Institutional and Value Support for Cultural Pluralism Is Stronger in Innovative Societies With Demanding Climate

Abstract

Past research shows that democracy is valued more in affluent societies with challenging climate than in other societies. Building on this finding, the present study examines how the amount of institutional and value support for cultural pluralism in a society is related to its climate and level of innovation performance. Cultural pluralism is defined as the societal condition in which minority groups within a society can maintain their distinctive cultural identities, values, and practices provided that they are consistent with the laws and values of the wider society. Institutions and values that support cultural pluralism include political democracy, tolerance for uncertainty, prioritization of secular-rational values, and openness to foreign cultures. I hypothesize that institutional and value support for cultural pluralism is stronger in societies with more challenging climate and higher innovation performance. I tested this hypothesis using society-level measures of harshness of climatic condition and innovation performance as predictors. The results showed that in societies with demanding climate and high innovation performance, their citizens tend to support democracy, are more tolerant of uncertainty, prioritize secular-rational values, and take more leisure trips outside of their home country. These results illustrate that innovation, through its moderation effect on climate, predicts the amount of institutional and value support for cultural pluralism, highlighting the reciprocal effects of culture and innovation.

Keywords

creativity innovation country-level cross-cultural democracy uncertainty avoidance cultural pluralism cultural psychology

Culture is a set of shared meanings that provide the common ground for individuals to coordinate their activities in collective living; it consists of formal and informal institutional structures that are set up to help individuals adapt to the external environment (Chiu & Chen, 2004; Hong & Chiu, 2001; Kashima, 2000; Shore, 1996; Sperber & Sperber, 1996). For example, in some areas of Tibet, before the marriage law was implemented, fraternal polyandry was widely practiced. It was not uncommon for a woman to be married to more than one husband, who were brothers to each other. This form of marriage institution made sense in the relatively hostile terrains of Tibet, where there was a huge demand for farm labor and a need to protect land ownership inside the family.

This example illustrates how the physical environment shapes the evolution of a culture. Recent advances in ecological psychology (Oishi & Graham, 2010) have demonstrated that economic, political, and religious institutions, as well as climates and geography can exert a distal and yet significant influence on human psychology and account for important variations in attitudes and behaviors across human groups (Chen, Chiu, & Chan, 2009; Chiu & Kwan, 2010; Georgas, van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Oishi, 2010; Van de Vilert, 2013).

To extend this research, the current study seeks to understand how the extent of institutional and value support for cultural pluralism in a society is related to its citizens’ attempts to cope with harsh physical environments through innovation. I hypothesize that institutional and value support for cultural pluralism is stronger in a society where a high level of innovation performance is available for coping with harsh climate. If this hypothesis is confirmed, the present study will be the first empirical demonstration of how climate and innovation can predict the prevalence of institutional and value support for the development of a pluralistic society. I will develop this hypothesis in the following sections after explaining the construct of cultural pluralism and its supportive institutions and values.

Cultural Pluralism

According to the Webster Dictionary, pluralism is “a state of society in which members of diverse ethnic, racial, religious, or social groups maintain and develop their traditional culture or special interest within the confines of a common civilization.” In line with this definition, Hazard and Stent (1973) referred to cultural pluralism as the societal condition in which minority groups within a society can maintain their distinctive cultural identities, values, and practices provided that they are consistent with the laws and values of the wider society.

What are the conditions that are conducive to the development of cultural pluralism in a society? According to Pantoja, Perry, and Blourock (1976), for cultural pluralism to prosper in a society, its members are required to adhere to certain regulative values—values that are adhered to by most members of the society and backed up by policy positions, institutions, and other socialization processes. Priority regulative values enhancing cultural pluralism include openness, acceptance, and appreciation of a heterogeneous society and diverse cultures.

Extensive discussions on the meaning of pluralism can also be found in Connolly (1995). As a philosophical doctrine, pluralism refers to the belief that there is more than one ultimate principle; the reality cannot be explained by one principle. As a social axiom, it values multiplicity in beliefs and institutions. As a political theory, it affirms the value of flexible consensus and dissensus in political decision-making. Because perfect consensus over the definitions of the good is hardly achievable, political institutions should be designed to enable expression of competing ideals and interests. A secular-rational approach that prioritizes the use of reason and logic is the preferred approach to managing disagreement and making decisions.

