Racism Within the Axis: Sexual Intercourse and Marriage Plans Between Italians and Germans,1940–3

The Security Service of the SS noted critically on 22 January 1942 that due to the millions of ‘foreign-race labourers’, sexual intercourse with German women was steadily rising. ¹ Its disapproval was directed not only at Poles, Czechs and French, but also at Italians working in the Reich. One report from Halle stated that ‘the girls show little care for the fact that despite the political friendship with certain countries, such as with Italians, any form of intercourse … from a racial biological standpoint, must be refused.’ ² Women, who were confronted by the authorities about this, argued in vain that since the Italians were allies, private contact with them should be welcome. ³ The two regimes had declared the ‘Berlin–Rome Axis’ in 1936, signed the ‘Pact of Steel’ in 1939, and waged war together since 1940, but this did not alter the fact that the Italians did not fit into the National Socialist racial-political concept. The Germans regarded the ‘blood’ of their coalition partner as inferior; the ‘Axis’ was no more than a strategic alliance.

Although this point must clearly have put a strain on the stability of the coalition, the problem has received little attention in historical research. ⁴ Racism studies have instead tended to focus on the question of whether antisemitism was imported from Germany or had autochthonous origins in Italy ⁵ – an important concern, of course, in the search for differences and commonalities between Fascism and National Socialism or when seeking to establish a comprehensive definition of Fascism. ⁶ In an investigation of the internal functioning of the German–Italian coalition, however, the important question is to what degree the Axis Powers were divided by race ideology when it was directed not at a third party, but at the Italians and Germans themselves: How did the Germans communicate to their coalition partner that a ‘mixing of the races’ was not acceptable to them? How did the Italians react? What diplomatic complications arose and how were they resolved? These questions remained hypothetical until 1941, since women and men from the two regimes had little opportunity to meet. The question, however, gains relevance after the Economic Agreement of 26 February 1941 was signed. The agreement stipulated that in exchange for the delivery of raw materials, the Italians would provide 204,000 workers to be deployed in the German armaments industry. ⁷ The Italian workforce in the German Reich grew rapidly within just a few months, turning what had been a mere hypothetical concern into a real issue: What role did the National Socialist race ideology play when Germans and Italians met and took a liking to one another? To answer this question, the essay begins by presenting German concerns about the Italian race and ‘mixing’ with this race. It then focuses on the Fascist government’s perceptions and reactions after it became aware of this point in summer 1941. Within this context, the focus shifts to the general treatment of Italian workers as this appears to have a racial connotation. The final section addresses the diplomatic conflict, during which the Reich Foreign Ministry is confronted and had to take a position. ⁸

Indicators of an anti-Italian racism are found in the German Reich even before the arrival of Italian workers. The notion that the Italians were inferior to the Germans was, in fact, an old interpretive pattern that had been widely disseminated in German-speaking countries since the eighteenth century. ⁹ An enthusiasm for Italy, in particular for Italian art and culture, coexisted with a stereotype that characterized the Italian national character as ‘apathetic, lacking discipline, ignorant, immoral and dishonest’. ¹⁰ In the First World War, when the Italians left the Triple Alliance to join the Entente in spring 1915, many Germans felt that their negative view of Italy had been confirmed. ¹¹ The German memory of the Italian ‘betrayal’ was still vivid two decades later, and at the first signs of weakness, was quickly linked to the stereotype of Italian inferiority. A German journalist wrote in mid-November 1940 that in the war in Greece – that was devastating for the Italians ¹² – one recognizes ‘the correctness of the race theory’, since ‘the Greeks, too, are miserable’. Two German sergeants would have asserted order on the Balkans long ago. ¹³ In a border police report in February 1941, the Reich governor in Tyrol and Vorarlberg referred to the Italians as ‘biological opponents in the south’. ¹⁴ Within party circles it was said that the strong blood influence of the ‘descendents of the Roman slave army’ had manifested itself on the peninsula; its proximity to Africa was having an impact on southern Italy and the Romans, along with the Slavs, Celtics and Finnish-Hungarian peoples, should in any case be considered foreign to European blood. ¹⁵ At a meeting of SS officials to address the national-political situation in Luxembourg, it was concluded in August 1941 that ‘in regard to race’ the Italians differed the most from the other populations of Luxembourg – as compared to the French, Belgians and Poles. ¹⁶ Even Adolf Hitler, who was inclined to stand behind the Italians on internal governmental matters, stressed in May of the same year that it had come time to ‘push the Latin race, which is about to achieve a position of power to which it is not entitled, back into the position to which it is suited’. ¹⁷

