Gendering the Bricks and Mortar: Building an Opportunity Structure for Equality Bargaining

Introduction

Collective bargaining for wages and employment conditions is a cornerstone of industrial relations research. Collective bargaining is also a primary activity undertaken by union negotiators with far-reaching impacts, as collective bargaining establishes the employment terms and conditions for the majority of Australian employees (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2011: 5). Yet limited research – particularly in Australia – has examined bargaining processes or how these are inherently gendered. Most research in the industrial relations area has examined bargaining without considering the impact of gender and without particular interest in family provisions. This reflects the discipline’s focus on an archetypal male worker, which does not recognize the industrial needs and realities of female employees.

Walton and McKersie’s (1965) ground-breaking research examining collective bargaining processes and strategies has been useful to many industrial relations researchers and practitioners in explaining collective labour/employment negotiations. It was, however, largely a product of its time and did not consider the impact of gender on bargaining processes or outcomes. Successors in this field, such as Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. (1995) and Kochan and von Nordenflycht (2003), have also not focused on gender or the work and family interface.

Practitioners have also not adequately considered the impact of gender on bargaining. Academics have found that unions have not pursued work and family issues that might benefit women for a number of reasons, including social conservatism and a resistance to maternal employment (Pocock and Brown, 2009: 173). However, as a result of women’s increased labour force participation over the previous 30 years and accompanying feminist activism, Australian unions have responded by incrementally securing gender equality provisions for female employees. Following this increased union attention, academics examined how unions bargained for gender equality items, developing theories of ‘equality bargaining’ (Briskin, 2006; Dickens, 1998; Heery, 2006a). Equality bargaining consists of including gender equality items in the bargaining claim (Heery, 2006a) and incorporating an ‘equality awareness on the part of negotiators in handling commonplace bargaining agenda items such as pay and pay opportunities’ (Colling and Dickens, 1998: 390).

Australian researchers examined the impacts of collective bargaining four to five years after the introduction of enterprise bargaining in Australia in 1991 to ascertain the impact of the new collective bargaining regime on female employees. Burgess et al. (1996) and Charlesworth (1996) found that minimal increases to equality initiatives were only gained through trade-offs to working conditions, particularly around working time. Despite the widespread extent of collective bargaining in Australia, little further research was conducted until 2009, when Williamson published an article examining collective bargaining in a large Australian Public Service (APS) organization. This study was explicitly framed within equality bargaining theories, adding a more sophisticated theoretical dimension to the research findings. Williamson found that the use of a standardized claim used by all union negotiators was key to successfully engaging in equality bargaining, spreading issues of gender equality throughout the union, from the union leadership that developed the claim to union negotiators and members, to result in increased family provisions (Williamson, 2009).

This article shows how two unions have undertaken ‘equality bargaining’ and contributes to the theoretical framework of equality bargaining. These case studies examine bargaining processes and outcomes, highlighting factors that facilitate or inhibit equality bargaining, which may be useful to other unions as they bargain for gender equality.

This article builds on the findings of Williamson’s (2009) article and compares negotiations in the public sector organization with a negotiation in a retail organization. The two case studies highlight the nuances of equality bargaining and the different factors that either inhibit or facilitate equality bargaining for family provisions in both sectors, specifically paid parental/maternity leave and personal/carers’ leave. This article commences with an overview of previous research, which identifies that unions use an ‘opportunity structure’ that occurs when a range of factors – the ‘bricks’ and ‘mortar’ – coalesce to achieve successful equality bargaining. The two case studies are then presented and findings discussed. The cases show that an opportunity structure was evident in Australia in 2008 and 2009 for the public sector negotiations, leading to successful equality bargaining. The cases, however, also highlight factors that weakened an opportunity structure in the retail sector negotiations.

Opportunity Structures and Equality Bargaining

Early equality bargaining research uncovered a range of factors that facilitated or inhibited bargaining for gender equality. Dickens (1998), one of the early authorities on equality bargaining, analysed these factors according to the regulatory level at which they occurred, finding that national, industry and organizational policy settings impacted on equality bargaining.

Gregory and Milner (2009) developed a similar theoretical framework, identifying ‘opportunity structures’ that enabled unions in Britain and France to negotiate work–life balance initiatives. Gregory and Milner (2009) found that an opportunity structure was dependent on three factors: gender politics, which can include government policies promoting work and family to achieve gender equality as well as an environment that promotes the presence of women in unions; the regulatory framework; and the organizational and bargaining dynamics, particularly between unions and managers.

