Abstract
An emerging body of research addresses the link between environmental issues, especially climate change, and employment relations. In this article, we examine the ways in which employment relations actors are addressing climate change, particularly focusing on collective bargaining. We begin by surveying the literature linking climate change and employment relations, especially analysing union strategies in this sphere, and develop a conceptual framework linking these threads. We then examine the incidence and content of collective enterprise bargaining over environmental issues in Australia for 2011–2016, applying and adapting Goods' concepts of embedded institutional and voluntary multilateral approaches. The former inserts environmental commitments into formal collective agreements; the latter involves unions and workers more directly in developing emissions-reduction activities in the workplace. We address the potential links between these and the different actors (unions or management) that drive them. We find that environmental clauses in Australian agreements are rare, and that they are as likely to be driven by management as by unions. The institutional, organisational, and particularly the regulatory environment seem responsible. However, exceptions – notably in universities – provide exemplars for substantial, class-based union agency. We also find that collective bargaining may facilitate more ongoing, strategic initiatives of the voluntary multilateral type.
Keywords
Introduction
An emerging body of research (notably Hampton, 2015; Lipsig-Mumme and McBride, 2015; Räthzell and Uzzell, 2013) addresses the link between environmental issues, especially climate change, and employment relations. Workplaces generally are a key source of greenhouse gas emissions, and efforts to address climate change are likely to involve changes to the nature of work and labour markets (Markey et al., 2014). According to Goods (2017: 670–679), [c]limate change is an ER issue because it shapes the types of jobs and industries that will exist, and not exist, in the future, the labour process, the wages and conditions of workers and the strategies of organisations and management.
The emerging literature focusing on worker agency in the sphere of environmentalism has been situated in a new area of ‘environmental labour studies’ (Räthzel and Uzzell, 2013), representing the juxtaposition of previously discrete fields of social action and research in labour studies and environmental studies. This new field encompasses unions and other forms of workers’ organisations, such as cooperatives, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), small traders and farmers’ organisations. Focusing more specifically, ‘labour environmentalism’ addresses the strategies of unions and workers in resisting environmental degradation, especially climate change, and adverse impacts on workers from either climate change or management efforts to adapt to it (Stevis et al., 2018). These strategies may be implemented in the political and/or industrial arena of action.
In this article, we address the ways in which employment relations actors are addressing climate change, with a particular focus on one potential means: collective bargaining and the insertion of clauses related to the environment in collective agreements. In the next section we outline our method, involving an extensive analysis of the literature, followed by an analysis of a database of agreements with clauses related to environmental improvement. We begin by locating this arena of activity in a wider literature of ‘labour environmentalism’, from which we develop a conceptual framework for evaluating union activity in this sphere. In the succeeding section we broaden our conceptual focus to employment relations more generally, by including consideration of employers’ role in environmental enterprise bargaining through adapting a typology of employment relations climate action proposed by Goods (2017). We then apply this typology in analysing the incidence and nature of environmental clauses in Australian enterprise bargaining agreements (EBAs) and their distribution between industries. We analyse the content of agreements in terms of whether they relate mainly to general and policy-related issues, or include substantive provisions for consultation, and specific behaviours and initiatives associated with environmental protection and climate change, and whether they are likely to be employer or union initiated. Based on this analysis, we draw broader conclusions regarding the impact and significance of this form of environmental union intervention in relation to labour environmentalism and for employment relations more generally.
Method
In the next section, we assess literature on the link between environmental issues, particularly climate change, and employment relations. We link the disparate literature on union-led environmental action, synthesising common threads and utilising more general conceptions of the role of unions. We follow this by broadening our conceptualisation to employment relations more generally, focusing on the agency of all the actors – principally employers and unions, but also the state which is responsible for contextual constraints and opportunities. This is achieved through adapting Goods' (2017) conceptualisation of the ways in which climate change may be addressed through collective bargaining. Empirically, we draw on evidence from a wide range of contexts, but with a particular focus on Australia.
Framed by this discussion, we then analyse environment-related collective bargaining through a data set of EBAs identified as containing ‘environmental clauses’ from the Workplace Agreements Database maintained by the Australian Department of Employment (DoE). Environmental clauses occurred in 2427 EBAs certified by the Australian Fair Work Commission (FWC) between January 2011 and June 2016. The DoE provided data on the distribution of these EBAs across particular groups (e.g. industry), as well as the proportion of EBAs containing such clauses within these groups.
We also more specifically examined the content of the environmental clauses by obtaining copies of the specific agreements through the FWC website. After an initial analysis, a coding framework containing a number of variables was used to quantify the appearance of particular elements within the clauses. This broadly included, among other things:
assessment of the onus of responsibility, whether primarily on employees, the employer, or unspecified or more broadly ‘the parties’; provisions for consultation, including whether this involves a mechanism dedicated to environmental matters; the existence and nature of particular environmental policies referred to in the clauses; specific behaviours or objectives, such as recycling, waste, etc., and whether climate change specifically was mentioned as a consideration (as opposed to the environment more broadly); links to performance management, discipline, job classification or training.
This analysis of the content of agreements excludes 117 agreements, leaving 2310. Agreements were excluded either because they could not be sourced or because recognisable environmental clauses could not be found. Agreements that made reference to the ‘work environment’, for instance within the context of occupational health and safety, were not included because the link to ecological factors was unclear.
The data and coding allow us to broaden Goods’ (2017) analysis of a small number of EBAs specific to one industry in Australia and analyse the prevalence and nature of particular forms of ‘embedded institutional’ climate bargaining in this context. This particularly includes the differences across industry groups. We also assess the data against Goods’ typology and in terms of the respective actors’ agency.