These few quotes begin to convey the racial-political criteria that were increasingly influencing Germany’s assessment of its ally. A look at diplomatic intervention in response to German–Italian ‘mixed marriages’ in 1941 provides an even more concrete impression, as this question left little room for diplomatic ambiguity. A law that would generally ban marriages between German citizens and foreigners was in preparation before the war. According to notes from the Foreign Office, this measure was justified on the basis of ethnic-political concerns: Such a marriage would weaken ethnic strength, it argued, since through marriage to a foreigner, the wife would lose her German citizenship and cause the loss of German national heritage. ¹⁸ When the war began, Hitler ordered the draft law to be postponed until after its conclusion. ¹⁹ The reasons for this decision were essentially foreign-policy related, which means there were diplomatic concerns. The Reich Chancellery had already decided that measures should be taken to prevent Germans from ‘mixing’ with other peoples. Responsibility for this task was delegated to the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). ²⁰

In a letter to the Foreign Ministry on 14 June 1940, Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Security Police and the SD, presented the measures to be used to hinder undesired ‘mixing’. It is worth noting that Heydrich’s catalogue of measures was directed not only at Poles, Hungarians, Slovakians and Czechs, but also explicitly included the Italians. In his letter, the head of the RSHA begins by suggesting that the German people be better informed. Lectures and similar events should raise awareness in the ‘national comrades’ that ‘sexual intercourse between a German and a foreigner is incompatible with the honour of the German people’. The population should be made to understand that every citizen who violates this ‘honorary duty’ has automatically put a distance between himself and the national community and must expect to face state police coercive measures. ²¹ Furthermore, Heydrich continued, a notice should be read out loud to all foreign labourers – ‘Italians, Slovakians, Hungarians, etc.’, in their mother tongue – that they must confirm with their signature. It should require that foreigners ‘refrain from engaging in any intimate intercourse with Germans’ or else face state police coercive action. ²² This measure would be justified with the explanation that during times when German men were on the front, intimate intercourse between foreigners and German women would cause the population unnecessary aggravation and concern. The third planned measure entailed instructing secret police offices to take the German man or woman into protective custody in such cases and to deport the foreigner. ²³

Heydrich received a response from the Foreign Office the following week: it had no general reservations about the planned measures, but asked that the Italians be excluded from the second and third regulation. In other words, in cases involving Italians, only the preventive approach – admonishment and education of the German women – was to be pursued. ²⁴ This made sense since this measure could be most easily concealed from the Fascist government. Diplomacy took priority, which explains why the originally planned law was ultimately discarded.

The law was replaced by the circular decree of 22 May 1940, which stipulated that ‘marriages with foreigners’ were unwelcome. The supplementary decree of 30 June 1940 detailed how the provision was to be handled: authorities should first try to amicably deter the German citizen from going through with the plans to marry. It should then be examined ‘whether by setting especially severe requirements… a legal reason could be found to refuse allowing the marriage to take place’. ²⁵ Using a decree was a more diplomatic way of handling the issue since as an administrative provision it was circulated for internal operational use only, whereas a law would have been published. ²⁶ For foreign policy reasons, Heydrich also rejected using legal regulations to deal with the problem. In his view, addressing it through a decree had the advantage that ‘the undesired mixing of Germans with Italians, Slovakians, Czechs, etc., could be stopped without offending the home countries of these foreigners’. ²⁷ It was not until mid-1941 that the RSHA, which was of course much more rigorous than the Foreign Ministry in pursuing race questions, changed its mind and demanded that a law be passed.

