Cultural Factors Facilitating or Inhibiting the Support for Traditional Household Gender Roles

Abstract

Movement toward gender equality has occurred worldwide for the past century; nevertheless, some people still strongly endorse traditional gender norms. We investigated the associations of societal characteristics (gross domestic product [GDP] per capita and the gender empowerment measure) and cultural characteristics, including Hofstede’s, Schwartz’s, and Welzel’s scores (hierarchy vs. egalitarianism, person vs. social focus, mastery vs. harmony, long-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity–femininity), with support for traditional household gender roles. To reveal advantageous or disadvantageous conditions for support for traditional household gender roles, we conducted a secondary data analysis with representative samples (n = 59,713) of 41 societies collected by the International Social Survey Program. According to the multilevel modeling analysis, individuals have lower endorsement of traditional household gender roles in societies that value mastery and enjoy economic development (i.e., GDP per capita), gender equality (measured by the gender empowerment measure), and personal focus. Contrarily, individuals have higher endorsement of traditional household gender roles in societies where hierarchy, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and masculine characteristics are valued. Individual characteristics (women, work experience, education, big-city experience, and younger generations) also predict lower support for traditional household gender roles. In addition, gender differences in traditional household gender roles are larger in societies with greater economic development and personal focus and lower emphasis on hierarchy and long-term orientation. Finally, the national means of traditional household gender roles predict concurrent social movement activities and gender equality at a later time. Potential mechanisms are further discussed.

Keywords

personal vs. social focus cultural characteristics gender equality

Movement toward gender equality has occurred worldwide since the 19th century (Rupp, 1997). Despite progress over such a long period of time, traditional gender norms are still robust and are reflected in many women’s lives across societies, such as in sex-selective abortion (e.g., in China, Huang et al., 2016) and domestic abuse (30.0% of Indian women reported abuse by their husbands in the past year, Kalokhe et al., 2017, and 47.2% of Indian women found such abuse justifiable, World Bank, 2016). Although many societies are changing in ways that allow individuals to fulfill their potential regardless of their gender, ethnicity, or social status (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), some societies still socialize individuals to internalize society’s different expectations and norms with regard to men and women (e.g., traditional gender norms, Allen, 1996; Spade & Valentine, 2011). Understanding how cultural and societal characteristics may affect support for traditional gender norms may be helpful in revealing the potential barriers that prevent individuals from realizing their potential (e.g., women who support traditional gender norms are more likely to care for family members and are less likely to have a full-time job, and even if they have a job, they earn less, Lee & Pratto, 2018).

Traditional gender norms specify appropriate behaviors for men and women. In the name of tradition and cultural values, traditional gender norms legitimize unequal gender power and can be considered a form of gender-based hierarchy. For example, according to these norms, women are expected to take care of family members’ needs, whereas men are expected to support the family financially. Consequently, many women are confined to the private home with limited social interactions and rely on men for resources, whereas men are encouraged to form connections that may benefit not only the family but also themselves (e.g., success in personal careers). It is not surprising that household gender norms place more restrictions and burdens upon women than men (Constantin & Voicu, 2015) and that roles conventionally associated with women are viewed as having less importance and status. As a result, the documented changes in the gender system are asymmetrical, with many women entering men’s world (e.g., having jobs) but few men entering women’s world (e.g., becoming full-time housekeepers or taking on feminine jobs, England, 2010).

The gender socialization of norms and behaviors (e.g., the household gender roles) is well studied in Western cultures (e.g., Blashill, 2011; Koenig et al., 2011; Lenton et al., 2009; Murnen & Smolak, 2009; Reilly & Neumann, 2013; Tenenbaum & Leaper, 2002) but is relatively understudied in non-Western societies. Investigating gender norms and behaviors across Western and non-Western cultures may reveal how traditional gender norms and behaviors may be supported through cultural values and conventions. That is, gender equality ideals may interfere with local culture and such interference may create tension in how members of these societies grapple with gender equality ideals. Culture provides an interpretive framework for individuals to make sense of the world, such as through cultural values and social norms. When social movements promote gender equality ideals that are consistent (inconsistent) with the mainstream values and norms in a given culture, the members of that culture are likely to accept (reject) such gender equality ideals. In Western societies, individual freedom and equality are core values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), and gender equality ideals may seem consistent with these values (Schwartz & Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). However, gender equality ideals that derive from individualism and liberalism may violate some traditional values in non-Western societies (e.g., family values in Chinese societies; Hu & Scott, 2016). Consequently, gender equality ideals may be at odds with core cultural values in non-Western societies.

Thus, our research aims to further knowledge about the gender socialization of norms and behaviors in both Western and non-Western societies. To this end, we adopt an etic approach to investigate traditional gender norms cross-culturally. Traditional gender norms are multifaceted and crosscut at least two dimensions: power differentials between women and men and the areas in which these roles manifest (Constantin & Voicu, 2015). Due to the complex nature of traditional gender norms, it is important to identify a scale with at least configural and metric invariance across societies (Constantin & Voicu, 2015). We targeted traditional household gender roles because they relate to the power differentials between women and men and the areas in which men and women are expected to fulfill their roles (men as breadwinners and women as housekeepers). Constantin and Voicu (2015) found that items on traditional household gender roles in the International Social Survey Program 2002 showed configural and metric invariance across societies. Furthermore, because traditional household gender roles can be considered part of a gender-based hierarchy, recognizing the power differentials between women and men may be the first step in rejecting such gender roles. As expected, previous researchers have found that individuals who identify as feminists are more likely to reject traditional gender norms (among women, Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010; among men, Silver et al., 2019).

Due to the lack of systematic investigation of the interactions between societal/cultural and individual processes on gendered household roles, we drew insight from a theory of politicized collective identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), and we targeted the first step in challenging traditional household gender roles. That is, individuals need to be aware of the increased restrictions and burdens that traditional household gender roles place on women compared with men (e.g., awareness of shared grievances, Simon & Klandermans, 2001) to reduce the support for such roles. This step involves (a) individuals’ awareness of differential treatments based on one’s gender and (b) awareness that such treatments are not properly justified. Societal and cultural characteristics that increase awareness of such differential treatments or the recognition of such treatments as unfair and unequal may be linked with lower endorsement of traditional household gender roles.