The role of labour and unions in environmental activism
Unions have a long history of environmental activism dating back to at least the 1970s (Stevis and Felli, 2015; Stevis et al., 2018: 441). In the US the United Auto Workers, and in Australia the Builders’ Labourers’ Federation (BLF) were pioneers in this sphere (Burgmann, 2013; Burgmann and Burgmann, 1998; Stevis et al., 2018: 441). More recently, a number of individual unions, global labour unions and peak union bodies across the world, including the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) (Burgmann, 2013; Markey et al., 2014), have adopted public positions advocating strong regulatory action on climate change. Global unions and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) (and its predecessor the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) collaborated with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and, from 2006, the United Nations (UN) Environmental Program (UNEP), to advocate a social dimension in addressing climate change. To this end, they participated in 25 annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) from 1995 to 2018, after their recognition as a social stakeholder by the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) in 1992, initially as observers, but more actively from the late 1990s. From the 1997 Kyoto COP the unions advocated the policy of ‘just transition’, which was eventually included in the final agreement of the 16th COP in Cancun in 2010 and incorporated into the UNFCCC in 2015 (Goods, 2017; ILO, 2015; Stevis and Felli, 2015: 33). The UNCSD Rio+12 Conference in 2012 similarly emphasised the importance of decent work for sustainable development. The ITUC also collaborated with the International Organisation of Employers and the ILO in developing a Green Jobs Initiative in 2007 (ILO, 2015a), and in 2016 established a Just Transition Centre to promote its policy with social partners and international agencies (ITUC, 2016, 2017a).
Unions have been concerned with the impact of climate change policies on employment and job quality. Significant job losses have commenced in high-carbon emission sectors, such as energy production, and many more are predicted in the transition to low-carbon economies. In this context, unions have often focused on labour protection or support for displaced workers in a ‘just transition’ to a low-carbon economy (Burgmann, 2013; ITUC, 2017a). From the late 1990s, global unions and international and national peak union organisations have broadened the policy of ‘just transition’, tying it more specifically to climate change action. This policy was initially defined by the ILO as consisting of sustainable development, rights at work, decent work, green jobs and social protection (ILO, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; ITUC, 2017a; Stevis and Felli, 2015: 33). Generally, just transition policy also incorporated a role for participation by workers and unions in the development and planning of climate mitigation policy and practices through social dialogue at the national level and collective bargaining at sectoral and workplace levels (Goods, 2017; ITUC, 2017b). These policy developments can also be observed with the ACTU (Burgmann, 2013; Markey et al., 2014).
However, contradictions remain in union responses to environmental challenges generally and climate change specifically. Some individual unions remain more focused on a labour protection approach (Goods, 2011, 2017; Räthzell and Uzzell, 2011; Snell and Fairbrother, 2011; Stevis and Felli, 2015). Unions have often perceived a conflict between jobs and the environment. As Goods (2013: 15) notes, ‘workers and unions seeking to avoid job losses support capitalism's pursuit of exponential production, as expanding production maintains and creates jobs’. In order to understand the variation in policy arising from the tension of ‘unions versus the environment’ it is important to recognise the inherently contradictory nature of unions operating within capitalist society. This issue has been addressed by a range of scholars from numerous perspectives. Allan Flanders depicted a tension within trade unions between two functions: as ‘vested interests’, defending workers’ rights within the institutional framework of industrial relations systems, and ‘swords of justice’, working for radical social change. Both traits co-exist in unions, for whilst their institutionalisation may tend to supplant functioning as a ‘sword of justice’, the latter role ‘generates loyalties and induces sacrifices among its members’ (Flanders, 1970: 15). Other recent commentators are often more pessimistic, arguing that trade union leaders have been ‘captured’ by neoliberalism to become its reluctant or enthusiastic ‘prisoners and pensioners’ (McIlroy, 2009: 195). Broadly speaking, unions as climate actors can primarily represent ‘vested interests’–protecting members’ jobs and working conditions, or ‘swords of justice’–recognising a role as agents for radical social change that addresses exploitation of the environment and workers; in other words, they may accommodate within capitalism, or act as class agents of workers (Hampton, 2018).
In practice, the concept of just transition has also encompassed different emphases and some variation in meaning between unions (Snell, 2018; Snell and Fairbrother, 2013; Stevis and Felli, 2015). Furthermore, at the level of the workplace, the strategic implications for union organisers and delegates are not always clear or fully developed. These contradictions in union strategy largely reflect circumstances in the sector in which unions operate. Unions in chemicals, mining, manufacturing and energy have commonly emphasised labour protectionism, representing ‘vested interests’ (Snell, 2018; Stevis and Felli, 2015). In Australia, the Australian Workers’ Union (AWU) has advocated compensation and protection for some highly pollutive industries such as mining where it operates, emphasising that their support for climate action is conditional on no job losses (Goods, 2011; Snell and Fairbrother, 2011). The position of Australia's Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) is emblematic of policy tensions within the Australian union movement; whilst the Mining and Energy Division has been a longstanding and strident supporter of public policies and business strategies to reduce carbon emissions, the CFMEU's Forestry Division has actively opposed policies designed to mitigate climate change (Goods, 2011; Markey et al., 2014). Unions have also opposed employer initiatives perceived to threaten income or employment security or create work intensification (Tufts and Milne, 2015).
On the other hand, some of the most proactive unions in terms of climate action have been situated in lower carbon emission sectors, such as education and public administration. For example, after organising a national conference on climate change in 2010, the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) developed a range of strategies at different levels, including participation in the ACTU's Climate Change Committee, creation of state and branch (university) environmental committees, an enterprise bargaining agenda that included environmental clauses, reduction of its own energy usage, and participation in activities such as a workers’ cooperative (Earthworker) for manufacturing solar hot water systems to distribute through union networks (Markey et al., 2014; NTEU, 2010, 2017; Rea, 2011). Similarly, in the UK the University and College Union (UCU) and public sector unions have played leading roles in addressing climate change (Hampton, 2015, 2018). These unions have operated more like ‘swords of justice’ in the climate change sphere.