The change had to do with the rise in the number of foreign labourers deployed in the German Reich. According to German data, a total of 939,386 foreigners were working in Germany in May 1939. As a consequence of increased recruitment of civilian labourers and forced recruitment of prisoners, this number rose to 3,506,000 by September 1941. In November 1942, more than 4,665,000 foreign labourers were working in Germany. ²⁸ In late 1941, 271,000 of these ‘foreign labourers” came from Italy. ²⁹ The Economic Agreement of February 1941 caused the percentage of Italians to rise dramatically from March to September 1941. ³⁰

As the number of foreign workers grew, the question of ‘mixed marriages’ became more acute. On May 22, 1940, the Foreign Ministry had informed all consulates abroad that marriages between Germans and foreigners were generally to be considered unwelcome. German women in particular should be informed that were the marriage to end through divorce or the man’s death, they should not expect to be naturalized in Germany again. In response to inquiries, German embassies and consulates abroad were to discourage marriage plans ‘using reasons derived from each respective individual situation’. ³¹ This decree regulation soon proved inadequate. As early as May 1941, Consul Hübner from Venice reported that the educational work being done there was utterly ineffective. The German women and girls who were summoned to a meeting to discuss their marriage plans were consistently and urgently advised against ‘acting prematurely’, but this proved unsuccessful. Hübner suggested handing this problem over to the German women’s associations (‘NS-Frauenschaft’). They could ‘organize training and educational meetings in cities, towns and countryside … and provide information about the Italians’ conduct wherever they may be in Germany’. ³² The German consulate general of Trieste confirmed the report a few weeks later, but warned against keeping German women solely away from the Italians. For political reasons, a general version was recommended that advised against ‘marital connections and other involvement with foreigners of every nationality’. ³³ The report states that the success of the decree of 22 May 1940 depended entirely on the work of the interior agencies since in issuing marriage approval certificates ³⁴ and approving foreign travel, they had many more opportunities to obstruct marriage plans. ³⁵

In July 1941, the RSHA reintroduced the idea of a legal regulation. In a letter to the Foreign Ministry, Heinrich Himmler wrote that neither training nor education nor laws would be able to completely banish the ‘danger of infiltration’ posed by ‘ethnically alien’ labourers. Nevertheless, he believed that a legal basis was absolutely necessary to at least reduce the ‘damage’ to a minimum. According to the Reichsführer-SS, this legal regulation should not only prevent marriages with partners of the German nation, but also forbid foreign labourers from purchasing or leasing property, becoming members of German organizations, and resettling families in the Reich. ³⁶ Although Himmler appears to have underestimated the contentiousness of the issue on a foreign policy level, he was aware that the Italians required special consideration. Thus he suggested that the Foreign Ministry create a workable basis through intergovernmental agreements with Italy and Japan. In his opinion, a general statement stressing the respective ‘national heritage of the contracting partner as a historically-evolved entity’ whose special characteristics need to be respected would suffice in settling the matter. ³⁷

The Racial Policy Office of the NSDAP had picked up the initiative around the same time and suggested to Ambassador Dino Alfieri that a ban on German-Italian marriages be introduced for reasons of racial purity. Walter Gross, head of the office, had informed Martin Bormann, head of the Reich Chancellery, and Alfred Rosenberg, head ideologue of the NSDAP, of this move in advance – but the Foreign Ministry had evidently not been notified. Gross stressed the purely private and exploratory nature of the conversation and according to Alfieri approached the subject tactfully, but without mincing words: on 25 July 1941, he told the Italian ambassador that the presence of Italian workers in Germany and German troops in Italy was increasing ‘the risk of a true epidemic of mixed marriages’. ³⁸ That Europe would be unified in the future did not mean that the races should be allowed to mix. It was important that each nation’s individual characteristics be preserved, particularly the leading ones, the Italians and Germans. Thus Walter Gross asked whether it wouldn’t make sense for the Axis partners to pass a joint statement. ³⁹ The initiative generally corresponded precisely with the plans of the RSHA, which was still waiting to hear the opinion of the Foreign Ministry.

The Italian ambassador, who had not been prepared for this request, admitted to Gross that the Italian race should indeed be kept pure, but added that a ban on marriage between the nation members of the axis powers would be difficult to explain to the Italian people. He then ended the conversation abruptly on the pretence that an unexpected obligation had arisen.

