Performance and reward practices of multinational corporations operating in Australia

Abstract

This paper examines the performance management and reward practices of multinational corporations operating in Australia. Drawing on a representative sample of 211 multinational corporations, we examine the uptake and determinants of performance management and reward practices used by multinational corporations in Australia. We investigate the influence of established contextual and organisational factors on performance management and rewards and explore the use of such practices amongst managers relative to the largest occupational group. Our findings suggest that overall multinational corporations operating in Australia use a wide range of performance management and reward practices. Findings indicate that multinational corporations are higher users of such practices for managers relative to the largest occupational group. Logistic regression results demonstrate that multinational corporations with higher use of human resource-shared services and global human resource integration are more likely to use the measured performance management and reward practices for both the largest occupational group and managers, suggesting some level of global integration around human resource activities. There is also greater likelihood of the use of these practices where there is low union recognition for the purpose of collective bargaining for the largest occupational group. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords

Human resource management multinational corporations performance management reward practices unions

Introduction

Performance management (PM) consistently appears as a key issue in the human resource management (HRM) literature and a number of empirical studies have articulated a clear link between employee PM and organisational performance (Den Hartog et al., 2004; Kuvaas, 2006). Employee PM and reward systems can lead to the development of a skilled workforce required by organisations (Kuvaas, 2006) and evidence suggests that effective PM is linked to financial performance (Kuvaas, 2006; Latham et al., 2005). Research has also identified some dissatisfaction with PM schemes (Fletcher, 2001; Nankervis and Crompton, 2006; Nankervis and Stanton, 2012), and gaps between the rhetoric and practice (Nankervis and Stanton, 2012). However, studies have focussed narrowly on the measurement aspects of performance appraisal (Budworth and Mann, 2011). Recently, in PM research, there has been a move to also examine related reward practices (Aguinis and Pierce, 2008) including performance pay and share options (Ferner and Almond, 2012).

PM has also been linked to facilitating organisational integration and creating a unified organisational culture (Haines and St Onge, 2011) and motivating employees to improve performance. Discussing reward systems motivated by similar goals, such as commitment, ‘belonging’ and retention (Pendleton et al., 2002), scholars have noted an aligned growth in the use and importance of employee financial participation as a form of reward (e.g., share ownership, share options and profit sharing) (Poutsma et al., 2012). Poutsma et al. (2012: 1513) explain ‘financial participation has emerged as a normal attribute of the employment relationship in important corners of the world’. These practices are covering an increasing number of employee categories and they can be found across many types of organisations (Poutsma et al., 2003). This paper seeks to contribute to the research agenda on the use of such practices in Australia, amongst different categories of employees (managers vs. largest occupational group (LOG)) and in multinational corporations (MNCs).

MNCs are an important component of the Australian economy and research suggests that they employ at least one quarter of all employees in Australia (McDonnell et al., 2011). MNCs are also regarded as an important conduit for the transmission of innovative human resource (HR) practices (Gooderham et al., 2006; Walsh, 2001). Therefore, through our sample of 211 Australian-based MNCs, we can provide insights into an important component of the economy and an influential category of organisation.

In relation to PM and particularly rewards, we argue that the value of such practices (and related outcomes discussed above such as ‘belonging’, a ‘unified culture’ and ‘organisational integration’) is potentially amplified in the multinational form of organisation and consequently, we would expect MNCs to be intensive users of a range of sophisticated PM and reward practices. We argue this on the basis that certain rewards, such as financial participation, could contribute to addressing intrinsic integrative needs of an MNC (Bartlett and Goshal, 1989), and perhaps attenuating ‘foreignness’ in their relationship with their Australian subsidiary workforce (a recognised liability for MNCs – Zaheer, 1995). Therefore, MNCs in particular should deploy these practices in subsidiaries.

Following from our measure of the incidences of such practices, we seek to explain the determinants of MNCs’ approaches to PM in Australia, guided by the following research question: What are the determinants of PM and reward practices of MNCs operating in Australia and what employees are covered by these practices?

Cognisant that ‘a key challenge for researchers in this field is the lack of replication studies making valid comparisons [of MNC employment practice] very difficult’ (McDonnell et al., 2014: 376), our Australian study builds on Ferner and Almond’s UK study (2012), in that we identify a similar range of PM and reward practices utilised by MNCs and compare their utilisation on both managers and the LOG. These practices include regular performance appraisal, forced distribution (FD), 360° feedback, employee share ownership, profit sharing and share options. We then carry out logistical regression modelling of a range of variables identified as significant in the literature with specific focus on strategic HRM and HR global integration and union recognition to explain the use of such practices. We also examine the role of country of origin (COO) as a key determinant of MNC practices and consider the broader organisational context as control variables. Through our intentional alignment with comparative international projects, this paper contributes to both our understanding of the explanatory power of these predictors of MNC practice in multiple contexts and specifically, in the ‘hybrid’ employment relations system in Australia (Townsend et al., 2013).

This paper is organised as follows. First, we outline literature on PM and reward and MNCs, COO effects, strategic HRM and trade union influence on PM and reward. Second, the methodology and regression models are outlined, followed by the presentation of the results. Finally, we present our discussion and conclusions.

PM, reward practices and MNCs

Performance appraisal is a key element in PM. However, there are a range of tools and mechanisms that can be utilised. We follow Ferner and Almond (2012) and focus on FD and 360° feedback. FD means that appraisers must place proportions of appraised staff across all performance categories or grades. It is often seen as a top–down and controlling device. Multi-rater or 360° feedback appraisals take a more developmental approach. Individual employees receive feedback from their supervisor, peers and subordinates to strengthen their skills, competencies and performance (McDonnell et al., 2011). In relation to reward, again building on Ferner and Almond (2012), we examine employee share ownership programs, profit sharing and share options. US MNCs in particular have traditionally sought to bind their employees into ‘shareholder capitalism’ through the use of employee share ownership schemes.

In light of the above, the role of COO in determining PM and reward, MNC integrative needs and distinctions between managers and employees are worthy of particular attention.