Variations in union policy also reflect their overall ideology and strategic approach. For example, the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU) has adopted an interventionist just transition policy advocating carbon pricing, state assistance for industry development policies, income support for displaced workers and inclusion of environmental responsibility in EBAs (Goods, 2011; Markey et al., 2014: 24; Snell and Fairbrother, 2011). At the regional community level, in the Victorian La Trobe Valley with an economy based on high pollution brown coal and power generation, the Gippsland Trades and Labour Council developed transition plans in collaboration with local small businesses, environmental and community groups and all levels of government. Similarly, in the Illawarra region of New South Wales, traditionally dependent on coal and steel, the South Coast Labour Council played an instrumental role in developing the Green Jobs Illawarra Project in collaboration with regional employer organisations, the local university and all levels of government to promote investment in sustainable industrial development (Snell and Fairbrother, 2011).
Richard Hyman's characterisation of three ideal types of unions, oriented to the market, society and class, provides a useful heuristic model for conceptualising these contradictions further. A market orientation generates business unionism focused primarily on collective bargaining to protect and improve members’ economic benefits, and operates within a mutual-gains pluralist frame of reference. A social orientation generates social movement unionism focusing on workers’ conditions, social justice and equality through moderating, or ‘civilising’, the capitalist market economy, classically through social democracy. A radical class orientation involves unions actively mobilising worker activism, generating class conflict and pursuing an anti-capitalist agenda. These ideal types represent tendencies or directions that may vary in different contexts and be contradictory and coexistent within the same union (Hyman, 2001).
In his analysis of Australian union policies, Goods (2013) applied three categories of just transition responses to climate change corresponding with Hyman's ideal types of unionism. A passive transition response corresponds with a market or business union orientation, whereby unions cooperate with enterprises for environmental improvements designed to enhance performance and thereby benefit union members. Goods’ minimalist position, associated with a social orientation, seeks reform for a ‘green capitalism’ involving social protection, retraining and consultation through institutional cooperation and the intervention of the state. However, it is essentially defensive in emphasising job protection. The third response, transformative transition, corresponds with a class orientation, whereby unions ‘become politically and socially active ant-capitalist forces’ (Goods, 2013: 17) depicting the need for an alternative political economy, since neither environmental nor workers’ interests can be protected in the current socio-economic system.
In similar vein, Hampton (2015, 2018) has linked three main approaches to environmental policy to Hyman's ideal union types. Neoliberal policy discourse perceives market-based instruments, notably carbon pricing, as the main strategy to address climate change through businesses changing behaviour in response to price signals. Ecological modernisation policy framing promotes a regulatory role for the state in addition to markets, and for non-state and non-business actors including environmental NGOs and unions. These policies include industry planning and assistance, support for research and development in renewable energies, promotion of low-carbon technologies, and social partnership at national and enterprise levels, as well as addressing social justice impacts. Hampton finally identifies a radical class-based approach to climate policy aligned with more class-orientated unionism, and characterised by an emphasis on class interests, transformation of social relations and economic structures, consequent unwillingness to rely on markets and the state, and alliances with community organisations.
Stevis and Felli (2015) categorised the variety of global union approaches to just transition into three main ‘environmental tendencies’ that might also be applied to individual unions. First, a shared solution approach promotes green decent jobs and a green economy through innovation and social dialogue and partnership, with a commitment to equity. This ‘green Keynesianism’ envisages a role for the state, but not transformative change of the political economy. It characterises the ILO, ITUC and ACTU approaches outlined earlier as well as that of the AMWU. Second, the differentiated responsibility approach acknowledges that green jobs will be created, but focuses more on labour protection – for displaced workers and the role of unions. It often characterises the approach of the transition losers in high-carbon sectors such as mining. The AWU policy outlined earlier is aligned with this approach, but aspects of the ACTU and ITUC policies are also consistent with the approach. The social ecological approach is much rarer. It is transformational in rejecting market-based strategies in favour of a democratisation of social and economic relations. In Australia, the BLF in the 1970s characterised this approach, through its militant rank and file activism and involvement of community groups in the implementation of ‘green bans’ on environmentally damaging development of heritage sites, public housing and common areas (Burgmann and Burgmann, 1998). There are also aspects of this approach in ACTU and AMWU calls for industry planning with state and union intervention.
Typology of trade union approaches to climate change policy.
ITUC: International Trade Union Confederation; ACTU: Australian Council of Trade Union; AMWU: Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union; AWU: Australian Workers’ Union; BLF: Builders’ Labourers’ Federation; NTEU: National Tertiary Education Union; UCU: University and College Union.
When applied to the workplace level, the three orientations can be broadly categorised in terms of the relationship to managerial prerogative and the agency of workers and unions at this level. The market orientation largely accepts managerial prerogative at the workplace, with environmental concerns addressed at a broader policy level. The state may direct organisations to respond to environmental challenges, but workers play little role in deciding the form such responses take, and unions cooperate with management to optimise outcomes that also benefit employees. Broadly, the society or ‘ecological modernisation’ orientation, which focuses on action at a national or industry level, conceives of a transition that includes express consideration of workers at the workplace level, but that still largely respects managerial prerogative. It may include a greater role for unions and workers in designing and implementing environmental policies, but on a voluntary partnership basis, with a focus on mutual gains. Finally, whilst class struggle may be conceived as occurring at a more systemic level, directed at challenging ‘capitalism’, we conceive of the radical class orientation at the workplace level as involving challenges to managerial prerogative on environmental issues and instigation of workers’ and union agency. Here, unions pursue both environmental action per se and a role in the design and implementation of such action in ways that mobilise workers and develop their capacity for agency, potentially bringing them into conflict with management.
