The Representation of the British Government in Zimbabwean Nationalist Propaganda,1965–80

During the period of Rhodesia's illegal independence (1965–80) Britain walked a tightrope. Following a period of failed negotiations, the white minority colonial government had finally declared their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), repudiating Britain's claims to authority over them. This placed Britain in a very difficult position, with little direct power to bring the crisis to an end. Four prime ministers had to tackle the problem of the rebellious colony, arguably five if one includes Sir Alec Douglas-Home's role in the torrid period preceding UDI. All of them had to navigate their way between a critical international audience, especially in newly independent Africa, the demands of the white settler minority government, and the intensely complicated politics of the Rhodesian African nationalist movement. Successive ministers went to negotiate in a series of talks with the various sides in the dispute, most notably on HMS Tiger (1966), on HMS Fearless (1968), at Geneva (1976), and at Lancaster House (1979). In addition, Britain sent the Pearce Commission to Rhodesia in 1972 to survey African opinion on a proposed new constitution. Throughout this period the two main African nationalist groups were the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and its offshoot, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The history of ZAPU goes back to the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress, which was founded in 1957. This was followed by the National Democratic Party, which in turn came to be overshadowed by ZAPU, which came into existence in 1961. It was not long, however, before ZAPU endured the ‘mother of all splits’, following which ZANU came to be formed. ZANU itself broke into two factions in 1975, one under Robert Mugabe, and the other under Ndabaningi Sithole. Sithole's group would eventually join hands with Ian Smith during his failed attempt to create an internal solution to the Rhodesian crisis. These two groups began as fairly limited parties, and, indeed, many of their leaders were in prison until 1974, when Rhodesia agreed to release them as part of international negotiations. Their military wings, ZANLA (ZANU), and ZIPRA (ZAPU) achieved little success in the decade following UDI. By the later 1970s, however, they had developed to become vast organisations, with extensive infrastructure in Mozambique (ZANU) and Zambia (ZAPU). There they maintained large training camps, supported by advisers and supplies from the communist bloc. They both fought against the Rhodesian Government during this period with the aim of creating an African majority majority-rule state, although they were absent from international negotiations until the Geneva conference of 1976. ¹

The UDI era in Rhodesia can broadly be divided into five periods. The first run from 1964 to 1968 and encompasses the run-up to the UDI crisis, the declaration itself, and negotiations in the immediate aftermath. At this time Rhodesia was not doing badly economically and many (white) people in the colony felt they had made the right choice. The second period runs from the end of the failed talks on HMS Fearless and approximately 1974. This time saw a change of government in the United Kingdom when the Conservatives won the 1970 election and subsequent hopes that a right-leaning administration might grant Rhodesia independence. A negotiated settlement was rejected in 1971, this time by the Africans of Rhodesia following a plebiscite. This period also saw the start of the war in earnest, but it remained manageable for the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). The years 1974 to 1977 saw the war rising in intensity and the opening up of the vast eastern border to Mozambique following the end of Portuguese colonialism. It also saw increasing pressure from the South Africans for the Rhodesians to grant concessions. Finally, there was the period from 1977 to 1979, which saw the war develop into a deadly stalemate in which neither side could win a decisive victory, which in turn led to the collapse of the government in many areas of the colony. It also saw a series of failed negotiations involving Rhodesia, Britain, and the USA, leading to Ian Smith attempting to create his own ‘Internal Settlement’ with selected African nationalist leaders. The final period, 1979–80, was politically very busy. In 1979, a Methodist Bishop, Abel Muzorewa (of the United African National Council), briefly led an African majority government, elected by universal suffrage, but of disputed legitimacy. He soon stepped down, however, in return for negotiations at Lancaster House in London. These led to the British taking over direct rule of the colony, and fresh elections, which were won decisively by ZANU. Independence followed soon after, with Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. It is important to keep this timeline in mind when considering the development of nationalist propaganda during these years.

The Rhodesian conflict was fought not only on the battlefield and in the meeting room. It was also a very modern war of images and words. Propaganda formed an integral part of the strategies of both the Rhodesian Government and the African nationalists who opposed it. ² Both ZANU and ZAPU produced prodigious amounts of propaganda material during the conflict, aimed at a range of different groups of people, both international and domestic. From their bases in Mozambique (ZANU) and Zambia (ZAPU) (and from Ethiopia (ZANU)), they broadcast radio and published a number of different publications, most notably the Zimbabwe Review (ZAPU), Zimbabwe News (ZANU) (which both dated back to the mid-1960s), and Zimbabwe People's Voice (ZAPU). ZANU support groups in the United States also produced their own materials, such as the Zimbabwe Bulletin. ZANU and ZAPU radio were developed shortly after UDI with the primary aim of legitimising their challenge to the Rhodesian Government. ³ It was further used to garner support from people in Rhodesia, and to gain recruits. ⁴ They also aimed to cover topics that the much-censored Rhodesian media did not report. ⁵ Radio was broadcast in several languages in order to reach as wide an audience as possible. ⁶ The fact that extracts from nationalist radio were being included in clipping publications such as the American Foreign Broadcast Information Service, shows that they were followed outside Southern Africa. British groups such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement also used nationalist publications as sources for their own pamphlets, and they were also sometimes cited in newspapers. ⁷ Added to this can be the many television, radio, and print media interviews given by their leaders and representatives around the world, especially during the 1970s.

The audience for all this was varied: television interviews tended to be for foreign viewers, guerrilla radio mostly for domestic consumption, and magazines a mixture of the two. ⁸ The communist bloc in particular was well-supplied with material on the war in Rhodesia from a guerrilla perspective. Citizens all across the Second World were therefore given a narrative of events in the colony. The nationalists were also asked to present to the United Nations on several occasions and took part in a range of different international events, including the 1970 meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, and the World Congress on Women in 1975. Additionally, they had relationships with frontline African states, whose leaders were not united over whom to support. Zambia, for example, hosted ZAPU for a long time, whilst Mozambique was a major backer of ZANU. ⁹ And, as Lisa Wedeen points out, propaganda is a means by which the producer can direct the audience, using text (and visual depictions) to exert power over them. ¹⁰ So ZANU and ZAPU were also using their messaging to enforce conformity amongst their own people, and, as Mhoze Chikowero argues to make them question white Rhodesian information sources. ¹¹ The range of groups to whom they had to appeal meant that the nationalists had to generate an assortment of different propaganda messages. For example, audiences in the communist bloc (especially governments) had to be offered material which dovetailed with their socialist ideas, whilst it was important not to alienate Western (and, indeed, West-leaning African) states. ¹²