In short, cultural pluralism fosters in a society that embraces diversity, affirms the merits of exposing individuals to conflicting ideas and interests, and tolerates uncertainty and differences. Cultural pluralism prospers in pluralist democracies that have more than one center of power and democratic institutions, which allow participation in government of all eligible members of a state through elected representatives. Cultural pluralism also flourishes in societies that prioritize secular-rational values of the use of reason and logic to negotiate meanings and settle disagreements among diverse groups.

Accordingly, the current study focuses on the following institutional and value support for cultural pluralism: presence of democratic institutions, tolerance of uncertainty, prioritization of secular-rational values, and openness to foreign cultures.

The Climato-Economic Theory

Past research has shown that the climate of a society is systematically related to its cultural and political values. For example, a recent cross-country study found that affluent societies with demanding climate tend to prefer and develop democratic institutions (Van de Vilert, 2013). Van de Vliert (2013) classified societies into three types: (a) societies with unchallenging or unthreatening climate, (b) societies with harsh climate and little economic resources to cope with it, and (c) societies with harsh climate and abundant economic resources to cope with it. Societies with harsh climate and little coping resources (threatening climate) have a high need for closure when deciding how to cope with extreme external conditions, and hence prefer hierarchical political organizations and autocratic leadership instead of pluralist and participatory democracy. In contrast, societies with harsh climate and sufficient wealth resources to cope with extreme climates (challenging climate) prefer democratic organizations that give each citizen a voice in political bargaining and collective decision-making. Hence, democracy is more prevalent in challenging than unchallenging habitats, and less prevalent in threatening than nonthreatening ones (Van de Vliert & Postmes, 2012). Furthermore, the level of democracy is positively associated with life satisfaction and happiness in societies with challenging climates only (Van de Vilert, 2013).

To explain these findings, Van de Vliert (2013) argued that sociocultural and political institutions are a part of the evoked culture that has evolved to cope with climatic threats or challenges. To elaborate, Van de Vliert (2013) contended that people continuously and unconsciously appraise how their place of residence affects their well-being and adaptively respond to the perceived challenges and threats in their habitat. The theory further posits that people have a universal need for thermal comfort in their interaction with the environment and perceive extreme climate to be challenging when they have sufficient wealth resources to cope with it and threatening when they do not.

From this perspective, a society’s culture can be shaped by the society’s climatic environment (Van de Vliert, 2011). Although societies with demanding climate are more likely to prioritize survival goals over self-expression goals (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Oyserman, 2004), those with economic resources to cope with demanding climate are more likely to value self-expression goals because individuals are free from the burden of hardship associated with extreme climates. On the contrary, societies that do not have the economic resources to cope with demanding climate are more likely to prioritize survival goals because they lack the means to cope with the hardship associated with demanding climate. Consistent with these ideas, Van de Vilert (2011) found that media freedom—an institution of self-expression—tends to be repressed in poor societies with demanding climates and promoted in wealthy societies with demanding climates. In short, wealth resources can moderate the effect of harsh climate on a society’s culture.

Innovation and Culture

Innovation and economic growth are integrally related. Richer societies invest more in innovation, and improved innovation performance accelerates economic growth. Thus, there are at least two ways innovation performance can influence the relationship between climatic demand and culture. First, like economic resources, innovative technology designed to create a comfort zone in adverse climate conditions is a resource for coping with demanding climate. Second, innovation performance can accelerate economic growth, which in turn generates more wealth resources for coping with demanding climate. As shown in past research, availability of coping resources may explain the popularity of pluralistic democracy in societies with demanding climate. Accordingly, societies that have developed innovative technology to cope with harsh climates are more likely to be societies that embrace cultural pluralism. Based on this idea, which is illustrated in Figure 1, I predict that among societies with harsh climate, those with higher levels of innovation performance will have a greater tendency to value and practice cultural pluralism.

Figure 1.

Innovation performance moderates the effect of climate on cultural pluralism.