Situating labour environmentalism in environmental employment relations
Labour environmentalism by its nature focuses on workers' and union agency in the sphere of environmentalism. This contrasts with green human resource management research, which emphasises management initiative and the responses of workers as individuals or in teams, and pays little attention to unions (e.g. Harvey et al., 2013; Zibarras and Coan, 2015). Both these approaches tend to underplay the interaction between employers and unions that is expressed, for example, through collective bargaining. A more comprehensive employment relations approach is required to consider the roles of both these actors and of the state.
Whilst retaining a principal focus on union agency, Goods (2017) moves beyond this to develop a conceptual framework for analysing the links between climate change and employment relations. Goods' analysis concerns the interaction between workers (especially through unions) and organisations (and their managers) in addressing climate change at the workplace level. Goods (2017) distinguished between embedded institutional approaches through inserting environmental commitments into formal collective agreements, and voluntary multilateral approaches, which involve unions and workers more directly in the development of emissions reduction activities at the workplace level, such as through environmental committees or teams.
Goods (2017) further distinguished three kinds of commitments appearing in embedded institutional-type environmental clauses:
a general commitment by the parties to improving the workplace's environmental impacts; provisions for consultation via the establishment of an environmental green committee; and commitment to specific environmental improvement activities.
Trade union involvement in the development of projects of the voluntary multilateral type have particularly featured in Europe and the UK. This includes the use of mechanisms for ongoing collaboration and consultation; for example, building upon an established record of collaboration and co-determination, organisations in Germany, Belgium, France and the Italian chemical industry have expanded the functions of works councils and/or health and safety committees to include environmental- and climate-related matters (European Commission, 2010; Olsen, 2010; UNEP, 2008). Unions have also played an important role in facilitating environmental skills development, in Denmark, France, Germany and Romania (Calvert, 2015; Vitols et al., 2011). In the UK, union campaigns on emissions reduction, led by the peak body–the Trade Unions Congress, have claimed success in reducing emissions in a range of workplaces across diverse industries since the early 2000s. The level of involvement has included projects involving implementation of new equipment and technology and changes to workplace practices (Hampton, 2015). In Australia, the education (especially tertiary education) and government sectors are notable for their involvement of employees through union-facilitated consultative mechanisms, including mechanisms dedicated to environmental matters, in order to reduce carbon emissions (Markey et al., 2016). The logistics company Linfox has also collaborated closely with the Transport Workers' Union (TWU) in their highly successful emissions-reduction activities (Markey et al., 2014). Research has indicated a strong association between substantive implementation of participation or consultation mechanisms and organisations engaging with climate change as an issue (Markey et al., 2016).
Collective bargaining over environmental matters – the embedded institutional approach – has been described as essential to meaningful democratic participation in climate mitigation (Olsen, 2010). It has occurred through much of Europe as well as Australia and Canada. German companies and unions have concluded agreements on environmental matters since the 1980s, encouraged by efforts to combat climate change at the national level (Olsen, 2010). Belgium's ‘eco-vouchers’ system, where vouchers for environmentally friendly products are used as a form of incentive-based pay, is implemented through collective bargaining agreements (Eurofound, 2011). Collective bargaining has also occurred over environmental matters among numerous firms involved in the UK's ‘green workplaces’ initiative (Hampton, 2015). In Australia, the NTEU made bargaining for climate change mitigation a key priority in negotiations from 2009. It faced substantial resistance from universities, particularly in the area of enforceable clauses and specific targets (Markey et al., 2014). However, the prevalence and nature of environmental collective bargaining remains under-researched in the literature.
The position of the employment relations actors varies in both the voluntary multilateral and embedded institutional modes of linking employment relations and climate change. Whilst Goods (2017) emphasised union-driven approaches, voluntary multilateral arrangements for environmental programmes may be either union- or employer-driven. The UK's green workplaces campaign has involved both instances in which unions drove environmental measures that may not otherwise have occurred and instances where unions and green representatives were involved in employer-driven initiatives (Farnhill, 2017; Hampton, 2015). Union involvement in employer-driven environmental activities has also been evident in at least one manufacturing plant in the US (Rothenberg, 2003) and in Australia with, for instance, the case of Linfox, which has collaborated closely with the TWU in its ambitious emissions-reduction practices (Markey et al., 2014).
Unions may adopt a range of roles in these employer-driven initiatives. They may be involved in facilitating employers’ ability to draw on employee skills in a more autonomous environment, and in contributing to discussions on how best to design and implement these initiatives (Farnhill, 2016, 2017; Hampton, 2015; Rothenberg, 2003). Unions benefit in these cases from a ‘seat at the table’ and a voice for workers in how emissions reduction is pursued. Unions may also assist employers in cultivating employee support and overcoming employee resistance to environmentally friendly practices (Farnhill, 2016, 2017; Hampton, 2015; Rothenberg, 2003), as well as acting in a ‘watchdog’ role (both with management and other employees) to ensure that environmental commitments are being pursued (Farnhill, 2017).
Embedded institutional links may similarly be either union- or employer-driven and also linked to ongoing involvement, which mirrors the voluntary multilateral arrangements identified by Goods (2017). However, the nature of these relationships may be less obviously cooperative than those which are primarily of the voluntary multilateral type. Stronger unions which prioritise environmental issues may use their bargaining power both to prompt organisations to commit to environmental programmes which they would not otherwise undertake and to ensure a role for unions in the design, implementation and monitoring of these programmes. Employers may also use environmental clauses in collective agreements principally as an instrument of managerial prerogative to commit employees to management-driven initiatives in a document likely to have a life of 3–4 years.