In addition to the endorsement of traditional household gender roles, societal and cultural characteristics may enlarge or diminish gender differences in the support of such roles. Drawing insight from the research of Lee et al. (2011) on group-based hierarchy, socialization that encourages women in particular to recognize gender-based interests (such as the looseness of the society) or to embrace masculine roles may enlarge gender differences in traditional household gender roles. Likewise, socialization that encourages men to embrace feminine roles may diminish gender differences in such roles. Although general support for and gender differences in traditional household gender roles could be statistically analyzed as independent components, the cultural characteristics associated with gender differences in traditional household gender roles are often associated with the level of general support in real-life phenomena. For example, if a cultural characteristic encourages women to reject traditional household gender roles to a larger degree than that it encourages men, the cultural characteristic would be associated with lower support and larger gender differences in traditional household gender roles. Only when a cultural characteristic is associated with women’s and men’s support for traditional household gender roles to the same degree but in opposite directions is the cultural characteristic associated only with gender differences in traditional household gender roles.

Previous researchers have observed that economic progress may generate systematic changes in two distinctive value dimensions. One dimension is traditional versus secular-rational values, and the other is self-expression versus survival values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). That is, with economic progress, individuals are more likely to adopt rational over traditional values (e.g., deference to authority) and emphasize self-expression and subjective well-being over necessities (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The more people support secular-rational and self-expression values, the more likely they are to support gender equality (Yeganeh, 2017). Thus, if economic progress is associated with the two distinctive dimensions, the support for traditional household gender roles should be lower in societies with higher economic progress. Because traditional household gender roles specify asymmetrical statuses for men and women (e.g., Croft et al., 2015), such as more restrictions and burdens of household gender roles on women than men (Constantin & Voicu, 2015), embracing values that reject traditions and emphasize personal well-being may encourage women to be more likely to reject traditional household gender roles than their male counterparts. In short, we hypothesize that gender differences in traditional household gender roles should be larger in societies with higher economic progress.

Drawing insight from previous research that documented fundamental cultural dimensions across societies (i.e., Hofstede, Schwartz, Welzel), we systematically examine cultural characteristics that may be associated with support for traditional household gender roles. However, research evidence for the associations between cultural characteristics and traditional household gender roles is limited. Researchers have compared traditional gender norms in a handful of countries that vary in specific cultural characteristics (e.g., An & Kim, 2007; Gibbons et al., 1991; Milner & Collins, 2000). Because these countries may differ in several cultural characteristics at the same time, it is difficult to pinpoint the associations between specific cultural characteristics and support for traditional household gender roles.

We adopt a different approach by targeting a large set of countries and combining multiple cultural indices identified by various researchers that tap into latent cultural dimensions to evaluate the associations between cultural characteristics and support for traditional household gender roles. To this end, we build upon Schwartz’s (1999) value theory, which identified three latent dimensions of cultural values: (a) egalitarianism versus hierarchy, (b) autonomy versus embeddedness, and (c) harmony versus mastery.

The first dimension of cultural characteristics involves the way people consider the welfare of others—specifically, whether others are considered moral equals or are individuals socialized to hierarchical distributions of roles (Schwartz, 2004). Some societies may encourage their members to view each other as equals, whereas other societies may instill in their members the idea that appropriate relationships are hierarchical and that subordinates should show deference to their superiors and comply with obligations and rules according to their roles (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 2008). This dimension has been captured by Hofstede’s (1980, 2018) power distance score and by Schwartz’s (2008) egalitarianism versus hierarchy scores.

If societies encourage individuals to view each other as equals, individuals in such societies may reject traditional household gender roles due to the differentially and often unequally defined roles for men and women. Power distance scores across societies are associated positively with managers’ support for traditional gender norms (Parboteeah et al., 2008) and gender-stereotypic styles (e.g., task-oriented and directive behaviors, van Emmerik et al., 2010) and negatively associated with the proportion of women on corporate boards (Carrasco et al., 2015). In short, we hypothesize that support for traditional household gender roles should be higher in societies that emphasize hierarchical values.

In addition, if societies encourage individuals to view each other as equals, they may encourage women to compare themselves to men and increase gender differences in the support for traditional household gender roles. Guimond and his colleagues (2006, 2007) found that individuals in hierarchical societies (indexed by power distance) may compare themselves to same-sex others, thus reducing gender differences in self-perceptions (e.g., relational interdependence and independence/agency). It is possible that women in egalitarian societies may compare themselves with men and may be more likely to reject traditional household gender roles than their female counterparts in hierarchical societies due to the additional burdens and restrictions of these roles placed on women. If men in egalitarian societies support traditional household gender roles as much as their male counterparts in hierarchical societies, probably because these roles may benefit them in terms of more freedom and fewer obligations, gender differences should be smaller in hierarchical societies than in egalitarian societies. Conversely, if men reject traditional household gender roles as much as their female counterparts in egalitarian societies, gender differences in these roles should remain the same as those in hierarchical societies. In short, we hypothesize that gender differences in traditional household gender roles should be equal or smaller in societies marked by hierarchical values and characteristics relative to societies marked by egalitarian values and characteristics.

The second latent cultural dimension concerns a primary personal focus versus a social focus (Schwartz, 2012), such as in Schwartz’s autonomy versus embeddedness values (Schwartz, 2008) and Hosftede’s (1980, 2018) individualism-collectivism scores. In societies that prioritize social focus, the cultural ideals are to fit in, to act according to one’s role and to promote others’ goals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In societies that prioritize the person, the cultural ideals are to be independent, to be unique and to express the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Consequently, members of cultures that promote social focus tend to define themselves by ingroups (e.g., family) and value adherence to obligations, whereas members in cultures that promote personal focus may value self-actualization, privacy, and freedom (Triandis et al., 1990).

