Culture of Corruption? The Effects of Priming Corruption Images in a High Corruption Context

Abstract

We examine what situational cues may influence corruption intentions of individuals in a high corruption context. We primed Brazilian participants with images related to corruption, but with different behavioral connotations (either images suggesting political corruption or images of a Malandro, a powerless antihero who blurs moral boundaries by breaking the law to survive). Corruption intentions increased in Studies 1 and 2 when individuals were primed with political corruption images, compared with a control condition. In Study 2, Brazilians who strongly identified with their country were more likely to endorse corruption scenarios, particularly when primed with Malandro images due to the dual activation of positive national symbols and morally ambiguous connotations. These findings highlight that conceptually related symbols within a cultural system can be linked to differential behavioral patterns. We outline some implications for corruption and cultural research, in particular, the need to study intracultural variability of psychological processes.

Keywords

culture priming corruption Malandro

Corruption has enormous negative effects on the well-being of individuals and societies, wasting resources that could help to combat poverty and malnutrition and increase the quality of life of billions of people (Azfar, Lee, & Swamy, 2001). Understanding predictors of corruption intentions of individuals is therefore a major challenge for behavioral researchers. A number of large-scale multinational studies have identified economic, social, and cultural factors associated with corruption. Societies characterized by low economic development, strong traditional group cleavages, high income inequality, and hierarchical social role systems are typically more corrupt (e.g., Husted, 1999; Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2007; Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011; O’Connor & Fischer, 2012; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005; Treisman, 2007; You & Khagram, 2005), with some authors even arguing for a culture of corruption (Smith, 2005).

However, individual-level research is lacking and has typically focused on dishonesty (Ariely, 2012; Gino & Ariely, 2012) or explored demographic differences in leniency toward corruption (Gatti, Paternostro, & Igolini, 2003; Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Azfar, 2001; Vauclair & Fischer, 2011). Moreover, little is known about predictors of individuals’ corruption intentions within cultural systems characterized by high levels of corruption. We describe two priming studies in which we manipulated cultural symbols related to corruption that have different behavioral implications and examined whether these would change corruption intentions of individuals in a high corruption context.

Culture and Cultural Symbols

Culture is typically defined as a shared set of values, norms, and beliefs of a group of people (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010; Fischer, 2012, 2013; Kuper, 1999) that can be activated through situational cues. For example, priming studies have used symbols of U.S. or Chinese culture to change the cultural mind-sets of both bicultural (e.g., Chao, Chen, Roisman, & Hong, 2007) and monocultural individuals (see Oyserman & Lee, 2008 for a review). When primed with Chinese symbols, U.S. American students tend to behave more prototypically Chinese and vice versa. Yet, many cultural systems have complex social histories, developed from a mingling of different cultural systems and characterized by hierarchically differentiated roles.

All modern nation states have had some extended contact with another cultural system (via colonization, migration, or extensive trading), resulting in a complex array of cultural influences that have action potential for individuals. At the same time, within each nation, different ideologies and social movements have competed for power and influence. As a consequence, diverse cultural cues are likely to exist within modern cultural systems that may have different potential to elicit behavioral responses (see Kwan, Chiu, & Leung, in press). In many Western nations, for example, cultural ideologies of freedom and autonomy are juxtaposed with narratives of community and prosociality, which are in turn shaped by historical, social, and economic conditions (Haidt, 2012).

These different cultural symbols and norms are prevalent in the public discourse and may lead to conflicting and contradictory behavioral scripts. Individuals within the cultural system will recognize cultural symbols attached or derived from these various sources (without necessarily being aware of the historical origin) and will typically agree about the positive or negative valence of these symbols. The presentation of such cultural symbols may temporarily activate associated behavioral scripts or beliefs and attitudes that increase the likelihood that individuals will act in line with the activated cultural cue.

In contrast to current cultural priming studies emphasizing broad cultural icons (e.g., Chinese wall, Statue of Liberty, politicians) or social orientations (e.g., I vs. we), we focus on specific cultural symbols that are likely to be unintelligible to cultural outsiders unfamiliar with the cultural history, but that will influence action scripts of cultural insiders (Brazilians in our case). We use symbols that are conceptually related to corruption behavior, but that at the same time have different behavioral implications.