Voluntary multilateral and embedded institutional approaches do not necessarily operate in isolation from one another, but may be co-facilitated, though with different emphases. Voluntary multilateral relationships may be formalised and embedded through embedded institutional bargaining. According to Hampton (2015: 127), agreements negotiated by some union representatives ‘institutionalized the role of union reps and union members in reducing emissions’. The establishment of consultation rights over climate change through enterprise bargaining, as identified by Goods (2017), also establishes and formalises a means by which employers and unions collaborate on and co-regulate environmental measures at the workplace level on an ongoing basis. Here, unions use embedded institutional bargaining to secure a role in environmental management, using their bargaining power to overcome employer resistance. In this case, the relationship, having been bargained over, may be seen as less ‘voluntary’ in the sense of necessarily being mutually desirable, but nonetheless involves ‘strategic workplace environmental projects that directly engage management and employees in environmental initiatives’ on a joint basis, as identified by Goods in his definition of voluntary multilateralism (2017: 674).
Links between the environment and employment relations, and in particular union influence on workplace environmental action, are also constrained by the organisational, regulatory and institutional context. The extent and success of initiatives are likely to vary considerably between organisations and industries (Farnhill, 2016, 2017; Hampton, 2015; Markey et al., 2014). Research on UK unions and workplaces (Farnhill, 2016) indicates that green workplace initiatives may be more likely in larger private sector and public organisations. The ongoing success of workplace climate initiatives and the partnerships involved may also be fragile, and subject to decline over time (Farnhill, 2017; Markey et al., 2014). Wright and Nyberg (2017) similarly find that organisational efforts to reduce climate impact often lose momentum over time.
Contextual factors also include the employment relations climate and the degree of national commitment to climate change mitigation. Relative to the Anglophone liberal market economies, employment relations in Europe remains relatively conducive to union participation. The European Union has also taken a leadership position in climate policy, including relatively ambitious targets and a long-functioning emissions trading scheme. Even in Europe, however, embedded institutional climate bargaining has been relatively limited (European Commission, 2010). In Australia, the employment relations context is less supportive either of unions generally or of climate-related bargaining specifically. Public climate policy is highly politically contested (Wright and Nyberg, 2017). Whilst the ACTU has contended that climate change commitments should be subject to collective bargaining, Fair Work Act provisions governing enterprise bargaining are ambiguous and may restrict bargaining over climate change. The Act appears to prohibit inclusion in enterprise agreements of terms that would require an employer to ‘commit to climate change initiatives’, since such clauses would not ‘pertain to the employment relationship’ as required by the Act (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009: 673). Clauses that impose an environmental obligation on employers (for instance the meeting of a particular target) have generally been rejected more readily than those imposing obligations on employees. However, there appears to be allowance for consultation clauses regarding environmental issues, because these deal with decision-making processes rather than substantive commitments. Issues clearly linked to efficiency or safety are also more likely to be approved, as pertaining to the ‘employment relationship’ required by the Act (Lambropoulos, 2009; Markey et al., 2014: 26–27). The type of enterprise bargaining that has occurred in Australia may have been shaped by this ambiguity.
From the perspective of Hyman's typology of union action, there is potential for both society/ecological modernisation and radical class orientations to be realised through embedded institutional environmental bargaining. In more cooperative industrial relations environments, directions for cooperation on climate change may be embedded into collective agreements, reflecting the society approach. However, collective bargaining provides more obvious means for unions to pursue a radical class approach by potentially challenging managerial prerogative, by embedding specific union-proposed obligations and policies into agreements, and/or embedding provisions for worker and union agency through joint decision making. Voluntary multilateral approaches more obviously reflect the society orientation, to the extent that they are indeed purely ‘voluntary’ from the employer's perspective. However, where unions use their bargaining power to secure a role in workplace climate policy and decision-making, this represents a potentially ongoing challenge to managerial prerogative and potential for developing capacity to mobilise workers, reflective of the radical class orientation.
Incidence of environmental ‘bargaining’
Table 2 shows the incidence of environmental clauses in EBAs and the proportion of environmental clauses within industries, between June 2011 and June 2016. This includes:
the distribution of EBAs with environmental clauses between industries; the distribution between industries of employees covered by EBAs with environmental clauses; the proportion of all industry agreements certified within the period which contained environmental clauses; the proportion of all employees covered by agreements certified within the period who are covered by agreements containing environmental clauses, by industry. Incidence of EBAs with environmental clauses, June 2011–June 2016, by industry.
The 2427 EBAs with environmental clauses make up around 7% of the total of some 35,000 EBAs certified within the period, and cover around 9% (426,000) of the 4.6 million employees covered by EBAs certified during the period. 1 There was no consistent pattern in yearly terms; 2013 had the highest proportion of EBAs covered at 10%, while the 6 months to June 2016 had the second highest at around 8%. The industries with the highest proportions of all agreements within the industry covered were Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services (EGWWS) (14%), Construction (10%), Mining (10%), and Professional, Scientific and Technical Services (PSTS) (10%) (column 4). The highest proportional employee coverage occurred in Public Administration and Safety (PAS) (27%), Education and Training (17%) and Construction (17%) (column 5).
The Construction industry had by far the highest number of EBAs with environmental clauses, with 1080 or 45% of the total; the next highest was Manufacturing at 453, representing 19% of all (column 2). However, the smaller numbers of organisations in the PAS and Education and Training sectors covered substantial numbers of employees: the 157,000 employees in PAS accounted for 37% of employees covered by EBAs with environmental clauses, and the 101,000 in Education and Training a further 24% (column 3). Many of the latter group were from universities covered by agreements negotiated by the NTEU, which had promoted itself as taking a leadership role in climate change (Goods, 2017). The overwhelming majority of all agreements with environmental clauses (around 83%) included a union as a party.