The cultural characteristics of personal versus social focus may affect how people view traditional household gender roles through two potential processes. Both processes may affect the levels of general support for traditional household gender roles and gender differences in such support. The first process involves cost-benefit analysis and whether this analysis occurs on the personal level or on the relationship level. If a person’s self is embedded in roles or relationships with others (e.g., what is best for the relationship/family?), it may be difficult for the individual to see the underlying status asymmetry of gender roles (e.g., Croft et al., 2015). Conversely, in societies where cultural characteristics encourage individuals to think for themselves (e.g., what is best for me?), women may be encouraged to be aware of the additional restrictions and burdens that traditional household gender roles place on them. The second process is via the pressure of others. Women in social-focused societies may be socialized to care more than women in person-focused societies about proper social norms. The supporting evidence is from Amanatullah and Morris (2010), who found that women (but not men) are less likely to bargain for themselves (to be assertive) because being assertive may violate female gender roles, but men and women are equally likely to bargain for friends. However, Carrasco and colleagues (2015) found that after controlling for Hofstede’s other scores, individualism-collectivism scores were not associated with the proportion of women on corporate boards. It is possible that these mixed findings are due to the different outcome variables. Amanatullah and Morris targeted how men and women evaluate and respond to a specific situation, whereas Carrasco and colleagues investigated the actual proportion of women on corporate boards, which may be constrained by the corporate structure and culture. Because we evaluate individuals’ support for traditional household gender roles, which is more similar to Amanatullah and Morris’ outcome variable, we hypothesize that the cultural characteristics of personal focus (in comparison to social focus) are expected to be associated with lower support for traditional household gender roles. In addition, via either the cost-benefit analysis or the pressure of others’ sanctions, both processes may reduce women’s motivation to conform to traditional household gender roles more than men’s motivation in societies with personal focus (vs. social focus), and gender differences in the support for traditional household gender roles are expected to be larger in these societies.

The third dimension, identified by Schwartz (2004), is the degree to which people manage their relations to the natural and social world. In societies that value harmony (e.g., peace, protecting the environment), individuals may attempt to fit in and understand and appreciate the world as it is. In societies that value mastery (e.g., values such as success and competence), individuals are encouraged to change, direct, and exploit. It is possible that Hofstede’s masculinity–femininity scores are also addressed in this dimension. According to Hofstede (2001), masculinity–femininity is associated with a fundamental dilemma of the “relative strength of nurturance interests versus assertiveness interests.” Societies that emphasize differential gender roles and expect men to possess traits such as ambition, assertiveness, toughness, and the acquisition of wealth would be high on Hofstede’s (2001) masculinity–femininity score. Conversely, societies that emphasize feminine traits for both men and women, such as being tender, caring, and nurturing, would be low on Hofstede’s masculinity–femininity score. Societies that emphasize active self-assertion, measured by Schwartz’s mastery score, may be similar to Hofstede’s masculine societies, whereas fitting into the social and natural world, as measured by Schwartz’s harmony score, may be similar to Hofstede’s feminine societies. If valuing feminine traits is a key factor in men taking on feminine roles (e.g., household chores, acting as caretakers), it is possible that men in these societies may support traditional household gender roles less than men in societies that value masculine traits. Thus, we predict that gender differences in traditional household gender roles should be larger in societies that emphasize masculine traits, including mastery, consistent with Hofstede’s (2001) explicit definition of masculinity as “a measure of gender role differentiation” (p. 285). Gender differences in traditional household gender roles should be smaller in societies that emphasize harmony and feminine traits. However, we did not have specific predictions of how this cultural dimension may be associated with general support for traditional household gender roles.

Although Schwartz’s (2004) three cultural dimensions provide an initial framework for our study of cultural characteristics, there are other cultural characteristics that may not be included in the three dimensions. Two of these cultural characteristics are Hofstede’s (1980) uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation (Hofstede, 2001). Uncertainty avoidance indicates a society’s intolerance of uncertainty or ambiguity. Because traditional household gender roles provide individuals with clear behavioral scripts to follow, members of high uncertainty avoidance societies should be more likely to endorse traditional household gender roles. Uncertainty avoidance scores across societies are observed to be positively associated with managers’ support for traditional gender norms (Parboteeah et al., 2008), managers’ gender-stereotypic styles (e.g., task-oriented and directive behaviors, van Emmerik et al., 2010), and the proportion of female managers (indexed by cultural tightness, Toh & Leonardelli, 2012) but not with the proportion of women on corporate boards (Carrasco et al., 2015), most likely due to structural constraints. In short, because traditional household gender roles provide clear behavioral scripts for people to follow, we predict that uncertainty avoidance should be linked positively with support for traditional household gender roles but should have no effect on gender differences in support for traditional household gender roles.

Finally, if a society encourages its members to think beyond the present time, a person may weigh the importance of the future and emphasize planning, hard work for future benefit, and perseverance (Bearden et al., 2006). This cultural characteristic is captured by Hofstede’s long-term orientation. During the development of Hofstede’s long-term orientation (initially used interchangeably with Confucian dynamism), respect for tradition was considered a characteristic of short-term orientation (Hofstede, 2001). However, Bearden and colleagues argued that long-term orientation should be defined as “the cultural value of viewing time holistically, valuing both the past and the future rather than deeming actions important only for their effects in the here and now or the short term.” Two sets of evidence support Bearden and colleagues’ conceptualization of long-term orientation. First, Bearden and colleagues collected data and found two subfactors of long-term orientation: respect for tradition and planning. The two subfactors were positively associated with each other and were positively associated with consumer frugality and personal ethics (Bearden et al., 2006). Hofstede (2001, p. 360) also found that people in high long-term orientation societies are more likely to agree with the traditional gender role belief that a “preschool child will suffer if the mother works,” consistent with Bearden and colleagues’ argument that respect for tradition is a characteristic of long-term orientation. Second, the current long-term orientation scores are LTO-WVS scores (see Hofstede et al., 2010), which are measured by three items (thrift, national pride, and the importance of service to others; Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). That is, people in high long-term orientation societies would find thrift important, whereas they would find national pride and service to others not important. In measuring LTO-WVS scores, respect for tradition is no longer an item for short-term orientation. People in long-term orientation societies may endorse traditional household gender roles more than those in short-term orientation societies, not only because these roles are traditional in the society but also because following these roles symbolizes one’s sacrifice of “immediate gains” (e.g., personal enjoyment or choices) for “greater gains” (e.g., the welfare of the family or others). Due to the paucity of data on cultural characteristics, we explore the association between gender differences in traditional household gender roles and long-term orientation.

The Present Research

Our goal for the present research was to systematically test how societal and cultural characteristics may be associated with women’s and men’s support for traditional household gender roles. We expected that support for traditional household gender roles should be lower in societies with more economic progress, more emphasis on egalitarianism values, more emphasis on a personal focus, lower uncertainty avoidance, and lower long-term orientation (see Table 1). In addition, because traditional gender norms place more restrictions and burdens on women than on men, gender differences in the societies that encourage women to think for themselves and to be aware of gender-based hierarchy were expected to be larger than gender differences in societies with societal and cultural characteristics that encourage women to think for others and to conform to the societal hierarchy. This should especially be the case in societies with more economic progress, more emphasis on egalitarian values, more emphasis on a personal focus, and more emphasis on control over the environment (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Hypotheses and Potential Processes.

