Abstract
While this article commences with apologies issued on 8 February 2022 in the Commonwealth Parliament in respect of alleged sexual harassment, workplace bullying and sexual assault, its focus is on the drivers behind and implications of the Sex Discrimination and Fair Work (Respect at Work) Amendment Act 2021 (Cth). Both flowed from reviews conducted by the Federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Kate Jenkins, and both were propelled by a need to address historical deficiencies and inequalities in workplace practice and culture leading to what is described now by the leader of the Opposition as ‘unsafe’ and ‘disrespectful’ workplaces.
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I am sorry. We are sorry …. For those of us who have perpetuated the bullying and violence, the light will come to those behaviours … As it must.
Prime Minister Scott Morrison, 8 February 2022
We acknowledge the unacceptable history of workplace bullying, sexual harassment and sexual assault in Commonwealth parliamentary workplaces. This issue is of the greatest importance and the responsibility of all people who work in this place. Any bullying, sexual assault or sexual harassment is unacceptable and wrong. We say sorry.
President – Independent Review into Commonwealth Parliamentary Workplaces, 8 February 2022
Introduction
The above statements flowed from a different review conducted by Federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner Kate Jenkins to that underpinning the Respect@Work Report issued to the Attorney General in January 2020, also by Commissioner Jenkins, which went on to propel the Sex Discrimination and Fair Work (Respect at Work) Amendment Act 2021 (Cth) (the Amendment Act).
Delivered on the first sitting day of Parliament in 2022 following Commissioner Jenkins’ Independent Review into Commonwealth Parliamentary Workplaces, the above statements demonstrate the importance of change to culture and practice to ensure safe and respectful workplaces. In the above statement, the President of the Independent Review said that the Commonwealth Parliament had ‘failed to provide this in the past.’
That same need for change to workplace culture and practice drove the Respect@Work Report, in which it was observed that a shift was required from the current reactive legislative model, under which the onus lies on individual complainants to raise and notify grievances, to a more proactive model (Jenkins, 2020: p10). One aspect of such a proactive model is one in which positive actions are required from both employers pursuant to a statutory duty to eliminate discrimination and harassment (under Recommendation 17, not yet implemented, as discussed below) as well as bystanders, now for the first time capable of being accessorily liable for ‘permitting’ 1 sexual harassment and/or ‘sex-based harassment’ engaged in by others. This represents a momentous shift in legislative approach to one that actively encourages bystanders to take action, thereby alleviating complainants from the great burden of doing so themselves.
The Respect@Work Report flowed from a 2018 National Inquiry into Sexual Harassment in Australian Workplaces (hereinafter the Inquiry) undertaken by the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) which examined the nature, prevalence and drivers of sexual harassment in Australian workplaces, and measures to address and prevent it. The Inquiry came after four national surveys, the first in 2003 and the most recent in 2018, showing a consistent pattern of workplace sex discrimination and sexual harassment. The 2018 survey showed that 39% of women and 26% of men had experienced workplace sexual harassment in the past five years (Jenkins, 2020: p881). As a victim, bystander or both, 51% of Australians (52% of women and 50% of men) in the workforce in the last five years were exposed to some form of workplace sexual harassment.
As was said in the Foreword to the Respect@Work Report, ‘Australia was once at the forefront of tackling sexual harassment globally … However, over 35 years on, the rate of change has been disappointingly slow. Australia now lags behind other countries in preventing and responding to sexual harassment … The current legal and regulatory system is simply no longer fit for purpose’ (Jenkins, 2020: p9).
The Respect@Work Report concluded that existing legal and regulatory frameworks for addressing workplace sexual harassment were difficult to navigate, on which basis 55 recommendations were made, including legislative amendments to simplify the legal frameworks to ensure that employers and workers are able to effectively address sexual harassment in the workplace (Revised Explanatory Memorandum, [2]-[3]).
Upon its commencement in September 2021, the Amendment Act introduced significant and important changes to the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (SD Act) and the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). 2
Amendments to the SD Act and the FW Act
The wide-ranging amendments to the SD Act included importantly not only the introduction of the additional prohibition of harassment on the ground of sex (or ‘sex-based harassment’), but also an expanded meaning of the term ‘worker’ for the purpose of extending the coverage of the sexual harassment and sex-based harassment provisions of the SD Act to all paid workers (including self-employed workers), as well as unpaid workers. These provisions therefore now cover all forms of workers, including employees, self-employed workers, contractors or subcontractors (and their employees), outworkers, apprentices, some volunteers, work experience students and interns.