Afterwards Alfieri informed his minister that Berlin wanted to hinder mixed marriages ‘at all costs’ and that it planned to use every imaginable obstacle to block marriage requests. A radical solution to the problem had been prevented until now only because the Nazi leadership could not gauge the reaction of the German population and the Italian government. ⁴⁰ The initiative of the Racial Policy Office revealed clearly and irrevocably to the Italians that they did not fit into the German race model. Although the point was clouded by the reminder that the Italians too must be interested in protecting the purity of their people, the importance that the National Socialist government placed on the so-called ‘race difference’ was quite evident. The Fascist government understood only too well the meaning of a ban that excluded a race from ‘mixed marriages’. It had, after all, its own provisions and laws in place in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia to prohibit sexual contact between whites and blacks. ⁴¹ Since April 1937, an Italian who lived in a marriage-like relationship ⁴² with an African woman could face a prison sentence of up to five years. ⁴³ Segregationist provisions like this were aimed at preserving the ‘racial standing’ of the Italians in Italian East Africa. ⁴⁴ Accompanied by an extensive press campaign, ⁴⁵ Mussolini had expressed himself unequivocally on this issue:

History teaches us that empires are conquered with weapons but sustained with prestige. To have prestige, it is necessary to have an equally clear and strict race consciousness, which not only draws borders but justifies a clear sense of superiority. ⁴⁶

Italians were to be bred with a race consciousness; the plan included an ‘anthropological revolution’, which meant the creation of a new Fascist Italian ⁴⁷ – and not only in Africa: In the mother country of Italy, the race law of 17 November 1938 forbade ‘mixed marriages’ with Jews and nullified all pre-existing marriages. ⁴⁸ In regard to relations with the German race, however, Italian race theorists held divergent views in the early 1940s. One important figure, Giacomo Acerbo, argued for preserving the differences between the nations because each has advanced the world in its own way. Giovanni Marro, in turn, recommended a ‘mixing’ with the German race because contact with a race that is very different has an advantageous influence on the development of one’s own. The German-friendly group led by Telesio Interlandi and Giovanni Preziosi claimed that the Italian race contains Aryan elements that should be strengthened; ⁴⁹ a similar argument was made by Julius Evola. ⁵⁰ The Fascist government did not hold a clear view on this matter.

The fact that the Germans were flirting with the idea of imposing discriminatory measures on the Italians in autumn 1941 naturally prompted concern in Rome. It was clear that the German initiative had touched a sore spot in the Fascist government, especially given that just a few weeks earlier Mussolini had complained to the council of ministers that the Germans viewed the Italians as nothing more than a labour force while regarding their own people as soldiers who knew how to fight. The Italian people, in contrast, were only suited to work. ‘A master race vs. a slave people!’ was how Mussolini summed up his view according to Bottai. ⁵¹ And as if this needed confirming, just two weeks later, on 21 June, Hitler rejected the participation of the Italian army corps designated by Mussolini for the Russian campaign. In Hitler’s opinion, it made more sense for the Italians to support the military forces in North Africa. For Mussolini, this apparent strategic consideration was proof that the Italian soldiers were not welcome on the eastern front. ⁵²

The German population was less understanding of the fact that the Italians were being used increasingly for labour. How could it be that the Italians, young and fit for war, some even with military training, were being sent to the Reich to work while German soldiers were losing their lives in North Africa, which had originally been the Italian front? ⁵³ In their reports various heads of Nazi districts (Gauleiter) noted a growing resentment in the population; in some cases Italian workers were even accosted with cries telling them to pack off to the front. Martin Bormann thus felt compelled to send a request to all the Reich, district and organization leaders on 11 July 1941, asking them to explain the situation to the people based on the following argumentation: First, Italy has almost twice as many trained soldiers as she is able to arm; second, the majority of the Italian army currently lies idle because Italy has only one theatre of war – North Africa – and transportation conditions have placed limitations on troop operations; third, also for reasons of transport, Italy is unable to send any troops to the eastern front because the railroad lines are at full capacity; fourth, the German government is presently grateful for every worker it has since the Reich is suffering a tremendous labour shortage at present. Bormann ended his circular by noting that it is the responsibility of the political leaders to ensure that ‘unwarranted criticism against the Italians’ cease in the future. ⁵⁴

