Honor and political violence

Abstract

Who participates in political violence? In this study, we investigate the issue at the micro-level, comparing individuals who have used violence in political uprisings with those who have not. We develop our argument from the observation that men are strongly overrepresented in political violence, although most men do not participate. Literature on masculinities emphasizes the role of honor and its links to different forms of violence, such as domestic abuse, criminal violence, and violent attitudes. Building on this literature, we discern two separate but related aspects of honor: honor as male societal privilege and control over female sexuality, that is, patriarchal values, and honor as ideals of masculine toughness, that is, the perceived necessity for men to be fierce and respond to affronts with violence or threats of violence in order to preserve status. We argue that patriarchal values combined with ideals of masculine toughness together constitute honor ideology, which contributes in turn to the explanation of who participates in political violence. We present new and unique individual-level survey data on these issues, collected in Thailand. We find that honor ideology strongly and robustly predicts a higher likelihood of participating in political violence among male political activists. A number of previous studies found a macro-level relationship between gender equality and peacefulness in a society. This study provides evidence for one micro-level mechanism linking gender equality and political violence at the macro level. Based on these results, we conclude that honor ideology endorsement is a driver of violence in political conflicts.

Keywords

gender honor masculinities political violence survey Thailand

Although collective violence during a political struggle can be extremely destructive and have far-reaching consequences, the number of people using violence for political purposes is often surprisingly small. For example, in the conflict over Northern Ireland between 1975 and 1991, the number of troops of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) was at no time higher than 500. Compared to the population of Ukraine at 45 million, the armed Self-Defence Group of the Maidan protest movement is reported to consist of only 12,000 members (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In this article we focus on the case of Thailand, where the political struggles between the so-called ‘red-shirts’ and ‘yellow-shirts’ were predominantly nonviolent, but a small number of individuals took to arms, causing destruction and violence that contributed to an escalation of the conflict and, eventually, a military coup.

Who decides to use violence in a political struggle? This important question has been the subject of surprisingly little systematic research. Most studies on the causes of collective violence within a state have used aggregate units of analysis, such as country-years or opposition movements. As a result, the explanations provided by these studies tend to be structural in character, for example pointing to poverty, semi-democratic political institutions, or economic dependency on natural-resource extraction (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Wimmer, 2014). While such aggregate structural explanations help to identify societies at risk, they have little or no leverage when it comes to characterizing who uses violence. We thus know very little about what distinguishes the small minority that engages in political violence from the large majority that does not.

A small stream of research has recently begun investigating the causes of violent participation by comparing individuals who have used violence with those who have not. Summarizing the existing evidence on individual-level attributes that predict participation in various forms of collective violence, McDoom notes that there is robust support for sociodemographic characteristics, in particular age and gender, and ‘more contingent support for socio-economic attributes’ (2013: 455). In other words, we know that the relatively small numbers who participate in collective violence are predominantly male young adults. Literature debating why people participate in violence has mostly emphasized different aspects of grievance, selective incentives, and social networks, but there is little consensus on what factors matter. Humphreys & Weinstein argue that several different causes for why people engage in armed violence ‘coexist within a single civil war’ (2008: 437). McDoom states that ‘[b]eyond age, gender and debatably socio-economic status, a scholarly consensus is crystallizing that violent perpetrators do not possess distinguishing individual characteristics’ (2013: 455). What sets participants in political violence apart from non-participants remains a puzzle, something that we address in this article.

We test a novel argument that relates honor ideology to participation in political violence. Our study concerns people who make a decision to participate in violence for political purposes – not people who have been forcefully abducted or conscripted. We develop our argument from the observation that men are strongly overrepresented in political violence, although most men do not participate. Literature on men and masculinities has long emphasized the role of honor and its links to different forms of violence, such as domestic abuse, criminal violence, and violent attitudes (such as approval of torture and racism). Building on this literature, we discern two separate but related strands of research around honor: one that conceives of honor as male societal privilege and control over female sexuality, that is, patriarchal values, and the other that focuses on ideals of masculine toughness, that is the perceived necessity for men to be fierce and respond to affronts with violence or threats of violence in order to preserve their status. We argue that patriarchal values combined with ideals of masculine toughness together constitute honor ideology, which contributes in turn to the explanation of who fights in political conflicts. We propose that patriarchal values lead to othering, and that masculine toughness drives violent aggression, so that honor ideology predisposes men to participate in political violence. Previous studies have explained why variables such as right-wing authoritarianism or machismo predispose people for extremism or sexual violence; we similarly investigate the role of honor ideology in political violence.

Political violence in Thailand

Thailand’s modern history is filled with political conflict, mass demonstrations, and military takeovers (see e.g. Bjarnegård, 2013). The two most recent military coups took place in 2006 and 2014. In this article, we focus on the volatile period between these two coups. During this time, two groups were taking turns to demonstrate in the streets. The groups were often referred to simply as the ‘yellow-shirts’ and the ‘red-shirts’, but the official names of the main actors were the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), respectively. The conflict was mainly played out in the streets of the capital city Bangkok, but its origins lay in a division between city and countryside. The privileged, urban ‘yellow-shirts’ mobilized against the increasing influence of the ‘red-shirts’ who were of predominantly rural origin, so-called ‘urbanized villagers’ (Thabchumpon & McCargo, 2011). The ‘red-shirts’ were initially mobilized to oppose the coup in 2006 that had ousted the then prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra (e.g. Dalpino, 2011). Increasingly, however, the movement went beyond being about supporting Thaksin, to centering more generally on questions of access to development, wealth, political inclusion, and influence (Sopranzetti, 2012). The vast majority of the tens of thousands of demonstrators were peaceful, orderly, and with moderate demands (Pasuk & Baker, 2012; Stent, 2012).

Officially, the ‘red-shirts’ and ‘yellow-shirts’ depicted themselves as demonstrating citizens and they advocated nonviolent but increasingly disruptive methods, such as occupying government buildings, international airports, and large parts of Bangkok (Chaisukkosol, 2010; Montesano, 2012). However, the two groups were growing social movements rather than coherent organizations. As such, they were loosely made up of people with similar ideological convictions, but with internal differences and fractured leaderships that resulted in different sub-elements advocating different strategies and methods – including the question of whether or not to use violence (Chambers, 2010; Thabchumpon & McCargo, 2011). For instance, even though the ‘red-shirt’ UDD leaders publically distanced themselves from the alleged chief trainer of a hardcore armed group known as the ‘men in black’, ‘Seh Daeng’,¹ a personality cult developed around him and many ordinary UDD members were inspired by him ‘as a symbol of masculinity, daring, and resistance to authority’ (Thabchumpon & McCargo, 2011: 998).