To flesh out this prediction, an elaboration of the reciprocal effects of innovation and culture is in order. Innovation refers to the implementation of a new and significantly improved product, process, or method in marketing, management, or external relations (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], 2010). The building block for innovation is creativity, generally referred to as the capability to conceive of something that is both novel and useful (Amabile, 1996). Creativity invigorates innovation, and both are important determinants of country-level economic growth (Cornell University, INSEAD, & WIPO, 2013). Consistent with the joint effect of climate and economic wealth on cultural evolution, I argue that although societies with demanding climate tend to have monist cultures with hierarchical institutions, pluralist cultures tend to prevail in societies with similarly demanding climate but have developed and used innovation to generate wealth and technology, which can be used to create human-made comfort zones in the otherwise hostile physical environment.

In this conceptualization, wealth and technology are not competing explanations of why cultural pluralism is not equally popular or unpopular in all societies with demanding climate. Instead, innovation is a means to create wealth and technology to cope with the burden of harsh climate. The collective experiences of overcoming climatic challenges through innovation—and the wealth and technology it creates—are empowering. Such empowering experiences increase a society’s ability to manage uncertainty and its readiness to embrace cultural diversity. As a result, the society is more prepared to develop a pluralist democracy. Thus, I hypothesize that democracy, tolerance for uncertainty, and secular-rational values are more prevalent in societies with demanding climate and higher levels of innovation performance. In addition, because societies with harsh climate and higher levels of innovation performance are relatively open to cultural diversity, individuals from these societies are also more likely to take leisure trips to explore unfamiliar cultures in foreign countries.

The current study aims to make three important theoretical contributions. First, it extends past research on the cultural effect of climate to a constellation of values and practices associated with cultural pluralism. Second, it links the relative prevalence of various expressions of cultural pluralism across societies to the interaction of natural and human-made environment. Being one of the few studies that have examined the joint effect of physical and human-made ecologies, the current study further extends the conceptual and empirical relevance of the climato-economic theory advanced by Van de Vilert (2011).

Finally, in relation to the theme of this special issue, the current research extends cross-cultural research on culture and innovation by treating innovation as a predictor and culture as an outcome variable. Although the positive impact of innovation on economic growth is widely accepted, how innovation affects the evolution of a cultural syndrome has not been systematically researched, probably because of the lopsided emphasis on the effect of culture on innovation in previous cross-cultural psychological studies of innovation (Chiu & Kwan, 2010; Kwan & Chiu, 2015; Mahbubani, 2002; Morris & Leung, 2010). By treating culture as an outcome of innovation, the current research highlights the reciprocal influence of culture and innovation.

Method

Dependent Measures

Country-level data from pertinent data sources were used to test my hypotheses. As in Van de Vliert (2013), political democracy was measured by the Unified Democracy Scores (Pemstein, Meserve, & Melton, 2010), which covers 10 aspects of political values and practices in a country, including fair elections, party competition, openness of executive recruitment, freedom of organization and expression, civil liberties, and citizen participation.

Two other dependent measures were Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance Index (Hofstede, 2001) and the Traditional Versus Secular-Rational Index from the World Value Survey (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which members of a community feel uncomfortable in novel, unknown, surprising, and atypical situations. The Traditional Versus Secular-Rational Index measures the extent to which people in a community accept nonconventional values and practices related to cultural pluralism (e.g., gay rights, divorce, and abortion) instead of adhering to traditional conventions.

The final dependent measure was the number of foreign leisure trips per capita in the country from 2002 to 2011 (Euromonitor International, 2013). The reason for using the 10-year average to form a summary index was to reduce the impact of extraneous fluctuations in the measure.

Independent Variables and Moderator

Climatic demand was the independent variable in the current study. To measure it, we used the index of climatic demand for 137 countries reported in Van de Vliert and Postmes (2014). This measure reflects the upward deviations from 22 ^oC for the average highest temperature in the warmest month and the downward deviations from 22 ^oC for the average lowest temperature in the coldest month from 1960 to 1990. Higher scores on this measure indicate more demanding climate in the country.