COO effects

Despite a considerable body of literature on COO effects and host-country effects relative to them in the study of MNCs (Almond, 2011), contemporary research continues to unpack the influence of both for HR practices, in terms of the nature of these effects and their manifestations in multiple contexts (Brewster et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2014). COO is a major influencing factor in regard to MNC PM and reward policies. For example, US MNCs in particular are known for developments in performance-based pay and individual and employee share ownership (e.g. Gunnigle et al., 1997; Vo and Stanton, 2011). In light of this, we propose that the use of PM and rewards by MNCs in Australia will be influenced by COO of the MNC. McGraw and Harley (2003) utilising data from the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) 1990 and 1995 in Australian and foreign-owned workplaces concluded that in Australia ‘there is a pronounced divergence in the HR practices of overseas workplaces when compared with locals’, with foreign-owned MNCs utilising a more sophisticated range of HR practices. However, Gooderham et al. (2006) using data from the 1999 Cranet survey found ‘considerable use of calculative HR practices’ such as performance appraisal by Australian firms and ‘even greater use’ by US MNCs. The authors suggested that the legislative changes in Australia during the 1990s led to more favourable operating conditions for MNCs. As Townsend et al. (2013) argue, Australia might now be classified as having a hybrid industrial relations system, with MNCs having considerable choice around their employment practices, COO effects may be pronounced as the host environment provides less pressure to adapt to domestic practices. The absence of such pressure that would lead to a more adaptive approach in the host context makes it easier to isolate COO effects, and recent evidence examining other practices in MNCs suggests variation across foreign MNCs in Australia can be expected (Sablok et al., 2013).

MNC integration and distinctions between managers and employees

Contemporary research on MNC HR practices has focussed attention on organisational characteristics that have a considerable impact on the employment practices in MNC subsidiaries (see Edwards et al., 2013; Ferner et al., 2004). Not surprisingly, the degree to which subsidiaries are integrated with the rest of the MNCs network has been found to be an important factor. However, while integrative goals are certainly an explanation for the replication of employment practice across subsidiaries, integration may also be an intrinsic underlying objective in employment practices deployed more generally in MNCs. For example, cognisant that PM practices can play a key role in communicating a shared vision of a firm’s overall strategies (Kuvaas, 2006; Latham et al., 2005), it might be argued that in an MNC, the intrinsic value of PM as a type of ‘normative integration’ is increased (Cicekli, 2011). However, research on subsidiary integration, which highlights a complex set of challenges and motivations for integration (e.g. Taggart, 1997), has explicitly flagged the limits of formal structures. This has, in turn, led to a greater discussion of the ‘normative’ means of integration amongst international HR scholars commonly in research on staffing (e.g., Collings et al., 2009). PM practices can play a key role in communicating and creating a shared vision of the organisation (Kuvaas, 2006; Latham et al., 2005) and in a similar vein, rewards such as financial participation practices are believed to contribute to a ‘sense of belonging’ in addition to the more direct incentive effects (Pendleton et al., 2002). Therefore, in light of potential value of such practices to MNCs, we would expect them to be intensive users of practices that can contribute to addressing intrinsic integrative needs. As decision makers in the subsidiary, managers would rationally be expected to be most important in this regard. Consequently, while examining the incidence of PM and reward practices, we propose that it is important to investigate differences between the managers and other employees in the subsidiary (in this study, the distinction is made relative to the largest occupation group –LOG). The integration of managers in particular with MNC goals through PM and their ‘internalisation’ through financial participation may reflect Lepak and Snell’s (1999) predication for an organisation-focussed employment relationship, characterised by incentives tied to the organisation.

Strategic HRM, shared services, HIRS and a global approach to HR policy

In light of the potential value of PM and reward as a means to build a sense of belonging and to assimilate subsidiaries employees to the MNC, we would expect that a strategic and global approach to HR policy should drive these practices in MNCs. In a MNC, strategic HR should not only stress the integration of the subsidiary practice with corporate strategy, but the deployment of HR practices (including PM and reward) that can help facilitate this integration (Boxall and Purcell, 2011). Other practices that may facilitate greater integration include shared services and the use of human resource information systems (HRIS). Edwards et al. (2007) suggest that data on the existence of ‘shared services’ across countries can indicate the extent of the international integration of HR function. Shared services centres can be used to provide both administrative and strategic advantages (Beulin, 2009) by efficiently communicating and aligning a whole variety of HR activities.

In MNCs, the integration of HR across the organisation through the use of shared services and information technologies may serve functions beyond efficiency, as they facilitate greater centralisation and leveraging of centralised expertise. Although MNCs’ strategies differ in the levels of integration they seek, they do share the common assumption, that the MNC is able to leverage centralised resources to some degree in international markets (Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002). In the HR context, shared services centres have been key developments to enable centralised service provision opening up new possibilities to deliver services on a global scope (Evans et al., 2011). Shared service centres will be supported by the use of global HRIS. HRIS will make global HR integration more feasible. Finally, the HR function itself may be globally integrated through global policy or HR managers being engaged with policy on a regional or global basis.

In light of the above, we propose that shared service centres and/or a global HR integration (represented by a global policy making) are likely to be positively related to the presence of PM and reward practices in MNCs as the capacity and motivation to share effective practice across the MNC are increased.

Trade union influence, PM and rewards

Predicating the relationship between union influence and PM and reward is not straightforward, especially in MNC subsidiaries that have greater discretion to avoid unions due to their ability to relocate or to establish greenfield sites. For example, in relation to rewards, union presence might explain an avoidance of financial participation as it may undermine employee support for union membership and potentially remove part of the negotiable remuneration from collective forms of pay determination (Pendleton et al., 2002). However, as financial participation stimulates greater involvement by employee representation and a more equitable distribution of wealth, studies indicate that employee representation and financial participation schemes are mutually reinforcing (McNabb and Whitfield, 1998 cited in Pendleton et al., 2002).

The potential influence of union presence on PM practices of MNCs is also complex. Taylor (2012) notes that the philosophy underpinning this mainstream perspective of PM is one of a mutuality of interest (Torrington et al., 2011; Armstrong, 2009), while Torrington et al. (2011: 269) note an ‘emerging of performance management which centres on “dialogue,” “shared understanding” and “mutual commitment”’. On the face of it, such aspirations may appear to align well with trade union goals and therefore union influence on the use of such practices could be positive. However, Taylor (2012) and others warn that both academics and practitioners have argued that PM goals are often compromised and used for conflicting purposes (Beardwell and Claydon, 2010; Callahan, 2007). Complicating things further, in MNCs of diverse nationality and in a foreign host environment, conflicting interpretations of the practice might be expected. For example, the ‘harder edge’ to PM and appraisal that emerged in US MNCs (Bach, 2005 cited in Taylor, 2012) may be interpreted very differently in subsidiaries with a union presence. Therefore, on balance it might be expected that the recognition of trade unions in the subsidiaries of MNCs will have a negative association with the use of PM and rewards particularly for employees.

