Abstract
The seventieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War brought a new focus on the ways in which the year 1945 marked a watershed moment in European and global history. In this context, Michael Neiberg’s book Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe attempts to shed new light on the Potsdam Conference of July and August 1945 where the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were faced with the task of reconciling their differing interests after the victory over Nazi Germany. Neiberg, professor of History and Security Studies at the US Army War College, argues that the Big Three managed to solve the main problems that had plagued the interwar period, namely the future role of Germany, the ethnic makeup of Eastern Europe, and the borders of Poland. He thus praises the outcome of the conference as a success of major historical significance.
The author sets out to develop a new perspective on the deliberations by exploring three larger themes: Potsdam as an attempt at ending the era of total war instead of placing it in the context of the superpower confrontation; how the lessons of the 1919 Paris peace conference shaped all parties involved; and the ‘range of options open to so-called “great men”’ (p. xxi) assembled in Potsdam. The narrative begins in the spring of 1945, when the USA was in a much stronger position, particularly in economic terms, than in 1919. The Americans this time would not revert to isolation but were determined to use their power to guarantee a stable postwar order for Europe. Britain, on the other hand, was in dire financial need and anxious to deal with growing unrest in several parts of its empire. Both Western allies struggled to gain a clear understanding of the Soviet Union. Assessments in the West oscillated between those who saw Soviet policy in the tradition of czarist Russia and those who warned of Communist attempts at global domination.
Neiberg focuses not so much on the day-to-day deliberations but on a few major aspects that shaped the discussions. From the start it became clear that the Soviet Union was negotiating from a position of military strength, possessing the world’s largest army and de facto ruling half of the European continent. Moreover, Stalin was well aware that Truman was anxious to receive help in the ongoing war with Japan. As a result, the Western allies could merely stage a symbolic protest against the Soviet annexation of Eastern Poland. Britain’s position was further weakened when Churchill had to leave the conference to be replaced by new Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee after being soundly defeated in the July elections. Still, with some of the main issues such as the demilitarization and joint occupation of Germany as well as the punishment of war criminals at hand, consensus prevailed. In the highly contested issue of reparations, the Big Three reached a compromise allowing each victor to extract compensation from their own occupation zone. Finally, the conference only briefly touched on matters in Asia. While in Potsdam Truman did, however, authorize the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima that signaled the beginning of a new era in world history.
Neiberg provides a swift narrative and his beautifully written book is full of fascinating anecdotes. When he describes the lavish banquets at Potsdam, or the Soviet routine of presenting Stalin as the good cop to Molotov’s bad cop, the author succeeds at painting a vivid picture of the conference. Moreover, by focusing on the thoughts and worries of a few protagonists he manages to bring contemporary voices to the fore and create an impressive panorama of the immediate postwar period. However, a few reservations need to be mentioned. First, in several instances, the almost exclusive concentration on contemporary reflections results in an unnecessarily vague picture where a more systematic approach would have allowed for a clearer understanding of decisions and context – such is the case, for instance, of the reasons for Churchill’s loss to Attlee; similarly, presenting a broad spectrum of positions regarding the future of Germany’s military rather obscures the fact that the vast majority agreed on the need for complete demilitarization. Secondly, the book is really written from US and British perspectives, while Neiberg confines himself to regard the Soviet Union through the eyes of his Western protagonists almost entirely.
Finally, it is unclear how much the author succeeds at providing a new perspective on the Potsdam Conference. The claim that Potsdam ought to be seen in the context of the 1914–45 period instead of the Cold War era is mentioned throughout the book, but remains largely unsubstantiated. And the argument that all the protagonists at Potsdam had in mind the failures of the Versailles treaty is not entirely convincing. This rather narrow focus on the prism of the 1919 peace conference does not do justice to the much broader reflections on the reasons for the collapse of the interwar period that shaped postwar planning in the 1940s. Most prominent was the idea that the economic and social deprivation after the world economic crisis fueled the rise of radical regimes. It underlay UN initiatives to foster social, economic, and cultural cooperation as well as European relief and reconstruction efforts. Potsdam was certainly part of this general reconstitution of the international order. Neiberg demonstrates how the conference certainly deserves more attention in future studies that may explore more precisely its historical significance in this broader context.