Bormann’s circular, however, was unable to prevent the worker issue from escalating into a political issue in 1941. One reason for this was that Italian work productivity – as perceived by the Germans – was lower than that of other foreigners working in the Reich. According to the Security Police of the Reichsführer SS, there were racial reasons for this: Whereas the poor work morale of the Germanic nations – the Dutch, Danes, Norwegians and Flemish – arose from political animosity, ‘ethnically alien’ workers – such as the Italians – had it in their blood. ⁵⁵ In light of this and given the fact that the Italian workers often demanded preferential treatment, dealings with the Italians continued to deteriorate. After the Italian diplomats took an interest in the matter in June 1941, ⁵⁶ the German ambassador noted the following September that the matter was putting a ‘sensitive strain’ on German–Italian relations. News of the harsh comments provoked by the presence of Italian workers had even reached the Duce’s own desk. ⁵⁷ Reports were accumulating in Italy about the poor treatment of its workers in Germany. In early June the industrialist Alberto Pirelli was told that some Italians in Siemensstadt in Berlin were being treated worse than the French labourers, that housing and food left much to be desired, and that there were not enough toilets, lights, telephones or wash facilities. ⁵⁸ The Italian workers, who had been promised blissful conditions by the German consuls, were flabbergasted by their accommodations. ⁵⁹ The Munich consul also reported that German women had apparently been advised to keep their distance from Italians. ⁶⁰ In August 1941, workers began to engage in protests and strikes in German factories. In the Linz work camp, tumults and serious riots had broken out in reaction to the insufficient food provisions; in the Heinkel Works in Rostock and Arado Aircraft Works in Brandenburg, workers stopped working for the same reason. The Italian workers also protested against a measure to introduce a badge that would identify them as Italian. They were told that all foreigners in the German factories had to wear a similar identifying marker, ⁶¹ but being placed on the same level as all the other ‘foreign workers’ displeased the Italians. In autumn, several reports, of which the Goldbeck debate and Cecchi report are the most notable, led to a diplomatic scandal.

The Duce was said to be ‘pained’ by a circular attributed to Goldbeck, the district head (Kreisleiter) of Recklinghausen. In the report, which was sent to the German Embassy on September 5, Goldbeck expressed his views on the issue of ‘mixed marriage’:

Mixing is not at all desirable but having the blood of a German girl mixed with a related-blood foreigner, such as workers from the occupied territories (Norwegians, Danes, etc.,) or even with hostile peoples (Englishmen) is preferable to a mix with the foreign blood of non-natives (which includes Italians). ⁶²

According to Italian information, relations between German women and Italian workers were subject to severe punishment. In Recklinghausen a woman had had her head shaved and her face smeared with asphalt. ⁶³ The Italian consulate general in Dresden added to this report, noting that several workers seen in the company of German women were promptly arrested by the local police. The women received a severe reprimand and were told that they were not to be seen again with the Italians. ⁶⁴

Around the same time, a report from the Italian trade union liaison, a man named Cecchi, ⁶⁵ caused a stir in Rome. In a letter of 17 September, he reported to the agency in charge of dispatching workers that abuses were taking place in the German Reich: workers were not only being beaten in the camps, they were also threatened by watchdogs that were ordered to attack at the most minor offence. Men who tried to strike, who remained idle or who simply wanted to return home were sent to concentration camps or prison camps without a trial and without notification of the Italian authorities. According to Italian information, the convicted inmates could serve up to 45 days in the Hallendorf camp. After they were photographed and medically examined, they were given a number, clothed in convict uniforms and made to perform forced labour for 16 hours. According to Cecchi, they were hit with a club or beaten whenever they stopped working. ⁶⁶

When the Germans tried to play down these reports as isolated incidents, the Italian diplomats became indignant. It was a matter of principle, Alfieri said, rebuking the German foreign minister and insisting that it was simply not right that Italian workers were being sent to German re-education camps. At this point Ribbentrop became conciliatory, offering to conduct a joint investigation of the cases in question. The minister explained that in regard to the incidents, in which German women were prohibited from associating with Italians, the measures had come from overzealous party comrades who, as ‘500 percent National Socialists’ were not even appreciated by the Führer. ⁶⁷ But that did not take care of the matter for good however. In early October, additional complaints from Italian workers led the ambassador to consider pulling all the workers out of Germany. State Secretary Weizsäcker had no other option but to warn Alfieri of the political significance of taking such a move: he reminded him that foreign propaganda would delight in exploiting such an extreme measure as the return transport of a few hundred thousand workers. ⁶⁸