Culture and Corruption in Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world both in terms of land area and population density. The anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro (1995) used the label of “ethnic matrices” to explain the conjoint historical influences of native Americans, Europeans, and African culture in the creation of Brazil as an independent country, which has successfully blended these cultural traditions into a complex, but coherent unitary culture (see also DaMatta, 1979/1997). At the same time, Brazil is hierarchically stratified along economic and social lines, originating from a differentiation between plantation owners and the feudal bureaucracy on one side, and the poor (both free citizens and slaves) on the other side. Cultural scripts deriving from this mix of cultural, social, and economic factors are multidimensional and multilayered, creating a rich action field (Lewin, 1943) within which individuals can operate.

We focus on two sociocultural symbols in Brazil, both of which have implicit and explicit connections to corruption. First, Brazil is characterized by significant levels of corruption at the political level. Headlines concerning politicians and large businesses being marred by corruption are regularly in the news, and implicate politicians from the local level to the highest ranks of government. The public awareness of these high-profile corruption cases is a sign of political openness and press freedom, but this awareness is also accompanied by a widely acknowledged failure to bring corrupt politicians to justice (as one proverb implies, “the police arrest, the courts set free”). Corruption in the political arena can be traced back to feudal systems of patronage (Freyre, 1963; Holanda, 1973) in which rich plantation owners became patrons of and donors to officials of the state, and the representatives of state in turn represented the interests of the patrons. We expected that priming individuals with an example of political corruption would invoke behavioral scripts of power abuse: Individuals in high-status positions use their status and power to gain unfair advantage. Therefore, we predict that priming of political corruption images is associated with greater corruption intention.

We contrast political corruption primes with the symbol of the “Malandro” (person) or “Malandragem” (behavior). The Malandro is a fascinating and complex hero in Brazilian folklore and everyday discourse. DaMatta (1979/1997) provides the most complete social analysis of the myth of the Malandro. The stereotypical narrative of a Malandro resembles Western stories of the poor (typically male) who by overcoming incredible challenges and obstacles proves his sincerity and humanness. However, the ending of any stereotypical Malandro story is different to Western narratives. The Malandro does not become part of the system (e.g., assuming a high social status position by having shown his worth) or alternatively, does not revert the hierarchy by punishing the wrongdoers and creating a more egalitarian and humane order (i.e., he is not the equivalent of a “Robin Hood” figure). The Malandro ultimately rejects the systems and remains at the margins and excluded from the formal social order, while still imposing his otherness and marginality; therefore, reinforcing the social order as normality.

The Malandro is morally and socially complex. He is excluded and a victim of the social order, but then uses and abuses the order to his advantage to survive, blurring the moral boundaries of what is right and wrong or good and bad. In popular discourse, the term refers to an individual who avoids work and makes a living off scams, deception, and petty crime, and enjoys fast living, multiple lovers, and a bohemian lifestyle of fun and pleasure. A Malandro is outside the social order, yet does not object to this outsider status and does not feel an inclination to join the social order, and rather is setting himself apart through his mannerisms, clothing, and way of talking. Symbolically, the Malandro is strongly associated with Afro-Brazilian culture (especially Carnaval and various forms of Afro-Brazilian religions, especially Candomble, and syncretic forms of Catholicism) and the stereotypical symbol is an Afro-Brazilian male dressed up in a characteristic white suit and Panama hat (DaMatta, 1979/1997).

Psychologically, Malandragem behavior is positively associated but empirically distinct from engaging in corruption (Ferreira, Fischer, Porto, Pilati, & Milfont, 2012; Pilati, Milfont, Ferreira, Porto, & Fischer, 2011): It not only involves breaking laws and social norms in a way that is similar to corruption but also the different social narrative of the powerless trying to make a living in an unfair and hierarchical society (DaMatta, 1979/1997). Both Malandragem and corruption in Brazil belong to a larger cluster of behavioral strategies called Jeitinho Brasileiro (Ferreira et al., 2012; Pilati et al., 2011), which involve flexible problem solving in hierarchical settings. Whereas an outsider may consider all behaviors falling within Jeitinho Brasileiro to be corruption (Barbosa, 2006), in the local Brazilian cultural context, Malandragem is dissociated from Western conceptions of corruption. Corruption requires a social position of power that can be abused. Malandros do not have this social status. Malandragem involves a different behavioral script of the powerless making a living in an unfair and bureaucratic system through morally debatable behaviors and without challenging the system directly. As a consequence, Malandragem priming should not activate behavioral intentions and beliefs associated with abuse of power.