Societal/cultural characteristics	Potential processes	Support for household gender roles
Societal/cultural characteristics	Potential processes	Mean levels	Finding	Gender differences	Finding
Economic progress (GDP per capita)	Increasing secular-rational and self-expression values over traditional and survival values	Negative	Negative	Larger	Larger
Hierarchy/power distance over egalitarianism	Justifying unequal power in household gender roles, encouraging intragender comparisons over intergender comparisons	Positive	Positive	Smaller	Smaller
Personal focus over social focus	Cost-benefit analysis on the individual level over the relational level, less aware of others’ pressure, such as social norms	Negative	Negative	Larger	Larger
Mastery/masculinity over harmony	Women encouraged to embrace masculine roles may support household gender roles less, and men encouraged to embrace feminine roles may support household gender roles less	N/A	Mixed: + (masculinity) /− (mastery)	Larger	n.s.
Uncertainty avoidance	Encouraging members to follow behavioral scripts such as household gender roles	Positive	Positive	N/A	n.s.
Long-term orientation	Encouraging individuals to give up immediate gains for “long-term gains”	Positive	Mixed: +/−	N/A	Smaller

Note. GDP = Gross domestic product.

To examine the associations between cultural characteristics and support for traditional household gender roles, we targeted the “Family and Changing Gender Roles (FCGR)” module, which includes information about gender roles and norms, collected by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP Research Group, 2016). The ISSP Research Group hosted an international collaboration of 41 societies in 2012 (see the list of societies in Table 2). This survey used a stratified multistage cluster-sampling design to obtain a nationally representative sample of adults aged 18 years and older.

Table 2.

Descriptive Analysis of Nations and Exploratory Factor Analysis of Traditional Household Gender Roles.

Country	Sample size	% female	Median age (years)	Years of education	Eigenvalue	Factor loadings	4-item a	THGR
Argentina	950	53.3	42.5	12	2.13	0.64	0.70	3.42
Australia	1,457	55.3	53.0	15	2.47	0.72	0.79	2.61
Austria	1,177	54.8	48.0	10	2.37	0.73	0.77	3.09
Belgium	2,030	52.1	49.0	12	2.48	0.74	0.80	2.64
Bulgaria	984	58.4	54.0	12	2.09	0.63	0.69	3.26
Canada	937	39.4	60.0	15	2.59	0.74	0.82	2.41
Chile	1,534	61.7	47.0	12	1.88	0.58	0.61	3.35
China	5,918	47.9	48.0	9	1.71	0.51	0.55	3.28
Croatia	983	53.3	45.0	12	2.32	0.70	0.76	2.78
Czech	1,769	55.5	47.0	12	2.14	0.52	0.70	3.07
Denmark	1,397	50.7	46.0	15	2.31	0.72	0.75	1.91
Finland	1,117	56.5	48.0	12	2.44	0.64	0.78	2.27
France	2,295	64.4	51.0	12	2.47	0.72	0.79	2.52
Germany	1,722	51.2	50.0	12	2.62	0.78	0.83	2.41
Hungary	1,000	52.6	47.0	11	2.32	0.71	0.76	3.39
Iceland	1,020	48.3	48.0	14	2.28	0.72	0.74	2.21
India	1,474	33.7	38.0	10	1.42	0.34	0.37	3.54
Ireland	1,102	64.3	50.0	15	2.50	0.73	0.80	2.48
Israel	1,178	56.2	44.0	12	2.12	0.65	0.70	2.96
Japan	1,165	55.3	50.0	12	2.09	0.66	0.69	2.60
Latvia	1,000	58.4	45.0	12	2.14	0.64	0.71	3.44
Lithuania	1,168	58.9	49.0	12	2.03	0.54	0.67	3.15
Mexico	1,403	51.0	38.0	9	2.00	0.67	0.67	3.57
Netherlands	1,247	53.5	56.0	14	2.64	0.79	0.83	2.47
Norway	1,380	51.6	48.0	15	2.51	0.76	0.80	2.18
Philippines	1,200	50.0	40.0	12	1.74	0.60	0.57	3.73
Poland	1,111	54.1	48.0	12	2.39	0.70	0.77	3.05
Portugal	985	54.7	48.0	9	1.99	0.64	0.66	2.97
Russia	1,491	64.5	47.0	12	2.14	0.63	0.71	3.47
Slovakia	1,114	53.8	53.0	12	2.08	0.56	0.69	3.27
Slovenia	1,010	54.3	51.0	12	2.57	0.74	0.81	2.76
South Africa	2,438	60.5	40.0	11	1.93	0.62	0.64	3.13
South Korea	1,396	55.8	50.0	12	1.94	0.61	0.64	3.35
Spain	2,559	53.1	48.0	11	2.15	0.70	0.71	3.30
Sweden	967	54.6	52.0	12	2.60	0.75	0.82	2.09
Switzerland	1,223	50.1	49.0	13	2.26	0.69	0.74	2.90
Taiwan	2,054	48.9	44.0	12	1.68	0.52	0.53	3.03
Turkey	1,551	52.3	39.0	9	1.90	0.50	0.61	3.42
UK	932	53.5	53.0	11	2.36	0.70	0.77	2.65
US	1,295	54.4	46.0	12	2.26	0.67	0.73	2.81
Venezuela	980	54.3	37.0	12	1.97	0.66	0.65	3.27

Note. An exploratory factor analysis using a principal axis factoring method to extract factors was conducted. Due to the one-factor solution largely observed across nations, no rotation method was imposed. A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on two randomly split samples with the paths set to be the same across societies. Due to the large sample size (Sample I = 30,656 and Sample II = 31,098), the chi-square tests were easily inflated by the sample size. Instead, the model fitness indices were used with absolute fit indices of AGFI and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). In both samples, the AGFI indices were .91 and the RMSEA was .02, indicating a good fit. THGR = Traditional household gender roles, ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree); AGFI = adjusted goodness of fit index.

We adopted multilevel modeling, specifying the first-level variable (e.g., participant sex) and second-level variables (e.g., cultural characteristics) in accounting for individuals’ support for traditional household gender roles. The cultural characteristics were used to model the intercept (i.e., mean support for traditional household gender roles) and the slope of participant sex (i.e., the gender difference in support for traditional household gender roles) while treating other variables as control variables.