Innovation performance was the moderator in the current study. I used the Global Innovation Index (GII; Cornell University et al., 2013) to measure country-level innovation performance. The GII ranks innovation performance of 143 countries or economies, based on 81 indicators of innovation input and output. GII was available up to 2014 when the current study was conducted. However, there were major revisions in the scoring method of the GII in 2011 and that of many indicators in the 2014 Index. The overall GII ranking includes political institution as an innovation input. To avoid overlap in the measurement of the moderator (innovation performance) and the dependent variable (the Unified Democracy Scores), I used the GII Innovation Output Sub-Index in 2013 as a measurement for Innovation performance in the current study. The GII Innovation Output Sub-Index does not overlap with the contents measured by the Unified Democracy Scores. It consists of two major components: The Knowledge and Technology Outputs component and the Creative Output component. The Knowledge and Technology Outputs component includes 14 items (α = .86): (a) the number of patent applications filed by residents at the national patent office; (b) the number of international patent applications filed by residents at the Patent Cooperation Treaty; (c) the number of utility model applications filed by residents at the national patent office; (d) the number of scientific and technical journal articles; (e) The H index: the number of published articles (H) that have received at least H citations in the assessment period; (f) the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per person engaged; (g) new business density; (h) total computer software spending; (i) the number of ISO 9001 certificates issued; (j) high-tech and medium-high-tech output; (k) royalty and license fees; (l) high-tech net exports; (m) communications, computer, and information services exports; and (n) foreign direct investment net outflows. The Creative Output component consists of 13 items (α = .87): (a) number of national office resident trademark registrations, (b) number of Madrid system trademark registration by country of origin, (c) number of information and communications technology (ICT) and business model creation, (d) number of ICTs and organizational model creation, (e) amount of audiovisual and related services exports, (f) number of feature films produced, (g) extent of daily newspapers circulation, (h) amount of printing and publishing output, (i) amount of creative goods exports, (j) number of generic top-level domains, (k) number of country-code top-level domains, (l) number of Wikipedia monthly edits, and (m) number of video uploads on YouTube.

The Knowledge and Technology Outputs component and the Creative Output component were highly correlated (α = .72). The mean of the two components was used to create the overall Innovation Output score in this study.

Control Variable and Other Measures

Because innovation performance and wealth are highly related, in the current study, I also included in the analysis each society’s wealth, measured by the average GDP/capita from 2002 to 2011 (Euromonitor International, 2013; α = .998). In my analysis, I first included the main effect of wealth in the multiple regression models to test whether the interaction of climate and innovation performance on cultural pluralism was significant after controlling for the main effect of wealth. Next, I also included in the multiple regression models the interaction of climate and wealth to test whether the interaction of climate and innovation performance remained significant after considering the interaction of climate and wealth.

Finally, individualism, which refers to the tendency to assign higher priorities to the pursuit of personal goals (Triandis, 1995), is one of the most researched cultural dimensions. Although individualism is conceptually different from cultural pluralism, many individualist cultures practice pluralistic democracy. To differentiate cultural pluralism from individualism, I also included in my measures the individualism index obtained from the Hofstede individualism index (Hofstede, 2001).

Results

Political Democracy

I predicted a significant interaction effect of climatic demand and innovation performance on the four measures of cultural pluralism. For each measure, I tested in a multiple regression model the main effects of climatic demand (mean-centered) and innovation performance (mean-centered) and their interaction. I also controlled for the effect of log-transformed GDP/capita in the analysis.

As shown in Table 1 (Model 1) and Table 2, the predicted interaction of climatic demand and innovation performance on political democracy was significant (β = .0002, p < .01). Table 1 shows that for societies with demanding climate, higher innovation performance was associated with higher political democracy. For societies with nondemanding climate, the effect of innovation performance on political democracy was not significant. Political democracy was most prevalent in societies with demanding climate and high levels of innovation performance, and least prevalent in countries with demanding climate and low levels of innovation performance. This finding is consistent with our empowerment argument and suggests that democracy tends to flourish in societies that have developed innovative technology to cope with demanding climate.

Table 1.

Summary of OLS Regression Analysis Results on Political Democracy, Uncertainty Avoidance, Secular-Rational Values, Number of Leisure Trips, and Individualism.