Research methodology

The data for this study comes from a large-scale survey of employment practices of MNCs in Australia. The criteria applied and the methodology that was used followed the protocols set out in the Investigation of Transnationals' Employment Practices: an International Database (INTREPID) international project assessing employment practices of MNCs across several countries (McDonnell et al., 2011). Foreign MNCs were defined as those that employed at least 100 in their Australian operations and 500 or more worldwide. Australian MNCs employ at least 500 with at least 100 in external operations. A total population of 1008 MNCs operating in Australia was developed utilising more than 20 different company-listing sources (McDonnell et al., 2011). From this population, a stratified random sample of 549 MNCs was selected according to COO and primary sector of operation. We lost 22 firms due to delisting, bankruptcy or merger and had a final sample of 527 MNCs. From this sample, interviews were held with 211 HRM managers (a response rate of 40%) between mid-December 2009 and February 2011. A total of 171 firms were foreign-owned MNCs and the remaining 40 firms were Australian owned. The questionnaire was administered by face-to-face interviews with the most senior HR practitioner able to answer questions for the entire Australian operation. Thus, this is an organisational rather than workplace-level study.

Variables used in the analysis

Dependent variables

In the interests of international comparison, the dependent variables mirror those used in other international studies (i.e. Ferner and Almond, 2012 in the UK). Performance and reward management variables included regular formal performance appraisals, FD, 360° appraisals, employee share ownership, profit sharing and share options. These variables were coded as dummy variables (e.g., practice used at the organisation = 1; practice not used at the organisation = 0). Each question was asked with respect to the LOG and managers.

Predictor variables

Country of origin

We constructed four dummy variables to examine the effects of European, Australian, Rest of the World, and US COO effects (e.g., 1 = US COO and 0 = Rest). We used US COO as the referent category.

Strategic human resource management (SHRM) approach

To ascertain if SHRM was used in the foreign MNC’s Australian operations and the Australian MNC’s local operations, participants were asked to respond using a Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 = ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 = ‘strongly agree’ to the following items: ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the Australian Operations’, participants were asked to rate each of the statements. ‘There is a distinct HR strategy in the company’, ‘The HR strategy is effectively integrated with corporate strategy’, ‘The HR strategy has a sufficient input influence on corporate strategy’ and ‘Our HR practices are integrated and consistent with each other’. Principal components analysis with varimax rotation was conducted to assess the factor structure of the measure. All four items loaded satisfactorily onto one factor. Reliability analysis was also conducted on the four items (α = .82). The measure was coded as ‘SHRM’.

HRIS

Respondents were asked ‘Does the ultimate controlling company utilise a HR information system that holds data relating to the firm’s international workforce?’. A dummy variable was created (Yes = 1, No = 0).

Australian HR representative

We also asked managers the following questions: ‘Is there a body within the ultimate controlling company, such as a committee of senior managers that develops HR policies which apply across countries?’ If the respondent selected yes, they were also asked ‘Is there someone from the Australian operations on this committee?’ The responses to these two questions were combined and developed into a variable that was dummy coded as ‘Australian HR Rep’ (Australian HR rep on body = 1, no HR policy formulation body exists but no Australian rep = 0).

Shared HR services

We asked respondents about whether their HR function in Australia used ‘shared service’ centres. This variable was coded as a dummy variable ‘Shared HR Services’ (Yes = 1, No = 0).

Trade union recognition

Participants were asked, ‘In Australia, are trade unions recognised for the purpose of collective employee representation at?’, The following options were provided to respondents: ‘No sites’; ‘All sites’; ‘Most sites’; ‘Some sites’; and ‘The company’s single Australian site’. The company’s single Australian site and all sites were combined to create a dummy variable (all sites = 1; Rest = 0). The rest of the variables were also coded as dummy variables. The ‘No sites’ dummy variable was used as the referent category.

Global integration

Participants were asked ‘Are any of the components, products or services of the Australian operations produced for operations in the ultimate controlling company based outside of Australia?’ A dummy variable was created (Yes = 1; No = 0).

Controls

Industry

We developed three categories that represented the industry sector: manufacturing and construction, service, and primary industries. Each category was dummy coded as follows: manufacturing = 1; rest = 0; services = 1; rest = 0; primary = 1; rest = 0). The service industry was used as a reference category in the logistic regression analysis.

Date of establishment of MNC’s Australian operations

Participants were asked to answer the following single-item question: ‘When did the company establish in Australia?’ This variable was coded as a continuous variable date of establishment (e.g., 1957, 1989, etc.).

Establishment size

Participants were asked to respond to the question: ‘Approximately how many employees work within the Australian operations?’ Empsize was coded as a dummy variable (>500 employees = 1; <499 employees = 0).

Participants were asked: ‘Are the shares of the company privately owned or publicly traded?’ This is coded as a dummy variable (privately owned = 0; publicly traded = 1).

Business strategy

We also used a variable regarding how the ultimate controlling company competes internationally based on Bartlett and Goshals’ (1989) MNCs strategic typology. We created dummy variables of the four broad strategic types described in that typology: localisation strategy, a low-cost strategy, combination of localisation and low-cost strategy and a replication strategy. This control was added to complement the integration variable. We sought to control for pressure on MNCs to adapt to local conditions (localisation strategy) versus pressure to integrate (represented by the other strategies to varying degrees).

Organisational learning

Participants were asked: ‘How important is this mechanism to the following organisational learning outcomes – dissemination of best practices internationally’. The single-item measure was represented on a Likert-type scale (from not important (1) to very important (5)).

Findings

To assess the use of PM and reward practices by the LOG and managers of MNCs operating in Australia, and the influence of the COO, we present frequencies and cross-tabulations.

Table 1 reports Cramer’s V (CV) tests for proportion differences between the use of PM and remuneration practices by the LOG of MNCs operating in Australia. Results indicate that there was a significant difference in FD applied to the results of performance appraisals for the LOG among MNCs operating in Australia (CV = .28, p < .01). The US MNCs operating in Australia tend to be the highest users of FD of the results of performance appraisals for the LOG and employee share ownership programs. The analysis reveals that 360° feedback also differs depending on COO (CV = .20, p < .10) with US and European the highest users of such practices. The analysis also shows that the provision of employee share ownership programs (ESOPS) by LOG differs significantly among foreign-owned MNCs (CV = .35, p < .01) with Australian MNCs the heaviest users of such practices.