Accordingly, we predict that political corruption symbols will implicitly encourage individuals to endorse the abuse of power (because they involve an abuse of power by the political elite in society, and are symbolic of social acceptance of such abuse), while Malandro symbols will not increase ratings for corruption scenarios involving abuse of personal power (as Malandros are associated with narratives of the powerless acting in morally debatable ways only as a necessary method to survive). We test these predictions with citizens of Rio de Janeiro, a city that has a strong stereotypical association with both Malandragem and a history of corruption (e.g., Goslin, 2004).

Study 1

Method

The sample consisted of 142 participants (79 females, M age = 25.5 years, SD = 5.1). The modal monthly income was between R$1,000 and R$1,500 (approximately US$490-US$740). Young people (mostly students at various university campuses) were approached via snowball sampling. Master’s students at a large private university distributed surveys to equal numbers of male and females and invited them to take part in a short study on the behavior of Brazilians in different social situations. Participants were primed with cultural symbols present within Brazilian culture that either emphasize corruption (cartoons and pictures presenting corrupt officials and police), or Malandragem (a traditional malandro in white suit; a scene from a street bar showing the bohemian lifestyle of Malandros; Walt Disney’s Ze Carioca). Three pictures for each condition were selected during focus group discussions with 10 graduate students (all material is available from the first author on request). We also included a control condition with neutral pictures (clouds; see Chao et al., 2007).

People were presented with the pictures and were asked to write down the thoughts and ideas that came to mind when seeing these pictures. They had six lines below the pictures to write down their thoughts and no time limit for this task. Most people completed this task within 1 to 3 min. The vast majority of participants either referred to malandragem or malandro in the Malandro condition. A total of 33% of participants listed “Malandro” or “Malandragem” as first word and 42% mentioned “Samba” as second most important word (DaMatta, 1979/1997 discussed the link of Malandragem to samba and carnival as the inversion of social order). Other keywords also included “bohemian lifestyle,” “Candomble/Macumba,” “Carnaval,” “Happiness,” “Party,” or “Ze Carioca.” In the corruption condition, the modal first response was “corruption” (45% of responses), followed by “robbery” (17%). The control condition was associated with a wider set of words, with the most frequent words being “peace” (19% of first responses), and “liberty” (10% of first responses). After completing some filler items (social desirability scale; Gouveia, Guerra, Sousa, Santos, & Costa, 2009), participants then completed a six-item corruption scale (Ferreira et al., 2012) in which respondents indicated (0 = very improbable to 10 = very probable) to what extent they would behave like corrupt individuals described in short scenarios (α = .84). This corruption scale was presented on a separate page from both the priming material and the filler task. The scale items are listed in the appendix.

Results and Discussion

A one-way ANOVA showed a significant main effect for priming: F(2, 139) = 15.39, p < .001, η² = .181.¹ When primed with corruption images, participants were more likely to endorse corruption behaviors (M = 4.01, SD = 2.94) compared with both the control condition (M = 2.98, SD = 2.01) and Malandragem (M = 1.33, SD = 1.98), all p < .05. Malandragem priming resulted in the lowest endorsement of corruption. Controlling for gender or demographic differences did not change the results.

As mentioned above, Malandragem is a relatively complex cultural symbol. We examined what associations individuals with high versus low corruption intentions reported in response to the priming. These qualitative findings are based on too few cases, but can provide some insights into potential mechanisms. Examining those individuals with a zero score on the corruption intention (n = 15) versus those with a score of 1.5 or higher (n = 14), few differences emerged. Individuals with low corruption intention scores listed the terms “Malandro”/“Malandragem” more frequently than high scorers (8 vs. 4 times), and low scores also reported associations with sexuality (e.g., “sensuality,” “promiscuity,” “prostitution”; 7 vs. 1 time) and Afro-Brazilian religion (e.g., “Candomble,” “Macumba,” and “Umbanda”²; 3 vs. 1 time) more often than high scorers. In contrast, high scorers reported both associations with “luxury” and “night”/“darkness” (5 vs. 0 times among high vs. low corruption intention individuals). The combination of responses also suggested a pattern whereby low corruption intention individuals associated Malandragem and Samba with combinations of happiness, good times (diversao), music, and sexual terms; whereas high corruption individuals tended to mention Malandragem in association with night/darkness and luxury. The association with darkness and luxury is theoretically interesting, as both terms have been found to increase moral transgression (e.g., Hirsh, Galinsky, & Zhong, 2011; Zhong, Lake, & Gino, 2010). These findings support our prediction that different cultural symbols have differential motivational effects on corruption intentions, even though objectively both sets of symbols have conceptual links to corruption and morally debatable behaviors.