From time to time, violence did erupt during demonstrations, but it remains unclear which individuals used violence, and under whose orders. Death tolls and injuries rose when the police stepped in against the ‘yellow-shirts’ occupying the government complex in 2008, and in particular, when the military was called in to disperse the ‘red-shirts’ who were occupying entire blocks of central Bangkok in 2010 (e.g. Montesano, 2012; Prasirtsuk, 2010). In 2010, despite the fact that most demonstrators were nonviolent, buildings and property worth billions of baht were destroyed and around 100 people were killed, most by the military. When members of the military launched their 2014 coup, they argued that they had to restore peace and order to the country.

Over time, there were more radical and armed elements aligning with both movements, and these armed elements were involved in attacks that included the use of assault weapons and arson (e.g. Thabchumpon & McCargo, 2011). However, the ‘red-shirts’ and ‘yellow-shirts’ in Thailand cannot be described as armed rebel groups with a primary purpose of fighting state forces or other groups using violence. The vast majority of protesters did not use violence and were not armed. Guns and weapons were not openly encouraged or centrally distributed through any official channels. In addition, there is no indication that the underground militias used forced recruitment. Although violent methods may have been encouraged by certain leaders, and although some leaders may have inspired protesters to use violence, ultimately participation in political violence was voluntary. Some protesters were prepared to use violence, although did not necessarily plan to do so. Hence, it seems to have been an individual decision to bring a gun or other type of weapon to a demonstration. Some may have armed themselves to be prepared to defend themselves if attacked. For instance, much of the 2010 violence and destruction of infrastructure took place when the military intervened against protesters.

This study concentrates on the small minority of protestors who decided to use violence in the ‘red–yellow’ conflict in Thailand, despite being part of predominantly nonviolent social movements.

Previous explanations for participation in political violence

As mentioned, a small number of studies have in recent years begun to systematically examine what sets voluntary participants in collective violence apart from the great majority that never joins. The most recurrent results are that young men are highly overrepresented. The fact that all forms of collective violence are extremely gendered is often not problematized in the studies reviewed here, but is rather taken as a given, so that the male sex is viewed merely as a control variable or selection criterion.² Yet, the estimation that less than 1% of all warriors in history have been women (Goldstein, 2001: 10) needs to be taken into account when searching for explanations for who takes to arms.

Beyond sex and age, different socio-economic attributes have been found to predict violent participation, although the results differ between studies. Humphreys & Weinstein (2008) find that political alienation, poverty, and low education were significant predictors for voluntarily taking up arms in the civil war in Sierra Leone. The authors also report that fighters were offered money to join, and that they said they felt safer as part of an armed group.

Analyzing the economic profile of perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, Verwimp (2005) finds that both those who were economically and socially vulnerable, and therefore potentially had much to gain from participation, and the local elite who had something to defend, were overrepresented among the killers (Verwimp, 2005). A study of participation in deadly riots in Nigeria shows that the number of individuals with strong grievances was much higher than the actual number of participants (Scacco, 2008). Scacco argues that grievance measures therefore are poor predictors of violent participation. Instead, she finds that the interaction of subjectively experienced grievances with membership in local social networks explains who participates and who does not: people who felt poor in comparison to their neighbors and who attended local community meetings before the outbreak of riots were more likely to participate. Lower education also predicted participation (Scacco, 2008).

McDoom (2013) finds that individuals were more prone to participate in the Rwandan genocide if they lived in the same neighborhood as other participants, and if other family members participated, and that these results cannot be accounted for by age, gender, or socioeconomic status. McDoom thus concludes that it matters where an individual lives, and that mechanisms of social influence, such as peer pressure, help to distinguish who becomes a killer.

Other studies focus more on in-depth understanding of the participants of political violence than on comparison with non-participants. For example, a study of recruitment to the Viet Cong guerillas in the context of the Vietnam war in the early 1960s lists a number of reasons for joining, including discontent and safety concerns, and specifically highlights that for many young recruits ‘the desire to win glory, or perhaps just the respect of their community’ was the main reason for joining (Donnell, 1967: xii). In a similar vein, Wood (2001) argues that individuals who joined the FMLN insurgents in El Salvador in the 1970s reaped emotional benefits, because participation expressed their moral outrage at the injustices they had experienced, often in the form of government violence against them or their families. Fighting represented the reassertion of their personal dignity, and led to a sense of pride. These guerillas were not expecting any material benefits; for them, fighting had a value in itself despite the obvious risks and costs, because of these emotional benefits.

Considerable progress has been made in research about individual-level determinants of participation in political violence, but we still know little about what differentiates participants from non-participants.³ Explanatory factors like poverty, political alienation, and local networks would seem to pertain to more individuals than the very small number who actually join out of choice. Explanations that involve seeking glory and respect in the local community, and expressing outrage over injustices, are intriguing but also raise new questions. Why is it that only some individuals seek glory and respect through violence? As researchers repeatedly point out, there is also a risk that people misrepresent their true motivations in self-serving ways when asked about why they fought (e.g. Collier, 2007). In what follows, we argue that men who more strongly endorse honor ideology are more prone to political violence. We then proceed to test this hypothesis in survey data collected among both participants and non-participants in political violence in Thailand.

Approaching honor

In the most general sense, honor has been defined as ‘the right to be treated as having a certain worth’ and ‘a right to respect’ (Stewart, 1994: 21). Also in a general sense, most societies and cultures have a concept of honor that means something along the lines of honesty, integrity, and virtuous conduct. Honor also has a more sinister meaning, however. The traits and behaviors that give a person honor in this latter sense concern strength and domination, and the respect that is earned entails the right to privilege and precedence (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996: 4). Two conceptions of honor that involve domination and precedence can be discerned in the literature: patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness. We suggest that both must be examined in order to understand how honor can be the driving force behind an individual’s decision to participate in violence

Patriarchal values and othering

The first strand of research on honor emphasizes the role of patriarchal values in honor. Patriarchal values entail a fundamental dichotomization between ‘us’ and ‘them’, namely between men and women, and a hierarchical power relationship privileging men. The othering of women means that they are devalued, deprived of privileges, and controlled, relative to men. The two pillars of this ‘othering logic’ correspond to what has been called the ‘gender system’. Hirdman (1988: 63) claims that the gender system shows a regularity based on two different rules or principles:

The first is the rule of distinctive separation, which can be seen in the division of virtually all areas and levels of life into male and female categories. The second rule is that of the male norm, i.e. the way that higher value is almost automatically accorded to things masculine.