Examining each of these factors in more detail reveals that, firstly, a national government promoting work–life balance initiatives and gender equality can create a climate conducive to bargaining for these issues (Gregory and Milner, 2009: 124). Similarly, Dickens found that national regulatory frameworks, including public policy and labour law, influenced equality bargaining (Dickens, 1998: xi). Heery also found that government policy promoting family provisions created an ‘external opportunity structure’ for unions to undertake equality bargaining, particularly for public sector unions (2006b: 59).

Examining this further, Dickens found that unions build on the legal minima and use the law as a bargaining lever (Dickens, 2000a: 34). Rigby and O’Brien-Smith (2010: 214), however, found that legislation acted as a lever for some provisions but not others and was dependent on occupational and industry characteristics. Their case study of the retail sector in the UK showed that a combination of influencing the national political agenda and a strong national union leadership, which had political influence and member density, resulted in successful equality bargaining (Rigby and O’Brien-Smith, 2010: 215).

A related factor in an opportunity structure as identified by Gregory and Milner is the involvement of women in union leadership, combined with mainstreaming gender equality (so that ‘gender is taken into account in all policies, campaigns and bargaining’; Dean, 2006, cited in Gregory and Milner, 2009: 130). This reinforces Dickens’ findings, who found that female union leaders make a significant, positive difference in shaping a bargaining agenda and advocating for family provisions. According to Dickens, ‘where the female negotiator is also a senior office-holder within the union this provides a resource and power base which otherwise may be lacking and prevents marginalisation’ (2000b: 204).

The second element of Gregory and Milner’s opportunity structure is closely linked to the previous element and relates to the ‘mode of regulation’. This includes collective bargaining. Union policies on negotiating for family provisions are related to their degree of involvement in bargaining for family provisions (Gregory and Milner, 2009: 125). Gregory and Milner focus on union involvement in negotiating working time flexibilities, but this element of the opportunity structure also extends to other family provisions.

The third element of their opportunity structure is dependent on the particulars of the industry and organizations. This element also includes the bargaining dynamics, such as the bargaining relationship between the parties (Gregory and Milner, 2009). Based on the EU case studies, Dickens found that a ‘high trust, social partnership orientation within the organisation rather than an adversarial style of negotiations’ is conducive to equality bargaining (2000b: 202).

Methodology

The research presented here is a case study that forms part of a larger study examining six cases of bargaining across a range of public and private sector workplaces in Australia. The research draws on multiple interviews with four paid union officials as well as two workplace union delegates from the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU), a large, public sector union. Twenty-nine interviews were conducted from March to November 2008. Accounts of the developments in the negotiations provided by the union negotiators were reflected in the union bulletins regularly issued to CPSU members and in emails between the bargaining parties.

In the second case study, 10 interviews were conducted with paid union officials from the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association (SDA), a large, national union covering the retail sector. The union’s National Secretary was the main interviewee and he was interviewed several times from September 2008 to May 2009. While it would have been beneficial to interview others involved in negotiating RetailCo’s collective workplace agreement, this researcher was not given access to do so. Union members in RetailCo were not provided with information throughout the negotiations, which means that the union Secretary’s account of the negotiations could not be validated. This is a limitation of the research undertaken for this article. The lack of any public documents relating to these negotiations highlights the ‘closed’ nature of collective bargaining undertaken by this union; however, the Secretary’s account of the negotiations does at least provide a window on bargaining processes.

Interviews were undertaken contemporaneously throughout the period of the negotiations. Due to its time-consuming nature, this is a little-used methodology but one which yields significant results, revealing the bargaining strategies and dynamics as they occurred and allowing the stories of the negotiations to unfold. The interviewees were asked about bargaining expectations, strategies and dynamics, as well as about the content and development of the negotiations. All interviews were transcribed and thematically coded by the researcher, enabling a close reading and analysis of the material.

Interview data gathered from the case studies were augmented with other supporting data. This included corporate documents, such as annual reports, the existing industrial instruments and other publicly available information, including submissions made by the unions to public inquiries. This data provided information about the bargaining parties and existing conditions as well as contextual information about the bargaining, political, social policy and economic environments.

