Abstract
The Euromissile crisis was a permanent political crisis with changing levels of polarization, lasting (at least) from 1977 – the year of Helmut Schmidt’s IISS speech – to 1987, when the INF Treaty was concluded. This timely volume takes stock of the history of the Euromissile crisis, based on the results of a major international conference which was held in Rome in 2009. The book comprises a brief introduction and 19 chapters, all written by distinguished scholars, who provide state-of-the-art and archival-based insights into essential strands of this complicated and multi-faceted history: decision-making processes; the impact of individual protagonists, some of which were less-appreciated so far; and, the impact of non-state actors and ideas on societies and belief-systems. The volume offers a comprehensive account of the international history of the Euromissile crisis that highlights the dynamics and the intricacies of the crisis in great clarity. The chapters are coherently organized by the editors. The volume represents and is likely to remain the starting point for further research on the subject.
A great part of several chapters and thus of the entire volume illuminates the complicated genesis of NATO’s dual-track decision which has caught scholarly attention in recent years. I concentrate on two issues. One of the most striking findings in light of the new evidence, which was deliberately withheld or obscured vis-a-vis the broader public by politicians and officials during the 1970s and 1980s, was the growing importance of limited nuclear war-thinking under the conditions of MAD, both within the Soviet Union and NATO. In regards to the Soviet Union, David Holloway (p. 14) and Jonathan Haslam (pp. 37, 39) point to an influential strand of politico-military reasoning, according to which the threat of limited nuclear warfare, based on an extensively modernized IRBM-capability, was intended to undermine the credibility of US extended deterrence. Malcolm Byrne adds that the crisis accelerated centrifugal dynamics within the Warsaw Pact due to a rising fear of nuclear war (p. 111). Concerning NATO, it is clear that LRTNF-modernization would not have materialized without a strong European impetus within NATO. The rationale was to enhance the allegedly rather fragile credibility of US extended deterrence by modernizing NATO’s long-range, Europe-based nuclear forces in order to threaten to enforce – in Kristan Stoddart’s words – ‘war termination through selective nuclear use’ (p. 190). Thus, the volume sheds light on a major desideratum: to foster a deeper historical understanding of the impact of limited nuclear war thinking during the late Cold War.
A second set of findings concerns West Germany and, quite surprisingly, the German question. The volume strongly confirms the existing understanding that the crisis initially emanated from West German apprehensions. William Burr disentangles how West German officials attempted already until late 1976 to enforce their ambiguous and controversial interpretation of the Soviet sub-strategic modernization efforts as a looming destabilization of the nuclear balance, which SALT appeared to shield. According to Burr’s account, these officials were clearly disposed to react to this problem with arms control negotiations over ‘euro-strategic’ nuclear weapons and, independent of the latter, LRTNF-modernization. Kristina Spohr draws a different picture of German politico-military strategy, although she concentrates on the late 1970s. Helmut Schmidt, undoubtedly the key figure in Bonn, appears in Spohr’s narrative as the superior figure by international standards as regards the genesis of the dual-track decision (p. 154). In any case, the Chancellor prioritized arms control over modernization. Hence, Schmidt’s plea for the zero-option, that is, Western non-modernization in the sequel of arms control negotiations. Stoddart, in contrast, attributes a boosting effect to Schmidt’s IISS speech regarding the facilitation of a LRTNF-modernization package according to European preferences (p. 179). Thus, the historical understanding of West Germany’s position and of Schmidt’s view on LRTNF-modernization remain vague. Intriguingly, Bonn’s main European partners – except for the Dutch – apparently endorsed the view that a certain LRTNF-modernization was indispensable and that the zero-option was undesirable and perhaps dangerous. This also applied to the UK under Callaghan and Thatcher; Italy, as Leopoldo Nuti shows, had an initial interest in nuclear sharing of cruise missiles; Norway, a traditionally nuclear weapons-distanced ally, played an important role to ‘influence compromises’ (p. 225) within the NPG/HLG, as Helge Danielsen shows; finally, Frédéric Bozo depicts French Gaullist and Socialist leaders alike as sophisticated students of an imaginative Realpolitik. Both parties had very sensible sensors for the imperatives of national interests and the evolution of German affairs. Key figures in Paris felt since the late 1970s that the German question was fermenting. Under Giscard and Mitterrand, Paris was a stiff supporter of NATO-LRTNF-modernization ‘to prevent a German eastward drift and strengthen West Germany’s alignment with the West’ (p. 197). Therefore, even in the early stages of the Euromissile crisis, the German question was apparently looming in the background. The interrelation between the crisis and the German question will certainly be of major importance to further research, especially on how the crisis fizzled out in the late 1980s.