Hudson and co-authors (Hudson & den Boer, 2012; Hudson et al., 2009; Hudson et al., 2012) review the study of othering related to patriarchal values, and link such othering to proneness to violence. Psychological studies show that human beings notice three basic differences almost from infancy: age, gender, and race. Furthermore, the first adults that most children observe regularly interacting are their parents. The way in which men and women relate to each other therefore becomes the fundamental template for differentiating between groups of people, and to the extent that the father dominates and controls the mother, this model teaches the child that domination by one group over another is appropriate and normal.

Psychological research also shows that children who grow up in violent homes have a greater tendency to become violent themselves (Alexander, Morre & Alexander, 1991; Ehrensaft et al., 2003; see also Velitchkova, 2015). Hudson et al. hold that ‘the first “other” is always woman, and if one can make peace with the first other without resorting to coercion, one will have a template in place to know how to do so with other “others’” (Hudson & den Boer, 2012: 317). In other words, when patriarchal dominance by men over women is reduced, the type of othering that breeds intolerance and violence is weakened, and more companionate marriages instead serve as templates for respectful and equal interaction with others (Hudson & den Boer, 2012; Hudson et al., 2009; Hudson et al., 2012).

The process of othering and dehumanizing has been referred to as a sociopsychological process that is a prerequisite for being able to consider killing another human being (Potts & Hayden, 2008: 50). In the context of war, such othering has been argued to lead to the perception that the perpetration of violence – including killing – is the right thing to do (Staub, 1989). This psychological process implies a strong differentiation between oneself and the enemy, to the extent that enemies are devalued and excluded from the moral realm (Staub, 2006). In line with the literature reviewed above we argue that the othering and devaluation of group differences inherent in patriarchal values provide a template for justifying violence against collectives such as political opponents.

A host of studies have found that patriarchal values are related to violent outcomes, both at the societal level and at the individual level. Cohrs et al. (2007) argue that egalitarian values in society are linked to more positive orientations toward human rights; conversely, Feather & McKee (2012) demonstrate a link between the value systems underlying right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on the one hand, and prejudice against women on the other. In a meta-analytic review, Murnen, Wright & Kaluzny (2002) found that the strongest predictor for sexual violence against women was a combination of adhering to a masculine ideology that included the acceptance of aggression against women and holding negative, hostile beliefs regarding women. Santana, Raj & Decker (2006) found that men who reported more ‘traditional masculine gender role ideologies’ had engaged in sexual risk behaviors and intimate partner violence (IPV) perpetration to a significantly higher degree than others. In a recent study on male perpetration of IPV conducted in the Asia-Pacific region involving over 10,000 men in six countries, Jewkes et al. (2013) found that the most important explanatory factors for IPV were norms and practices relating to gender and relationships. Using data from Africa, Velitchkova (2015) shows that individuals who support patriarchal norms have a stronger tendency to participate in political violence. These studies follow a long line of scholarship pointing to the significance of sex role stereotyping (Burt, 1980), norms of hypermasculinity (Mosher & Sirkin, 1984), and hostile masculinity (Malamuth et al., 1991) for explaining men’s violence against women.

Ideals of masculine toughness

The second strand of research looks at honor from the point of view of ideals of masculine toughness. According to this perspective, honor depends on violence or threats of violence as a means to protect a man’s reputation and maintain his societal status. Indeed, Nisbett & Cohen (1996: 4) claim that the distinguishing feature of cultures where honor is strong is that men ‘are prepared to fight or even to kill to defend their reputations as honorable men’. Another key aspect is the importance placed on insults and displays of disrespect. If a man’s social standing and power is built on his preparedness for violence, not reacting to an insult can be interpreted as a lack of strength and an incapacity to protect himself and what belongs to him – including the female members of his family (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). The extent to which insults or affronts to a man’s female family members are considered threats to the man’s own honor is, in turn, related to patriarchal values. In other words, trying to live up to the ideals of masculine toughness requires men, in particular, to use violence.

In many societies, ‘honor’ has been used as justification for interpersonal violence. Ethnographer David Mandelbaum, studying honor in North India, describes this concept as ‘a word often heard in men’s talk, particularly when the talk is about conflict, rivalry and struggle. It crops up as a kind of final explanation for motivation, whether for acts of aggression or beneficence’ (Mandelbaum, 1988: 20). Several other studies also find that attitudes that are linked to this understanding of honor are important factors in the study of violence. Barnes, Brown & Osterman (2012) found that ideals of masculine toughness among men in the USA were linked to more militant attitudes toward terrorism, such as supporting the use of torture during interrogation.

Similarly, the link between honor and violence is key in the literature on the ‘code of the street’ (Anderson, 1999). Anderson found that in low-status groups in disadvantaged communities, self-respect and honor were dependent on cultivating a tough reputation, whereby any insult must be avenged with violence. Brezina et al. (2004) conducted a longitudinal study with 900 adolescent men and found that youths who (at time 1) held street-code beliefs, that is, beliefs that violence is an appropriate and legitimate response to disrespect and insults to honor, were involved in more violence than others (at time 2, measured one year later), including deadly violence.

Honor ideology as patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness

We conceive of honor ideology as the combination of patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness. Honor ideology is present in some way or other in all contemporary countries and cultures, although individuals vary in the degree to which they endorse it. We argue that the othering associated with patriarchal values predisposes men to violence, and that it becomes particularly dangerous when it is combined with the proneness to violence that is associated with idealizing masculine toughness. We also think that these two components tend to correlate to some extent, although most previous research has focused on either one or the other. We will therefore test whether honor ideology in this sense, that is, the combination of patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness, predicts participation in political violence in Thailand.

We are inspired by Mahalingam, who states that the reputation and standing of men in cultures of honor hinge to a large extent on two things: men demonstrating aggressiveness in the face of insult; and the chastity and loyalty of their female family members (Mahalingam, 2007). There is also a feminist literature investigating the role of honor in nationalism that has, at least implicitly, linked patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness to the concept of honor. In nationalist discourses, the nation is often likened to a family; as such, men and women are assigned different roles. As wives and mothers, women are bearers of honor, and women’s sexuality is to be controlled and defended by men (McGregor, 2003; Nagel, 2005).