Content of agreements
In our discussion of the content of agreements, we assess specific obligations and goals for the parties as well as particular mechanisms that may be used to monitor, discuss, develop and/or enforce these. These are readily discernible from the content of agreements. We also speculate on the relative agency of the parties, that is, whether clauses are likely to be primarily employer- or union-driven. This latter analysis is necessarily imperfect, given the frequent absence of clear and direct evidence, and should be taken as indicative rather than definitive. Nonetheless, knowledge of the parties involved, their interests, and the content of agreements does in many (though not all) cases appear to give some indication of which party is likely to have been the principal driver of the clause. Where clauses are focused on imposing environmental obligations on employees, this likely indicates that employers have simply used the agreement-making process as an instrument of managerial prerogative. Where consultation provisions have been included, this may be mutually agreeable or employer-driven, reflecting a society orientation, and the facilitation of voluntary multilateral approaches through bargaining. However, more substantial obligations for employers, including substantial consultation provisions, are likely to represent challenges to managerial prerogative in this sphere, reflective of a radical class approach.
Overview of commitments and behaviours
Many of the clauses appeared to be largely or exclusively employer-driven, in that they extended managerial prerogative by committing employees to management-driven initiatives. Typically, these clauses contain very general commitments to environmental improvement that are used by employers to embed and enforce behaviours associated with existing environmental policies and/or compliance measures. Around half of all agreements referred to an existing environmental policy, though only 5% contained details of the policy, and a number made reference to agreements being periodically varied. Many agreements did not go beyond simply mentioning that employees should comply with the company environmental policy, or even more vaguely, ‘requirements’. Indeed, 40% placed the onus of environmental protection exclusively on employees, including compliance with policy or a more general directive to conduct tasks in an environmentally responsible manner; 8% of agreements also linked environmental issues to disciplinary procedures, including summary dismissal. Often clauses were standardised and patterned across a range of agreements. For instance, one clause which appeared in a range of agreements in the Construction sector simply included ‘[c]omply with project environmental health and safety regulations, procedures and practices’ and ‘[p]articipate in and comply with the Project's cultural and environmental processes’ amongst a list of activities that ‘each employee is accountable to’. Many clauses seemed linked more to regulatory compliance and avoiding ‘incidents’ than to proactive environmental improvement. Almost 5% linked environmental issues to performance management through incentive payments, key performance indicators and Performance Reviews. Most commonly, these were not aspirational or proactive targets and were primarily concerned with avoiding environmental ‘incidents’. Interestingly, among these apparently employer-driven agreements, the use of language explicitly linked to climate change was near non-existent.
It is interesting in this regard that about 45% of agreements linked environmental commitments with Occupational Health and Safety. ‘Environment’ was commonly added to acronyms associated with health and safety – e.g. OHSE (occupational health safety and environment), HSE (health safety and environment), WHSE (work health safety and environment). These clearly involved expanding considerations to include ecological considerations rather than more broadly the ‘work environment’, though in some cases this may simply be a matter of employers including environmental protection issues with other regulatory compliance issues. Not all employer-driven agreements were necessarily vague, and some seemed quite substantial. For example, Hazell Bros., a company involved in various construction-related activities, included both union and non-union agreements which listed a range of behaviours, including in some cases commitment to the International Organisation for Standardisation's (ISO) 14001 environmental management standard, greenhouse gas reduction, the setting of targets (though without specifying these) and other workplace behaviours. The ISO14001 standard was mentioned by only 55 agreements altogether.
With the exception of the universities and PAS sectors, there is limited evidence of concern for climate change specifically. Only 74 agreements (3%) expressly used language that linked environmental sustainability to the reduction of carbon emissions and/or the mitigation of climate change as such. Of these, 23 were from Education and Training and 19 were from PAS. Only two EGWWS organisations, five from Construction, seven from Manufacturing and one from Mining used such language. The latter sectors are both more carbon intensive and had more total agreements in the sample.
In general, clauses that included express consideration of climate change had greater detail than other agreements in the sample, including a range of more specific environmental commitments and behaviours. Only 17% of all agreements linked environmental improvement to specific behaviours such as recycling, waste reduction and/or improved materials efficiency, commitments to implement technology or other physical equipment related to environmental improvement, links to specific work practices or continuous improvement initiatives, or links to reduced energy usage. All but two of those agreements considering climate change explicitly included a range of such behaviours. However, with the exception of NTEU agreements, these agreements typically reflected specific concerns and provision for dedicated worker or union agency tended to be ambiguous or non-existent.
More broadly, the highest industry rates of specific environmental behaviours can be found in Education and Training (65%) and PAS (40%), and together these accounted for most employees in this category (about 75% in total; around 80,000 and 71,000, respectively). Whilst most agreements in the overall sample included only one or two specific behaviours, agreements from these two industries also tended to include a greater range of initiatives. Agreements in the university sector included commitments to sustainability reporting, investment in environmentally friendly capital works, provisions for environmentally friendly personal transportation, and even encouraged environmental research. These NTEU agreements overall appeared to place significant obligations on employers in addition to embedding a substantial role for unions. Agreements in PAS similarly emphasised aspects such as reduced water and energy usage, recycling, environmentally friendly capital works and personal transportation.
Consultation on environmental issues: Potential facilitation of voluntary multilateral relationships through collective bargaining
About 25% of agreements (586) contained some provision for consultation over environmental matters. Most of these (536) included a consultative body, such as a JCC or occupational health and safety (OHS) Committee, and most (550) included a union as a party and/or otherwise specified the involvement of a union. Most agreements included environmental issues in the remits of more general JCCs or OHS Committees. A typical example was a patterned clause in 320 agreements where the CFMEU was a party – simply listing ‘Environmental Protection’ amongst issues which a general JCC could consider. The patterning of this particular clause across a range of organisations and industries, with the CFMEU as the common factor, does suggest that this was driven by union agency. Other organisations did have more substantial provisions. For example, one clause appearing in metropolitan fire brigades appeared to give employees a substantial role in the development of environmental practices. In a section entitled ‘Environmental Responsibility’, the clause specified that ‘so that a contribution can be made by the MFB to reduce the effects of global warming, it is agreed that a joint partnership of the MFB, Employees and the Union will consider and implement ideas’, and that ‘employees nominated to attend working groups/committees established under this clause shall be released from duty to attend such meetings’.