Critically, in addition, as stated above, for the first time accessorial liability under section 105 of the SD Act attaches to both sexual harassment and the newly inserted prohibition against sex-based harassment. 3 The effect of this is that bystanders who happen to observe conduct prima facie in breach of the prohibition against sexual harassment and/or sex-based harassment but take no action in respect of that conduct can be held liable as accessories if they are found to have ‘permitted’ another person to do an impugned act within the meaning of section 105.
Finally, the anti-bullying jurisdiction of the Fair Work Commission (FWC) under the FW Act was expanded to allow it to make orders to stop sexual harassment at work and a statutory note added to the criteria under section 387 of the FW Act for a finding that a dismissal is harsh, unjust or unreasonable (unfair dismissal) stating that a valid reason for the dismissal could be sexual harassment.
Expansion of the coverage of the SD Act
The insertion of the new section 28AB, which provides a definition of a worker in a business or undertaking, has the effect of extending the coverage of the SD Act (Revised Explanatory Memorandum, [12], [169]). The Amendment Act does this by adopting the concepts of ‘worker’ and ‘PCBU’ (persons conducting a business or undertaking) used in the model Work Health and Safety laws. This ensures that persons not previously covered by the SD Act, such as those described above, are now for the first time protected from both sexual and sex-based harassment by the corresponding amendments to sections 28B(3)-(6) (Revised Explanatory Memorandum, [12], [169]).
A corresponding definition of a ‘person conducting a business or undertaking’ has been inserted into subsection 4(1) of the SD Act. A PCBU is defined to match that term under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) (the WHS Act) (Revised Explanatory Memorandum, [77]-[79]). This amendment ensures that PCBUs, in addition to employers, fall within the scope of the sexual and sex-based harassment provisions under Division 3 of Part II of the SD Act, ‘reflecting the evolving world of work’ (Revised Explanatory Memorandum, [79]). Commensurately, the definition of ‘worker’ included in the SD Act extends now to include the expansive meaning of ‘worker’ within the WHS Act.
The definition of worker under the WHS Act is deliberately broad and intended to capture any person who carries out work in any capacity for a person conducting a business or undertaking. 4
As stated above, the effect of the inclusion now of the broad meaning of ‘worker’ and ‘PCBU’ described above in sections 28AB and 4(1) of the SD Act is to extend the SD Act to expressly prohibit sexual harassment and sex-based harassment in respect of all such paid and unpaid workers.
Finally, the SD Act now crucially also covers complaints of contraventions by and against members of Parliament as well as Commonwealth, State and Territory judges and State and Territory public servants (see the amendments to those definitions in section 4 and the deeming provisions in sections 108 and 109).
New prohibition against harassment on the basis of sex
The new prohibition in the SD Act against harassment on the basis of sex in the area of work sits alongside the pre-existing prohibition against sexual harassment in the amended section 28B of the SD Act and is defined in the newly inserted section 28AA.
In addition, the same prohibition against sex-based harassment now sits alongside the pre-existing prohibition against sexual harassment under sections 28C to 28L of the SD Act to protect against these forms of conduct in all other proscribed areas of public life. Sex-based harassment (as well as sexual harassment) is therefore now proscribed by bodies with the power to grant occupational qualifications; in the areas of education, the provision of goods and services and/or accommodation; by registered organisations (meaning unions or employer associations) and/or by employment agencies; in the course of dealing with or disposing of an interest in land; in relation to becoming or by a member of a club; in the exercise of a power under a Commonwealth law or a Commonwealth program.
As was explained in the Respect@Work Report (at p457-8), the new prohibition against harassment on the ground of sex was inserted to codify already existing legal authority which provides that conduct that falls short of sexual harassment may nevertheless constitute sex discrimination if it amounts to less favourable treatment on the basis of sex.