Who created this propaganda? In the case of ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo, who had founded the party in 1961, had a great deal of latitude in choosing what to say. Likewise, after he gained ascendancy in ZANU in 1977, Robert Mugabe was more able to push his own particular line in public. Beyond that, it is difficult to tell precisely how far spokesmen were kept in check by the party regimes, but it seems likely that there must have been a certain level of editorial control over the contents of the official magazines and radio broadcasts. Comments made off-the-cuff at press conferences and in interviews were less likely to have been managed. Many of the key players were high-up officials in either the parties (such as ZAPU's George Silundika) or else the guerrilla armies (e.g. Jason Moyo, founder of ZIPRA). Additionally, some media output was a direct response to Rhodesian Government propaganda, which was designed to counter and ridicule. ¹³ Given the internal politics of these organisations, it is surprising how consistent a message they managed to produce. Indeed, despite several attempts to work together, culminating in the creation of the Patriotic Front in 1976, ZANU and ZAPU were never happy bedfellows. Yet, as Eliakim Sibanda has pointed out, they were split less by ideology than many people assume and tended to operate pragmatically to achieve their aims. ¹⁴ There were points where their diplomatic stances differed, such as when Nkomo engaged in secret talks with Ian Smith over the Internal Settlement, but for the most part, they actually approached the struggle in a surprisingly similar fashion. Indeed, one of the points that will become apparent in this piece is how similar their presentation of Britain was. The nationalist groups knew the power of propaganda, as well as the need to present their side of the story to as many people as possible.

The history of African liberation struggles has tended to focus either on political events, the role of the masses, or else the part played by particular individuals. Good examples of this can be seen in the writings of Timothy Scarnecchia and Mordechai Tamarkin on the diplomacy of the period, Norma Kriger on the peasantry, and Blessing-Miles Tendi on ZANLA's Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo). ¹⁵ Important as these studies are, however, they only engage with the propaganda war in a tangential way. Media messaging was one of the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of African liberation movements during the 1960s and 1970s. ¹⁶ Indeed, the importance of African print culture has been emphasised by Emma Hunter, Stephanie Newell, and Derek Peterson. ¹⁷ Faced with well-armed, highly-trained, and politically motivated opponents it was vital for the nationalists to gain and maintain support abroad for their cause. In one sense the odds were stacked in their favour, since political opinion in both the West and Communist worlds was generally against white minority regimes. European empires were receding rapidly in the 1960s, and by the later 1970s, very few colonies remained. The efforts of the civil rights movement in America also served to raise racial issues in the public consciousness. Yet, despite this, the Rhodesian issue was not seen as a major issue by most of the British electorate. ¹⁸ This had two implications. The first was that effort was needed to ensure that Rhodesia remained in the public sphere of debate. Second, it made it easier for a small, committed interest group to be heard in governmental circles. The fact that they received significant aid from European charitable organisations also meant that a clear propaganda message had to be put out. What is more, it was important for African liberation groups to put forward their case to the politicians and populations of their primary backers in the communist bloc. ZANU received heavy backing from China and ZAPU from the USSR. Without this continued support, their efforts would surely have failed. Since Britain was the colonial power in Rhodesia it inevitably became central to nationalist propaganda output.

The nationalists, as this article shows, sought to use depictions of Britain to influence negotiations, and to galvanise their own supporters through the creation of a narrative. There were also occasions where it was necessary to deflect criticism, and at these times Britain could serve as a useful scapegoat for ZANU and ZAPU leaders. The framework of action that British politicians could operate within was shaped by a range of factors, and one of them was the international message presented by the nationalists. In order to explore these themes, this article seeks to reconstruct the way in which Britain and its politicians were presented during this period. It will show that both ZANU and ZAPU created developed conceptions of Britain and its place in their liberation struggle. They were acutely aware of the different charges that could be laid at Britain's door and sought to use them to affect opinion across the world. Yet it will also show that these ideas were not always consistent. For example, despite consistently attacking Britain's colonial record they also maintained that it had a vital role to play as the imperial power in Rhodesia. So, despite painting Britain in extremely negative terms much of the time, they also felt obliged to acknowledge the legal bonds that tied it to the rebellious colony. In doing this it will shed some light on the terms upon which the two main African nationalist movements of Rhodesia saw their struggle. It will further give voice to the African side of debates surrounding decolonisation, showing how they developed a language of discussion to engage with the process.

UDI itself was a political disaster for the British Government for a whole host of reasons. One part of the nightmare facing Harold Wilson's Labour administration was that ZAPU were making it out to be evidence of British duplicity. In a piece from December 1965, they accused the British of merely making a show of implementing sanctions, whilst at the same time seeking to undermine the unity of the OAU, and preventing the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference from including a reference to majority rule in their communiqué. ¹⁹ ZANU and ZAPU were quick to condemn the British, effectively presenting them as being in favour of UDI, tacitly supporting it whilst superficially criticising it on the world stage. In 1969, ZAPU argued that, whereas colonial independence usually required an Act of Parliament, in the case of Rhodesia, where ties with the colonists were so strong, the British were ‘relaxed’ about the process. ²⁰ They had previously stated very bluntly that they believed that UDI was Britain's ‘creation’. ²¹ ZANU told the United Nations that UDI had only been possible because the British had created the necessary situation for it in terms of the Rhodesian economy and politics. ²² As such, UDI was, according to them, actually evidence that Britain was on the side of the colonists, and certainly not an exasperated colonial power trying to rein in a rebellious territory. ZAPU further told the UN in 1966 that they believed that the talks then taking place were confirmation of a British-Rhodesian ‘conspiracy’. ²³ Their argument was that the British were essentially on the side of the Rhodesian whites, but had misled some people to think that they supported the Africans. They claimed that this was damaging to the African nationalist cause as it had led other states to give them less support than they might otherwise had done, had Britain not presented herself as a defender of the Africans. The British were also presented as having stalled attempts to undermine the Rhodesian Government at the UN. ²⁴ To this could be added claims that the British had broken their word on more than one occasion. ²⁵ This may represent genuine feelings that members of ZANU and ZAPU felt about UDI. After all, from their perspective, it must have seemed that the British had not come down harshly enough on Ian Smith's white nationalist Rhodesian Front Government. It was not as though UDI had been unexpected either. They must also have been acutely aware of the need to seize the moral high ground against both Britain and the Rhodesian Government as a means by which to reinforce their negotiating position and build sympathy elsewhere in the world. However, as UDI became more distant, this sort of language became of less immediate import to nationalist propaganda.