Method

Sample

The first dataset was used to analyze latent cultural dimensions and was compiled from Hofstede’s (2018) scores, Schwartz’s scores (personal communication), and world value surveys (Welzel, 2014). The number of countries varied from 56 to 63. The second dataset was collected from 2011 to 2015; the sample characteristics are shown in Table 2. Missing data at Level 2 were treated with pairwise deletion. In total, there were 59,713 individuals (31,998 females) across 41 societies. There were a minimum of 930 respondents in each society (see Table 1).

Measurement and Data Collection

Traditional household gender roles

Five items pertaining to traditional household gender roles that have implications for gender equality were selected. An example item is “A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family.” These items suggest that men are expected to be successful (i.e., earning money), whereas women are expected to be relational (i.e., motherhood). Exploratory factor analysis was conducted across nations (see detailed information in Table 2). Among the five items, one item (“Both men and women should contribute to household income”) was excluded due to low factor loading. The remaining four items loaded on one factor, except in India (one item did not load on the factor). The item that had the lowest loading in India (“A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family”) also had the lowest loadings in the samples across nations (see Table 2). However, we kept this item in further analyses because it is the only item that probes men’s proper behaviors. The confirmatory factor analysis also showed that the model was equivalent across cultures (see the note under Table 2 for fit indices), consistent with Constantin and Voicu’s (2015) findings. The items used a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate greater agreement with traditional household gender roles. In the exploratory factor analysis, missing data (such as those who responded “don’t know”) were pairwise deleted.

Economic progress

We extracted data on the GDP per capita from 2007 (United Nations Development Programme, 2009). The GDP per capita of Taiwan in 2007 was separately extracted from the Taiwanese government’s report (National Statistics, Republic of China, 2019).

Cultural characteristics

To indicate the general liberalism of the sociocultural climate (which implies that people think for themselves and have self-concerns), we used S. H. Schwartz’s (personal communication, November 1, 2009) cultural values, Hofstede’s (2018) national norms, and the emancipation value index (Welzel, 2014). These three sets of measures include a large set of countries, are diverse in scope, and have been rigorously examined by other researchers. Schwartz presents seven orientations: intellectual autonomy, affect autonomy, embeddedness, harmony, egalitarianism, hierarchy, and mastery norms. These seven orientations reflect three aspects of human society: (a) the emphasis on different types of social structure (egalitarianism vs. hierarchy), (b) the relations and boundaries between the person and group (intellectual or affective autonomy vs. embeddedness), and (c) the relation between humans and natural resources (harmony vs. mastery).

We also included five of Hofstede’s scores: (a) individualism-collectivism assesses a society’s emphasis on the separate self (individualism) versus the group (collectivism), (b) power distance indicates individuals’ acceptance of unequal power distribution in organizations within a society, (c) masculinity–femininity describes a society’s salient values for men (wanting to be the best vs. liking what you do), (d) uncertainty avoidance indicates a society’s intolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity, and (e) long-term orientation measures the extent to which a society values planning over self-enhancement. Due to the different scales used by Hofstede, Schwartz, and Welzel, we standardized the scores before combining them.

We conceptually categorized the cultural characteristics and values into five dimensions (hierarchy/power distance over egalitarianism, autonomy/individualism over embeddedness, mastery/masculinity over harmony, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation; see Table 3). We used Hofstede’s power distance index and Schwartz’s egalitarianism and hierarchy values to indicate whether a society encourages its members to view each other as equals. The three indicators loaded on the same factor (Eigenvalue = 1.88, absolute values of the loadings > .73; see detailed information in Table 3) across all the societies collected in Hofstede’s and Schwartz’s data sets. In addition, Schwartz’s autonomy versus embeddedness and Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism scores, along with the emancipation value index, were found to be the same factor (Eigenvalue = 3.88, absolute values of the loadings > .75). The indicators for people’s relations to the natural and social world also loaded on the same factor (Eigenvalue = 1.46, absolute values of the loadings > .29). However, due to the low loading of masculinity–femininity, this indicator was analyzed separately. The remaining two indicators (long-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance) were only collected by Hofstede, and each has a single indicator.

Table 3.

Latent Cultural Dimensions Using Schwartz’s Scores, Hofstede’s Scores, and the Welzel’s Emancipation Value Index.

Cultural scores	Hierarchy/power distance over egalitarianism	Autonomous/individualism over embeddedness	Mastery/masculinity over harmony
Power distance	0.73
Hierarchy	0.79
Egalitarianism	−0.85
Affect autonomy		0.89
Emancipation value		0.90
Individualism		0.75
Intellectual autonomy		0.89
Embeddedness		−0.96
Mastery			0.84
Harmony			−0.82
Masculinity–femininity			0.30^a
Uncertainty avoidance
Long-term orientation
Eigenvalue	1.88	3.88	1.46
a	.70	.92	.61
K	63	56	63

Note. An exploratory factor analysis using a principal axis factoring method to extract factors was conducted. Missing data were treated with pairwise deletion (K = no. of countries). All indicators were standardized before computing the reliabilities/correlations and composite scores.

Due to the low loading of this indicator, masculinity–femininity scores were analyzed alone.

Demographic information and control variable

Single items each evaluated respondents’ sex, age, year of education, place of residence (e.g., big city, town or small city, farm or home in the country), marital status, and employment status. To allow for quantitative examination, the respondents’ sex, residence, marital status, and employment status were dummy coded (female, coded 1; big city or not, once married or not, and currently employed or not). Following the CWC(M) approach (Z. Zhang et al., 2009), we standardized the variables within the society and separately recorded society-level mean scores for each demographic item. For example, the percentages of women were recorded in each society (the society-level mean), and the dummy-coded variable was standardized within the society. We also included a cool-water condition (Welzel, 2014) to control for ecological hardship, from the hottest and driest countries (scored 0) to countries with highly consistent precipitation and cold temperatures (scored 1).

Objective indicator

To explore potential consequences of support for traditional household gender roles, we tested the associations between traditional household gender roles, concurrent social movement activities, and objective gender equality at a later time. To control for gender equality at a previous time, we recorded a gender equality index in 2009 (gender empowerment measure, United Nations Development Programme, 2009). We recorded a social movement activities index from the World Value Survey documented at the same time (Welzel, 2014) as the traditional household gender roles data. To evaluate whether traditional household gender roles could predict future gender equality and to avoid high collinearity using the same index, we recorded a different gender inequality index in 2017 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019).

Analysis strategy

We conducted multilevel modeling using HLM 7.0, specifying first- and second-level equations. Because we were interested in how, in general, people support traditional household gender roles and the differences between men and women in this support, we modeled the intercept (i.e., mean support for traditional household gender roles) and the slope of participant sex (i.e., the gender difference in support for traditional household gender roles) while treating other variables as control variables.