Study 2

One important issue in the context of corruption is national identity. Malandragem incorporates an image of Brazilians as socially creative and flexible in interpreting the rules and norms of society to solve problems created by the formal bureaucracy. We could expect that national identification moderates reactions to Malandragem versus corruption images. Because corruption is typically perceived negatively (Ferreira et al., 2012), people identifying strongly with the country will likely be motivated to downplay negative behaviors. The image of political corruption damages the positive image of Brazil. High identifiers should be motivated to protect the image of their nation and this should weaken corruption tendencies. Thus, we predict that when being primed with corruption images, individuals with a strong sense of Brazilian identity should report less intention to engage in corrupt behavior.

However, the Malandro is a national symbol that has a number of positive associations with Brazilian identity, primarily via the national music of samba and the world famous Rio carnival (Vianna, 1999). What is important is that Malandragem is morally ambiguous and involves breaking social rules and norms. The cultural narrative of the Malandro emphasizes his status as a morally ambiguous figure that continuously blurs the distinction of right and wrong (DaMatta, 1979/1997). The creative rule bending is often associated with Brazilian ingenuity to make things work, a spontaneous form of Brazilian problem solving, which infringes formal laws, but helps people to overcome daily problems (see DaMatta, 1979/1997; Ferreira et al., 2012) and therefore can become a positive distinctive feature of Brazilian identity (Vianna, 1999). By priming symbols of Malandros, the moral ambiguity should be triggered together with the positive associations of Brazilian identity (samba, carnival, flexibility in problem solving) that should spread the activation to increase corruption intentions. Therefore, the moral complexity of highly positively stereotyped national symbols should make corruption more easily accessible in the minds of respondents who highly identify with Brazil. Hence, we predicted that individuals with a strong sense of Brazilian identity who were primed with Malandragem images would respond more favorably to corruption scenarios, compared with individuals with a weak sense of Brazilian identity. Therefore, our second study aimed to replicate and extend findings from Study 1 in a new nonstudent sample, by investigating the moderating effects of sense of national identity on the previously found priming effects on corruption intentions.

Method

A total of 171 residents of Rio de Janeiro (92 females, M age 47.4 years, SD = 10.6) participated in this study. The modal monthly income was above R$3,500 per month (approximately US$1,700). Participants were recruited by students in their homes or at workplaces, following the same procedure as in Study 1. Similar words were elicited by the participants, with Malandro references being most frequent in the Malandro priming condition (43% of participants mentioned it first) and corruption references being most frequent in the corruption condition (54% of respondents mentioned it first). Prior to the priming task, participants completed a 14-item Brazilian national identity scale developed by Leach et al. (2008). Example of items include “Being a Brazilian is an important part of how I see myself,” “I feel connected to other Brazilians,” “I am happy to be a Brazilian,” “I often think about the fact I am Brazilian.” Internal consistency for the national identity scale was adequate (Cronbach’s α = .91). Cronbach’s alpha for corruption intentions was .88.