Over the following weeks, the Foreign Office worked very hard to disprove or at least minimize the impact of both the Goldbeck case and the Cecchi report. On 11 October 1941, Weizsäcker openly admitted to the existence of labour education camps (AEL). ⁶⁹ He explained that the conditions of war had made these camps necessary in order to teach workers ‘disciplined conduct and proper work performance’ and to guarantee the maintenance and increase of production essential to the war effort. The state secretary told Alfieri that people were admitted to such a camp solely for disciplinary purposes. It was not a penal measure and not officially registered. Thus if the consulate authority had not been informed of such transfers, it was because the ‘arrest’ in the legal sense had never actually occurred. ⁷⁰ Furthermore, these measures applied to all workers within the Reich territory, both German and foreign, and were thus in accordance with Article 2 of the German-Italian agreement of 10 July 1940. This clause stipulated that employment of Italian workers was subject to German law. Weizsäcker also presented the investigations of the Hallendorf (Watenstedt) and Wuhlheide camps showing that many points in the Cecchi report had been greatly overstated. ⁷¹

To avoid further conflict, Hitler eventually issued the order that Italian workers in Germany were no longer to be punished or sent to an AEL. If difficulties arose, these men were instead to be deported back to Italy. ⁷² All imprisoned Italians were released from the camps on 4 November 1941. ⁷³ Heydrich followed up on this measure on November 19 with official instructions to all police and SD offices regarding the new regulations on how to deal with Italian workers. ⁷⁴

At the same time that these changes were taking place, the Foreign Ministry was also examining the Goldbeck case. The investigation found that the purported circular had originated from a conversation with Italian representatives and that the protocol of that conversation had been signed by the district leader. Goldbeck admitted having said that intercourse with foreign nationals in Germany was unwelcome on the basis of National Socialist principles. But he expressly denied having mentioned the Italians. Moreover, the punishments carried out in Recklinghausen had been justified because the women in question had committed adultery. ⁷⁵ He thus denied any racial-political motivation.

The Fascist government received the interrogation protocol, but Ribbentrop made a point of stating that Goldbeck’s memo had been provoked in a very peculiar, misleading way by the Italian representatives and that Goldbeck, as a low-level party official, was not even authorized to provide official statements on the race question. ⁷⁶

If the Italian authorities had chosen to view the German investigation critically, they would have found sufficient grounds for protest, but instead they accepted it in mid-October. By this point, they too had evidently begun to regard the Cecchi report and other complaints as an exaggeration. ⁷⁷ Italian representatives who had been invited to check the camp sites personally had confirmed that the conditions in the AEL were indeed severe – the inmates had to wear a uniform, were required to perform 10–12 hours of hard physical labour, could be committed for up to 56 days, in some cases with a prison sentence (some workers were even shackled in the Wuhlheide camp because there were not enough cells). ⁷⁸ But from a legal standpoint they found no grounds to question the Germans’ action. Moreover, they added, the workers were indeed partially to blame for the mistakes. Alfieri pointed out that the recruitment of workers had been carried out too hastily; that a careful selection had not taken place. In some places, Italian factories had even used the opportunity to rid themselves of disagreeable ‘elements’. ⁷⁹

The Italians were uncertain now and began their retreat. Italian diplomats started playing down the issue in response to the Germans’ frequent allusions to the unpleasant repercussions that the incident was having on German–Italian relations. It was soon claimed that most workers actually felt comfortable in Germany. ⁸⁰ Foreign Minister Ciano stressed that conclusions about the general mood of the labour force should not be drawn on the basis of individual complaints and that certain difficulties had been dramatized unnecessarily. ⁸¹ Alfieri instructed the consulate representative to be sure not to let the worker issue grow into widespread political disgruntlement. The ambassador told Weizsäcker that these kinds of secondary issues should not be allowed to interfere in political relations in the future. The Duce was also not to be further bothered by them. ⁸² The Cecchi report was not mentioned again.