The scope of the new section 28AA of the SD Act, which contains the definition of harassment on the ground of sex, is said to be intended to apply to the same level of conduct as existing section 28A, which provides the definition of sexual harassment, but noting that section 28A requires conduct to be ‘of a sexual nature’ while section 28AA requires conduct to be ‘seriously demeaning in nature’ (Revised Explanatory Memorandum, [158]-[159]). This means that harassing conduct on the ground of sex would need to be sufficiently serious or sustained to meet the threshold of offensive, humiliating, or intimidating, as well as seriously demeaning. As is said in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum, the provision is not intended to capture mild forms of inappropriate conduct, however depending on the circumstances, the conduct in prima facie breach of section 28AA of the SD Act may include:
Asking intrusive personal questions based on a person's sex. Making inappropriate comments and jokes to a person based on their sex. Displaying images or materials that are sexist, misogynistic or misandrist. Making sexist, misogynistic or misandrist remarks about a specific person. Requesting a person to engage in degrading conduct based on their sex.
An illustrative example given in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum of the type of conduct envisaged to be captured by the new prohibition is described as involving two co-workers (George and Anna) who are of a similar age in a small retail business. George is said to have a close friendship with the business owner, John, and regularly makes belittling comments to Anna about her appearance, including in front of customers, such as “Anna, you’ve put on some serious kilos, sweetheart” and “couldn't you make a bit more of an effort for the customers?” George also makes inappropriate comments about Anna's menopausal symptoms, joking that she is “bloody hormonal all the time” and is “constantly hiding in the bathroom”. On many occasions, George intentionally creates a mess and then tells John to “get Anna to clean that up – she's the help around here – it's what women are for after all”. John takes no action to prevent or address the conduct and Anna therefore makes a complaint against George for contravention of the new statutory provisions, as well as against John for vicarious liability under section 106 of the SD Act.
Similarly, a supervisor may be held to be liable as an accessory to the harassment under section 105 if the supervisor aided and permitted its continuation rather than taking steps to prevent it (Revised Explanatory Memorandum, [168]).
Changes to the objects of the SD Act and implications for damages
Finally, amendments to the objects of the SD Act are said to be aimed at making ‘it clear that in addition to the elimination of discrimination and harassment, the SD Act aims to achieve, so far as practicable, equality of opportunity between men and women’ (Revised Explanatory Memorandum, [6]). These amendments have implications for the calculation of damages under section 46PO(4)(d) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (the AHRC Act) in respect of breaches of the SD Act.
As was made clear in the recent decision of Friend v Comcare (2021) 308 IR 445 at [81], the statutory objects in anti-discrimination legislation are capable of informing the assessment of damages. In Friend, Justice Rares considered the impact of the objects in section 3 of the SD Act on the assessment of damages in accordance with s 46PO(4)(d) of the AHRC Act, in particular light of the statements of the Full Court in Hughes (t/as Beesley and Hughes Lawyers) v Hill (2020) 277 FCR 511 at 521 [47]. His Honour Justice Rares observed in Friend at [81]:
As Perram J, with whom Collier and Reeves JJ agreed, asked rhetorically in Hughes (t/as Beesley and Hughes Lawyers) v Hill (2020) 277 FCR 511 at 521 [47], in a case of sexual harassment contrary to s 28A of the SDA, “what is the ruin of a person's quality of life worth?” (see too at 511 [47]–[48]). His Honour also affirmed that, in assessing statutory damages for unlawful discrimination in accordance with s 46PO(4)(d), the statutory objects of the SDA, and I would add the DDA, are relevant considerations, including the object of the elimination of such discrimination. Such awards can have a public vindicatory effect both for the applicant affected and the public at large. Here, the SDA included the following objects in s 3(a), (b), (c) and (d) …
Amendments to the FW Act
The amendments to the FW Act took effect from 11 November 2021, providing inter alia certain workers with the ability to seek stop sexual harassment orders as well as enabling an employer to rely on an employee having engaged in sexual harassment as constituting a valid reason in defending an unfair dismissal claim.
Stop sexual harassment orders
The amendments to the FW Act allowing certain workers to apply to the Fair Work Commission (the FWC) for orders to stop sexual harassment at work sit alongside the pre-existing ‘stop bullying’ orders in section 789FC, Part 6-4B of the FW Act. Section 789FD of the FW Act now defines when a worker is bullied or sexually harassed at work, while section 789FF empowers the FWC to make stop bullying or stop sexual harassment orders. Finally, the Dictionary in section 12 of the FW Act provides that the term ‘sexually harass’ has the meaning given by section 28A of the SD Act (being in general terms unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature).