Table 1.

Cramer’s V tests on PM and remuneration practices versus country of origin of MNC for LOG.

Practices	US	Europe	Australia	ROW
Regular performance appraisal	66 (81.5%)	44 (86.3%)	35 (87.5%)	28 (71.8%)
Forced distribution	28 (42.4%)	8 (18.2%)	5 (14.3%)	5 (17.9%)
360° feedback	22 (33.3%)	15 (34.1%)	4 (11.4%)	7 (25%)
Employee share ownership programs	20 (24.7%)	11 (21.6%)	20 (51.3%)	1 (2.6%)
Profit sharing	17 (21%)	10 (19.6%)	7 (17.5%)	7 (17.9%)
Share options	8 (9.9%)	7 (13.7%)	6 (15%)	2 (5.1%)

Note: PM, performance management; LOG, largest occupational group.

N = 211.

Table 2 reports CV tests for proportion differences between the use of PM and remuneration management practices by managers of MNCs operating in Australia. Results indicate that there was a significant difference in FD applied to the results of performance appraisals for managers among MNCs operating in Australia (CV = .32, p < .01). US MNCs were the greatest users of FD of results of performance appraisals for managers. The analyses also show that the provision of employee share ownership programs by managers differs among MNCs (CV = .37, p < .01). Australian MNCs were the heaviest users of ESOPS followed by the US and European MNCs. Moreover, there was a significant difference in the provision of share options for managers (CV = .26, p < .01). European MNCs were the greatest users of share options for managers, closely followed by Australian MNCs.

Table 2.

Cramer’s V tests on performance management and remuneration practices versus country of origin of MNC for managers.

Practices	US	Europe	Australia	ROW
Regular performance appraisal	80 (98.8%)	50 (98%)	40 (100%)	38 (97.4%)
Forced distribution	41 (51.3%)	11 (22%)	7 (17.5%)	9 (23.7%)
360° feedback	50 (62.5%)	26 (52%)	18 (45%)	22 (57.9%)
Employee share ownership programs	42 (51.9%)	24 (47.1%)	28 (71.8%)	5 (12.8%)
Profit sharing	27 (33.3%)	19 (37.3%)	11 (27.5%)	14 (35.9%)
Share options	32 (39.5%)	25 (49%)	19 (47.5%)	5 (12.8%)

MNC, multinational corporations.

N = 211.

In Table 3, the frequencies for PM and reward of LOG are presented. Regular performance appraisals are used by most MNCs for the LOG and most MNCs in our sample did not use other PM and reward practices such as FD, share options and 360° feedback.

Table 3.

Frequencies for the use of PM and reward by LOG.

Practices	%
Regular performance appraisal	82
Forced distribution	21.8
360° feedback	22.7
Employee share ownership programs	24.6
Profit sharing	19.4
Share options	10.9

Note: PM, performance management; LOG, largest occupational group.

N = 211.

From Table 4, regular performance appraisals are used by most MNCs operating in Australia for managers. Interestingly, our MNC sample tended to be more prolific users of PM and reward practices for managers as compared to their LOG.

Table 4.

Frequencies for the use of the measured PM and reward for managers.

Practices	%
Regular performance appraisal	98.6
Forced distribution	32.2
360° feedback	55
Employee share ownership programs	46.9
Profit sharing	33.6
Share options	38.4

Note: PM, performance management.

N = 211.

The logistic regression model

The logistic regression model is as follows:

PM&R = α + β₁Australia + β₂Europe + β₃Rest of the World + β₄SHRM + β₅HRIS + β₆HR global + β₇Shared HR services + β₈Organisation learning + β₉Unions recognised at all sites + β₁₀Unions recognised at most sites + β₁₁Unions recognised at some sites + β₁₂Industry Sector + β₁₃Employment Size (log) + β₁₄Date of Establishment + β₁₅Shares + β₁₆Global integration + β₁₇global business strategy + ∈.

We test this model using five logistic regressions. The first model (Model 1) tests the predictors of regular performance appraisal. However, this analysis was not performed for managers as there is an absence of variance in the data. The second model (Model 2) tests the predictors of FD. The third model (Model 3) tests the predictors of 360° feedback. The fourth model (Model 4) tests the predictors of employee share ownership programs. The fifth model (Model 5) tests the predictors of profit sharing. We did not test for the predictors of share options due to absence of variance in the data – too few MNCs used share option for the LOG. Table 5 shows the logistic regression results for all five models for the LOG and Table 6 shows the logistic regression results for the five models for managers.

Table 5.

Results of logistic regression analysis for performance management and rewards for LOG.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5
	Regular performance appraisal		Forced distribution		360° feedback		Employee share ownership programs		Profit sharing
Variables	SE	Exp (B)	SE	Exp (B)	SE	Exp (B)	SE	Exp (B)	SE	Exp (B)
Australian MNCs	.964	.481	.802	.330	1.043	.182	.774	5.982**	.786	1.911
European MNCs	.749	3.308	.598	.229**	.591	.836	.591	.765	.579	1.530
ROW MNCs	.846	.652	.838	.441	.765	1.564	1.194	.077**	.768	4.762**
SHRM	.087	1.036	.080	.956	.080	1.149*	.081	.991	.078	1.082
HRIS	.613	2.259	.577	2.094	.585	3.960**	.563	1.814	.573	2.923*
HR global	.730	4.063*	.874	4.223*	.836	2.656	.905	6.273**	.768	4.796**
Shared HR services	.640	2.084	.488	1.890	.482	1.007	.518	.521	.479	2.739**
Organisational learning	.321	1.470	.269	1.035	.260	.755	.296	1.546	.265	.894
Unions recognised at all sites	1.101	.018***	.741	1.962	.759	.237*	.723	1.204	.696	.342*
Unions recognised at most sites	1.154	.032**	.815	2.431	.848	.589	.912	.225	.913	.194
Unions recognised at some sites	.975	.036**	.633	1.320	.683	.546	.598	1.889	.570	1.576
Primary sector	1.125	.111*	1.162	.146*	.952	1.158	.885	2.006	1.176	.136*
Manufacturing sector	.652	.136**	.565	.300**	.549	.550	.560	1.415	.543	.354*
Employment size (log)	.605	2.322	.459	.655	.473	.856	.477	3.245**	.446	.943
Date of establishment	.008	.989	.006	1.000	.007	.989	.006	1.007	.007	1.006
Shares	.645	1.442	.594	.920	.565	1.611	.676	.352	.533	1.942
Global integration	.591	.479	.493	.487	.462	.859	.488	.836	.453	.713
Localisation strategy	.898	4.883*	.675	.390	.716	2.027	.662	1.208	.667	1.028
Low-cost strategy	.957	3.420	.761	.384	.816	1.453	.959	.196*	.725	1.592
Combination strategy	.780	1.835	.589	.715	620	3.159*	.605	1.677	.575	1.486
−2LLR	101.952		144.000		139.290		136.646		149.225
Nagelkerke R²	.486		.283		.296		.419		.249

Note: LOG, largest occupational group; MNC, multinational corporations; HRIS, human resource information systems; HR, human resource.