Despite this, however, throughout the period of the Rhodesian rebellion they made out the British to be imperialists, who sought to maintain their control on Rhodesia either by perpetuating the colonial regime there, or else by resorting to ‘neo-imperialism’. ²⁶ In doing this, they were building on the words of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, who had popularised the term in a book of 1965. ²⁷ ZAPU were quick to paint a picture of British imperialism in Africa, stretching back into the slavery era, and used their record as a means to discredit them on the world stage. ²⁸ They maintained that Britain had not changed. One needs to see this messaging within the context of ZAPU's frustration, noted by Eliakim Sibanda, at how the British took for themselves the right to negotiate on behalf of the Africans, who were not given a say (certainly not until the Pearce Commission of 1971–2). ²⁹ In this context, it is unsurprising that in 1974 they should have said that: ‘British ruling circles are still in the dark ages of colonial rule and would like to subvert every move which carries the seeds for the destruction of colonialism’. ³⁰ This scepticism continued until the end of the conflict: ‘The British remain…arrogant exploiters and colonial masters’, they stated in 1979. ³¹ Why do this? Disgust at Britain for taking their voice cannot be the whole answer. The rhetoric certainly did not entirely fit with the unusual situation Rhodesia was in: whereas the Portuguese and South African Governments openly resisted majority rule, the British were (at least nominally) in favour of it throughout the entire UDI period, and were actually opposing (even if weakly) the Rhodesian Government. It seems more likely that, because there was no pre-existing paradigm to fit these circumstances, ZANU and ZAPU merely defaulted to treating the British as close allies of the Rhodesian Government. In doing this they were able to create a clear divide between a range of differing political actors, simplifying the nature of what was a very complex situation. Propaganda, after all, works best when it has a single, easily digestible message.

Over time, claiming that the British were merely trying to impose ‘neocolonialism’ on Rhodesia came to be a commonly used trope in ZANU and ZAPU media output, aimed at justifying the rejection of various peace initiatives sponsored by either Britain or America. Indeed, Mugabe argued that the British were claiming to need American assistance to decolonise in order to enlist their support in creating a neocolonialist situation in Rhodesia; Nkomo openly claimed that the Anglo-American initiative of 1977-8 was aimed at this. ³² They justified their continued campaign by arguing that Smith was ‘only willing to accept neocolonialism and not genuine national independence’. ³³ The British (and Americans) were, they claimed, trying to ‘hijack the Zimbabwe people's revolutionary struggle’ with an aim of ‘bringing about a neocolonialist solution’. ³⁴ Sibanda has further suggested that the Anglo-American proposals failed because they would have left too much power in the hands of the white minority. ³⁵ Likewise, at the time of the Internal Settlement, they put forward a similar view, asserting that Britain was using ‘puppets’ such as Muzorewa and Sithole to effect a neocolonialist outcome since they felt that the white regime was no longer useful. ³⁶ Certainly, they were not presented as having the interests of the Africans of Rhodesia at heart. ³⁷ This sentiment also had an obvious appeal to Eastern European audiences. For example, in 1977, Nkomo expressed these views during a Hungarian television interview. ³⁸ It would, after all, have been in line with the established communist worldview. They also used the rhetoric of neocolonialism to undermine the Zimbabwe–Rhodesian elections of 1979. These were, they argued, ‘imperialist-held elections and only serve the interests of the imperialists themselves’. ³⁹ All attempts at diplomacy which might have ended in a non-Patriotic Front government were therefore painted as being merely mechanisms for the imposition of ‘neocolonialism’ by Britain and its purported allies. Such an attitude was built upon accepted views in post-colonial Africa and would have been powerful rhetoric to encourage support for their cause both internationally and in Rhodesia itself. What is more, in the complex Cold War environment anti-colonialism was a cause which was not unique to either East or West, both of which ZANU and ZAPU needed to court for support.

At the same time, they argued that the British were conspiring with the white Rhodesians to create another South Africa. ⁴⁰ In adopting such a position they were implicitly presenting British imperialism more as white solidarity than as a form of direct rule. A ZANU representative emphasised this point to the UN Special Committee on Colonialism when it met in Dar es Salaam in 1967. ⁴¹ He further argued that the British sought to achieve this through Portuguese and South African connivance. ⁴² Were they tapping into existing African discourse here? These views can certainly be found outside Rhodesia: Zambian Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepke made similar comments in 1966, for example. ⁴³ In 1967, ZANU expressed the view that the British were against Smith rather than the white Rhodesians per se. Were Smith to be replaced, they argued, the British would inevitably end sanctions and grant independence. ⁴⁴ ZAPU's Edward Ndlovu explained in 1973 his view that the British, ‘having happily negotiated away political independence during the sixties’ across Africa, found that their ‘nervous system became spastic’ when it came to Rhodesia. The white Rhodesians, having had a ‘responsible government’, had refused to agree to this, and Britain lacked the will to act. The British, he argued, ‘preferred to let the whole world know its imperial power was being defied…than to let the whole world know the truth – that…[they]…did not want to arrange for majority rule in Zimbabwe’. ⁴⁵ The easiest explanation for such comments is that it was how nationalist leaders felt at the time: that Britain was being obstructive. Another angle, which developed during the 1970s, was the idea that the British, unable to support Rhodesia militarily themselves, had formed a secret pact with South Africa. ⁴⁶ As late as October 1979, ZANU was arguing that British proposals were merely a means by which to clear the way for South African interference in Rhodesia. ⁴⁷ South Africa was, of course, an ally of Rhodesia, so for ZANU and ZAPU to take this position is understandable. However, their suggestion that Britain was conniving to secure Rhodesia's longer-term position as a variant on the South African model was less believable. The problem that it allowed them to get around was the fact that Britain was pushing for independence based on majority rule, just not necessarily led by ZANU or ZAPU. In that sense Britain was not a true ally, meaning that they had to find some way of discrediting British motives: to align them with South Africa was a powerful way of doing this. Indeed, given South Africa's pariah status, it represented a means by which to undermine Britain's credibility as an arbiter of the dispute. Or perhaps these comments are best seen as a way of rallying their international supporters by warning them of what might happen if the independence movement were to fail.