	Political democracy		Uncertainty avoidance		Secular-rational values		Number of leisure trips		Individualism
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
CD	−0.003 (0.003)	−0.002 (0.003)	−0.005 (0.16)	−0.06 (0.15)	−0.005* (0.17)	−0.005* (0.02)	−0.003** (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	0.22 (0.12)	0.25* (0.12)
IO	0.009** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	−0.62** (0.20)	−0.47* (0.21)	0.0005* (0.003)	0.0005* (0.003)	0.003* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.18 (0.15)	0.12 (0.16)
CD × IO	0.0002* (8.90e−5)	8.90e−5 (0.0001)	−0.02** (0.008)	−0.001 (0.01)	−0.0002** (8.61e−5)	2.35e−5 (0.00001)	−0.0001** (3.87e−5)	7.29e−5 (6.18e−5)	0.001 (0.006)	−0.007 (0.009)
GDP/capita	0.22*** (0.054)	0.23**** (0.05)	6.52 (3.50)	3.40 (3.67)	0.23* (0.05)	0.24* (0.04)	0.094* (0.024)	0.10*** (0.024)	9.51** (2.66)	10.74*** (2.84)
CD × GDP/Capita		0.003(0.003)		−0.46* (0.20)		−0.005* (0.002)		0.001(0.001)		0.18(0.16)
Intercept	−0.08	−0.11	98.3	101.9	−0.17	−0.23	−0.22	−0.23	−3.4	−4.85
R ²	53.5%	54.2%	21.1%	28.0%	62.0%	64.6%	56.4%	56.7%	58.3%	59.4%
n	116	116	56	57	69	69	116	116	56	56

Note. For innovation performance, higher scores indicate higher performance. GDP per capita was measured in US$1,000, and was log-transformed to reduce skewness. All continuous predictors were mean-centered in the analysis. The regression weights are nonstandardized weights. Standard errors of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses. OLS = ordinary least squares; CD = climatic demand; IO = innovation output.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ****p < .0001.

Table 2.

Estimated Values of the Dependent Variables for Countries With Varying Climatic Demands and Innovation Performance.

Climate	Nondemanding (25th percentile)		Demanding (75th percentile)
Innovation performance	Low(25th percentile)	High(75th percentile)	Low(25th percentile)	High(75th percentile)
Political democracy	0.45[0.24, 0.66]	0.64[0.38, 0.90]	0.11[−0.13, 0.35]	0.74[0.55, 0.93]
Uncertainty avoidance	72.6[46.01, 99.14]	70.73[58.89, 82.56]	112.47[86.96, 137.98]	67.01[60.07, 73.96]
Secular-Rational Value	0.35[0.07, 0.63]	0.31[0.09, 0.52]	−0.21[−0.46, 0.04]	0.23[0.11, 0.36]
Number of foreign leisure trips	0.17[0.07, 0.27]	0.17[0.06, 0.27]	0.16[0.04, 0.27]	0.41[0.32, 0.49]

Note. 95% confidence intervals for the estimated value are indicated in square brackets.

Uncertainty Avoidance

Table 1 (Model 1) and Table 2 show that the predicted interaction of climatic demand and innovation performance on uncertainty avoidance was significant (β = –.02, p < .001). As shown in Table 1, among societies with demanding climate, those with higher levels of innovation performance had lower uncertainty avoidance. This finding is consistent with the climato-economic theory, which asserts that in societies with threatening climate, innovation performance can increase tolerance of uncertainty. Among societies with nondemanding climate, innovation performance had no effect on uncertainty avoidance. In short, societies facing severe weather and that manage to innovate have the lowest levels of uncertainty avoidance.

Secular-Rational Values

The predicted interaction of climatic demand and innovation performance on secular-rational values was also significant (β = –.0002, p < .001; Table 1, Model 1). Tables 1 and 2 show that among societies with demanding climate, those with higher innovation performance endorsed secular-rational values more. For societies with nondemanding climate, the effect of innovation performance on secular-rational values was not significant. Acceptance of nonconventional and subcultural values and practices was the lowest in societies with demanding climate and low innovation performance. In societies with demanding climate and high innovation performance, endorsement of secular-rational values was comparable with that in societies with nondemanding climate.

Leisure Trips to Foreign Cultures

The predicted interaction of climatic demand and innovation performance on the frequency of making leisure trips to foreign cultures was also significant, as shown in Table 1 (β = .0001, p < .001; Model 1). As shown in Tables 1 and 2, in societies with demanding climate, higher levels of innovation performance were associated with higher frequency of making leisure trips to foreign cultures. In contrast, there was no association between innovation performance and leisure trips in societies with nondemanding climate. Table 1 also shows that the frequency of making leisure trips to foreign cultures was the highest in societies with demanding climate and high innovation performance.