As the Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Amendment Act states in respect of the amendments to the FW Act enabling workers to apply for stop sexual harassment orders, conduct that amounts to bullying can also be sexual harassment. While sexual harassment that is repeated is already captured under the existing provisions of the anti-bullying jurisdiction, the amendments expressly provide that the FWC can make an order following a single instance of sexual harassment. This contrasts with the existing relief in relation to stop bullying orders, which requires that the conduct be repeated. The new provisions afford those who have suffered workplace sexual harassment with access to a fast, low cost, informal mechanism to deal with complaints ([21]-[22]).
By December 2021, at least one application for a ‘stop sexual harassment’ order had been received by the FWC, in Application by Ranson, SO2021/6. As at the date of writing, this appears to remain undecided.
As with the pre-existing anti-bullying jurisdiction, section 789FD of the FW Act applies to workers sexually harassed ‘while at work in a constitutionally-covered business’. Section 789FD(3) continues to define ‘constitutionally-covered business’ by reference to conducting ‘a business or undertaking’ within meaning of the WHS Act, similarly to the definition of PCBU in the amendments to the SD Act.
‘PCBU’ refers to the legal entity running the business or undertaking, and includes incorporated entities, sole traders, partners of a partnership and certain senior ‘officers’ of an unincorporated association. It also refers to the Commonwealth including its departments, local governments and other government businesses and undertakings. The Interpretive Guidelines to the model Work Health and Safety Act published by SafeWork Australia provides that the following is relevant to the meaning of a PCBU:
A person (including a corporate entity, unincorporated body or partnership) may conduct a business or undertaking alone or with others, and it is irrelevant whether the business or undertaking is conducted for profit or gain: WHS Act, section 5(1). Businesses are usually enterprises operated with the aim of making a profit, and ‘have a degree of organisation, system and continuity.’ Undertakings usually have ‘elements of organisation, systems and possibly continuity, but are usually not profit-making or commercial in nature.’
Sexual harassment as a valid reason
The amendment to section 387(a) of the FW Act expands the criterion for determining the existence of a ‘valid reason’ for the dismissal to include sexual harassment by the insertion of a Note in the following terms:
The following conduct can amount to a valid reason for the dismissal:
the person sexually harasses another person; and
the person does so in connection with the person's employment.
Regulation 1.07(3) of the Fair Work Regulations 2009, which provides the statutory meaning of ‘serious misconduct’ for the purposes of the unfair dismissal jurisdiction, has in addition been expanded to add ‘sexual harassment’ to the conduct said to constitute serious misconduct. As was previously the case, a finding of serious misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 1.07 can constitute a valid reason under section 387(a) of the FW Act, including for summary dismissal.
The amendment to section 387 of the FW Act inserting a notation enabling employers to rely upon sexual harassment as a valid reason for dismissal in defending an unfair dismissal application is said to promote the right to safe and healthy working conditions (Revised Explanatory Memorandum, [32]-[33]). The aim of the amendment is said to be to deter sexual harassment and assist employers to respond, thereby improving safety in Australian workplaces.
This amendment is consistent with the existing operation of the FWC's unfair dismissal jurisdiction and does not limit employees’ rights not to be unjustly deprived of work (Revised Explanatory Memorandum, [32]-[33]). The FWC continues to exercise its existing discretion in considering whether a valid reason is established and whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable in all the circumstances.
The following decisions of the FWC historically indicated a willingness to make a finding that sexual harassment can constitute a valid reason, even before the legislative amendment:
In Elmazovski v Fletcher Insulation [2021] FWC 5990 [43], the FWC held that aggressive conduct constituted a valid reason, observing ‘in my view the employer had to act to protect employees … who should not have to deal with such aggressive and confronting and disrespectful conduct at work …’. In Bridge v Globe Bottleshops Pty Ltd [2021] FWC 3153 [61], [64], the FWC held that ‘unwelcome comments of a sexual nature’ to customers constituted a valid reason for the dismissal, although ultimately found the dismissal to be ‘procedurally disastrous’ and therefore unfair.