Equally, on other occasions, the nationalists were keen to place responsibility for the Rhodesian situation at Britain's door as the colonial power. This worked two ways. On the one hand, they were quick to condemn the British for failing to live up to their responsibilities to the people of their colony. Nkomo's expressed view was that ‘Britain colonized Zimbabwe. So as far as we are concerned, it has been the duty of Britain all along to end colonialism in Zimbabwe’. ⁴⁸ On the other hand, they also argued that the British were the root of the problem by virtue of being the imperial government. This meant, according to ZAPU, that the British should be on the Rhodesian side of the table at any further negotiations since they were unable to be neutral since ‘she is the major part in the dispute as the coloniser of our country’. ⁴⁹ ZAPU was particularly opposed to US involvement, and so framed the issue squarely in terms of relations between the colonial power and the colony. This deligitimised attempts by other powers, such as the United States, to become involved in negotiations. ⁵⁰ ZAPU's position here can be put down to the US Government has been historically closer to ZANU. ⁵¹ In particular, after the Sino-American rapprochement of 1969–72, ZANU, being backed by China, was better placed to develop ties with the USA. ⁵² The fact that these assertions were made with increasing vigour during the later 1970s likely reflects the attempts of first Henry Kissinger and then Cyrus Vance and Jimmy Carter to become involved in Rhodesian affairs. Kissinger in particular tried to act as a peace broker in the run up to the Geneva conference. This stance also justified the rejection of any sort of power-sharing agreement. Nkomo argued in 1976 that to share power with Ian Smith would suggest that he was the giver of power, whereas the British, as the colonial authority, were the only people who could hand over power to the Africans of Rhodesia. ⁵³ The nationalists also used this rhetoric to oppose what they saw as attempts by British politicians to distance themselves from the whole issue. For example, in 1976, they attacked Jim Callaghan for, what they claimed was an attempt to present Rhodesia as de facto no longer a British colony. Their view was that, however, much freedom Britain may have given to the Rhodesians since 1923, ‘[t]he ultimate responsibility was always in London. The ultimate power was also always in London’. ⁵⁴ Rhodesia very much remained a British territory in their minds. What is clear is that, however, much the nationalists might have disliked Britain, they knew that they could not achieve independence without it. Certainly, there are contradictions in how they presented Britain's role, but they never denied that responsibility for the colony ultimately lay with London.

An ancillary of this was the presentation of the whites of Rhodesia as being a mere adjunct of Britain: ‘the British colonial extension in Salisbury’, as ZANU put it in 1979. ⁵⁵ This line of argument sought to show Britain as a puppet master, directing affairs so as to produce a positive ending for the white minority. Once again, this was about Britain being arch-imperialists, who had never left their colonialist past behind. An early example can be seen in a 1969 comment by ZAPU when they referred to the Rhodesian Government as the ‘British settler regime’. ⁵⁶ Such comments show that these ideas had currency from an early stage in UDI, however, they were to gain particular currency during the later 1970s. By this point in the conflict, the ideological battleground had, if anything, hardened, as had the international dialogue surrounding ‘anti-colonialism’. In addition, ZANU and ZAPU became increasingly reliant on the communist bloc for support and so it is likely that they felt it necessary to engage in the sort of language which would sit well with audiences there. Thus, George Silundika told the UN that ‘the Rhodesian racist regime is an undoubted colonialist agent of the United Kingdom’. ⁵⁷ Rhodesia's military was merely a ‘British colonial army’, said ZANU. ⁵⁸ Another line was that British politicians were stalling talks in order to assist Ian Smith in securing his position in Rhodesia. ⁵⁹ ‘They have always supported Smith’, Mugabe stated bluntly in a Yugoslavian interview of 1978. ⁶⁰ In making these comments ZANU and ZAPU were once again trying to place the British squarely on the side of the minority regime and to discredit them in both Africa and the wider world. This would have fitted particularly well with communist conceptions of imperialism and exploitation, hence Mugabe's Yugoslavian media. It also allowed the nationalists to position themselves squarely against imperialism. This is an advance on arguments made elsewhere which merely suggested that Britain was failing to act assertively enough against the whites, rather than claiming that the British Government was their patron.

Were they simply playing to the gallery? Perhaps, but one should not dismiss the possibility that these views actually reflected the genuinely held beliefs and frustrations of the nationalist leadership, at least to a certain extent. In particular, it would not have been surprising for them to have held a dim view of the abject failure of the British to bring the rebels to heel in the 1960s. Whereas in 1965 it was possible to believe that Britain might broadly sympathetic to the Africans, its failure to act decisively, and willingness to negotiate with the Rhodesian Government must have undermined their credibility for many in the nationalist community. The nationalists might well also have pointed to the extensive sanctions-breaking outlined in the Bingham Report of 1978 as further evidence of British collusion. ⁶¹ The deliberate conflation of the Rhodesian whites and the British also enabled them to tacitly deny the African identity of the former. This allowed them to imply that they did not belong there, further undermining the whites’ cause. And, given their haphazard response to the crisis, it is hardly surprising that the nationalists dismissed the British as on the side of the Rhodesians.

This view applied to both the Conservative and Labour administrations during this period, although in different ways. The former were presented as arch-imperialists, driven by their business supporters, and by the right of their party (especially the Monday Club). ⁶² Their relationship with imperialism, ZANU argued, went right back to Cecil Rhodes, and the party had more recently become tainted by the ideas of Enoch Powell. ⁶³ The Conservatives, claimed ZANU, were in negotiations with the Angolan FNLA (of whom they disapproved) in 1978. ⁶⁴ The next year, Voice of Zimbabwe further declared that, to the Africans of Rhodesia, the election of a Conservative government ‘only means an attempt to recolonize and not decolonize Zimbabwe’. ⁶⁵ That ZANU and ZAPU should have distrusted the Conservatives is hardly surprising, however, their attitude to Labour was almost as negative, if differently focused. Labour, unlike the Conservatives, were depicted as decent in principle, however, when in office they were said to have succumbed to a cynical realpolitik and financial interests and became ‘the loyal servant of British financial and industrial interests at home and abroad’. ⁶⁶ Despite claiming to be ‘socialists’, Labour were in fact ‘lieutenants of capitalism’. ⁶⁷ Labour was, it was said, ‘unprincipled’, and Harold Wilson ‘one of the most vociferous anti-racialists in the United Kingdom, BUT ONLY WHEN HE IS IN OPPOSITION [emphasis in the original]’. ⁶⁸ Indeed, shortly after Wilson returned to the government following the February 1974 election, ZAPU drew a deliberate distinction between Labour ‘as a party and a Labor [sic] government as an administration’. ⁶⁹