Level 1: Y_ij = β_0j + β_1j (female) +β_2j (work status) +β_3j (years of education) +β_4j (participant age) +β_5j (residing in big city) + β_6j (once married) + r_ij

Level II:

β_0j = γ₀₀ + γ₀₁ (GDP) + γ₀₂ (GEI) + γ₀₃ (hierarchy) +γ₀₄ (personal focus) + γ₀₅ (mastery) + γ₀₆ (masculinity–femininity) + γ₀₇ (uncertainty avoidance) + γ₀₈ (long-term orientation) + γ₀₉ (cool-water condition)

β_1j = γ₁₀ + γ₁₁ (GDP) + γ₁₂ (GEI) + γ₁₃ (hierarchy) + γ₁₄ (personal focus) + γ₁₅ (mastery) + γ₁₆ (masculinity–femininity) + γ₁₇ (uncertainty avoidance) + γ₁₈ (long-term orientation) + γ₁₉ (cool-water condition)

Results

We adopted a multilevel data structure (individuals embedded in societies) to examine whether respondents’ immediate contexts (Level 1 variables) and societal and cultural characteristics (Level 2 variables) predict their support for traditional household gender roles. The intraclass correlation across nations was .19, suggesting that 19% of the variability in the support for traditional household gender roles is among societies. Correlations of predictors on the national level are reported in Table 4.

Table 4.

Correlations Between National Indices.

National indices	GDP	GEI	DM1	DM2	DM3	MAS	UAI	LTO	CWI	Age	Edu	Work	Big city	Married
GDP	1
GEI2009	.733**	1
DM1	−.722**	−.787**	1
DM2	.799**	.792**	−.782**	1
DM3	−.027	−.256	.416**	−.265	1
MAS	−.187	−.313*	.340*	−.231	.220	1
UAI	−.386*	−.302	.144	−.237	−.260	.021	1
LTO	−.099	−.147	.271	.052	−.117	.064	.021	1
CWI	.707**	.614**	−.580**	.771**	−.269	−.232	−.246	.155	1
Age	.474**	.425**	−.272	.559**	−.013	−.069	−.106	.285	.669**	1
Edu	.761**	.696**	−.585**	.717**	−.234	−.309	−.257	.056	.812**	.553**	1
Work	.651**	.584**	−.513**	.454**	−.206	−.220	−.132	−.120	.387*	.094	.590**	1
Big city	−.435**	−.311*	.222	−.463**	.145	−.120	.218	−.166	−.513**	−.422**	−.273	−.218	1
Married	.120	−.084	.168	.095	.102	.011	.003	.447**	.352*	.583**	.180	−.021	−.188	1
Female	.000	−.043	−.067	.046	−.229	−.101	.325*	.020	.143	.140	.190	−.069	.240	−.039

Note. GDP = gross domestic product; GEI = gender empowerment index; DM1 = latent cultural dimension I (hierarchy vs. egalitarianism); DM2 = latent cultural dimension II (personal vs. social focus); DM3 = latent cultural dimension III (mastery over harmony); MAS = masculinity–femininity; UAI = uncertainty avoidance; LTO = long-term orientation; CWI = cool-water index; demographic characteristics such as age, education (edu), work status (work), residing in a big city or not (big city), once married or not (married), and being female were recorded at the national level. The number of countries ranged from 38 to 41.

p < .05. ** p < .01.

Women were less likely to support traditional household gender roles (γ₁₀ = −0.07, see the 13th row of the second column in Table 5), as were those who were employed (β_2j = −0.07, see the bottom fifth row of second column in Table 5), those residing in big cities (β_5j = −0.03), and those with more years of education (β_3j = −0.15). Conversely, people who were older (β_4j = 0.07) and those who were once married (β_6j = 0.04) were more likely to support traditional household gender roles. After controlling for personal characteristics, the overall support for traditional household gender roles across samples was close to the midpoint (2.97 on a scale of 1–5, see the third row of the second column).

Table 5.

Multilevel Modeling of the Effects of Cultural Characteristics on Support for Traditional Gender Norms.

Multilevel modeling	Coefficients^a,b	Coefficients (with other indicators controlled for)^b	t ratios
For intercept (β_0j)	2.968 (0.003)***	3.056 (0.006)***	525.11
GDP per capita in 2007 (γ₀₁)	−2.4 x 10⁻⁵ (< 1 x 10⁻⁶)***	−2.2 x 10⁻⁵ (< 1 x 10⁻⁶)***	−44.82
GEI in 2009 (γ₀₂)	−1.125 (0.044)***	−0.212 (0.057)c***	−3.73
Hierarchy (γ₀₃)	0.081 (0.006)***	0.124 (0.008)***	15.55
Personal focus (γ₀₄)	−0.432 (0.008)***	−0.410 (0.014)***	−48.43
Mastery (γ₀₅)	−0.070 (0.004)***	−0.107 (0.005)^c***	−19.91
Masculinity–femininity (γ₀₆)	0.003 (0.0002)***	0.004 (0.0002)^c***	18.57
Uncertainty avoidance (γ₀₇)	0.005 (0.0002)***	0.003 (0.0002)^c***	14.04
Long-term orientation (γ₀₈)	0.0008 (0.0002)***	−0.001 (0.0002)^c***	−5.74
Cool-water index (γ₀₉)	−1.60 (0.05)***	−1.77 (0.04)^c***	−40.99
For the slope of participant sex (female coded 1, γ₁₀)	−0.073 (0.004)***	−0.071 (0.006)***	−12.19
GDP per capita in 2007 (γ₁₁)	−3 x 10⁻⁶ (< 1 x 10⁻⁶)***	−3 x 10⁻⁶ (< 1 x 10⁻⁶)***	−6.49
GEI in 2009 (γ₁₂)	−0.102 (0.044)*	p = .27^c	−0.30
Hierarchy (γ₁₃)	0.016 (0.006)**	0.016 (0.010)*	2.10
Personal focus (γ₁₄)	−0.042 (0.008)***	−0.041 (0.008)***	−4.92
Masculinity–femininity (γ₁₆)	p = .625	N/A	N/A
Uncertainty avoidance (γ₁₇)	p = .458	N/A	N/A
Long-term orientation (γ₁₈)	0.0005 (0.0002)**	0.0005 (0.0002)^c*	2.89
Cool-water index (γ₁₉)	−0.154 (0.051)**	−0.172 (0.04)^c***	−4.04
Controlling variables: individual level
Work status (β_2j)	−0.068 (0.004)***	−0.070 (0.004)***	−17.67
Years of education (β_3j)	−0.154 (0.004)***	−0.154 (0.004)***	−39.54
Participant age (β_4j)	0.068 (0.004)***	0.064 (0.005)***	14.05
Residing in big city or not (β_5j)	−0.030 (0.003)***	−0.029 (0.004)***	−8.12
Once married (β_6j)	0.035 (0.004)***	0.032 (0.004)***	7.76

Note. Listed Level 1 control variables were all significant (ps < .001). Missing data were treated with listwise deletion when entering predictors simultaneously. Country levels of individual characteristics are not shown (% female, % of work status, average years of education, average participant age, % residing in big city, % once married). GDP = gross domestic product; GEI = gender empowerment index.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Controlling for demographic characteristics at the national level.

