Organized violence,1989–2018 and peace agreements

Abstract

This article reports on trends in organized violence and peace agreements collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The number of fatalities in organized violence decreased for the fourth consecutive year, to reach the lowest level since 2012. In 2018, UCDP recorded almost 76,000 deaths: a decrease of 20% compared to 2017, and 43% compared to the latest peak in 2014. State-based armed conflict drives this downward trend in organized violence, with Syria accounting for much of the change. The number of civilians killed in one-sided violence also dropped in 2018, reaching its lowest level since 2012. In contrast, non-state conflict remained on a high level. The general decline in fatalities from organized violence does not correspond with the trend in the number of active conflicts. In fact, the world has seen a new peak in the number of conflicts after 2014, matched only by the number of conflicts in the early 1990s. In 1991, the peak in the number of armed conflicts corresponded with a similar peak in the number of signed peace agreements. This was followed by a decrease in the number of conflicts in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, the most recent rise in armed conflicts has not been matched by a similar rise in the number of peace agreements. Two circumstances that characterize the recent rise in conflicts have also been found to make conflicts harder to solve: explicit religious claims and high levels of internationalization.

Keywords

armed conflict conflict data non-state conflict one-sided violence peace agreements war

Organized violence 1989–2018¹

In 2018, the number of fatalities in organized violence decreased for the fourth consecutive year, now being at the lowest level since 2012. Figure 1 shows that UCDP recorded almost 76,000 deaths in 2018: a decrease of 20% compared to 2017, and 43% compared to the latest peak in 2014. As in most years, state-based conflict drives this trend. The de-escalation of violence in Syria and Iraq was the primary cause of this decrease. The number of civilians killed in one-sided violence also dropped in 2018, reaching its lowest level since 2012. In contrast, non-state conflict continued on a high level.²

Figure 1.

Fatalities in organized violence by type, 1989–2018

The general decline in fatalities from organized violence does not correspond with the trend in the number of active conflicts. In fact, the world has seen a new peak in the number of conflicts after 2014, matched only by the number of conflicts in the early 1990s. In 1991, the peak in the number of armed conflicts corresponded with a similar peak in the number of signed peace agreements. However, the most recent rise in armed conflicts has not been matched by a similar rise in the number of peace agreements.

State-based conflict 1946–2018

In state-based conflict, the number of conflicts remained on a high level. However, substantial de-escalation in several countries contributed to the number of battle-related deaths decreasing for the fourth consecutive year.

UCDP recorded 52 active state-based armed conflicts in 2018, an increase by two compared to 2017.³ Figure 2 shows that the years since 2014 have been characterized by the highest numbers of armed conflict since 1946.⁴ For the fourth consecutive year, UCDP registered more than 50 ongoing conflicts. Only one year prior to 2014 experienced numbers this high: 1991 with 52 conflicts. This trend is largely driven by the expansion of the Islamic State (IS) to countries beyond Iraq where it originated. Despite their reported defeat in several

Figure 2.

State-based armed conflict by type, 1946–2018

countries, including Syria and Iraq, the group was active in 12 different state-based armed conflicts around the world in 2018. Nonetheless, this is a decrease from 16 conflicts in 2017. The four conflicts, in Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, and Bangladesh, de-escalated following government offensives in 2017 and did not result in 25 fatalities during 2018.

Figure 2 shows that interstate conflict continues to be a rare event; only two of the 52 conflicts in 2018 were between states. The border conflict between India and Pakistan continued on a high level in spite of the parties’ announcement in May 2018, that they would restore the ceasefire agreement from 2003. Skirmishes across the border resulted in over 100 fatalities during the year, and India reported the highest number of ceasefire violations since 2003 (Hindustan Times, 2019).

For the first time, the conflict between Iran and Israel became active in 2018. Diplomatic relations had been tense since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and worsened following the conflict between Israel and Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, in 2006. Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei (2014) has called for the elimination of the Israeli regime through armed confrontation since 2014, while Israel has fired missiles into Syria, partially targeting Hezbollah and Iranian forces as well as Syrian military installations since 2013. In May 2018, Israel accused Iran of hitting Israeli positions in the Golan Heights and retaliated with ‘Operation House of Cards’ against Iranian forces in Syria (McKernan, 2018; Lahad, Stern & Fuchs, 2018).

Eighteen of the 50 intrastate conflicts were internationalized in the form of troops from external states supporting one or both sides in the conflict, which has been shown to increase both conflict duration and

Figure 3.

State-based armed conflict by intensity level, 1946–2018

lethality (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce, 2008; Lacina, 2006). A case in point is Afghanistan, one of the most protracted conflicts still active, and the bloodiest one in 2018. Over the years, numerous external parties have been involved in the conflict with troops on the ground, including the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) during the 2000s, and the USA in recent years. For five consecutive years, more than 30% of the conflicts have experienced this type of external involvement, a level never witnessed previously in the post-World War II period. Just as in 2017, the USA was involved in more conflicts as a secondary warring party than any other country in 2018 and maintained engagements in seven internationalized intrastate conflicts. By the end of 2018, however, US President Donald Trump signaled that the country would pull its forces out of, or severely reduce their numbers in, countries including Syria and Afghanistan (Issa & Karam, 2019; Gibbons-Neff & Mashal, 2018).