It is easy to see why ZANU and ZAPU should have been frustrated with the various administrations in Britain, given that neither party had any success in talks with Ian Smith's government. As such, it is unsurprising that they lashed out at the Conservatives and Labour for, in their opinion, failing the Africans of Rhodesia. Their further suggestions that they were somehow allies of Smith, perhaps represent a desire to undermine the credibility of the British as negotiators in the dispute. Of course, both parties had different views on Rhodesia, with the Conservatives being generally more sympathetic to the demands of the whites. For example, upon winning a parliamentary majority in 1970 the Tories were willing to negotiate a new agreement which engaged with the illegal 1969 Rhodesian Constitution. The Conservative manifesto of 1979 also hinted at (but stopped short of explicitly promising) recognition for Zimbabwe–Rhodesia. Labour on other hand stuck more firmly to the idea of ‘No independence before majority rule’ (NIBMAR) when in office. Many Labour MPs were overtly hostile to the Rhodesian Government and its supporters. The nationalists played on this in their propaganda, tending to present the Conservatives as Rhodesian sympathisers, with Labour being attacked for failing to live up to their own principles. Whilst these accusations did put some pressure on successive British administrations, that is unlikely to have been their primary purpose. After all, it is unlikely that many British politicians read the Zimbabwe News or Zimbabwe Review. It is certainly possible that it reflects genuine opinion within ZANU and ZAPU, although it must surely also have been useful in maintaining hostility amongst their supporters towards Britain and imperialism. In addition, depicting their interlocutors as duplicitous shielded the nationalist politicians from blame whenever negotiations failed.

By ruling out the use of force the British were forced to rely on international sanctions to defeat the Rhodesian rebellion. They maintained this position throughout the UDI era, ever cynical about the possibility that sanctions might work. This approach led to various criticisms from the nationalists. On one level they were quick to assert that this showed the lack of desire the British had to defeat Ian Smith. In 1969, for example, ZAPU argued that Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart knew that sanctions were useless, yet still advocated them. ⁷⁰ When the failure of sanctions became obvious the British Government came under continuous attack for supposedly not enforcing the rules, and, indeed, breaking them themselves. In 1973, for example, a ZAPU leader claimed that sanctions were merely a ‘smokescreen, never intended to bring about majority rule in Zimbabwe’. ⁷¹ Of course, they were not alone in this. The Bingham Report into sanctions busting by oil companies had been controversial when it was published in 1978. ⁷² The publication of that report gave ammunition to ZANU, who used it as a chance to attack the British Government. ⁷³ The British were even accused by ZAPU of having introduced sanctions ‘with the full knowledge that they would not harm Rhodesia but would harm the economy of Zambia’. ⁷⁴ In 1979, Nkomo accused Britain on Czechoslovakian radio of turning a blind eye to British companies supplying oil to Rhodesia via Beira in Mozambique. ⁷⁵ His comments are an example of how ZAPU were able to identify its campaign with the anti-capitalism of Eastern European governments. Sanctions were seen by many in the international community as an ineffective way of ending the Rhodesian crisis, so it is unsurprising that ZANU and ZAPU should have criticised the British over their failure. However, they also sought to use them as evidence that the British Government was in league with the Rhodesian whites. Such accusations could have only served to damage the reputation of Britain in Africa. What is more, it tied into the socialist ideologies of ZANU and ZAPU, since it was further evidence that big business was the enemy of the Africans of Rhodesia.

This financial angle was spun out extensively by the nationalists, who presented Britain and Rhodesia as being tied together by such financial ties as inevitably undermined the former's ability to discipline the latter. Indeed, they were, argued ZAPU, the ‘root and stem’ of Britain's policy towards Rhodesia. ⁷⁶ So, for example, George Silundika pointed to the decision by the British Government not to close down Rhodesia House in London, for which rent had not been paid, on the grounds that there might be retaliation against British financial interests in the colony. He argued that this was evidence that the Rhodesian Government was ‘a custodian of British investments’. ⁷⁷ Likewise, the 1968 talks on HMS Fearless were presented as having ‘been hatched out by British financial and industrial groups with interests in Rhodesia, South Africa and Mozambique’. ⁷⁸ British ‘direct investment’ in Rhodesia was cited as £200 million by ZANU in 1972. ⁷⁹ The British were also attacked in the pages of the Zimbabwe Review for putting profit before principle in South Africa, being described as the largest investors in the Apartheid state. ⁸⁰ The ancillary of this was that the British (and Americans) needed to keep the whites in power in order to protect their economic interests, a point made by Voice of Zimbabwe in 1979. ⁸¹ These financial ties were said to extend further than Rhodesia, to South Africa, a fact which further limited the UK's scope for action. ⁸² Firms such as Lonrho were presented as key drivers of imperialism, and were referred to by ZAPU as ‘the backbone of Ian Smith's Rhodesia [sic] Front’. ⁸³ As already outlined, part of this was ideological: both ZANU and ZAPU, who claimed to be Marxist–Leninists, were duty-bound to oppose both capitalism, in general, as well as multinational corporations, in particular. However, this in turn led to a desire to portray Britain as under the control of capitalists who were driven by profit and had no regard for the welfare of the Africans of Rhodesia. As such, one can see the clear effect of their ideology on how Britain was depicted in their media output. The fact that such ideas continued to be presented throughout the period, and by both parties, shows a consistency to their propaganda strategy, and probably represents their genuine perception of the economic reality.