Results and Discussion

We conducted a General Linear Model analysis with priming (3: corruption, malandragem, control) and identity (continuous variable) as predictors. The main effects of priming,³ F(2, 165) = 7.02, p < .01, η² = .078, and identity, F(1, 165) = 4.08, p < .05, η² = .024, were significant, as was their interaction, F(2, 165) = 5.25, p < .01, η² = .06. Corruption intentions were significantly higher (p < .01) in the corruption priming condition (M = 3.48, SD = 3.30) compared with the Malandragem condition (M = 2.01, SD = 2.60), and marginally (p < .10) higher compared with the control condition (M = 2.47, SD = 2.33). This conceptually replicates the pattern observed in Study 1.⁴

In line with predictions, the simple slope of identity predicting corruption intentions was significant and negative in the control (b = –.85, p < .05; r = –.32; n = 54) and corruption (b = –.91, p < .05; r = –.27; n = 61) condition, but positive and marginally significant (b = .49, p < .10; r = .21, n = 56) in the Malandragem condition. A two-way ANOVA with priming and high–low identity (median split) as between-subject variable revealed the same interaction: F(2, 165) = 3.22, p < .05, η² = .038. High national identity individuals in the Malandragem condition are more likely to endorse corruption intentions compared with low national identity individuals (p < .05), see Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Interaction between national identity and priming on corruption intentions (Study 2).

None of the other comparisons across levels of identity within conditions were significant, implying that identity did not moderate the effects of the corruption and control manipulation. The overall effect of condition was significant: F(2, 165) = 4.048, p < .05, η² = .047, with scores in the corruption manipulation being significantly higher than the Malandragem condition (p < .01) and marginally higher than the control condition (p = .06).

We also examined what associations came to mind by high versus low identifiers in the Malandragem condition. Again, a few noteworthy trends emerged. Low identifiers listed “Samba” and “Malandro”/“Malandragem” more than high identifiers (“Samba”: 14 vs. 6; “Malandro”/“Malandragem”: 17 vs. 13). Associations of Malandro/Malandragem among high identifiers were more often qualified by adjectives referring to traits (e.g., “cunning”), locations (specific places in Rio associated with Malandros), or historical references (e.g., implying the good old times of Rio’s past in the 1920s to the 1960s). No qualifications of the terms Malandro/Malandragem were reported by low identifiers. High identifiers also mentioned more diverse music and dance styles, often with localized or historical associations (e.g., “pagode,” “gafiera,” “chorinho”). In addition, among high identifiers there were slightly more diverse references with negative connotation, including prostitution, depraved individuals, vulgarity, and terms implying sensation seeking (e.g., “prazerosos”). This suggests that high identifiers had more diverse associations that elicited not only more negative connotations but also more historical and localized associations.

General Discussion

Corruption has attracted a significant amount of research at the country level, but what motivates individuals to engage in these behaviors is not well understood. Many developing nations are plagued by high levels of corruption, which is often rejected at a symbolic level by the very same individuals who engage in it (Smith, 2005). By studying different situational primes in a highly corrupt context, we were able to identify some important situational facilitators of corruption.

Priming Corruption

Our findings provide one answer to the question why corrupt systems persist even in the face of public outcry about them. First of all, media images of corrupt politicians getting away with severe infringement of the law primes notions of corruption on a regular basis and therefore will make such behaviors more salient and accessible to individuals when opportunities arise. The obsession with corruption and crime in daily news in Brazil may facilitate further corruption in everyday behavior, via promulgation of corruption as descriptive norms (Ferreira et al., 2012; Fischer, 2006; Pilati et al., 2011). Perceiving the apparent benefits of corrupt behavior, individuals become susceptible to behave in similar ways if an opportunity arises. Perceiving that even the constituted authorities show disregard to the laws, Brazilians tend to feel that everything is allowed, leading to distrust in institutions and moral values expressed by cynical reasoning (Costa, 1994). In future studies, it would be interesting to examine how these dynamics change after the recent sentencing of high-profile politicians in Brazil (e.g., the former chief of staff to President Lula). We predict that this will shift corruption intentions to be lower.

Concerning the differences in the corruption versus the control condition, it is noteworthy that the correlations between corruption intention and national identity were negative in both the control and corruption condition. The corruption prime was very explicit and clearly negative. Being presented with a clearly negative symbol, high identifiers were as likely to reject corruption intentions as high identifiers in the control condition. This is a major difference with Malandragem, a more complex cultural symbol.