Ideals of masculine toughness endow individuals steeped in patriarchal values with an additional impetus to violence. Thus, we propose that patriarchal values lead to othering, and that masculine toughness drives violent aggression, so that the combination of patriarchal values and masculine toughness, which we refer to as honor ideology, predisposes men to participate in political violence. We will investigate this proposition with the help of survey data on attitudes regarding gender and actual participation in political violence in Thailand. As described above, Thailand has seen several episodes of political violence in recent years. While both the ‘red-shirt’ movement and the ‘yellow-shirt’ movement described themselves as peaceful, some radical elements used violence. Thailand thus represents a case where there have been ample opportunities for participating in political violence, and where provocations and calls to stand up for a particular cause have been fairly common. Structural and organizational characteristics inherent in the political conflict provided a context in which violence was more of an option, but individual activists have nevertheless had a choice. Thailand is also a country in which gender roles have shifted quite remarkably in some areas but not in others. Women are highly visible in the public sphere and are participating in the workforce to a large extent, but they have not reached high levels of representation in the political sphere (Bjarnegård, 2013). Thailand thus provides an interesting case for our analysis as we can expect to find variation both in participation in political violence and in attitudes concerning honor ideology. Focusing on Thailand also addresses the identified lack of studies on honor and violence in East Asia (Vandello & Cohen, 2008).

Design and methods⁴

This study builds on the Survey on Gender, Politics and Violence in Thailand (more information on the survey design can be found at [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/gender-and-conflict/survey-on-gender--politics-and-violence-in-thailand/]), that was conducted in collaboration with King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) in Bangkok, Thailand. Data were collected between November 2012 and February 2013; in total 1,200 questionnaires were completed. We assumed that participation in political violence (our dependent variable) will generally be very rare in Thailand, as in most societies. We therefore collected two sets of data: first, a cluster survey of 200 respondents who are politically active as either ‘red-shirts’ or ‘yellow-shirts’, and second, a nationally representative sample of 1,000 respondents. The reason for drawing special samples with politically active and possibly radical ‘red-shirt’ and ‘yellow-shirt’ members was to try to obtain larger variation in the rare phenomenon of participation in political violence. The activist sample is the main sample of interest for this study. We will however use the nationally representative sample to construct our measures of honor in Thailand.

The two hundred political activist interviewees – 100 ‘red-shirts’ and 100 ‘yellow-shirts’ – were chosen by purposive sampling, with 20 interviewees per district in ten districts that were considered to be either ‘red’ or ‘yellow’ strongholds. The representative survey of the national population was conducted by selecting 1,000 interviewees using multi-stage random sampling: (1) regional sampling, (2) district sampling, (3) subdistrict sampling, and (4) household sampling. There are 76 provinces in Thailand, and 37 were surveyed. More details about both the purposive sampling of ‘red-shirt’ and ‘yellow-shirt’ activists, as well as about the nationally representative survey of the Thai population, can be found in Online Appendix A.

Most of the survey questionnaire was conducted in face-to-face interviews; however, one section containing sensitive questions on personal experiences of violence and the personal use of violence was self-administered on paper. This has been recommended in earlier studies that have demonstrated that self-administration of sensitive questions tends to reduce interviewer effects such as social desirability bias and thereby increase the probability of getting honest answers even to sensitive questions (see Jewkes et al., 2013 and more information in Online Appendix A). According to our argument, honor ideology predisposes men, but not women, to participate in political violence. Consequently, we only use the male part of the sample in the analyses. There are 113 men among the 200 activists, and 572 men in the nationally representative sample.⁵

Dependent variable: Participation in Political Violence (PPV)

The dependent variable is ‘participation in political violence’, and it is measured by the following three questions:

Have you ever carried a weapon (e.g. a gun, bomb, knife, or club) during a protest for political purposes?

Have you ever used a weapon during a protest for political purposes?

Have you ever caused damage (to a building, car, or infrastructure, or assaulted others) during a protest for political purposes?

Responding ‘yes’ to any of these three questions yields a code 1 on the dichotomous dependent variable PPV because it denotes that an activist has either carried out acts of violence or at least considered violence as an option before going to a demonstration.

In an alternative test, we used a more restrictive dependent variable. This alternative dependent variable does not include causing material damage as part of PPV; in this test, only bringing a weapon to or using a weapon in a political protest counts as PPV. In yet another alternative test we used an even more restrictive dependent variable. This alternative dependent variable takes the value 1 if the respondent admits to actually having used a weapon during a protest for political purposes, and 0 otherwise.

Explanatory variables

In the theory section, we argued that honor ideology should be associated with PPV, and that honor ideology consists of the combination of an attitude that embraces ideals of patriarchal values and masculine toughness. The implication of our theoretical argument is that the appropriate way of testing for the effect of honor ideology is to test for the effects on PPV of the interaction of patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness.

Based on previous research, we developed survey questions to capture our proposed construct of honor ideology. In doing so, we take on Vandello & Cohen’s call for developing better ‘individual-level measures of the endorsement of honor beliefs and values’ (2008: 662).⁶

Table I.

Results of exploratory factor analysis of Patriarchal Values

Item	Range	Factor loading	Scoring coefficients
Overall, men are better political leaders than women.	Strongly Disagree/Disagree/Agree/Strongly Agree	0.56	0.18
Overall, men are able to administrate a business better than women.	Strongly Disagree/Disagree/Agree/Strongly Agree	0.64	0.27
University education is more important to men than to women.	Strongly Disagree/Disagree/Agree/Strongly Agree	0.54	0.17
The husband should make the final decision on all matters.	Strongly Disagree/Disagree/Agree/Strongly Agree	0.50	0.15
A woman should bear violence to keep her family together.	Ten-step scale: 1 (Disagree) – 10 (Agree)	0.40	0.11
It is appropriate to beat a child for his/her good upbringing.	Ten-step scale: 1 (Disagree) – 10 (Agree)	0.44	0.12
A good wife should obey her husband despite disagreeing with him.	Ten-step scale: 1 (Disagree) – 10 (Agree)	0.59	0.21
A woman should remain a virgin until her marriage.	Ten-step scale: 1 (Disagree) – 10 (Agree)	0.46	0.16
It is a man’s duty to protect his family’s dignity by watching over his woman’s chastity and ethics.	Ten-step scale: 1 (Disagree) – 10 (Agree)	0.39	0.13

To capture the first element of honor ideology, we constructed the measure of Patriarchal values as an index, composed of a combination of nine different questions. The questions are developed from previous theory and surveys (Vandello & Cohen, 2003; Figueredo et al., 2001; Neff, 2001) and the index has been constructed using factor analysis. In line with theory, we argue that patriarchal values consist of the belief in male privilege and dominance in society at large as well as in the family, and that they extend to control over female sexuality. We thus expect that a set of questionnaire items tapping into these attitudes can be combined to measure patriarchal values with more precision than any item used by itself. We submitted nine items that we, based on theory, believe tap into patriarchal values to an exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring as the extraction method (Table I).