Rejecting the British as mere puppet masters of the Rhodesian whites had another important role for the African nationalists: it provided further justification for their doctrine of armed struggle. ZANU and ZAPU sought to argue, from an early stage, that a non-violent position was untenable in the face of pressure both domestically in Rhodesia and internationally from Britain and other sympathetic powers. ZANU was saying this even before UDI, as can be seen in a press release issued in response to a statement made by the Commonwealth Secretary in March 1965. ⁸⁴ Since, they argued, the British were supporting the Rhodesians, there were no constitutional means by which to achieve majority rule. Therefore the only way to win was to use the force of arms. A similar view can be found in ZAPU writings of the late 1960s. One piece argued that ‘[the armed struggle] is a language which Britain and her agents in Rhodesia will understand’. ⁸⁵ Later on, the failure of negotiations was cited as justification for the continuation of the conflict. Nkomo in particular seems to have been sensitive to accusations that he sought to conquer Rhodesia militarily, rather than win power by the ballot box. He needed to justify ZAPU's position, and it made sense for him to present the war as a necessary development where politics had failed. Therefore he sought to explain that it was the failure of the British Government to punish their rebels that led to ZAPU starting the armed struggle. ⁸⁶ One can also see Nkomo using this point to develop support for the armed struggle in the Eastern Bloc. In 1978, he told a Hungarian newspaper that, since the British were supporting Smith, ‘[i]t is in vain to expect that someone else would lower the British colours or the Smith regime's [sic] flag. The banner of…independent Zimbabwe has to be hoisted by ourselves, as a result of our successes’. ⁸⁷ A guerrilla war is never without controversy, and it was important for ZANU and ZAPU to maintain their political position in the face of ‘moderate’ African politicians (such as Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole) who were willing to negotiate with the Smith Government. This was particularly the case after the Internal Settlement was signed in 1978.

Yet, by the final years of the period, inconsistencies were starting to creep in. Having tried to argue that the British were in league with the Rhodesians, they also then sought to present the British as lacking the means to bring them to heel anyway. This may well reflect a recognition of the continued failure of the British to mediate an end to the crisis. In December 1965, ZAPU's Jason Moyo had expressed hope that Britain would invade if the situation in Rhodesia became chaotic, however, such confidence had evaporated by the 1970s. ⁸⁸ A good example of this can be seen in a 1976 broadcast by Voice of Zimbabwe. In this, they argued that, so long as the Rhodesian military existed there was no way that the British could get the white minority government to concede universal suffrage. ⁸⁹ The image of a weak and incapable Britain was also useful to the nationalists, since it once again, they argued, justified their use of armed struggle. That same 1976 broadcast went on to make precisely this point. ⁹⁰ Nkomo stated very bluntly in a press conference that year that ‘I don’t talk about Britain helping. Britain could not help anybody’. ⁹¹ Aware of Britain's difficult situation in the late 1970s, Voice of Zimbabwe declared that it wanted ‘to take the initiative and dominant position [over America], but it no longer has the economic or military strength to effect its desires’. ⁹² There was certainly truth to their allegations: Britain was fundamentally unable to control the Rhodesian Government, and the UK did face increasing domestic problems which further weakened it internationally during the 1970s. Having ruled out military intervention in the 1960s there was arguably little that the British Government could do but watch as the Rhodesian conflict wore on. Yet by presenting things thus ZANU and ZAPU were also undermining much of their other media output which suggested that the British were in league with Smith.

There were also strong intimations that the British had been racist in their response to colonial crises since the end of the Second World War. There had been a number of conflicts during the period since 1945, some larger than others, but the two recent campaigns which attracted notice in nationalist propaganda were that in Kenya during the 1950s, and the invasion of Anguilla in 1969. ⁹³ In each case, the British had used military force to put down rebellion in a colony, with no deaths in the case of Anguilla, and with greater loss of life during the conflict with the Mau Mau in Kenya. ⁹⁴ Aden, Cyprus, India, and Northern Ireland (where Catholics were said to have challenged Britain's ‘authority as the colonial power’) were other examples cited. ⁹⁵ The nationalists were quick to point out the obvious fact that it was only the rebellion of white colonists in Rhodesia which had not been ended by military intervention. ZAPU told the UN that ‘Britain's military action in Anguilla was consistent with her policy of refusing to use the same measures against her kith and kin in Rhodesia. British force is reserved only for the black man’. ⁹⁶ ZANU also cited the Anguillan invasion, alongside other examples, such as the 1896 campaign in Rhodesia, the use of troops in Guyana in 1953, and the Suez crisis of 1956. ⁹⁷ The failure of Britain to act against the Rhodesian whites was linked by the nationalists to the concept of ‘kith and kin’ politics and used to demonstrate what they saw as the unacceptable racism of Britain. ⁹⁸ In 1977, ZANU explicitly stated that the British had chosen to put the interests of their ‘kith and kin’ over those of the Africans of Rhodesia, showing ‘callous disregard’ for the latter. ⁹⁹ Nkomo likewise argued that Britain ‘dodged’ its responsibilities to decolonising Rhodesia because it ‘has held an attitude of kith and kin first’. ¹⁰⁰ The failure of the British to overcome their support for their kin was thus presented as a key stumbling block on the way to solving the Rhodesian problem. ¹⁰¹ Worse still, the nationalists suggested that it highlighted the inability of the British to think in non-racist terms. This may well be a true representation of how they saw the situation: they felt that the British were unhelpful (at best), and saw hypocrisy in how they had handled other colonial situations.

A further mechanism to attack the British Government was to highlight the role played by some of its citizens in the RSF during the later 1970s. This has been discussed extensively elsewhere, however, it is worth exploring here as means to explore the specific ways in which the nationalists sought to use it against Britain. ¹⁰² They certainly did not miss an opportunity to report on the activities of British ‘mercenaries’, with Voice of Zimbabwe reporting an interview given by a deserter to a Botswanan newspaper in 1977, for example. ¹⁰³ The message that ZANU and ZAPU wished to get across was that Britain was not doing enough to prevent UK citizens from joining the Rhodesian military, which was further evidence of the ‘kith and kin’ phenomenon. Mugabe accused them in 1978 of allowing recruitment of mercenaries to take place in Britain. ¹⁰⁴ Such accusations ignored the reality that the British Government lacked the means, legal or otherwise, to prevent people from leaving for Rhodesia, however, much they might have wished to. Yet it was undeniable that there were British citizens who travelled to Rhodesia with the objective of serving in the Security Forces there, and such men did on occasion create very negative press. ¹⁰⁵ Such men were also a very visible link between the white Rhodesians and Britain: Their presence allowed ZANU and ZAPU to suggest that the British were willing to go further than merely giving moral support. The British were further accused of supplying arms and ammunition to the Rhodesian regime, often through South Africa, or else via multinational companies. ¹⁰⁶ Such claims were, of course, outlandish, and formed part of a broader attack on the Western powers, almost all of whom were described as Rhodesia's arms dealers at one point or another. Fundamentally, ZANU and ZAPU wished to undermine any sense that the British Government and people were other than prominent supporters of Ian Smith during the war.