To avoid multicollinearity, predictors of correlations higher than .70 were not entered together (see Table 4).

Entered together along with the demographic characteristics at the national level, except for education years (n = 54,894), with an acceptable proportion of missing data (8.1%). The scale is from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

We further explored how support for traditional household gender roles may be accounted for by societal and cultural characteristics. As expected, people who live in wealthier societies (γ₀₁, see the fourth row of the second column in Table 5) and in societies that emphasize personal focus (γ₀₄) tend to reject traditional household gender roles, whereas those who live in societies that emphasize uncertainty avoidance (γ₀₇) tend to support traditional household gender roles. Although the findings are largely consistent with our hypotheses, there are two findings that are mixed or unexpected. First, when entered alone, individuals in high long-term orientation societies (γ₀₈) were more likely to support traditional household gender roles but were less likely to support traditional household gender roles after controlling for other societal and cultural characteristics (see the 11th row of the second and third column). Second, the values of mastery over harmony (γ₀₅) were consistently found to be associated with lower support for traditional household gender roles, in contrast to the finding on masculinity–femininity (γ₀₆).

We also explored whether gender differences in support for traditional household gender roles increased or decreased according to certain societal and cultural characteristics. Women were found to reject traditional household gender roles more than men (γ₁₀), especially in societies with greater economic progress (γ₁₁) and greater emphasis on personal focus (γ₁₄) and in societies lower in hierarchy (γ₁₃) and long-term orientation (γ₁₈). For example, the gender difference in societies with high personal focus (1 SD above the mean) would be −0.115 (−0.073 + [−0.042] x 1 = −0.115), the absolute value is larger than −0.031 in societies with low personal focus (1 SD below the mean, −0.073 + [−0.042] x [−1]). No other cultural characteristics were found to be significant after simultaneously controlling for other societal and cultural characteristics.

The Predictive Power of Traditional Household Gender Roles

To further explore how beliefs about traditional household gender roles (data collected around 2012) were related to social movement activities around 2012 and gender equality in 2017, we ran two regression models with the gender empowerment measure in 2009 as a control, national means of traditional household gender roles as the predictors, and the social movement index and the gender inequality index as the criteria. As expected, national means of traditional household gender roles predicted social movement activities roughly at the same time (B = −0.45, p = .04, k = 22), whereas the gender empowerment measure was marginal (B = 0.39, p = .07). Furthermore, national means of traditional household gender roles significantly predicted the gender inequality index 5 years later (standardized B = .58, p < .001, k = 41), whereas a different gender equality index at a previous time did not (p = .34).

General Discussion

By adopting an etic approach, our research is able to reveal cultural characteristics that may facilitate or inhibit support for traditional household gender roles. In our findings, a set of societal/cultural characteristics are associated with lower support and larger gender differences in traditional household gender roles, suggesting that these societal/cultural characteristics may encourage women to reject traditional household gender roles more than their male counterparts. Consistent with a theory of politicized collective identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), when processes encourage individuals to think for themselves, whether these involve secular-rational values, self-expression values, or personal focus, the subordinate group members (i.e., women) are more likely to become aware of the restrictions and burdens that traditional household gender roles place upon them (i.e., shared grievance) and to reject such roles. We found that individuals residing in societies characterized by more wealth and personal focus (e.g., individualistic societies) may be more likely to reject traditional household gender roles, perhaps because such societal contexts encourage individuals to process and organize information in the self and the extended self (group membership formed according to one’s gender) as opposed to process and organize information in the relationship and family in which self is embedded. These findings are in line with previous research, such as the positive association between gender equality and individualism (Hofstede, 2011; Sheridan et al., 2017).

Conversely, legitimizing ideologies may lead individuals to justify unequal treatment in traditional household gender roles. Societies offer multiple ways to legitimize traditional household gender roles, which may function similarly for men and women. For example, when women and men are conceptualized as naturally different, traditional household gender roles and gendered divisions of work seem just and proper (Budgeon, 2014; Connell, 1995). Societies that emphasize hierarchical distributions of roles (Schwartz, 2004) may legitimize unequal power in traditional household gender roles, consistent with previous research (Li, 2000; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004).

Furthermore, some cultural characteristics may increase individuals’ motivation to endorse traditional household gender roles. One such cultural characteristic is uncertainty avoidance, not because this cultural characteristic legitimizes unequal power but because it makes its members (both men and women) less likely to endure the uncertainty involved in rejecting these roles. That is, when rejecting traditional household gender roles, individuals need to engage in information processing and attempt to identify a different way of behaving (not as men vs. women but as equal individuals); this process involves uncertainty. It is not surprising that members of societies with strong uncertainty avoidance have a high need for clarity and structure and a low tolerance for deviant persons and ideas and consider deviations from norms dangerous (Hofstede, 2011). Consequently, people in these societies may conform to traditional household gender roles because of the fear of being viewed as deviants who may be under tremendous societal scrutiny and sanctions. Our research provides supporting evidence that uncertainty avoidance is associated with individuals’ support for traditional household gender roles and that this cultural characteristic is not associated with gender differences in the support for traditional household gender roles.