These nine items measure the view of appropriate roles of men and women in different spheres of life, including in the family, education, working-life, and politics. One dominant factor emerged, accounting for 82% of the total variance, with an eigenvalue of 2.34. No other factor had an eigenvalue greater than 1, which indicates that a single dimension captured the bulk of the variation in these items. All items load positively and strongly or moderately strongly on the first factor, and the alpha internal reliability value for the resulting index is an acceptable 0.67. We therefore use these items combined as our index of patriarchal values. The last column of Table I gives the regression coefficients used to estimate the individual scores. Despite referring to different spheres in life, this analysis demonstrates that these items taken together represent a single dimension that has to do with the view of the appropriate roles of men and women in a society. We will hereafter refer to this index as Patriarchal values.

Ideals of masculine toughness (henceforth shortened to masculine toughness) is captured by two statements derived from previous theory (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Brezina et al., 2004; Barnes et al., 2012) and by adding the answers to these two survey items. The first item is a dichotomous indicator that reflects whether or not the respondent agrees with the statement ‘A man shouldn’t show emotions and weakness’. The second item is likewise a dichotomous indicator that reflects whether or not the respondent agrees with the statement ‘It is fair for a man to assault anyone who has spread a rumor that he is a coward’. Taken together, these two statements capture the main components of masculine toughness as described in the literature: that a man’s reputation and social status is upheld by emotional detachment and by displaying signs of strength (for example through using threats of violence), not least in response to insults and signs of disrespect (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). The resulting variable Masculine toughness thus ranges from 0 to 2 depending on whether the respondent agreed with neither of the two items, with one item, or both statements.

Based on our reading of the relevant literatures, we argue that Patriarchal values and Masculine toughness are separate but related elements of honor ideology. The correlation between Patriarchal values and Masculine

Table II.

The effect of honor ideology on participation in political violence

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Dependent variable	Standard	Standard	Alternative DV1	Alternative DV2
Patriarchal values	–0.74	0.35	–0.68	–1.03
	(0.45)	(0.28)	(0.47)	(0.63)
Masculine toughness	1.53		1.56	1.55
	(0.56)**		(0.59)**	(0.783)*
Patriarchal values ×	0.78		0.87	0.99
Masculine toughness	(0.42)		(0.45)	(0.48)*
Constant	–2.59	–0.94	–2.73	–4.02
	(0.70)**	(0.29)**	(0.73)**	(1.11)**
N	83	87	83	83

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

toughness is positive as expected, but not very strong (0.23). Moreover, if the variable measuring Masculine toughness is added to the factor analysis of the items that constitute Patriarchal values, it loads only weakly on the first factor (0.27). Thus, we consider it to be warranted to treat Patriarchal values and Masculine toughness as separate but related elements of honor ideology. Next, we will test whether these two elements indeed interact as we expect in explaining PPV.

We construct the interaction term Patriarchal values × Masculine toughness by multiplying the index Patriarchal values with the indicator for Masculine toughness. When testing for the effect of honor ideology, we will thus include both the component variables Patriarchal values and Masculine toughness as well as the interaction term Patriarchal values × Masculine toughness in our baseline regression models, as is standard practice.

In addition, we used a number of control variables: age, education, income, importance of politics, importance of religion, marital status, identification as a Muslim, identification as a ‘red’ sympathizer, identification as a ‘yellow’ sympathizer, identification as a military veteran, identification as Malayu ethnicity, and employment status.

Results

The purpose of our analysis is to determine if honor ideology played a part in the individual decisions to participate in or prepare for political violence among ‘red-shirt’ and ‘yellow-shirt’ activists in Thailand. Table II presents multivariate logit regressions testing whether honor ideology is associated with a higher likelihood of PPV among male activists.

In Model 1 we examine the effect of honor ideology by including the two component variables Patriarchal values and Masculine toughness together with the interaction term Patriarchal values × Masculine toughness. Model 2 tests for an unconditional effect of Patriarchal values, but no significant effect is found for the unconditional effect. Model 3 uses the first alternative, more restrictive dependent variable (which does not include causing material damage). Model 4 uses the most restrictive dependent variable (which only includes admitting to actual use of a weapon during political protests).

Interpreting the coefficients for the components that together capture an interaction is not straightforward when dealing with regressions with a binary dependent variable. The sign, magnitude, and significance of the individual coefficients that together capture the interaction effect (Patriarchal values, Masculine toughness, and Patriarchal values × Masculine toughness) tell us nothing in and of themselves about the existence and statistical significance of substantially meaningful interaction effects in terms of the relevant probabilities (i.e. the likelihood of PPV). As pointed out by Ai and Norton, the interaction effect can be non-zero even if the coefficient of the interaction term (Patriarchal values × Masculine toughness) is 0; the statistical significance of the interaction cannot be tested with a simple t-test on the interaction term; and the sign of the interaction term is not necessarily the same as the sign of the interaction effect (Ai & Norton, 2003). Using the software Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg & King, 2003; King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000), we calculated the change in the predicted risk of PPV for different combinations of variable values in Model 1.

Table III reports the change in the predicted likelihood of PPV for three different scenarios, all three of

Table III.