The British press (and, indeed, that of the West more generally) were also said to be major players in the defence of Rhodesia, acting for the British Government to undermine the liberation movement. The BBC was acting to raise ‘scares and excuses’ and to ‘justify UDI’, argued ZAPU in 1974. ¹⁰⁷ In particular, ZANU and ZAPU regularly dismissed claims that there was a division between them by asserting that such stories were merely propaganda. The idea that the British media was trying to generate division between ZANU and ZAPU was repeated in 1977, when the Patriotic Front argued that it was engaged in ‘the vilification of…progressive delegations…The BBC and the Western press [are] dutifully manufacturing imaginary splits and revolts’. ¹⁰⁸ Joshua Nkomo tried to paint an image of Britain using the media as a means of derailing the plans of the independence movement in Rhodesia, including by imaging divisions that did not actually exist. ¹⁰⁹ Western journalists were also presented as being too critical of the African independence movement of Rhodesia, and on at least one occasion Britain was accused of being behind this. ¹¹⁰ Sometimes such accusations were used to rebuff criticism, such as when Nkomo claimed that the Western media were overlooking the many people killed by the Rhodesian Government whilst focusing on the shooting down of an airliner by ZIPRA forces. ¹¹¹ He felt that they were portraying ZAPU's ‘struggle…as nothing less than a mere terrorist action’. ¹¹² To achieve their aims they were said (by ZAPU) to be willing to descend to the use of falsehoods. As such they could not be trusted. For example, the BBC was accused by ZAPU of broadcasting 26 ‘malicious lies’ in reporting a 1977 Lusaka summit attended by the heads of the frontline states. They claimed that ‘the BBC and other British news media’ sought to ‘destroy the armed struggle in Zimbabwe’. ¹¹³ Yet both Nkomo and Mugabe were willing to be interviewed by the British outlets on a number of occasions, so they also recognised the need to engage with them. ZANU and ZAPU were clearly very sensitive to any suggestion that they were divided, or that their victory might lead to further conflict. Unsurprisingly, this was particularly the case after they united under the banner of the Patriotic Front in 1976.

British diplomatic activities came under fire on a regular basis during the 1970s. They were viewed variously as duplicitous, naïve, and inconsistent at different times. So, for example, in 1973, a ZAPU spokesman attacked the British for a weak and unconvincing approach which (impossibly) attempted to placate both African demands for independence and white opposition to it. ¹¹⁴ These efforts were extended further at the time of the Anglo-American plan (1977–8), when David Owen, the British foreign secretary, became a focus for criticism. ¹¹⁵ ZANU were keen to present Dr Owen as sitting on the fence, and not engaging with them as he should have (in their view). In 1978, Robert Mugabe told the Guardian that he felt Dr Owen was ‘an unpredictable character, quite mysterious’, arguing that he was deliberately keeping ‘one foot in the internal settlement talks and another foot in the external settlement talks…He can’t have it both ways’. ¹¹⁶ They also made out that Owen was trying to ‘divert the Patriotic Front's attention from the armed struggle by inviting them to unproductive settlement talks’. ¹¹⁷ At one point they went even further than this and accused Owen of condoning the Rhodesian military's external raids. ¹¹⁸ These attempts to smear Dr Owen were surely part of a drive to undermine the British Government's negotiating strategy, and to tie in with their conception of ‘kith-and-kin’. As such these comments should be seen less as an attack on Owen personally as on the British Government. Mugabe further sought to present ZANU and ZAPU's withdrawal from these 1978 negotiations as a show of unity in the face of British duplicity. ¹¹⁹ The media output on this issue during the later 1970s suggests that the Patriotic Front was acutely aware of the danger posed to its position by the wrong-negotiated settlement. Were Smith to achieve an agreement with Britain it could potentially lead to recognition of a Zimbabwe in which they did not have a prominent role. Indeed, their claims against the British may well reflect a genuine anger at what they saw as British intransigence. However, equally, they were a means by which they sought to bolster their own credentials as anti-imperialists, and as a way of putting further pressure on the British to distance themselves from the whites of Rhodesia.

By the end of the decade, the political landscape was rapidly changing. Smith had been forced to accept the possibility of majority rule, and it was clear that the RSF were unable to win the war on the ground. ¹²⁰ Against this backdrop, both sides changed strategy. Most significantly, Smith moved to create an ‘Internal Settlement’ with his favoured African politicians. Were this to have succeeded it would have been dire for both ZANU and ZAPU. As a result, it was vital for it to be delegitimised and for it to be made impossible for anyone on the international scene to recognise the new government. In particular, the British had to be dissuaded by all means necessary from granting independence to ‘Zimbabwe–Rhodesia’, as it became known. Thus, in 1978, a ZANU spokesman attacked Britain for failing to expressly reject the Settlement. They had, he argued, tacitly given hope to Ian Smith that the new regime might be recognised, thus condemning Rhodesia to further turmoil. ¹²¹ Mugabe similarly condemned the British for abstaining on a UN Security Council resolution against it. ¹²² Western countries were, of course, generally criticised by the Patriotic Front for supposed support for the Settlement. ¹²³ Worse still for Britain were accusations that they were in fact behind the agreement. ZAPU claimed in 1977 that Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau were ‘running dogs of British and American imperialism’. ¹²⁴ ZANU maintained that the British and Americans were using the Zimbabwe–Rhodesian election of 1979 as a means to keep Ian Smith in power whilst trying to appear independent. Any criticisms that the British might make of the Muzorewa regime were written off as camouflage for their true neocolonialist internations. ¹²⁵ As such the elections represented British duplicity as well as their partisanship. ¹²⁶ The Internal Settlement was certainly a significant threat to ZANU and ZAPU. Were it to be accepted by Britain and the rest of the World then their position would be untenable. They therefore went out of their way to reject and undermine both the agreement and its signatories. And one effective way of doing this was to suggest that it was merely a means of extending British rule. Whether they changed minds within the British Government is hard to tell, but it is telling that in the end, no one was willing to recognise Muzorewa's government. Even the new Conservative Government was unwilling to do so in the face of international disapproval.