Background to the Negotiations: National Environment

Two national events had the potential to impact on the negotiations that are the subject of this study: the public policy development processes occurring around the possible introduction of a national paid parental leave scheme for Australia; and the global economic downturn. Throughout 2008 and 2009, at the request of a federal Labor government, Australia’s Productivity Commission (2009) conducted a high-profile inquiry examining the feasibility of the introduction of a national, legislated, paid parental leave scheme, as at the time Australia was only one of two Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries that did not have a national scheme. Both the case study unions made submissions to the inquiry, appeared at hearings and educated their members about the need for such a scheme (CPSU, 2008a; SDA, 2008). A modified version of the Commission’s paid parental leave scheme was ultimately adopted and legislated by the Australian government in 2010 (Baird and Williamson, 2011).

There was much public commentary and media speculation throughout 2008 and early 2009 that the government would not be able to afford to fund a national scheme because of adverse economic conditions (Baird and Williamson, 2010: 357). The Australian economy was negatively impacted by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a term given to the global economic downturn that followed ‘a near-collapse in the global financial system’ in September 2008 (Gruen, 2009). The media speculated that the GFC would result in the government not being able to afford a national paid parental leave scheme (Baird and Williamson, 2010: 357); however, the scheme did eventuate. As well as impacting nationally, the GFC also impacted on bargaining at the enterprise level in one of the case studies, as will be shown.

PublicOrg Negotiations

In 1996, APS employment conditions were regulated through one service-wide award, one enterprise agreement, the Public Service Act 1922 (PS Act), the Industrial Relations Act 1988 and legislation on specific conditions, including the Maternity Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1973 (Molloy, 2007: 82–3). From 1996, as with the rest of Australia, processes for determining wages and conditions in the APS became increasingly decentralized. This was achieved through introducing statutory individual employment contracts as an alternative to collective bargaining, and devolving industrial relations functions, which enabled agency heads to determine the terms and conditions for their employees (Molloy, 2007: 104).

In response to these changes and an increasingly hostile environment for unions, the CPSU changed its structure to focus more on collective bargaining and increased union member involvement (O’Brien and O’Donnell, 2008). The CPSU also developed a centralized, ‘core’ claim to counter the decentralization of the APS, with the aim that it would provide consistency across all agency negotiations (interview with union official, 8 August 2008). The core claim formed the basis of all claims for negotiations, although claims also included items specific to individual agency negotiations. In 2008, the core claim included a range of terms and conditions, including paid parental leave and personal/carers’ leave (CPSU, 2008b).

At the time of negotiations, the APS case study organization – known here as ‘PublicOrg’ – had almost 6000 employees, and over 80% were women (PublicOrg Annual Report, 2007). Over a third of PublicOrg employees worked in one of the 230 local branches, providing government services in a ‘shopfront’ setting. The agency employed a large number of comparatively low-paid employees, with over 60% earning $48,101 or less, significantly less than the average APS wage of $75,536 in 2007 (Australian Public Service Commission, 2008: 75).

PublicOrg employees were represented by the CPSU. The union had approximately 60,000 members in 2008, and density in PublicOrg was approximately 35%, with very experienced workplace union delegates (interview with union negotiator, 11 April 2008). PublicOrg’s bargaining team consisted of two women and two men, with the women leading the negotiations (interview with union negotiator, 12 June 2008). The CPSU had a history of engaging with women’s industrial rights, with successive feminist leaders dating back to the 1970s (interview with union official, 30 June 2009). This continued through to the present negotiators, who also identified with using collective bargaining to progress gender equality in the workplace.

As with all other eligible APS employees, PublicOrg employees were entitled to a statutory 12 weeks’ paid maternity leave. PublicOrg, however, was one of the few large APS agencies that did not provide an additional two weeks’ parental leave through a collective workplace agreement (interview with union official, 8 August 2008). PublicOrg also did not provide any paid paternity/supporting partner leave, with parents required to use personal leave for this purpose.

The core claim included 14 weeks’ paid maternity leave, with a further 14 weeks for the primary care-giver, six weeks’ paid ‘supporting partner’ leave and adoption leave, and up to five years’ unpaid parental leave (CPSU, 2008b). The union Secretary announced just before the PublicOrg negotiations were about to start that the union would be negotiating for 26 weeks’ paid maternity leave. This position was then incorporated into the core claim and the PublicOrg claim. The union claim was widely reported by the media and added to the speculation, and momentum, for a national paid parental leave scheme as well as building expectations for increased parental leave within the APS.

The other main family provision was personal/carers’ leave. The union’s core claim for personal/carers’ leave was to expand the definition of carers’ leave to include caring for dependants who required unforeseen care but who were not sick, as well as to include caring for non-dependants. The personal/carers’ leave provisions for PublicOrg reflected an industry standard of 18 days per year.