Additional Analyses

As mentioned earlier, GDP per capita and innovation performance were highly correlated (r = .77). I had controlled for the main effect GDP/per capita in the analyses reported above. I also performed additional analyses, in which I replaced the interaction of innovation performance and climatic demand with that of GDP per capita and climatic demand. As shown in Table 3, the interaction of GDP per capita and climatic demand was significant on all dependent measures except secular-rational values (Political Democracy (β = .0002, p < .01), Uncertainty Avoidance (β = –.02, p < .01), and Number of Leisure Trips (β = .0001, p < .001).

Table 3.

Summary of OLS Regression Analysis Results on Effects of Climatic Demand and Country’s GDP on Cultural Pluralism.

	Political democracy	Uncertainty avoidance	Secular-rational values	Number of leisure trips	Individualism
CD	−0.0004(0.003)	0.09(0.15)	−0.002(0.003)	0.004** (0.001)	0.36* (0.12)
Country’s GDP	0.018** (0.002)	−0.35** (0.15)	0.015** (0.002)	0.006** (0.001)	0.56* (0.12)
CD × Country’s GDP	0.0002* (0.0001)	−0.02* (0.01)	0.0001(.0001)	0.0001** (4.11e−5)	0.001(0.01)
Intercept	−0.39	89.52	−0.56	−0.35	−16.23
R ²	46.3%	15.9%	47.4%	50.1%	48%
n	116	57	69	116	57

Note. GDP per capita was measured in US$1,000, and was log-transformed to reduce skewness. All continuous predictors were mean-centered in the analysis. The regression weights are nonstandardized weights. Standard errors of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses. OLS = ordinary least squares; CD = climatic demand.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ****p < .0001.

Next, I included both the interaction of innovation performance and climatic demand and that of GDP per capita and climatic demand in the regression model. As shown in Table 1 (Model 2), the interaction of climatic demand and innovation performance became nonsignificant. However, when interpreting this result, it is important to note that in most developed economies, innovation is a major driver of economic growth. It is possible that the high innovation performance in a society drives economic growth and hence enables the citizens to use their wealth to cope with climatic challenges.

Individualism is the most researched cultural dimension in cross-cultural psychology. As shown in Table 4, individualism is positively correlated with political democracy (r = .71, p < .0001), innovation performance (r = .70, p < .001), GDP per capita (r = .71, p < .001), secular-rational values (r = .66, p < .001), and number of leisure foreign trips (r = .35, p < .01). To establish the discriminative validity of my results, I examined the main effects of climatic demand and innovation performance and their interaction on individualism. As shown in Table 1, the interaction of climatic demand and innovation performance on individualism was not significant.

Table 4.

Correlations of Political Democracy, Innovation Output, GDP Per Capital, Demanding Climate, Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance Index, Secular-Rational Values, and Number of Leisure Trips Taken.

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Political democracy
2. Innovation output	.65***
3. GDP/capita	.67***	.77***
4. Demanding climate	.33*	.49**	.53**
5. Individualism	.71***	.70***	.71***	.50**
6. Uncertainty avoidance index	.01	−.21	−.04	−.12	−.20
7. Secular-rational values	.79***	.61**	.68***	.25	.66***	−.21
8. Number of leisure trips	.48**	.53**	.56***	.60**	.35**	−.37*	.52**

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ****p < .0001.

An alternative explanation of my results is that innovation is motivated by having to deal with demanding climate and supported by cultural pluralism. To test this alternative explanation, I examined the effects of climatic demand and measures of cultural pluralism on innovation performance. As shown in Table 5, the interaction of climatic demand and cultural pluralism on innovation performance was not significant.

Table 5.

Summary of OLS Regression Analysis Results on the Effects of Climatic Demand and Cultural Pluralism (Political Democracy, Uncertainty Avoidance, Secular-Rational Values, Number of Leisure Trips) on Innovation Performance.

Dependent variable = Innovation performance
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
CD	.11(.08)	0.04(0.10)	0.11(0.11)	0.06(5.51)
PD	285* (7.92)
CD × PD	0.04(0.11)
UA		–0.20* (0.08)
CD × UA		−0.0003(0.004)
SV			11.1* (5.42)
CD × SV			0.004(0.18)
FT				10.99(8.83)
CD × FT				0.11(0.35)
Country’s GDP	11.13(1.51)	12.6** (1.70)	9.75** (2.08)	12.45** (1.52)
Intercept	24.1	50.60	33.72(6.72)	26.77
R ²	66.7	63	65	65.3
n	116	57	69	116

Note. For innovation output, higher scores indicate higher performance. GDP per capita was measured in US$1,000, and was log-transformed to reduce skewness. All continuous predictors were mean-centered in the analysis. The regression weights are nonstandardized weights. Standard errors of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses. OLS = ordinary least squares; CD = climatic demand; PD = political democracy; UA = uncertainty avoidance; SV = secular-rational value; FT = foreign trips.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ****p < .0001.