Changes in predicted probability of participation in political violence when Masculine toughness changes from 0 to 1

Scenario [1]	Scenario [2]	Scenario [3]
Low Patriarchal values =–1.97 (10th percentile)	Medium Patriarchal values =–0.57 (59th percentile)	High Patriarchal values = 0.62 (90th percentile)
Not significant	11% to 26%	6% to 27%

which show the effect of a change in Masculine toughness from 0 to 1 (41% of the male activists had Masculine toughness = 0 whereas 47% scored 1 on this variable and 12% had the highest value 2). The three scenarios differ in the value of the conditioning variable Patriarchal values, and scenario [1] looks at low Patriarchal values. Note that the effects in scenario [1] are not statistically significant, and that this finding agrees with our expectations. In other words, Masculine toughness has no statistically significant effect when Patriarchal values are low. It is the combination of the two components of honor that creates the predisposition to participate in political violence. The effect of the one-unit increase from 0 to 1 in Masculine toughness is significant from levels of Patriarchal values equal to or greater than –.57, which among the activists is the 59th percentile of this variable. Scenario [2] shows the effect of a change in Masculine toughness from 0 to 1 when Patriarchal values are somewhat higher. The statistically significant effect at the 59th percentile is strong in that the predicted probability of PPV is more than twice as high (26% compared to 11%) for a male activist with Masculine toughness 1 compared to an activist with Masculine toughness 0. Strikingly, scenario [3] shows a very strong effect when Patriarchal values are high, at the 90th percentile: a change in Masculine toughness from 0 to 1 now corresponds to a more than four-fold increase in the risk of PPV, from 6% to 27%.

These numbers show that Patriarchal values has a strong conditioning effect on the relationship between Masculine toughness and PPV. Moreover, the effect of Masculine toughness is very strong in substantial terms when combined with higher levels of Patriarchal values. On the other hand, there is no statistically significant relationship between Masculine toughness and PPV among the men with low Patriarchal values. These results are in line with our arguments about the function of honor ideology with regard to participation in political violence. In other words, ‘red-shirt’ and ‘yellow-shirt’ male activists with strongly patriarchal values in combination with strong ideals of masculine toughness were far more likely to participate in political violence than were activists who did not agree with these values and ideals. These gender ideologies influence the propensity to use violence more than the political ideologies they fight over. Neither being a ‘yellow-shirt’ nor being a ‘red-shirt’ has any statistically significant effect on participation in political violence in any of the models (as shown in Online Appendix B, Tables B3, B7, B11).

As pointed out above, we analyze the data on activists; given how rare participation in political violence is among ordinary people it follows that it would have been very difficult to obtain statistically significant results had we instead used the nationally representative sample. Indeed, only eight men (out of 533) in the nationally representative sample reported having participated in political violence, and hence running multiple logistic regression using this sample is not meaningful because of the very small cell counts. Seven out of the eight agreed with one of the two items used to capture Masculine toughness, whereas the eighth participating non-activist did not answer the question about men showing emotions and weakness. Furthermore, in the national sample the average value of Patriarchal values among those who had participated in political violence was more than three times the average value of those who had not (0.55 versus 0.16). These numbers together suggest that honor ideology may operate in a similar way among non-activists, although this cannot be tested with these data. The unsurprising fact that participation in political violence is much rarer among ordinary Thais than among the activists also suggests that other violent triggers exist among activists. Potentially, encouragement to use violence from within the movement, or inspiration from idealized radical front-figures, may trigger violence among those that subscribe to honor ideology and who already see violence as a justifiable way of solving political conflicts. The importance of such triggers for honor ideology to translate into violent political actions is an important avenue for future research.

A number of control variables were added, one by one, to each of Models 1–3.⁷ The controls failed to achieve significance, whereas the results for honor ideology remained similar throughout. We must also ask: is it possible that embracing honor ideology is a consequence of being exposed to violence or threats of violence, so that the direction of causality is from participation in violence to honor ideology? A coherent argument can be made that people become more warlike in their attitudes when their environment and experiences suggest that there is a need for manly warriors. We explored this possibility in several different ways, and conclude that there is no indication that our results are due to reverse causality.

First, we tested whether honor ideology is systematically related to having served in the armed forces. All armed forces socialize recruits into a warrior role and try to convince them of the necessity and virtue of military service. One would thus expect that men who have served in the armed forces would espouse honor ideology more strongly than other men, if the causal direction is the opposite from what we hypothesize. In Thailand, conscription among men is enforced through lottery. As a result, a large proportion of the men in Thailand have served in the armed forces (18% in our survey). However, in numerous tests, we find no indication that honor ideology is stronger among men who have served in the military compared to other men.⁸

Furthermore, our survey includes questions on whether the respondent has been a victim of violence or threats of violence, personally or directed against one’s family. If the causal direction goes from violence to honor ideology, we would expect to see that people who have experienced violence or threats of violence have higher honor ideology; however, numerous tests failed to show any such relationship.⁹

Conclusion

In this study, we set out to investigate to what extent honor ideology predicts participation in political violence. Previous research has established that the level of gender equality within a country correlates to the peacefulness of the state (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005; Hudson et al., 2009; Gleditsch et al., 2011; Reiter, 2014). This study provides unique micro-level evidence that links misogynist attitudes with self-reported participation in political violence among political activists. Do gender-unequal norms increase the likelihood of participating in political conflict? Our findings suggest that yes, they do. In particular, male activists who more strongly endorse honor ideology are more likely to have participated in political violence than other male activists. We argue that honor ideology consists of patriarchal values (i.e. male societal privilege and control over female sexuality) combined with ideals of masculine toughness (i.e. the perceived necessity for men to display fierceness in order to preserve their status).

Thailand is a country that has seen recent political violence in predominantly nonviolent ‘red-’ and ‘yellow-shirt’ demonstrations. More than 100 fatalities were incurred and enormous material damage inflicted in this political conflict. We collected and analyzed survey data in order to examine the effect of honor ideology on participation in political violence in Thailand. Our findings were that honor ideology strongly and robustly predicted a higher likelihood of participation among male political activists in Thailand. Based on these results, we conclude that honor ideology endorsement is a driver of violence in political conflicts.

We should mention a few caveats. The first is that while participation in political violence is rare, it is also likely to be underreported. As in all survey work, receiving honest, truthful answers to questions – particularly sensitive questions – is a challenge. Biases such as acquiescence (‘yah-saying’) and social-desirability rating (the tendency to answer in a way that gives others a favorable view of oneself) are always part of survey responses. In order to minimize such effects, sensitive questions were asked in a self-administered part of this survey. This should also minimize any potential incentive of honor endorsers to exaggerate their participation in violence to appear more manly, since not even the enumerator will know the respondent’s answers.¹⁰

It should also be noted that the statistically significant and robust effects that we found pertain to male political activists. By design, our sample of political activists differs from the complementary nationally representative sample. Whereas participation in political violence is extremely rare among ordinary Thais (1.5% of the men reported that they had participated), a substantial share, namely 23%, of the male political activists had participated in political violence. Previous research has shown that misogynist ideals increase violence in families; here we demonstrate that this is also true for political activists: future research should investigate to what extent this is also the case for political violence among ordinary people. Relatedly, the question of how and why a person becomes a political activist in the first place also deserves more study.