N = 173. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Table 6.

Results of logistic regression analysis for performance management and rewards for managers.

Variables	Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6
	Forced distribution		360° feedback		Employee share ownership programs		Profit sharing		Share options
	SE	Exp (B)	SE	Exp (B)	SE	Exp (B)	SE	Exp (B)	SE	Exp (B)
Australian MNCs	.783	.113***	.625	.584	.694	1.267	.631	.933	.688	1.029
European MNCs	.517	.152***	.454	.686	.486	.755	.463	1.265	.518	2.376*
ROW MNCs	.668	.200**	.606	2.236	.682	.172***	.591	2.773*	.739	.255*
SHRM	.065	.992	.061	1.100	.066	.956	.060	1.065	.069	.895
HRIS	.463	1.521	.412	2.641**	.444	.918	.430	2.332**	.458	1.411
HR global	.630	2.252	.532	3.039**	.625	4.256**	.535	2.294	.658	2.828
Shared HR services	.413	1.222	.389	.732	.422	.523	.389	1.769	.432	.943
Organisational learning	.225	.918	.205	.812	.217	1.078	.206	.832	.221	1.239
Unions recognised at all sites	.650	2.986*	.564	.850	.614	.979	.563	.745	.648	1.162
Unions recognised at most sites	.669	4.425**	.621	.930	.674	1.120	.630	1.009	.689	3.290*
Unions recognised at some sites	.542	2.564*	.494	1.201	.522	2.403	.480	1.701	.521	2.032
Primary sector	.949	.107**	.743	.491	.818	.744	.890	.153**	.832	2.896
Manufacturing sector	.449	.445*	.419	.913	.449	.649	.425	.351**	.473	.669
Employment size (log)	.420	1.129	.372	1.276	.426	2.666**	.367	1.147	.421	1.696
Date of establishment	.005	.999	.005	.999	.005	1.004	.005	1.007	.005	1.008
Shares	.502	.587	.443	.486	.519	.204***	.442	1.580	.689	.088**
Global integration	.413	.604	.380	.816	.404	1.734	.367	.812	.420	1.028
Localisation strategy	.588	.490	.535	2.030	.579	.794	.542	1.325	.588	.727
Low-cost strategy	.637	.524	.585	.799	.631	.772	.600	1.743	.641	1.127
Combination strategy	.507	1.175	.479	1.985	.519	1.742	.482	1.609	.530	2.342
−2LLR	181.024		204.075		183.197		205.752		174.285
Nagelkerke R²	.308		.221		.372		.184		.379

Note: LOG, largest occupational group; MNC, multinational corporations; HRIS, human resource information systems; HR, human resource.

N = 173. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

A total of 173 cases (after allowing for missing cases) were included in the logistic regression analysis. Model 1 for the LOG accounted for 48.6% of the variance for regular performance appraisal (Nagelkerke R²). Table 5 shows standard errors and exponential beta values for each of the independent variables. Of the 20 determinants investigated in the logistic regression, ‘unions recognised at all sites’ (p < .01), ‘unions recognised at most sites’ (p < .05) and ‘unions recognised at some sites’ (p < .05) were statistically significant. Moreover, ‘primary sector’ (p < .10), ‘manufacturing sector’ (p < .05) and ‘HR global’ were statistically significant at p < .10. These results indicated that large MNCs were more likely to have a system of regular formal performance appraisal for the LOG. MNCs in the primary and manufacturing sector as compared with those in the service sector, and MNCs that recognise trade unions at all sites, most sites and some sites for the purpose of collective employee representation relative to those that did not recognise unions at all were less likely to have a system of regular formal performance appraisal for the LOG. The MNC ultimate controlling company that possessed a body that develops HR policies relating to the MNCs’ international workforce was more likely to use formal performance appraisals.

Model 2 for the LOG and managers accounted for 28.3% and 22.1% of the variance for FD, respectively (Nagelkerke R²). Four determinants investigated in the logistic regression were statistically significant for LOG. ‘European MNCs’ were less likely relative to US MNCs to use FD approaches to performance appraisal (p < .05). ‘HR global’, ‘primary sector’ (p < .10) and ‘manufacturing sector’ (p < .05) were statistically significant (p < .10). This indicates that MNCs operating in the ‘primary’ and ‘manufacturing sectors’ as compared with those in the ‘service sector’ are less likely to use FD for the LOG. Moreover, the MNC ultimate controlling company that possessed a body that develops HR policies relating to the MNCs international workforce was more likely to use FDs for the LOG. Model 2 for managers indicated that ‘Australian’ (p < .01), ‘European’ (p < .01) and ‘rest of world (ROW) MNCs’ (p < .05) were less likely relative to ‘US MNCs’ to use FD. Moreover, ‘Unions recognised at some’ (p < .10), ‘at most’ (p < .05) and ‘at all sites’ (p < .10) were more likely relative to those MNCs that did not recognise unions to use FD for managers. FD for managers was less likely to be used by MNCs operating in both the ‘primary’ (p < .05) and ‘manufacturing sectors’ (p < .10) relative to their ‘service sector’ counterparts.

Model 3 for the LOG and managers accounted for 29.6% and 22.1% of the variance for 360° feedback, respectively (Nagelkerke R²). For the LOG, ‘SHRM’ (p < .10) and ‘HRIS’ (p < .05) were statistically significant. Moreover, ‘union recognition at all sites’ (p < .10) was also negatively significant. MNCs using a ‘combination strategy’ (p < .10) were more likely to use 360° feedback relative to those using a replication strategy. These results indicate that MNCs using a SHRM approach and possessing a HRIS were more likely to use 360° feedback. MNCs that recognised unions at all sites were less likely to use 360° feedback relative to those that did not recognise unions. For the managers, ‘HRIS’ (p < .05) and ‘HR global’ (p < .05) were both positively significant. Once again the MNC ultimate controlling company that possessed a body that develops HR policies relating to the MNCs international workforce was more likely to use 360° feedback for managers.