The wording in the newly inserted Note to section 387 of the FW Act, requires the conduct to be ‘in connection with the person's employment’ to constitute a valid reason for dismissal. The position was historically the same under established FWC authority, but with mixed results as to whether the conduct was in fact found to be sufficiently connected to the employment.
For instance, the notion of ‘in connection with employment’ was considered in Keenan v Boral Amey NSW Pty Ltd [2015] FWC 3156 [101]-[103], where the FWC found that inappropriate kissing and touching in a bar at an after work function constituted sexual harassment but that it was not sufficiently connected to the employment (and was ‘merely incidental to’ it), such that the conduct did not constitute a valid reason for dismissal. By contrast, in Drake v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2019] FWC 7444 [156], the FWC held that an employee ‘punching’ a colleague ‘in the head more than once’ at a work function was sufficiently connected with the employment to constitute a valid reason. In Newton v Toll Transport Pty Ltd [2021] FWCFB 3457 [115]-[116], [147]-[148], a Full Bench determined that fighting after a union meeting in a bar was not ‘sufficiently connected with the employment’ to constitute a valid reason for dismissal, although dishonesty that emerged during the hearing of the unfair dismissal application itself did constitute a valid reason.
Historically, whether out of hours conduct is sufficiently connected with a person's employment to constitute a valid reason for dismissal has been determined applying the established principles in authorities such as Rose v Telstra [1998] AIRC 1592. In Rose v Telstra, the Full Bench held that out of hours conduct will be sufficiently connected to the employment relationship to constitute a valid reason for dismissal where, when viewed objectively, the conduct is likely to cause serious damage to the relationship between the employer and employee, is likely to damage the employer's interests and/or is incompatible with the employee's duty as an employee.
These principles were recently applied in John Keron v Westpac Banking Corporation [2022] FWC 221. In Keron the employer held a work-related function immediately following a mandatory training workshop. At that function, a senior manager touched a junior colleague's buttocks for which Westpac dismissed the senior manager, who had 35 years of unblemished service. Deputy President (DP) Binet found that the out of hours conduct was sufficiently connected to the employment to constitute a valid reason for the dismissal, finding that the applicant had not been unfairly dismissed despite the significant mitigating factors such as his longstanding service. DP Binet observed that ‘the bar as to what constitutes consent for physical and sexual interactions has been significantly raised in the community since Mr Keron commenced his employment’, indicating recognition within the FWC of the shift in community standards in respect of sexual harassment.
Judicial recognition of a shift in community standards
Recent appellate authority highlights judicial recognition of the significant shift in community standards in respect of the treatment and value of women in the workplace and generally. In Beesley and Hughes Lawyers v Hill (2020) 277 FCR 511, Justice Perram held (with Justices Collier and Reeves agreeing) that the conduct described above clearly fell within the meaning of ‘unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature’, observing at [23] that whether conduct was unwelcome is ordinarily to ‘be proved by the person allegedly harassed giving evidence that the conduct was unwelcome’ but that ‘proof of this fact, like proof of any other fact, may be done by a variety of means.’ ‘The unwelcome quality of the conduct’ engaged in by the perpetrator was ‘painfully obvious.’ His Honour further held at [8] that the conduct of the perpetrator was ‘despicable’ and that ‘It was also in every sense improper.’
Similarly, in Vitality Works Australia Pty Ltd v Yelda (No 2) (2021) 307 IR 443 the Court of Appeal had little trouble concluding that conduct of both the employer, Sydney Water, plus corporate wellbeing consultancy Vitality Works Australia Pty Limited, engaged in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature amounting to sexual harassment in contravention of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) when both exhibited an image of a Sydney Water employee on a work health and safety poster under the heading ‘Feel great – lubricate!’.
The employee said that, while she had given permission for her image to be taken, she had not given permission for or known that it would appear under the slogan and ‘nearly collapsed’ when she saw the poster outside men's toilets and a lunchroom.