Furthermore, we argue in this article that honor ideology pivots around two elements: patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness. While these factors seem to be fundamental and universal elements of honor ideology, they are found to a different extent and take different forms around the world. Therefore, the measures developed in this article are likely to be culture-specific, and if applied to other contexts, will require care in adapting wording and meaning.

We also acknowledge that we do not know the scope conditions for the explanation that participation in political violence is driven in part by honor ideology. Does this explanation only apply to the kind of violent protesting and street clashes that characterize the recent turmoil in Thailand, or is the explanation applicable also to other forms of political violence such as guerilla warfare and massacres? This is an important issue for further study. We argue that it is likely that honor ideology will also turn out to be a driver of other forms of political violence as all forms of deadly political violence exhibit the particular pattern that an overwhelming majority of those who fight are men while most men never take up arms even under conditions of political conflict.

Future research should also explore the multifaceted concept of honor ideology further. We need to conceptually and empirically refine this concept in order to determine exactly what it entails. We also need to complement studies of one country, such as this one, with comparisons of other contexts. Much remains to be done, but the micro-level findings presented in this article provide important and unique insights into what causes male political activists to use violence for political purposes.

Footnotes

Replication data

The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, as well as the Online appendix, can be found at

Acknowledgments

We thank the Editor and reviewers for insightful comments.

Funding

This work was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant number M10-0100:1), The East Asian Peace Program.

Notes

References

Chungron

Norton

Edward C

(2003) Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics Letters 80(1): 123–129.

Alexander

Pamela C

Morre

Sharon

Alexander

Elmore R

III (1991) What is transmitted in the intergenerational transmission of violence? Journal of Marriage and Family 53(3): 657–667.

Anderson

Elijah

(1999) Code of the Street. New York: WW Norton.

Barnes

Collin D

Brown

Ryan P

Osterman

Lindsey L

(2012) Don’t tread on me: Masculine honor ideology in the US and militant responses to terrorism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38(8): 1018–1029.

Bjarnegård

Elin

(2013) Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation, Gender and Politics. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bjarnegård

Elin

Melander

Erik

(2014) Thailand’s missing democrats: Reds, yellows and the silent majority. Foreign Affairs 22 May (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141454/elin-bjarnegard-and-erik-melander/thailands-missing-democrats).

Blattman

Christopher

Miguel

Edward

(2010) Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature 48(1): 3–57.

Brezina

Timothy

Agnew

Robert

Cullen

Francis T

Wright

John Paul

(2004) The code of the street: A quantitative assessment of Elijah Anderson’s subculture of violence thesis and its contribution to youth violence research. Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice 2(4): 303–328.

Burt

Martha R

(1980) Cultural myths and supports for rape. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38(2): 217–230.

10.

Caprioli

Mary

(2005) Primed for violence: The role of gender inequality in predicting internal conflict. International Studies Quarterly 49(2): 161–178.

11.

Carpenter

R Charli

(2006) Recognizing gender-based violence against civilian men and boys in conflict situations. Security Dialogue 37(1): 83–103.

12.

Chaisukkosol

Chanchai

(2010) The internet & nonviolent struggle: The anti-government movement in Thailand 2005–2006. Social Alternatives 29(3): 49–55.

13.

Chambers

Paul

(2010) Thailand on the brink: Resurgent military, eroded democracy. Asian Survey 50(5): 835–858.

14.

Cohrs

J Christopher

Maes

Jürgen

Moschner

Barbara

Kielmann

Sven

(2007) Determinants of human rights attitudes and behavior: A comparison and integration of psychological perspectives. Political Psychology 28(4): 441–469.

15.

Collier

Paul

(2007) The Bottom Billion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

16.

Dalpino

Catharin

(2011) Thailand in 2010: Rupture and attempts at reconciliation. Asian Survey 51(1): 155–162.

17.

Donnell

John C

(1967) Viet Cong recruitment: Why and how men join. DTIC Document (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA032187).

18.

Ehrensaft

Miriam K

Cohen

Patricia

Brown

Jocelyn

Elizabeth

Smailes

Henian

Chen

Johnson

Jeffrey G

(2003) Intergenerational transmission of partner violence: A 20-year prospective study. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 71(4): 741–753.

19.

Feather

Norman T

McKee

Ian R

(2012) Values, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and ambivalent attitudes toward women. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 42(10): 2479–2504.

20.

Figueredo

Aurelio José

Corral-Verdugo

Victor

Frías-Armenta

Martha

Bachar

Karen J

White

Janine

McNeill

Prentiss L

Kirsner

Beth R

Pilarcastell-Ruiz

Irasema Del

(2001) Blood, solidarity, status, and honor: The sexual balance of power and spousal abuse in Sonora, Mexico. Evolution and Human Behavior 22(5): 295–328.

21.

Gleditsch

Kristian Skrede

Wucherpfennig

Julian

Hug

Simon

Reigstad

Karina Garnes

(2011) Polygyny or misogyny? Reexamining the ‘First Law of Intergroup Conflict’. Journal of Politics 73(1): 265–270.

22.

Goldstein

Joshua S

(2001) War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

23.

Hirdman

Yvonne

(1988) Genussystemet – Reflexioner kring kvinnors sociala underordning [Gender system: Reflexions on women’s social subordination]. Kvinnovetenskaplig tidsskrift 3: 49–63.

24.

Hudson

Valerie M

Boer

Andrea M den

(2012) A feminist evolutionary analysis of the relationship between violence against and inequitable treatment of women, and conflict within and between human collectives, including nation-states. In: Shackelford

Todd K

Weekes-Shackelford

Viviana A

(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Perspectives on Violence, Homicide, and War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 301–323.

25.

Hudson

Valerie M

Ballif-Spanvill

Bonnie

Caprioli

Mary

Emmett

Chad F

(2012) Sex and World Peace. New York: Columbia University Press.

26.

Hudson

Valerie M

Caprioli

Mary

Ballif-Spanvill

Bonnie

Rose

McDermott

Emmett

Chad F

(2009) The heart of the matter: The security of women and the security of states. International Security 33(3): 7–45.

27.

Humphreys

Macartan

Weinstein

Jeremy M

(2008) Who fights? The determinants of participation in civil war. American Journal of Political Science 52(2): 436–455.