Formal negotiations commenced in June 2008. The CPSU negotiators stated that PublicOrg management responded initially to the majority of their claims with a negative response, supported by few reasons. The employer tabled their claim, which included an unspecified amount of paid paternity leave that would assist supporting partners; however, it also contained a claim to reduce personal leave from 18 to 10 days a year (union bulletin, July 2008).

The CPSU officials reported that negotiations around the reduced personal/carers’ leave were low-trust, even hostile, to the point of a PublicOrg negotiator yelling at the union negotiators. In return, the union membership demonstrated their displeasure towards their employer. The opposition stemmed not only from employees not supporting reduced conditions, but also because female employees in this female-dominated workplace may have needed carers’ leave more than other female APS employees. CPSU research found that women in service provision agencies such as PublicOrg tended to have a higher level of caring responsibilities than other groups of APS female employees (Donnelly, 2006) and so PublicOrg employees needed to at least maintain the current level of carers’ leave.

The antipathy to the proposed reduction in PublicOrg resulted in employees undertaking activities in the workplace to support the union’s bargaining position and oppose the PublicOrg claim. The union officials had concerns that any action would not be successful, as their experience had shown that engaging in collective or industrial action is a gendered activity, with employees in female-dominated agencies being less willing to take industrial action than employees in other workplaces (interview with union official, 10 November 2008). A modest protest was organized, however, building on a sustained union communication campaign.

Members wore stickers and held highly visible morning teas to highlight what they perceived as an unjust proposal. Workplaces were festooned with union balloons and posters, with areas set aside for the morning tea. Some of the union members made hundreds of cupcakes in PublicOrg’s corporate colours, further adding to the colour of the protest action. It was designed to be fun, not aggressive, and aimed to encourage participation. The majority of the 230 workplaces participated and most people in each workplace participated (interview with union official, 12 September 2008).

While holding a morning tea does not appear to be a typical form of collective action, it represented a major form of activism for these union members. According to the union organizers, CPSU members in PublicOrg had not taken collective action as far as they could recall. Indeed, while PublicOrg had a group of committed and long-term union delegates, union members were not industrially active and had previously resisted invitations from the paid union officials to become engaged in the bargaining campaign in the lead-up to the negotiations. This was not a workforce used to engaging in collective activity. The CPSU officials also stated in interviews that union members in this workplace were rather intimidated by their managers, who had tried to discourage union members from wearing stickers and participating in the morning tea action. Many union members had public contact roles, and the PublicOrg managers were concerned ‘about any activity that could potentially damage our professional reputation and image’ (email from PublicOrg manager to union delegate, 4 September 2008). Additionally, industrial action in the APS was rare and therefore even this seemingly small collective action was seen as significant by the union officials, members and managers.

The collective action was effective and a breakthrough was made in negotiations as a result. The revised position saw a return to providing 18 days a year personal/carers’ leave, which also included three days’ ‘special’ leave to enable employees to care for non-immediate family. This new personal leave clause effectively gave the union the conditions they were seeking in regard to personal/carers’ leave – staff did not face a diminution in leave, and could also use the leave for childcare and caring for non-dependants (PublicOrg Collective Agreement, 2008–2011).

The employer also agreed to an additional two weeks’ paid maternity leave, which would bring this provision into line with other major APS agencies. The union also secured a 4.3% annual pay rise, which the union considered ‘a good offer’ (interview with union negotiator, 23 September 2008). The union negotiators considered that the PublicOrg managers offered both the wages increase and the increased paid maternity leave as they were desirous of preventing further collective action. As one union negotiator stated: ‘[t]his is definitely likely to take the sting out of our campaigning’ (interview with union negotiator, 23 September 2008).

In October 2008, five months after commencing negotiations, union officials held members’ meetings in almost every one of the 230 workplaces so that members could endorse the proposed agreement, which was a huge undertaking (interview with union negotiator, 24 October 2008). Organizers visited branches, as did two elected union negotiators who were taken ‘offline’ from their regular employment in PublicOrg and supplied with a car each by the union, then travelled to branches. This amount of contact for the union was new, but was considered necessary so that ‘people could have a say’ (interview with union negotiator, 24 October 2008). Subsequently, 82% of members endorsed the new agreement (CPSU, 2008c).

Essentially then, increased family provisions were achieved through union members taking action in support of their claims and the employer increasing standards to be consistent with the rest of the APS. These factors were framed by the union Secretary publicly announcing that the union would seek 26 weeks’ paid parental leave, which also strengthened the union’s core claim, against the backdrop of a high-profile Productivity Commission inquiry into the introduction of a national paid parental leave scheme.