At the conclusion of the judgment in Yelda (No 2), in which her Honour Justice McCallum agreed with the findings of President Bell (as his Honour then was, having been appointed Chief Justice of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in February 2022) and Associate Justice Payne, her honour went on to make the following significant observation at [125]:
… It was common ground that the poster depicting Ms Yelda was designed for the purpose of conveying a work safety message in what was established to be a male-dominated workplace. One of the arguments in support of ground 5(a) was that the depiction in that context of a woman feeling great because she lubricates could not amount to sexual harassment because its sexualised message was not “explicit”. The sexualisation of women in the workplace often isn't. Innuendo, insinuation, implication, overtone, undertone, horseplay, a hint, a wink or a nod; these are all devices capable of being deployed to sexualise conduct in ways that may be unwelcome. The power of implication is well understood in the field of defamation: cf Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 186; [2005] HCA 52 at [8]- [12]. In the nature of things, sexual implication is perhaps the most powerful of all. The suggestion that conduct cannot amount to sexual harassment unless it is sexually explicit overlooks the infinite subtlety of human interaction and the historical forces that have shaped the subordinate place of women in the workplace for centuries. The scope of the term “conduct of a sexual nature” in s 22A of the Anti-Discrimination Act is properly construed with an understanding of those matters.
What did not make it in?
Some key omissions, including from the Amendment Act, were:
Recommendation 17, being the introduction of a positive duty under the SD Act compelling all employers to take reasonable and proportionate measures to eliminate sex discrimination, sexual harassment and victimisation, as far as possible. The factors that must be considered in determining proportionality were to be prescribed. It is to be noted that a similar positive duty has already been implemented in Victoria under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) as well as under the Commonwealth WHS Act in respect of work health and safety. Recommendation 18, being that the AHRC be given the function of assessing compliance with the positive duty, and for enforcement, including the power to undertake assessments, enter into enforceable undertakings and applying for a court order to ensure compliance with a duty. Recommendation 19, being a further amendment to the AHRC Act to provide the AHRC with a broad inquiry function to inquire into systemic unlawful discrimination, including systemic sexual harassment. Unlawful discrimination includes any conduct that is unlawful under the federal discrimination laws (SD Act, RD Act, DD Act, AD Act). Recommendation 24, being that the Australian Government conduct further research in to the assessment of damages in sexual harassment matters to determine whether it reflects contemporary understandings of the nature, drivers, harms and impacts of sexual harassment. This research should inform judicial education and training.
On 15 February 2022, the Attorney-General Michaela Cash announced a deadline for feedback on certain of the outstanding recommendations flowing from the Respect@work Report, including in particular the positive duty under Recommendation 17. Only days earlier, both 28 year old Brittany Higgins
5
and 27 year old Grace Tame
6
had spoken at the National Press Club in support of Recommendation 17. At the time of writing, legislation had been introduced to the Upper House of federal Parliament implementing both Recommendation 17 and 24 of the Respect@work Report.
Similarly to the positive duty under Recommendation 17, the positive duty that exists under sections 19 and 27 of the WHS Act, for instance, has received the following judicial interpretation, placing a heavy burden on employers, as was recently observed in SafeWork NSW v All Seasons (Aust) Gourmet Produce NSW Pty Ltd; SafeWork NSW v Skevos Kakias [2022] NSWDC 12 at [49], [51]:
49 The defendants’ duty required them to identify risks at the site and to adopt measures to eliminate or minimise them: s 17 of the Act: Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 at [34] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
…
51 Employers must take steps to protect workers against risks created by inadvertent conduct of workers in the course of their work, if it is reasonably practicable to do so: SafeWork NSW v Poletti Corporation [2019] NSWDC 491 at [88].
A positive duty introduced under the SD Act could similarly require employers (or those operating PCBUs) to identify risks at work (as that term is broadly interpretated) of sexual and/or sex-based harassment occurring and to take steps to protect workers against such risks, including where that risk is inadvertently created, where it is reasonably practicable to do so.
Conclusion
The full implications of these hard-fought amendments are yet to be seen but appear to have the potential to be far-reaching. From the impact of the increased strength of the objects in the SD Act on the assessment of damages in sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and sex discrimination matters; to the extension of the SD Act to all paid and unpaid workers of any kind, as well as the judiciary and Parliamentarians; from the linkage of accessorial liability to sexual harassment and sex-based harassment claims; the elevation of sexual harassment to constitute a valid reason for dismissal of an employee and the ability to obtain stop sexual harassment orders, all are momentous changes capable of addressing historical gender inequality and deficiencies in workplace practice and culture.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.