Ribbentrop used the momentum gained by the Italians’ insecurity and wrote a letter in which he shifted all responsibility to the Italian workers. Listing various incidents, he traced the difficulties of each case back to the illegal conduct of a few Italians. He conceded that, naturally, problems existed in regard to the German preparation of food and the poor living conditions, but the basic tenor of the letter was that the Italian workers had strongly contributed to the conflict by engaging in theft and selling stolen goods. If the atmosphere among the Italian workers was not good, he stated, in no way was this the fault of the Germans. ⁸³

The fight over the Cecchi report and Goldbeck memo had a direct impact on the issue of German–Italian ‘mixed marriages’ that had been reintroduced by the RSHA and the Racial Policy Office in July. It was impossible for the Foreign Office to endorse the law initiated by the SS now that the foreign propaganda had made such a big deal over the problems concerning Italian workers. ⁸⁴ Moreover, the first objections were being articulated in Italy. Ambassador Alfieri warned in late October that this issue should not leave the impression that ‘legislation and administrative conduct’ were incompatible with ‘the principles of the Axis friendship’. ⁸⁵ Although articulated in a convoluted way, it was the first sign that the Italian government was having reservations. The Italian Embassy expressed itself more clearly 14 days later. In response to a request from Weizsäcker, Minister Cosmelli submitted a memo on ‘mixed marriage’ on 12 November 1941, in which the Italians took a clear position:

‘Knowledge of the existence of a ban in Germany on mixed marriages with members of certain races and peoples, such as Jews and Poles, has caused general unease in Italy regarding the ban on German-Italian mixed marriages that can no longer be denied or ignored. It would seem wise to provide total clarity on this issue as soon as possible.’ ⁸⁶

It noted further that the Italian government had examined the issue carefully and come to the conclusion that a limited number of marriages between persons belonging to nations with the same Aryan racial core poses ‘neither a danger of degeneracy nor an impoverishment’ and is therefore not in conflict with the race policies of the German and Italian governments. ⁸⁷

The Italians could not have stated their position more clearly and thus a written agreement with the Fascist government became increasingly unlikely. The staff of the Foreign Office recognized that the Reich foreign minister would now have to make an official statement stressing that it had never been the intention to discriminate against the Italian people. ⁸⁸ But Ribbentrop was still of the view that these kinds of ‘mixed marriages’ should not be supported ⁸⁹ and consequently the issue dragged on.

The Italian Embassy, however, did not give in to this delaying tactic. In January 1942, Alfieri sent a reminder to the Germans that the question still needed addressing, adding that Rome would like to see the German principle that prevented ‘mixed marriages’ loosened. In his accompanying memo, Weizsäcker, who had to present the issue to the Reich foreign minister again, expressly advised against engaging in a discussion of the issue with the Italian diplomats. Ever since the Goldbeck case, the state secretary noted, there exists a ‘pronounced Italian inferiority complex’. It would therefore make more sense to oblige the Italians as much as possible and allow them to present on an individual basis all the cases that are important to them. ⁹⁰

A week later the Reich foreign minister took a stand: from the German standpoint, independent of the race issue, marriages between states are not happy marriages. This point was to be conveyed to Alfieri ‘verbally’ at the next inquiry. At the same time Ribbentrop permitted special cases to be examined on an individual basis, allowing German–Italian marriages to take place in exceptional cases. ⁹¹ This represented a clear rejection of the bilateral agreement with Italy that the RSHA had hoped to use to prevent ‘mixed marriages’; the law proposed by the SS was also no longer open to discussion. ⁹²

The Italians must have regarded with scepticism Ribbentrop’s claim that the German policy had not been motivated by race policy, but had instead been based solely on the belief that marriages between partners from different countries were unhappy relationships. The Fascist government knew that there was an exception allowing members of the German Wehrmacht to marry women from Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Holland. Without further comment, the Italian Embassy conveyed clearly to the Foreign Office that it was aware of the unequal treatment. ⁹³ The apparent reason why ‘mixed marriages’ with northern peoples were permitted, however, was not articulated explicitly.