RetailCo Negotiations

The retail case study organization, known as ‘RetailCo’, is a discount department chain store that sells toys, leisure goods, clothing, consumables and home products. At the time of the negotiations in 2008, it had over 180 stores in Australia and employed over 25,000 people (RetailCo, 2009, RetailCo Parent Company Annual Report). In 2008, the retail industry employed the second-highest proportion of female employees (after ‘health and community services’), with 58% of the workforce being female (Pech et al., 2009: 19). The retail sector also employed the highest proportions of young workers, the majority of whom were low-skilled (Pech et al., 2009). The low skill level was reflected in the level of wages, with the retail industry being the second-lowest-paying industry, above the ‘accommodation and food services’ industry, in 2008 (ABS, 2008: 18).

RetailCo negotiations commenced as the GFC was starting to impact on the Australian economy. The GFC caused high fuel prices and increased interest rates that resulted in a decline in retail sales, which then led to the loss of almost 8000 full-time jobs in the retail sector in the 12 months to August 2008 (Rintoul et al., 2008). The retail sector was expected to remain subdued for some months when negotiations commenced in late 2008 (Shaw, 2008). As with other retailers, the GFC resulted in decreased sales for RetailCo due to decreased discretionary spending by consumers (Bell, 2008; Evans, 2009).

The employees of RetailCo were represented by the SDA, the largest union in Australia, which had 217,000 members at the time (SDA, no date). SDA members were predominantly young women (SDA, no date). The membership of the union was concentrated in the larger retail organizations and, correspondingly, the union density was estimated to be between 65 and 70% in RetailCo, where young, female employees also predominated (interview with union official, 15 April 2010).

The SDA bargaining party was led by the union Secretary and also included a representative from each of the State branches. The Secretary was extremely experienced, having held his position since 1978 (email from union official to researcher, 1 July 2010), and had a long history of negotiating with RetailCo. The Secretary was the leading negotiator, doing most of the talking and making the decisions. Out of the seven branch secretaries who participated in the negotiations, five were male and two were female. The union had a history of being involved in ‘test’ cases and campaigns to progress industrial rights for female employees, and the union also had a dedicated Women’s Officer. The Secretary, however, while supporting women’s industrial rights, had also been criticized for his stance in relation to gender politics. Conservative union leaders have been accused of trading off maternity leave for a wages increase, and the SDA Secretary, specifically, had been labelled ‘paternalistic’ (Dunleavy, 2009).

The SDA also had a core claim consisting of four items including 10 weeks’ paid parental leave (SDA, no date; RetailCo Negotiations 2008: SDA Log of Claims). The quantum of 10 weeks was determined by the Secretary, who considered it to be a midpoint between the amount that other major retailers (including Coles, Aldi’s and David Jones) had introduced in the previous year or so, which ranged from six to eight weeks, and the community standard of 12 weeks (interview with union Secretary, 4 May 2009). The union’s claim also included an item to convert sick leave in excess of 300 hours to carers’ leave, which would benefit long-term employees (interview with union Secretary, 2 December 2008).

Negotiations commenced in November 2008, when the union Secretary presented the union’s claim to the RetailCo managers (interview with union Secretary, 2 December 2008). After a hiatus due to Christmas holidays, at the second meeting in February 2009 the managers confirmed media reports stating that the organization was not trading well compared to competitors. The management negotiators presented their claim, which did not include any family provisions, to the union negotiators. The main claim sought by the employer was for additional flexibilities in staffing, particularly during the company’s busiest times of the year (interview with union Secretary, 17 February 2009).

The employer responded to the union’s claims at this second negotiating meeting. As well as almost ‘entirely disagreeing’ with the union claim, the SDA Secretary stated that the management negotiators disagreed with the paid parental leave claim, saying that the company could not afford it (interview with union Secretary, 13 February 2009). Even at this early stage, the union Secretary was preparing to concede the paid parental leave claim:

I’ve said to our branch secretaries … of the claims that cost money, we really should be focusing on the wages outcome, because if we were, for example, to get an expensive maternity leave benefit up, which only benefits a small proportion of the employees, that’s going to come off the wage increase, which everybody gets. (Interview with union Secretary, 13 February 2009)

The negotiations continued throughout February and March 2009, with agreement reached on staffing levels during peak periods and rostering. In late March 2009, RetailCo reported on their sales, showing that the company was not doing well financially, with only a 0.1% sales increase (interview with union Secretary, 23 April 2009). The union Secretary at this point formally withdrew the union’s paid parental leave claim, not only because it could detract from a wages increase, but also because ‘you’ve got the government poised to do something on paid maternity leave at some point’ (interview with union Secretary, 20 March 2009).