Whilst other research (Markey et al., 2016) suggests that including environmental issues in a more general mechanism may have relatively limited impact on the propensity of organisations to undertake climate mitigation initiative, there is nonetheless significant scope for extending opportunities for environmental worker agency in general consultative clauses. Other research has also indicated a strong tendency to expand the use of existing structures for union or employee influence (Farnhill, 2017) in environmental issues, and we have already noted the specific extension of OHS Committees’ remit into the sphere of environment issues in Europe. It would be a mistake to dismiss all of the clauses bringing environmental issues into the remit of OHS Committees as employer-driven attempts to extend employee compliance. Given unions’ involvement in OHS issues, this practice may also reflect an attempt by unions to expand their own areas of influence and agency. In collective bargaining, extension of the role of OHS Committees may be a productive ‘foot in the door’ strategy for unions which otherwise face strong obstacles for environmental intervention from employers and/or the regulatory environment in Australia.
Dedicated environmental consultation mechanisms were very rare, restricted to only 23 agreements–although the large organisations involved meant that these covered a substantial portion of employees (some 62,000). A total of 14 such agreements were in the university sector and negotiated by the NTEU, the Australian union focused on by Goods (2017). These accounted for the vast majority (93%) of employees covered by dedicated environmental consultation clauses. The relevant clauses were typically quite substantial, providing for involvement of dedicated committees in the development of policy as well as the inclusion of specific behaviours and at times commitment by the organisation to reporting on its progress to the committee. These agreements also made specific mention of climate change as an issue to be addressed. In this industry, the union does seem to have successfully negotiated for employees to have a substantial say in the development and implementation of climate change mitigation.
Of the remaining agreements with provisions for dedicated mechanisms, three were from PAS (3970 employees). The others included two from Other Services covering 22 employees: one of these organisations was a not-for-profit organisation specifically dedicated to ecological issues, Environment Victoria; the other was a union peak body, the Gippsland Trades and Labour Council. There was one each from Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (186 employees), Manufacturing (total 33 employees), Arts and Recreation Services (118 employees) and PSTS (129 employees). In general, these did not demonstrate the same level of detail as the NTEU agreements, and in a number of cases either simply mentioned the existence of an environmental committee or mentioned that the organisation would establish such a committee. The use of language indicating a commitment to climate change mitigation specifically was also less common in these other agreements. Two agreements made other provisions for employees to participate in the development of climate change initiatives without this being necessarily linked to a JCC. One PAS sector agreement (which also referred to environmental committees) mentioned the use of ‘Green Teams’ linked to continuous improvement in environmental initiatives.
Another agreement in the Transport sector mentions the use of a union-appointed ‘Eco-Champion’ to ‘monitor and encourage’ the development and implementation of environmental initiatives. These ‘Eco-Champions’ were mentioned in two other agreements involving the TWU, but without a commitment to their implementation. The agreements used language which indicated that the clauses were union-led initiatives, but seem to reflect a society orientation towards partnership, with management the ultimate arbiter. However, the collaborative relationships previously indicated with respect to Linfox (in the same sector) are not evident in their EBAs: these show more general aspirations to environmental improvements. In this case, EBAs have not been used to formalise those voluntary multilateral relationships.
Without corroborating information, however, other than in those sectors identified, it is difficult to assess to what extent such clauses reflect union agency. Some consultation clauses may, for instance, be the result of employer-initiated desires to tap into workers' skills and knowledge, whilst others may be more bilateral partnerships between unions and employers. These reflect a society orientation. Only in the NTEU cases do we see sustained evidence of more substantial attempts to assert unions into decision-making in a manner reflective of the radical class approach.
Discussion and conclusions
The relationship between employment relations and the environment is complex and dependent upon the power and resources of the parties, the degree of importance they place on environmental issues and the particular strategies they use to achieve their objectives. Overall, the use of collective bargaining – the embedded institutional approach – to facilitate environmental activity is rare in Australia. A small minority of EBAs contained recognisable environmental clauses, and relatively few of those that did contained a substantial environmental commitment or even climate change specific language. On the employer side, many may simply be largely unconcerned with environmental issues, and even amongst those who are concerned, few may see a benefit in driving their inclusion in EBAs, even if the primary responsibility indicated is on employees. On the union side, limited resources to devote to the issue, a lack of union bargaining power, the legal impediments identified earlier, and managerial prerogative over this issue specifically and workplace practices more generally, are all likely to contribute to the low incidence. With unions marginalised by low and decreasing membership density (15%) (ABS, 2017a) and a climate of low wages growth (ABS, 2017b; Workplace Express, 2017), it seems likely that traditional issues regarding wages and conditions crowd out the impetus to bargain for a voice in determining environmental issues. As suggested by Farnhill (2016) in the UK context, the inability of environmental action to provide a sufficiently valuable ‘product’ to employees may limit its attractiveness, particularly in such an environment. The legal ambiguity of the Fair Work Act referred to earlier also may have reduced the incidence of environmental clauses in EBAs and shaped the nature of those that were present. Hence, there was a preponderance of clauses that were vague, referring to existing employer policies, and employee rather than employer obligations; specific environmental initiatives were far more scarce, as were consultative mechanisms unless linked to existing JCCs or OHS mechanisms. All of this reflects the continuing pre-eminence of the employer in determining workplace practices and the limitations on unions for facilitating these practices.