Priming Complex Cultural Symbols

In contrast, symbols associated with the powerless engaging in illegal activities did not activate corruption intentions, except for those who highly identify with Brazil. Malandragem is associated with distinctive positive features of Brazilian identity (including samba, carnival, flexibility in negotiating social relations). At the same time, these symbols have also negative associations with moral transgressions. It was interesting to see that the strongest distinction between high versus low identifiers was found in the condition with the most culturally loaded symbols (associated with Afro-Brazilian culture). Drawing on sociological theories (DaMatta, 1979/1997), we argued that this differentiation is due to the complex narratives and features of Malandros, providing not only positive associations via their connection to important cultural symbols but also negative implications by increasing the accessibility of morally questionable behavior. We found that individuals who highly identify with Brazil appeared to report more negative associations (as well as more historical and local references) in comparison with individuals who did not identify as strongly with Brazil. It suggests that these negative associations may then have triggered higher levels of corruption intentions among high identifiers. This observation raises interesting questions. For example, are high identifiers more critical of cultural symbols such as Malandros, but by noting more negative associations of these symbols, the threshold for moral transgressions is lowered? Alternatively, do high identifiers embrace both the positive and negative aspects more generally, leading to these moral transgression intentions if these symbols are activated in specific situations? Future studies, in which specific instructions are given to individuals (e.g., to evaluate the morality of cultural heroes vs. a condition that does not prime morality; manipulations of corruption and Malandro images simultaneously to highlight their conceptual similarity) may shed some light on these processes.

In Study 1, we also found that associations with Malandragem in connection with either luxury or references to darkness/night were more frequent among high corruption intention individuals. This is particularly noteworthy because past research has demonstrated that darkness cues can increase moral transgressions (Hirsh et al., 2011). Future studies that differentiate these plausible patterns are necessary. For example, Malandro symbols could be given in light or darkly lit rooms or in presence of luxury items and differential effects on moral intentions and behaviors of participants be noted.

Potential Mechanisms Underlying Our Effects

We found consistent effects across studies showing that images of corruption increase corruption intentions. The most likely mechanisms underlying these effects are (a) shifts in cost–benefit ratios, (b) activation of descriptive norms, and (c) activation of behavioral scripts associated with corruption. These three mechanisms are not necessarily distinct from each other. For example, the priming of a descriptive norm (e.g., Chiu et al., 2010) of corrupt behavior in Brazil may both shift the ratio of cost–benefits toward benefits (“everyone is doing it, so the chances of detection and punishment are low”) and activate behavioral scripts of corrupt behavior. Future studies that manipulate different levels of costs or benefits (via differential incentives, probability of detection, levels of punishment); accessibility of behavioral scripts (common vs. uncommon situation that makes activation of behavioral scripts more or less likely); and information about descriptive norms (e.g., by providing information about levels of corruption) may help to distinguish some of these processes.

In contrast, the Malandragem priming may work via semantic associations. We noted that individuals who were higher in corruption intentions listed words associated with night or darkness (Study 1) and negative associations more generally (e.g., high identifiers in Study 2). It may be that these semantic associations of Malandragem activate associations that then lead to lowered thresholds for moral transgression. These potentially different mechanisms are theoretically interesting and should be explored in future studies.

Limitations and Conclusions

Future research can address some of the shortcomings of our research. For example, future research could investigate temporal effects (e.g., following the recent cases of corruptions sentences handed to former politicians), the extension to which different priming methods (e.g., word scramble tasks, sentence completion) or dependent measures show similar results. We opted for presenting visual stimuli given the relatively ease of reaching participants in natural settings. We used scenarios that have been developed and validated in Brazilian samples (Ferreira et al., 2012), but future studies may use different measures of unethical behavior suitable for experimental studies (e.g., Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009) as well as behavioral measures in real-world settings to identify whether these patterns generalize to real behaviors.

Cultures are characterized by conflicting demands that are imposed on individuals and are variably reinforced, maintained, and changed by individuals. Studying the effects of such culturally complex and rich symbols can help us understand what behaviors are more likely to be triggered on a daily basis. We demonstrated these effects in Brazilian nonstudent samples and particularly focused on national identification as one potential moderator. Other recent studies have examined how political figures may increase intersubjective norms of national identity and liking for stereotypical national brands (Kwan et al., in press). This emerging paradigm of intracultural priming opens up exciting avenues for further exploration of how cultural symbols and identification with cultural subgroups interact in the emergence of social behaviors that in their aggregate have significant social implications.

Footnotes

Appendix

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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