Model 4 for the LOG and managers accounted for 41.9% and 37.2% of the variance for employee share ownership programs, respectively (Nagelkerke R²). For the LOG, ‘Australian MNCs’ (p < .05) were more likely relative to ‘US MNCs’, whilst ‘ROW MNCs’ (p < .05) were less likely relative to ‘US MNCs’ to use employee share ownership programs. ‘HR global’ (p < .05) and ‘employment size’ (p < .05) were significant. Results also show that larger MNCs are more likely to use ESOPS. Employment size (p < .01), ‘shares’ (p < .01) were statistically significant at a 99% confidence level (p < .01). ‘HR global’ (p < .05) was significant for managers. These results suggest that large MNCs, MNCs with shares that were publicly traded and MNCs with HR global were more likely to use ESOPS for their managers.

Model 5 for LOG and managers accounted for 24.9% and 18.4% of the variance for profit sharing, respectively (Nagelkerke R²). Of the 20 investigated in the logistic regression, ‘ROW MNCs’ (p < .05), ‘HRIS’ (p < .10), ‘HR global’ (p < .05), and ‘shared HR services’ (p < .05) were statistically significant. Moreover, MNCs with ‘union recognition at all sites’ (p < .10) were less likely to use profit sharing for the LOG. These results show that ROW MNCs were more likely to use profit sharing as compared with US MNCs operating in Australia. MNCs that use share service centres and the ultimate controlling company of MNCs that possessed a body that develops HR policies relating to the MNCs’ international workforce were more likely to use profit sharing for the LOG. Conversely, for the manager cohort, ‘ROW MNCs’ (p < .10) were more likely to use profit sharing relative to ‘US MNCs’. Moreover, ‘HRIS’ (p < .05) was statistically significant. MNCs operating in the ‘primary’ and ‘manufacturing sectors’ were less likely relative to MNCs operating in the ‘service sector’ to use profit sharing.

Model 6 for managers accounted for 37.9% of the variance for share options (Nagelkerke R²). ‘European MNCs’ (p < .10) were more likely to use ‘share options’ for managers relative to their US counterparts. ‘ROW MNCs’ (p < .10) were less likely to use such rewards in comparison to ‘US MNCs’. MNCs that ‘recognised unions at most sites’ (p < .10) were more likely to use share options for managers. ‘Shares’ was statistically significant (p < .05), that is, MNCs with shares that were publicly traded were more likely to use share options for managers.

Discussion and conclusions

In this paper, we set out to examine the use of PM and reward practices of MNCs operating in Australia, examine the determinants of these practices and identify the class of employees that are covered by these practices. In the following sections, we discuss the key results in terms of their scholarly and internationally comparative implications to articulate the contribution of this paper.

First, this paper contributes to addressing the need for more studies that adopt comparable measures of MNC practices in multiple contexts. For example, our findings in the Australian context concur with many of Ferner and Almond’s (2012) conclusions for the UK examining similar practices. Both studies show MNCs to be users of a suite of PM and reward practices, both reveal important distinctions in the application of these practices between the LOG and managers, and both studies fail to find significant results around comparable measures of international operational integration. That is, in the not dissimilar host environment of Australia, similar MNC practices that were evident is far from inconsequential, as such findings contribute to the practice convergence thesis that there are ‘best-practices’ common to MNCs (i.e. both across contexts and irrespective of COO). This thesis suggests the MNC is less bound by host or home norms (Kostova et al., 2008), but rather by global ‘isomorphic pressures’ (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998). Indeed, MNCs’ isomorphism through similar practices is best studied through replicating findings in multiple contexts. In light of this, comparable findings between the UK and Australia are an important contribution to understanding the explanatory power of predictors of management practice in multiple contexts.

However, despite commonalities in the presence of a range of PM and reward practices amongst MNCs, we found distinct evidence of COO effects relating to these specific practices. For example, despite the fact that US firms were higher users of FD relative to other COO categories, Australian and European MNCs were more likely to use ESOPs relative to US firms and are also higher users of share options for managers. These findings are significant in that they provide insights into ‘best-practice’ that is not US led and also challenge the idea that corporations that originate in shareholder contexts are more likely to use share owner options. The findings reveal COO variation as predicated at the outset, but notably, this variation does not reflect a dominance of individualistic practices in US MNCs. This finding has important theoretical implications for two reasons. Firstly, extant research suggests that ‘if convergence is assumed, an orientation toward the U.S. model is the prime focus’ (Festing, 2012: 39), but while this study provides evidence of the use of such practices, it casts doubt on whether such ‘individualistic practices’ should still be understood as primarily ‘American-practice’ (Pudelko and Harzing, 2007). Secondly, the dominate theoretical frameworks used to explain COO effects, cultural and institutional theory (Zhu et al., 2014) stress the transfer of home practice as their principle manifestation and ‘that for an MNC from a dominant country such as the US, COO effects are more likely to be relatively strong’ (Almond, 2011: 263), especially so in a liberal host context like Australia. The mixed finding relating to COO presented from this study (using US MNCs as the reference for analysis) lends support to calls for more nuanced examinations of specific practices and behaviours rather than abstract conceptualisations of the effect. This supports Ferner and Almond’s (2012: 19) conclusion that ‘the notion of national distinctiveness “in the round” is of limited usefulness’.

Second, this paper contributes to the enduring interest in distinguishing the application of these PM and reward practices between the workforce and managers (Ferner and Almond, 2012). For example, whilst all MNCs use performance appraisal for LOG, many do not use both FD and 360° appraisal for LOG and managers. In relation to reward practices for the LOG, MNCs operating in Australia are not extensive users of ESOPS, profit sharing and share options. However, they make greater use of these practices for managers, suggesting a differentiated HR architecture for employee groups (Lepak and Snell, 1999). The rationale of MNCs may include using PM and rewards as a mechanism of controlling managerial behaviour and integrating reward more closely with head quarters practices (Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). From an employment relations perspective, data highlighting distinctions in the management of the LOG and managers has the broader implication of placing important conditions on more general interpretations of MNCs’ as ‘adopters of good management practices in almost every country in which they operate’ (Bloom et al., 2012: 14). Through analysis of the categories of employees to which ‘good practices’ apply, we begin to unpack important discrepancies in the application of ‘good practice’ for the people who work in MNCs.