Despite the supporting evidence found in our research, there are unexpected findings involving long-term orientation, mastery over harmony, and masculinity–femininity. We observed that men and women in long-term orientation societies tended to be more alike. According to Bearden and colleagues (2006), long-term orientation is a cultural characteristic in which members of a society process time holistically and possess the characteristics of respect for tradition and planning. Although Bearden and colleagues conceptualize this dimension differently than its original researcher, Hofstede, their conceptualization does not directly contradict the revised perspective on this dimension by Hofstede and colleagues (Hofstede & Minkov, 2010; Minkov et al., 2017). Hofstede and Minkov (2010) revised long-term orientation to reflect general thinking styles (virtue vs. truth; synthetic vs. analytical), whereas Minkov et al. (2017) revised long-term orientation to be characteristic of the self (self-enhancement and self-stability vs. self-reliance). The difference in the conceptualizations of long-term orientation between Bearden and colleagues and Hofstede and Minkov is in the scope of the dimension, Bearden and colleagues focus on time and time-related domains, whereas Hofstede and Minkov do not. We find that the time-specific nature of the dimension (Bearden and colleagues’ conceptualization) is more consistent with this dimension than other cultural characteristics (see Table 4; no significant correlations were observed between long-term orientation and other cultural dimensions). Furthermore, it is possible that in some societies, the tradition is equality, which reduces support for traditional household gender roles. In other societies, the tradition is unequal gender power, which increases support for traditional household gender roles. This possibility explains why long-term orientation is not associated with general support for traditional household gender roles in a specific direction once the hierarchy is controlled for but is associated with smaller gender differences in such support.

Moreover, mastery over harmony and masculinity–femininity were not associated with gender differences in traditional household gender roles. Instead, mastery over harmony was associated with less support for traditional household gender roles, whereas masculinity–femininity was associated with more support for traditional household gender roles. These findings suggest that Hofstede’s masculinity–femininity and Schwartz’s mastery-harmony are only similar at face value, consistent with Schwartz’s (2009) finding but inconsistent with Steenkamp’s (2001) finding. Individuals who reside in societies that emphasize control over the environment (mastery) are less likely to support traditional household gender roles. It is possible that individuals in societies that emphasize control over the environment may shape the environment according to their abilities and skills (e.g., firms reaching out to new markets, Schwartz, 2009) and not be constrained by the social norms. However, individuals in societies that emphasize masculinity traits and characteristics are more likely to support traditional household gender roles. That is, people in societies that stress highly masculine traits may comply with the gender hierarchy and keep themselves in their respective gender framework (Hofstede, 2011; Pek & Leong, 2003), such as dominant men (e.g., obtaining status, reputation, and wealth) and subordinate women (e.g., taking good care of their family, N’Guessan, 2011). Such societies are likely to have rigid gender frameworks, and people are expected to act according to their proper roles (Y. B. Zhang et al., 2005).

Finally, societal changes often become possible when third parties or the larger societal atmosphere are sympathetic toward such changes (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). The larger societal atmosphere and individuals’ support for traditional household gender roles are reciprocal. In terms of rejecting traditional household gender roles, if the government or its social policy identifies with gender equality ideals, changes may be more likely. As seen in our research, support for traditional household gender roles was lower in societies with gender equality (see Table 5). In addition, general support for traditional household gender roles is associated with social movement activities collected roughly around the same time. Although not all social movement activities are feminist in nature or directly related to traditional household gender roles, the significant association suggests that societies allowing individuals to reject traditional household gender roles may also encourage individuals to take actions in challenging the status quo. Furthermore, support for traditional household gender roles predicts objective gender equality at a later time. In short, the more that societies enjoy gender equality, the less likely individuals are to support traditional household gender roles at a later time; likewise, the less individuals support traditional household gender roles, the more likely societies are to enjoy gender equality and engage in social movement activities to challenge the status quo.

We should acknowledge that despite the contribution our approach brings, it has some limitations. First of all, by understanding societies using in a handful of cultural dimensions, it is inevitable that rich information may be lost and unexplored (e.g., why a specific household gender role item did not load with other items in India? Is that due to their high levels of acquiescence?), and some dimensions may be highly associated (see Table 4). Furthermore, we relied on previous researchers’ works (i.e., Hofstede, Schwartz, Welzel) to derive latent cultural dimensions, and may be limited by the robustness of these previous researchers’ works (e.g., lack of replication of these cultural scores and Minkov’s critics of Hofstede’s scores in Minkov, 2018; single cultural index in several dimensions). While we do not deny that there is a need for exploring each society in depth and for the replication of the cultural scores, we do find consistent patterns in our findings that suggest some usefulness of the latent cultural dimensions and our data.

The findings from the current research contribute to our knowledge of the long struggles in gender equality movements. First, traditional household gender roles tend to establish more restrictions and rules for women than for men. As shown by our research, three out of four items related to traditional household gender roles specify only women’s proper behaviors (women should not work, otherwise, children and family life suffer; all women should really want is home and kids), and one item specifies both men’s and women’s proper behaviors (men as breadwinner, women as housekeeper). Moreover, when gender equality ideals are consistent with mainstream cultural values, such as the fulfillment of one’s potential regardless of gender and race in individualistic societies, gender equality movements are more likely to gain support. However, when gender equality ideals are in conflict with mainstream cultural values or subcultural values, such as in societies that value hierarchy, masculine traits, and uncertainty avoidance, it is difficult to challenge traditional household gender roles. In these societies/subcultures, traditional household gender roles may implicitly guide people in choosing occupations or situations consistent with these roles, such as women in “service work” (Liu, 1998) or part-time jobs, to allow women to fulfill domestic obligations. These jobs often have limited opportunities for advancement and offer relatively low income (Lu et al., 2009). Thus, although men and women may seem to have equal rights and opportunities to fulfill their lives in these societies, their freedom and development are still constrained by traditional gender norms, such as traditional household gender roles.

More broadly speaking, there are benefits of liberation from traditional gender norms for both men and women. In traditional gender norms, men are often expected to be tough, competitive, and successful. Such a “tough man” façade may lead to men’s difficulties in coping with stress, such as heavy drinking or underutilization of medical resources (Addis & Cohane, 2005; Yang, 2010). Liberation from rigid gender norms may assist men in recognizing and expressing their needs, feelings, and emotions and may ultimately enhance their mental health (O’Neil, 1981). In traditional gender norms, women are often expected to be family-oriented, subordinate, and caring. This “little woman” façade may place roadblocks to women’s success in their careers. For example, successful women are perceived to have deficiencies in their communality and are consequently penalized (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007). These cultural pressures and societal penalties may decrease women’s motivation to fulfill their potential. By being liberated from traditional gender norms, human beings can have greater flexibility and freedom to realize their potential and their dreams.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by a Grant from the National Science Council in Taiwan (NSC101-2628-H-004-004-MY2) and a small Grant from National Taiwan University.

ORCID iD

I-Ching Lee

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