28.

Jewkes

Rachel

Fulu

Emma

Roselli

Tim

Claudia

Garcia-Moreno

(2013) Prevalence of and factors associated with male perpetration of intimate partner violence: Findings from the UN multi-country cross-sectional study on men and violence in Asia and the Pacific. The Lancet Global Health 1(4): e187–e207.

29.

King

Gary

Tomz

Michael

Wittenberg

Jason

(2000) Making the most of statistical analyses: Improving interpretation and presentation. American Journal of Political Science 44(2): 347–361.

30.

Mahalingam

Ramaswami

(2007) Beliefs about chastity, machismo, and caste identity: A cultural psychology of gender. Sex Roles 56(3): 239–249.

31.

Malamuth

Neil M

Sockloskie

Robert J

Koss

Mary P

Tanaka

(1991) Characteristics of aggressors against women: Testing a model using a national sample of college students. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 59(5): 670–681.

32.

Mandelbaum

David G

(1988) Women’s Seclusion and Men’s Honor: Sex Roles in North India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.

33.

McDoom

Omar Shahabudin

(2013) Who killed in Rwanda’s genocide? Micro-space, social influence and individual participation in intergroup violence. Journal of Peace Research 50(4): 453–467.

34.

McGregor

Robert

(2003) The popular press and the creation of military masculinities in Georgian Britain. In: Higate

Paul R

(ed.) Military Masculinities. Westport, CT: Praeger, 143–156.

35.

Melander

Erik

(2005) Gender equality and intrastate armed conflict. International Studies Quarterly 49(4): 695–714.

36.

Montesano

Michael J

Chachavalpongpun

Pavin

Chongvilaivan

Aekapol

(2012) Bangkok May 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

37.

Mosher

Donald L

Sirkin

Mark

(1984) Measuring a macho personality constellation. Journal of Research in Personality 18(2): 150–163.

38.

Murnen

Sarah K

Wright

Carrie

Kaluzny

Gretchen

(2002) If ‘boys will be boys,’ then girls will be victims? A meta-analytic review of the research that relates masculine ideology to sexual aggression. Sex Roles 46(11): 359–375.

39.

Nagel

Joane

(2005) Nation. In: Kimmel

Michael S

Hearn

Jeff

Connell

(eds) Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 397–413.

40.

Neff

James A

(2001) A confirmatory factor analysis of a measure of ‘Machismo’ among Anglo, African American and Mexican American male drinkers. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 23(2): 171–188.

41.

Nisbett

Richard E

Cohen

Dov

(1996) Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South: New Directions in Social Psychology. Boulder, CO: Westview.

42.

Phongpaichit

Pasuk

Baker

Chris

(2012) Thailand in trouble: Revolt of the downtrodden or conflict among elites? In: Montesano

Michael J

Chachavalpongpun

Pavin

Chongvilaivan

Aekapol

(eds) Bangkok May 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 214–229.

43.

Potts

Malcolm

Hayden

Thomas

(2008) Sex and War: How Biology Explains Warfare and Terrorism and Offers a Path to a Safer World. Dallas, TX: BenBella.

44.

Prasirtsuk

Kitti

(2010) Thailand in 2009: Colored by turbulence. Asian Survey 50(1): 203–210.

45.

Reiter

Dan

(2014) The positivist study of gender and international relations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(7): 1301–1326.

46.

Santana

M Christina

Raj

Anita

Decker

Michele R

Marche

Ana La

Silverman

Jay G

(2006) Masculine gender roles associated with increased sexual risk and intimate partner violence perpetration among young adult men. Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine 83(4): 575–585.

47.

Scacco

Alexandra

(2008) Who Riots? Explaining Individual Participation in Ethnic Violence. New York: Columbia University Press.

48.

Sopranzetti

Claudio

(2012) Burning red desires: Isan migrants and the politics of desire in contemporary Thailand. South East Asia Research 20(3): 361–379.

49.

Staub

Ervin

(1989) The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

50.

Staub

Ervin

(2006) Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing, or intractable conflict: Understanding the roots of violence, psychological recovery, and steps toward a general theory. Political Psychology 27(6): 867–894.

51.

Stent

James

(2012) Thoughts on Thailand’s turmoil. In: Montesano

Michael J

Chachavalpongpun

Pavin

Chongvilaivan

Aekapol

(eds) Bangkok May 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 15–41.

52.

Stewart

Frank Henderson

(1994) Honor. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

53.

Thabchumpon

Naruemon

McCargo

Duncan

(2011) Urbanized villagers in the 2010 Thai red-shirt protests. Asian Survey 51(6): 993–1018.

54.

Thomas

Jakana L

Bond

Kanisha D

(2015) Women’s participation in violent political organizations. American Political Science Review 109(3): 488–506.

55.

Tomz

Michael

Wittenberg

Jason

King

Gary

(2003) Clarify: Software for interpreting and presenting statistical results. Version 2.1. Journal of Statistical Software 8(1).

56.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2015) UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/database/, accessed 22 April 2015).

57.

Vandello

Joseph A

Cohen

Dov

(2003) Male honor and female fidelity: Implicit cultural scripts that perpetuate domestic violence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84(5): 997–1010.

58.

Vandello

Joseph A

Cohen

Dov

(2008) Culture, gender, and men’s intimate partner violence. Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2(2): 652–667.

59.

Velitchkova

Ana

(2015) World culture, uncoupling, institutional logics, and recoupling: Practices and self-identification as institutional microfoundations of political violence. Sociological Forum 30(3): 698–720.

60.

Verwimp

Philip

(2005) An economic profile of peasant perpetrators of genocide: Micro-level evidence from Rwanda. Journal of Development Economics 77(2): 297–323.

61.

Wimmer

Andreas

(2014) War. Annual Review of Sociology 40: 173–197.

62.

Wood

Elisabeth Jean

(2001) The emotional benefits of insurgency in El Salvador. In: Goodwin

Jeff

Jasper

James M

Polletta

Francesca

(eds) Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 267–281.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

Honor and political violence

Abstract

Keywords

Political violence in Thailand

Previous explanations for participation in political violence

Approaching honor

Patriarchal values and othering

Ideals of masculine toughness

Honor ideology as patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness

Design and methods 4

Dependent variable: Participation in Political Violence (PPV)

Explanatory variables

Results

Conclusion

Footnotes

Replication data

Acknowledgments

Funding

Notes

References

Supplementary Material

Design and methods⁴