Third, it is ‘striking’ (Ferner and Almond, 2012: 258) that, as in the UK, measures of international unit integration were poor predictors of PM and reward in Australian-based MNCs. Moreover, efforts to control for a link with the broader strategic typologies of MNCs (Bartlett and Goshal, 1989), which had not been undertaken in Ferner and Almond, also failed to yield a significant result. However, in light of our findings that in MNCs whose ultimate controlling company possessed a body that develops HR policies relating to the international workforce were more likely to use the PM and reward practices for both the LOG and managers, we would suggest that functional integration may occur despite a lack of evidence of ‘strategic’ integration in the corporate sense. To test this, the impact on the MNC’s full suite of HR practices would need to be measured. However, our evidence of a relationship between HR integration mechanisms (such as shared services, global HR and HIRS) and PM and reward practices that can address integrative needs (as argued at the outset) implies some normative integration through HR policy, despite an absence of evidence that this is linked to structural needs of the MNC (i.e. unit integration). Although no significant result was found against the strategic HR variable, our overall findings give credence to the proposition that PM and reward may be linked to integrative needs of MNCs through HR practices. Future research that investigates the degree to which these practices are replicated throughout MNC units and/or research which seeks to directly measure the degree to which they are positively associated with an increased ‘sense of belonging’ (Pendleton et al., 2002) could shed light on both the use of PM and reward, as well as other HR integrating mechanisms for normative integration.

Fourth, this paper provides important insights into the impact of trade union presence on PM and reward practices as measured by union recognition for the purpose of collective bargaining. We find that there is greater likelihood of more extensive use of these practices (i.e., especially performance appraisal, 360° feedback and profit sharing) where there is low union recognition for the purpose of collective bargaining for the LOG. Our findings support the literature that suggests that unions often oppose these schemes (Pendleton et al., 2002; Taylor, 2012). In contrast, we find greater likelihood of the use of PM and reward for managers, particularly FD and share options, when MNCs recognise unions. It is possible that heavily unionised organisations might be more hostile environments to exercise managerial prerogative, hence managers might need stronger carrots (share options) and sticks (FD) to improve their performance. Performance appraisal and performance-based rewards are contentious areas for trade unions as they threaten to undermine collective behaviour and promote individual effort and bargaining – hence challenging the very heart of union solidarity. Our findings suggest that despite union decline in Australia, unions still have some influence over managerial policy, in particular in the manufacturing and primary industries. The implication of these findings is that unions in Australia do not perhaps see PM practices as ‘sharing understanding’ and ‘mutual commitment’ (Torrington, 2011). Or if they do, they see such developments as a threat to their influence. In turn, this could mean that employers see unions as blocks that hinder the development of more performance-based practices and improvements in productivity, hence risking future investment as employers seek out a more compliant workforce.

These findings also have important implications for comparative analysis of MNC practice. Ferner and Almond (2012) reported that bargaining coverage has no influence on profit sharing in the UK, noting that their finding supports Kersley et al.’s (2006) conclusion that such practices are common in unionised firms. However, as we found MNCs with union recognition at all sites for the purpose of bargaining were less likely to use profit sharing for the LOG, caution is warranted in concluding that ‘commonly found practices’ are immune to union influence. This finding raises the prospect that the ‘hybrid’ system in Australia and the tradition of unionism (Townsend et al., 2013) have a greater influence than in the ‘permissive’ UK context. Future research across comparable host contexts could provide a better understanding of the fault-line between host countries’ ‘permissiveness’ to common MNC practice and when and where unions still have scope to influence them.

Finally, we acknowledge the limitations to this study. First, this is a cross-sectional study which represents a snapshot of MNC practices at one point in time. Second, the study only measured the perceptions of the most senior HR manager and did not include the views of other important organisational participants. Third, as we have no reference point in terms of the non-MNC population, we cannot say to what extent the PM and reward practices of MNCs deviate from that found in non MNCs. Fourth, while a more detailed questionnaire design may have provided for better insights into the skill and knowledge of the workforce, as well as job design, as factors that impact on PM and reward, our survey was designed for comparability (i.e. with the INTREPID network as discussed in our methods section). We would encourage future researchers to delve deeper into the variations in the use of PM and reward inside MNCs in Australia based on further categorisation of employees beyond management and the LOG.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding

We acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council (DP120103071).

Biographical notes

Timothy Bartram, School of Management, La Trobe University has an extensive research record in the area of HRM and employment relations. Having published in various international and domestic journals he is also currently the co-editor of the Asia pacific journal of Human Resources and co-author of Human Resource Management: Strategy, People, Performance textbook, 4th Edition (t.bartram@latrobe.edu.au).

Brendan Boyle, University of Newcastle, Newcastle Business School. Dr Boyle's research interests include international management and international business. He has published extensively in leading international journals such as Human Relations and the International Journal of Human Resource Management (brendan.boyle@newcastle.edu.au).

Pauline Stanton, School of Management, RMIT University has over eighty peer reviewed publications in a wide range of international and domestic journals. Professor Stanton's research focuses on high performance work systems, performance management and employee voice (pauline.stanton@rmit.edu.au).

Gitika Sablok, School of Management, RMIT University. Her research interests include HRM, international management and employee voice. She holds a DipBus and BBus Honours from La Trobe University (gitika.sablok@rmit.edu.au).

John Burgess, School of Management, Curtin University of Technology has an extensive research record on employment developments, HRM, the labour market, gender and work and labor regulation. John has published extensively in outlets including the international journal of human resource management, Personnel review and has co-edited 15 special journal issues (john.burgess@curtin.edu.au).

References

Aguinis

Pierce

(2008) Enhancing the relevance of organisational behavior by embracing performance management research. Journal of Organizational Behavior 29: 139–145.

Almond

(2011) Re-visiting ‘country of origin’ effects on HRM in multinational corporations. Human Resource Management Journal 21: 258–271.

Bartlett

Ghoshal

(1989) Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Beulin

(2009) The contribution of a global service provider’s human resource management information system (HRIS) to staff retention in emerging markets: Comparing issues and implications. Information Technology and People 22(3): 270–288.

Bloom

Milkovich

Mitra

(2003) International compensation: Learning in how managers respond to variations in local host contexts. International Journal of Human Resource Management 14(8): 1350–1367.

