequential requests that France persuade its former African colonies to adopt a critical position toward Israel and vote with the USSR bloc in international organizations. In July 1967, top Soviet statesmen asked their French colleagues to pressure France's former colonies to vote for the Yugoslav proposal in the UN assembly. However the French were aware that due to Israel's great influence among those countries, the chances of influencing them were slim. ⁸³ In this way, France was forced to eat the bitter fruits of the goodwill it had shown toward Israel's activities in Africa.