While paid parental leave was taken off the bargaining table, the employer compensated somewhat by formally agreeing that six days’ sick leave could be used as carers’ leave (interview with union Secretary, 20 March 2009). This item was likely to be of low cost for the employer, as it would only apply to long-term employees with dependants, in a workforce populated with many young, casual employees. Also in March 2009, the bargaining parties reached agreement on a range of non-family provisions and the wages increase was finalized by the parties in April 2009.

The negotiations were finalized in May 2009 and organizers met with delegates and union members in all 180 stores nationally to explain the new agreement and have it approved. This was the first communication with members since the SDA had developed the claim. The union Secretary stated that seeking approval for the agreement was an enormous logistical undertaking that would take months to complete (interview with union Secretary, 23 April 2009). The delegates in each store were presented with the proposed agreement first, which was then circulated to union members (interview with union Secretary, 4 May 2009). Approximately 97% of employees voted to approve the agreement (email from union official to researcher, 17 August 2009), which duly became operative from 30 April 2009 (RetailCo Agreement 2009).

According to the union Secretary, both parties approached the bargaining very pragmatically against a background of mutual understanding. This relationship resulted in both parties engaging in trade-offs to arrive at satisfactory outcomes, indirectly leading to the final positions on paid parental leave and carers’ leave. The GFC, however, contributed to a paid parental leave scheme not being introduced.

Discussion: Using Opportunity Structures for Equality Bargaining

These case studies reinforce research findings showing that an opportunity structure can exist when a range of factors converge. Similar to Gregory and Milner’s (2009) findings, these cases highlight elements of an opportunity structure: national policy promoting family provisions; female union leaders and union policies enshrining bargaining for family provisions; and organizational dynamics that include a high-trust bargaining relationship. The case studies also show that only some of these ‘bricks’ need to be in place to form an opportunity structure for equality bargaining. Further, different elements form an opportunity structure depending on the particular characteristics of the industry and enterprise negotiations.

The opportunity structure for the CPSU/PublicOrg case study consisted of the national policy framework, feminist-influenced union leadership and a committed and active membership. In contrast, the SDA/RetailCo case study highlights elements that can undermine an opportunity structure, namely, the economic conditions and, paradoxically, the national policy development for a paid parental leave scheme. The unilateral power of the union Secretary to remove the paid parental leave claim may also have contributed to undermining an opportunity structure for the RetailCo negotiations.

Conclusions

This article has examined equality bargaining in two female-dominated organizations to uncover the bricks and mortar of an opportunity structure for equality bargaining. The case studies show that while the same elements for an opportunity structure for equality bargaining can be present, industry and organizational factors result in opportunity structures that differ by industry, occupation and organization. Unions negotiating in public sector organizations may have more equality ‘bricks’ to build an opportunity structure. The CPSU has a relatively high union density, a higher minimum of gender equality and family provisions on which to build, as well as being comparatively sheltered from considerations of costs and profits. Public sector unions, then, have the opportunity to progress an equality bargaining agenda through collective bargaining, which results in both more inclusive processes and more equitable outcomes.

Some of the same ‘bricks’ for an opportunity structure were in place for both case study negotiations, namely, the development of the paid parental leave scheme and union leaders who were politically influential and were experienced workplace negotiators. However, the RetailCo negotiations suggest that the economic climate and absence of feminists in the union leadership may have eroded the mortar and weakened the opportunity structure. This further suggests that while external factors do have a bearing on creating an opportunity structure for equality bargaining, unions and union leaders also have a major role to play in creating their own opportunity structures. This can be done by unions nurturing and progressing feminist union leaders (as suggested by Dickens, 2000: 204; Gerstel and Clawson, 2001: 290), using a bargaining claim that includes gender equality provisions and fully utilizing the opportunities presented when a convergence of national policy development and bargaining for gender equality provisions converge. The case studies also suggest that for employees in low-paying industries, securing increased family provisions through public policy avenues may be more effective than using collective bargaining.

The case studies show that the need – and potential – for equality bargaining is significant. Equality bargaining is a vital area not only to ensure that unions fully represent the needs of their members and secure relevant provisions, but also to ease the strains of working life for both male and female employees. This article shows evidence of an emerging form of equality bargaining in Australia, while also highlighting the significant barriers that unions are yet to overcome to fully implement effective equality bargaining.