Boxall

Purcell

(2011) Strategy and Human Resource Management, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Brewster

Wood

Brookes

(2008) Similarity, isomorphism or duality? Recent survey evidence on the human resource management policies of multinational corporations. British Journal of Management 19: 320–342.

Budworth

Mann

(2011) Performance management: Where do we go from here? Human Resource Management Review 21(2): 81–84.

Cicekli

(2011) Antecedents of normative integration in multinational companies: A conceptual model. International Journal of Management 28(4).

10.

Collings

Scullion

Dowling

(2009) Global staffing: A review and thematic research agenda. The International Journal of Human Resource Management 20(6): 1253–1272.

11.

Den Hartog

Boselie

Paauwe

(2004) Performance management: A model and research agenda. Applied Psychology 53(4): 556–569.

12.

Edwards P, Edwards T, Ferner A, et al. (2007) Employment practices of MNCs in organisational context: A large-scale survey. De Montfort University.

13.

Edwards

Marginson

Ferner

(2013) Multinational companies in cross-national context: Integration, differentiation, and the interactions between MNSc and nation states. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 66: 547–696.

14.

Evans P, Pucik V and Björkman I (2011) The Global Challenge: International Human Resource Management. McGraw-Hill Irwin.

15.

Ferner

Almond

(2012) Performance and reward practices in foreign multinationals in the UK. Human Resource Management Journal 23(3): 241–261.

16.

Ferner

Almond

Clark

(2004) Dynamics of central control and subsidiary autonomy in the management of human resources: Case-study evidence from US MNCs in the UK. Organization Studies 25(3): 363–391.

17.

Ferner

Quintanilla

(1998) Multinationals, national business systems and HRM: The enduring influence of national identity or a process of Anglo-Saxonisation. International Journal of Human Resource Management 9(5): 710–729.

18.

Festing

(2012) Strategic human resource management in Germany: Evidence of convergence to the US model, the European model, or a distinctive national model? The Academy of Management Perspectives 26(2): 37–54.

19.

Fletcher

(2001) Performance appraisal and management: The developing research agenda. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 74(4): 473–487.

20.

Gooderham

Nordhaug

Ringdal

(2006) National embeddedness and calculative human resource management in US subsidiaries in Europe and Australia. Human Relations 59(11): 1491–1513.

21.

Gunnigle

Morley

Clifford

(1997) Human Resource Management in Irish Organisations: Practice in Perspective, Dublin: Oak Tree Press.

22.

Haines

III St-Onge

(2012) Performance management effectiveness: Practices or context? The International Journal of Human Resource Management 23(6): 1158–1175.

23.

Kersley

Alpin

Forth

(2006) Inside the Workplace, London: Routledge.

24.

Kostova

Roth

Dacin

(2008) Institutional theory in the study of multinational corporations: A critique and new directions. Academy of Management Review 33(4): 994–1006.

25.

Kuvaas

(2006) Performance appraisal satisfaction and employee outcomes: Mediating and moderating roles of work motivation. The International Journal of Human Resource Management 17(3): 504–522.

26.

Latham

Almost

Mann

(2005) New developments in performance management. Organizational Dynamics 34: 77–87.

27.

Lepak

Snell

(1999) The human resource architecture: Toward a theory of human capital allocation and development. Academy of Management Review 24(1): 31–48.

28.

McDonnell

Lavelle

Gunnigle

(2014) Human resource management in multinational enterprises: Evidence from a late industrializing economy. Management International Review 54: 361–380.

29.

McDonnell

Stanton

Burgess

(2011) Multinational enterprises in Australia: Two decades of international human resource management research reviewed. Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 49(1): 9–35.

30.

McGraw

Harley

(2003) Industrial relations and human resource management practices in Australian and overseas-owned workplaces: Global or local? Journal of Industrial Relations 45(1): 1–22.

31.

Nankervis

Compton

(2006) Performance management: Theory in practice? Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 44(1): 83–101.

32.

Nankervis

Stanton

(2012) Exploring the rhetoric and reality of performance management systems and organisational effectiveness – Evidence from Australia. Research & Practice in Human Resource Management 20(1): 40–56.

33.

Pendleton

Poutsma

Brewster

(2002) Employee share ownership and profit-sharing in the European Union: Incidence, company characteristics, and union representation. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 8(1): 47–62.

34.

Poutsma

Blasi

Kruse

(2012) Employee share ownership and profit sharing in different institutional contexts. The International Journal of Human Resource Management 23(8): 1513–1518.

35.

Poutsma

Nijs

(2003) Broad-based employee financial participation in the European Union. The International Journal of Human Resource Management 14(6): 863–892.

36.

Pudelko

Harzing

A-W

(2007) Country-of-origin, localization, or dominance effect? An empirical investigation of HRM practices in foreign subsidiaries. Human Resource Management 46(4): 535–559.

37.

Roth

O’Donnell

(1996) Foreign subsidiary compensation strategy: An agency theory perspective. Academy of Management Journal 39(3): 678–703.

38.

Sablok

Bartram

Stanton

(2013) The impact of union presence and strategic human resource management on employee voice in multinational enterprises in Australia. Journal of Industrial Relations 55(4): 621–639.

39.

Taggart

(1997) Strategy shifts in MNC subsidiaries. Strategic Management Journal 19(7): 663–681.

40.

Tallman

Fladmoe-Lindquist

(2002) Internationalization, globalization, and capability-based strategy. California Management Review 45(1): 116–135.

41.

Taylor P (2012) Performance management and the new workplace tyranny. Report for the Scottish Trades Union Congress. Available at: www.stuc.org.uk.

42.

Townsend

Wilkinson

Burgess

(2013) Is enterprise bargaining still a better way of working? Journal of Industrial Relations 55(1): 100–117.

43.

Stanton

(2011) The transfer of HRM policies and practices to an transitional business system – The case of performance management practices in US and Japanese MNEs operating in Vietnam. International Journal of Human Resource Management 22(17): 3513–3527.

44.

Walsh

(2001) HRM in foreign-owned workplaces: Evidence from Australia. International Journal of HRM 12(3): 425–444.

45.

Zaheer

(1995) Overcoming the liability of foreignness. Academy of Management Journal 38(2): 341–363.

46.

Zhu JS, Zhu CJ and De Cieri H (2014) Chinese MNCs’ preparation for host-country labor relations: An exploration of country-of-origin effect. Human Resource Management, Wiley Online Library, DOI: 10.1002/hrm.21613.