However, there is evidence that a radical class approach to environmental protection can be pursued by motivated unions under the right circumstances. Research by Goods (2017) and Markey et al. (2014) clearly indicates that the NTEU has been expressly committed to pursuing climate change issues through collective bargaining as well as in other spheres of action. Universities seem to lead other industries in the range of practices they are undertaking, but many universities resisted NTEU attempts to include climate bargaining in EBAs (Markey et al., 2014). This shows the importance of union agency in this case and its potential for others. Universities were particularly likely to include substantial provisions for consultation through representative mechanisms dedicated to environmental matters, to give explicit attention to climate change, and to include a range of specific environmental initiatives with commitments by both management and employees, including to report progress to these dedicated consultation mechanisms. The degree of union agency in achieving these clauses, the extent to which they encroach upon managerial prerogative and the opportunities for development of environmental workers' activism through ongoing participative structures that have been developed all indicate a radical class-based or transformative transition approach.
There is also some evidence for this approach in the PAS sector. It too was amongst the industry sectors most likely to include environmental consultation, was the second most likely to include dedicated mechanisms for environmental consultation, was also particularly likely to expressly consider climate change, and had agreements including a range of specific activities. The degree of union agency in this sector is less clear, since none of the main public sector unions has openly declared climate change as a collective bargaining objective like the NTEU did. We are thus unclear about the extent to which this reflects radical class-oriented challenges to managerial prerogative or society-oriented voluntary multilateral arrangements. Union membership, however, is higher in the public sector, including universities, than elsewhere, and the incidence of JCCs generally in the public sector is greater than in the private sector (Adam and Markey, 2015). This provided PAS unions with a strong base from which to extend participation into environmental consultation. The public purpose of the PAS may also be a factor in the more substantial commitments to climate mitigation. However, the Australian government, as the ultimate employer in the PAS sector agreements,2 has certainly not been a leader in the sphere of climate mitigation since 2013. The extension of representative environmental consultation opportunities for workers regarding climate change suggests union agency in the PAS sector. It also potentially curbs exclusive managerial prerogative and provides opportunities to develop capacity for workers' activism.
Interestingly, however, the inclusion of environmental clauses in agreements also appears at least as likely to be employer-driven, an instrument of managerial prerogative, as reflective of union agency. In many cases this may represent a commitment to improved environmental protection by the organisations themselves, and at least in some cases such as Hazell Bros, such commitments may be substantial. However, where employer-driven voluntary multilateral approaches identified in the literature may nonetheless involve a substantial voice for workers in the development of initiatives, many employer-driven clauses examined here seem designed to impose uncritical compliance on workers. This is hardly an indication of worker agency.
There is mixed evidence on the link between voluntary multilateral and embedded-institutional strategies. Certainly, there is some evidence that consultation mechanisms are being employed in a number of workplaces, though their inclusion in EBAs represents a minority even in the minority of agreements with environmental clauses at all. The kind of dedicated mechanisms promoted by the NTEU, and occurring to a lesser extent in the PAS sector, are very rare. However, in organisations where they do occur, they involve substantial provision for ongoing, strategic relationships between unions and employers in addressing environmental challenges. This demonstrates how embedded institutional climate bargaining can be used to facilitate and commit to further voluntary multilateral activities. That agreements in the university sector particularly, and to a lesser extent PAS, include both a range of specific and strong provisions for environment-specific consultation suggests ongoing collaboration between unions and management in mitigating climate change between bargaining periods. Mechanisms for setting and achieving measurable targets have been included in these agreements. Moreover, whilst the NTEU has recently eased its focus on this issue due in part to other emerging crises (Markey et al., 2014), our research shows that its gains in this area have remained in university EBAs. This demonstrates that the use of enterprise bargaining clauses may serve to embed a role for labour participation in climate activities, even as the level of focus expended on these issues by both employers and unions wanes. This means that there has been an ongoing impact on employment relations in universities through involving employee representatives in spheres of activity that were previously the prerogative of management.
The absence of substantial evidence for union agency in EBAs in other sectors may in part be because union attempts to involve themselves in climate change mitigation have focused on strategies other than collective bargaining. Unions seem for the most part to have focused what efforts they have in the area of climate change on lobbying in the public policy sphere, usually reflecting market or society orientations, particularly through the ACTU (see Markey et al., 2014: 34–54; Burgmann, 2013). Vague or absent environmental clauses in EBAs may fail to capture more substantial voluntary multilateral activities at the workplace level, such as in the Linfox case referred to earlier. The indefinite allusion to ‘environment’ amongst a list of issues to be considered in JCCs or OHS Committees in CFMEU agreements may nonetheless be a marker of substantial negotiation on environmental management within the context of these JCCs at the workplace. This may indicate worker and union agency, perhaps even reflect a radical class approach, and certainly opens up the potential for this. We know, for example, that OHS provisions and concerns have generated rank-and-file workplace activism related to climate change, including methane gas emissions, in the CFMEU Mining Division. Other unions such as the TWU have also been engaged in workplace initiatives to ameliorate climate change (Markey et al., 2014), though in this case reflecting a more cooperative, society orientation. In one recent instance, workers at an Australian regional food factory mobilised to reduce water usage and generation of solid waste (Workplace Express, 2009). Moreover, it is noteworthy that few environmental clauses occurred in non-union enterprise agreements.
The conclusions point to limitations in the type of data analysed. One of the main limitations is that in itself it offers no clear indication of union as opposed to employer initiative for the insertion of environmental clauses in agreements, nor where unions have unsuccessfully attempted to insert these clauses in EBAs. We were able to address this gap and contextualise EBAs as a result of existing research that provided specific knowledge of union bargaining and climate mitigation policies and strategies in key instances here, notably with the NTEU. We were also unable to track outcomes of environmental measures in enterprise agreements. EBA data ultimately need to be located in a broader context, involving case studies of unions and enterprises, and this indicates a clear direction for future employment relations research.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