The issue might have been addressed again if the German foreign minister hadn’t changed course: henceforth all rules applying to members of Nordic nations for racial reasons were also to apply to the Italians for political reasons. Neither a law nor a bilateral agreement was passed banning marriages between members of the two countries. Cases continued to be decided on an individual basis and the German authorities continued to look for reasons to oppose each individual wedding. An internal training paper of 1942 from the Racial Policy Office explicitly stated that the Italians were a ‘foreign people’ (stammesfremd). ⁹⁴ The document that was intended for ‘official use only’ noted that in regard to racial policy, Berlin and Rome were in agreement ‘that the German and Italian people should be kept apart biologically’. ⁹⁵ The only recognizable change was that the Italian authorities also became more rigid in approving marriages. In June 1942, for example, the German government learned for the first time of a case in which the Italians had refused to approve a marriage. ⁹⁶

In general, the situation for the Italian workers eased only slightly in 1942. Ambassador Alfieri reported in February that the situation had improved considerably, that both authorities and the population had changed their conduct and the agreements on disciplining workers were being honoured. ⁹⁷ But given the diplomatic quarrels of the previous year, Alfieri was probably inclined to play down the problems at this point. Other sources reported that the Italians were still not on equal ground with other ‘foreign workers’ and that the Italians had the reputation of being ‘shirkers’ in comparison with the German soldiers. ⁹⁸ Similar reports reached the Italian National Culture Ministry in May 1942. It was also noted that having Italian waiters serve in German restaurants while the German youth were at the front was problematic. ⁹⁹ The German population’s widespread rejection of Italians found strong expression during the Allied bombings. Some Italian workers recall being hindered from entering German air-raid bunkers in the summer 1942. ¹⁰⁰ The presence of Italian ‘foreign workers’ in the German Reich was an open wound in the German–Italian coalition; the National Socialists’ racial concerns, which in light of this current situation could no longer be concealed, poisoned the atmosphere within the ‘Axis’ and made cooperation, which had never been completely without friction, even more difficult.

But when the regime in Rome finally decided to withdraw its workers in late 1942 and early 1943, ¹⁰¹ the determining factor was not the incidents in the German Reich and the mixed-marriage issue – at least not officially. The official explanation was that Italy needed the workers for its own production at home. ¹⁰² The decisive reason would have been the German–Italian financial clearing, which had been turned on its head by the delivery of workers in 1941 since the Italian state paid the workers’ wages directly to their families; all expenses were settled on paper. ¹⁰³ By late 1942, German debt to Italy was so great that it was causing inflation in Italy. The Italian government ultimately withdrew its workers, not out of anger, but in response to the economic situation. Hitler, who had already planned to replace the Italian workers with Russians in March 1942, ¹⁰⁴ agreed to the withdrawal on 20 February 1943. ¹⁰⁵ Negotiations began to determine how many Italians would be allowed to return home per month. This issue, however, lost importance following the coup on 25 July and the armistice between the Italians and the Allies. More than 120,000 workers remained in the German Reich without diplomatic protection in September 1943. ¹⁰⁶

In a concluding analysis of how Germany dealt with the Italian workforce from 1940 to 1943, what stands out firstly is the high value attributed to racial policies in the Third Reich. ¹⁰⁷ In the middle of war, government officials risked drastically snubbing their coalition partner for racial ideological reasons. Without advance consultation, the Racial Policy Office encroached on the authority of the Foreign Office by communicating to Italian diplomats that a ‘mixing’ of the two races was undesirable. Secondly, it is evident that diplomacy with Rome took priority at this time. Hitler postponed until after the war a law that would have banned marriages between Germans and foreigners; Ribbentrop tried to placate the Italians by blocking the regulations that the RSHA and Racial Policy Office had wanted to implement. The well-being of the Axis partners was more important than German racial policy, at least during the war. After the failed Greece campaign, Italy became increasingly dependent on Germany, both militarily and economically, and yet the affair shows thirdly that the Fascist government was not willing to be pushed into the role of a ‘satellite state’. ¹⁰⁸ As it had in other areas of German-Italian relations, ¹⁰⁹ Rome resisted further denigration within the ‘Axis’ on the issue of “mixed marriage”– and was successful: In the end, the German government decided against the explicit regulations and could only surreptitiously prevent German–Italian marriages.