 The election of Margaret Thatcher was further depicted as a serious threat to the Africans of Rhodesia. ZANU claimed that by 1979 ‘Conservative circles in the West’ had ‘become bold enough to stand as champions for the Salisbury regime’. ¹²⁷ Thatcher herself was said to be deluded, believing that Britain retained powers that had long been lost, as well as being partisan against ZAPU. ¹²⁸ Her Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, was accused of racism by Nkomo at the UN that May. ¹²⁹ The stakes were high during the summer and autumn of that year and one can see this in the media output of the Patriotic Front. A recurring theme was that the Conservatives, in league with the Americans and South Africa, were trying to orchestrate a neocolonial solution to the crisis. To do this they were using Muzorewa and the other pro-Internal Settlement Africans as puppets. Their concern that the Conservatives, having hinted at it in their manifesto, might recognise Zimbabwe–Rhodesia is obvious from their propaganda output. Indeed, Voice of Zimbabwe broadcast a warning to Thatcher to ‘mind her own business’ in May 1979. ¹³⁰ They also stated that British recognition would change nothing, since they would carry on the war regardless. ¹³¹ Such posturing reflected a genuine fear that the rug would be pulled from under them by Britain. Again here one can see the inconsistency of the Patriotic Front's expressed position. Having spent much time asserting that the dispute could only be resolved by talks between Britain (as the colonial power) and themselves, the Patriotic Front was now asserting that the UK was too partisan to take a mediating role in discussions. ¹³² This antagonistic rhetoric probably made things more difficult with the British, although it must have reflected the fact that, as Nancy Mitchell argues, the Patriotic Front had very little trust in Britain. ¹³³

When the British finally did return to Rhodesia in 1979–80 they came under fire from ZANU for supposed partiality. Mugabe was quick to attack the new British governor, Lord Soames, for trying to prevent him from coming to power. ¹³⁴ Soames was also accused of reneging on the agreement signed at Lancaster House the previous year, as well as making efforts to ‘hinder as much as possible the election prospects of ZANU’ with an aim to improve Muzorewa and Sithole's chances of victory. These efforts, they said, included keeping a ZANU delegation out of Salisbury during a period when Muzorewa was holding rallies. ¹³⁵ In claiming that Muzorewa was a ‘quisling’ who was a ‘puppet’ of the British, ZANU explicitly sought to present him as ‘not good for the people’, in contrast to Robert Mugabe, who was the opposite, ‘a true representative of the people’. ¹³⁶ ZANU was either concerned or confident enough to release a letter from Mugabe to Margaret Thatcher outlining the various supposed imperial acts of Lord Soames. Further accusations included that the British had allowed ‘a mammoth army’ of South African troops to enter Rhodesia, in order to ‘destroy the fighters for freedom and install a (welcome?) [sic] regime in power’. ¹³⁷ ZANU then pushed this further, claiming that the entire ceasefire procedure was a scheme to concentrate guerrilla fighters in staging points where they would be at the mercy of a combined British, Commonwealth, and South African assault. ¹³⁸ It would be easy to assume that ZANU attacked the British because they were getting on well with ZAPU. Indeed, one ‘senior British source’ told the Daily Telegraph that ‘Mr Nkomo is being extremely helpful’. ¹³⁹ This may have been true, although ZAPU had been denouncing Britain in similar terms as late as November 1979. ¹⁴⁰ Another reason may have been that the British believed that ZANLA was not adhering to the ceasefire properly, with many fighters still at large. The fact that they claimed that Britain was smearing ZANLA as ‘lawless’ is suggestive of this. ¹⁴¹ In addition, the 1979 Conservative manifesto had come very close to promising recognition for the Zimbabwe–Rhodesian Government (but carefully did not) must also have fed into this. Certainly, ZANU wished their supporters to see Lord Soames and the British Government in the most negative terms possible, as opponents who were trying to propagate the Muzorewa regime and prevent a ZANU-PF victory.

The Rhodesian Bush War/Zimbabwe War of Liberation was one of the great media wars of the post-1945 era. More than any other conflict in Africa it was waged almost as much with words as with weapons. Both ZANU and ZAPU were acutely aware of the need to win this public debate and sought to use every occasion available to them to do so. As such, it was inevitable that Britain was going to be dragged into the arena of discussion. ZANU and ZAPU had a highly ambivalent yet complex relationship with Rhodesia's colonial power, and their media output shows this. In particular, it reflects the unusual nature of the Rhodesian dispute, in which the British Government was positioned against its own colonists, but did not support either of the main African nationalist movements. As a result, ZANU and ZAPU had no confidence that Britain would (or could) ensure that any settlement was in their favour. On the one hand, it was tempting to score easy hits against Britain's imperial record, and for having failed to prevent the UDI débâcle in 1965. On the other hand, it was also necessary for them to engage with the British since, ultimately, it was the UK Government which had the power to formally grant them independence. One can further see a fear of being politically eclipsed as a key motivating factor in the later 1970s. Concerned that the Internal Settlement might lead to recognition of Zimbabwe–Rhodesia, it was vital for the Patriotic Front that they undermine its credibility as much as possible, both domestically and on the international stage. They had a range of strategies to do this, but one central one was to link figures such as Muzorewa with Britain and to present them as being agents of imperialism. Likewise, when ZANU felt threatened by the relationship that the UANC and ZAPU had with Lord Soames in 1980 they quickly denounced him as biased. Another element of ZANU and ZAPU media output was, of course, the need to appeal to the sentiments of both their international supporters and wider post-colonial society across Africa. As this article has shown, they were adept at this, differentiating their media output to their audiences. When speaking to the communist world the British were ‘neo-imperialists’, backing up Smith, but when engaging with Africans and the West, Britain's power was downplayed. Change can also be seen over time: whereas in the 1960s criticism was directed at the British Government's failure to act, by the later 1970s Britain was dismissed for lacking the ability to bring Rhodesia to heel. It seems that, by that point, ZAPU was concerned about unwelcome American interference. The British were acting in conjunction with the US to create a ‘puppet regime’. The relationship between the British and their colony was therefore emphasised in an attempt to edge the USA out of negotiations. Comments about British business were shaped by the framework of socialist rhetoric within which the two groups operated. Sanctions busting in particular was a gift for relations with the communist world. Having said all this, nationalist propaganda probably also reflected their frustration at having to work with a British state that (to them) never quite seemed to move firmly enough against Rhodesia, whatever its representatives might have claimed.