Discussion and Conclusion

The current study shows that society differences in the prevalence of values and practices associated with cultural pluralism (preference for democracy, prioritization of secular-rational values, receptiveness to diverse cultures, and tolerance of uncertainty) can be predicted from the interaction of the societies’ climate and levels of innovation performance. Among societies with demanding climate, those that are more innovative are more likely to practice democracy, prioritize secular-rational values, and have higher tolerance for uncertainty and frequency of visiting foreign cultures.

These findings extend the climato-economic theory of cultural evolution. First, I found that like GDP/capita, innovation moderates the effect of climate on the prevalence of cultural pluralism. My additional analysis shows that after controlling for the interaction of climatic demand and GDP/capita, the interaction of climatic demand and innovation performance on measures of cultural pluralism became nonsignificant. This result may suggest that innovation is a major driver of economic growth. Innovation-enabled economic growth allows citizens living in societies with demanding climate to cope with the adverse climatic conditions they face. The experiences of overcoming physical hardship through agentic human behaviors may in turn foster values and practices that support cultural pluralism. In contrast, our evidence indicated that in societies with nondemanding climate, innovation-driven economic growth is not related to the prevalence of cultural pluralism. The results in this article contest that the need to innovate in harsh climatic environment is a mechanism to regulate or even foster cultural pluralistic values. In a place where there is no environmental pressure for innovation, cultural pluralistic values are likely not linked with innovation. This is consistent with our current findings in this article. Future research can seek to uncover what, if not innovation, are linked with pluralistic cultural values in societies with nondemanding climatic environment.

Second, my results extend the joint cultural effects of climate and coping resource from democracy to other values and practices associated with cultural pluralism, including exploration of foreign cultures, uncertainty avoidance, and secular-rational values. Nonetheless, given the correlational results from the current study, it is premature to draw conclusions regarding the direction of causal inferences, although the results in Table 5 do not support the idea that prevalence of cultural pluralism in societies with demanding climate promotes innovation performance.

The relationship between culture and innovation is a complex one; culture can affect and be changed through innovation (Chiu & Kwan, 2010). For example, innovation promotes cultural and economic changes, but culture also influences the development of innovation (Galambos, 1997). Indeed, extensive research has sought to identify the cultural factors that foster innovation (Arrow et al., 1995, 2004; Ayres, 2008; Kwan & Chiu, 2015). Because innovation often requires disruption to the market economies and physical ecologies (Beise-Zee & Rennings, 2005; Boons & Wagner, 2009; Rennings, 2000), tolerance for uncertainty is necessary to support innovation. Ecological economists have also found that when a society moves toward democracy, entrepreneurship tends to flourish (Potts, Foster, & Straton, 2010).

Finally, past psychological studies of culture and innovation have focused on cultural differences in innovation. The present research adds to this literature by examining how innovation, through its moderation effect on climate, predicts relative prevalence of pluralist culture. This analysis highlights the reciprocal effects of culture and innovation. Future research may extend this investigation by examining how innovation in societies with harsh climate predicts development of cultural pluralism over time.

In summary, consistent with the climato-economic theory, the physical and human-made environments interact with each other to affect the evolution of many different aspects of the evoked culture in a society. People living in physical habitats with demanding climate tend to appraise their living environment as uncomfortable and even threatening. When people in these societies cannot develop and use innovative technology to create a comfort zone in the hostile physical habitat, they may feel vulnerable and experience psychological uncertainty, expect their well-being to be externally controlled, craze for cognitive closure and avoid uncertainty, feel reluctant to explore foreign cultures, and resist political democracy. In contrast, when people living in demanding climates manage to develop and use innovation and the wealth it generates to create a comfort zone in the otherwise unfriendly physical environment, they feel empowered, tend to support democracy, and be tolerant of uncertainty and willing to explore other cultures.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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