In 2018, six conflicts reached the intensity level of war, with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. This is a decrease by four from 2017, and the lowest number recorded since 2013. As Figure 3 shows, this number is on par with the low numbers of wars witnessed during the first decade of the 21st century. All six wars were also internationalized, which illustrates the general pattern that conflicts with external involvement tend to be more lethal.

The decline in the number of wars corresponds to a substantial reduction in battle-related deaths during 2018. As Figure 1 shows, the number of fatalities decreased for the fourth consecutive year, reaching the lowest level since the Arab spring in 2011. At just over 53,000 fatalities, the numbers decreased by 21% since 2017 and by almost 50% since the peak year of 2014 when UCDP recorded over 104,000 fatalities. Driven by the conflicts in Syria, 2014 was one of the bloodiest years since the end of the Cold War but it was nowhere near as violent as the wars in Korea, in Vietnam, and between Iran and Iraq during the Cold War era. This continuing decline in battle-deaths lends support to the claim that we live in an increasingly peaceful world (e.g. Goldstein, 2011; Pinker, 2011). In Syria, conflicts involving the government caused around 11,500 deaths during 2018. Down by nearly 9,000 from 2017, the conflicts in Syria reached their lowest level since 2011.

Several other conflicts also experienced substantial de-escalation during 2018. The most prominent example is Iraq where fatality numbers decreased by more than 9,000 fatalities, or 92%, down to just over 800. In December 2017, the Iraqi Prime Minister announced that IS was defeated (BBC, 2017) and the conflict did not reach the intensity of war in 2018. This has only happened once since the 2003 invasion of the US-led coalition, in 2012.

Yet, the overall reduction in violence did not affect all parts of the world. In Yemen, fatality numbers almost doubled as the conflict escalated and became increasingly complex with numerous external actors involved. The UN (2018) has described Yemen as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, and the peace negotiations in Sweden in December 2018 failed to put an end to civilian suffering. Another country in which historic peace talks during the year failed to halt the escalating violence is Afghanistan. Violence has been on the rise there during the last decade, particularly since 2013. In 2018, fatality numbers reached a new high with almost 26,000 killed in state-based conflict, and Afghanistan surpassed Syria as the country hardest hit by this type of violence. The Hazara population was the target of many attacks during the year: the Taliban movement pushed deep into Hazara-populated areas in Ghazni and Uruzgan in October, while IS carried out numerous suicide attacks in Hazara-populated neighborhoods in the capital, Kabul.

Non-state conflict 1989–2018

Non-state conflict remained on a high level in 2018, in terms of both the number of conflicts and the number of fatalities in these conflicts.

UCDP has recorded 721 non-state conflicts since 1989, with a yearly average of 39 active conflicts. In 2018, UCDP registered 76 non-state conflicts. Albeit a decrease by seven from the 83 conflicts recorded in the peak year of 2017,⁵ the number of active non-state conflicts remains on a high level. UCDP registered just under 18,300 deaths in 2018, almost the same level as in 2017, which is the peak year of the entire 1989–2018 period. The past six years have all recorded higher levels of non-state violence than any other year since 1989. The better part of this surge in non-state violence is due to the many interrebel conflicts in Syria, intercartel violence in Mexico, and communal conflicts in Nigeria, mainly along farmer–herder lines.

As in previous years, the countries hardest hit by this type of violence in 2018 were Syria and Mexico, together responsible for 30% of the non-state conflicts, and 67% of the deaths. In Syria, many rebel groups were severely weakened by the government offensive against rebel-controlled areas, including the siege of Eastern Ghouta during the first months of the year, and there was also a merging of groups into bigger alliances fighting common enemies. The net result was a decrease in the number of conflicts in Syria from 15 in 2017 to 10 in 2018. This decline in the number of conflicts corresponded to a reduction by 35% in the number of fatalities. By contrast, the recent trend in Mexico has been one of fragmentation among the main cartels, particularly of the Sinaloa Cartel. As the Cartel has been losing ground, others have stepped in to fill the void, most notably the Jalisco Cartel New Generation that was involved in six different non-state conflicts in 2018. In total, Mexico registered 13 intercartel conflicts, an increase by five compared to the year before, making it the country with the largest number of non-state conflicts in 2018.

In both Syria and Mexico, formally organized groups, such as rebel groups or criminal cartels, were involved in the non-state conflicts recorded. Formally organized groups generally have access to more resources, better training, and sturdier command structures than informally organized groups such as communal groups. Therefore, these conflicts may result in more severe encounters and more deaths. Rebel groups are also more likely to function as proxies for other states and, thereby, increase their capabilities through military support from these external actors (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2014). The data show that conflicts between informally organized groups, on average, result in lower fatality numbers but Figure 4 reveals that for many years in the late 1990s

Figure 4.

Fatalities in non-state conflict, by type of actor, 1989–2018

and early 2000s, conflicts between such groups resulted in more fatalities than conflicts between more organized groups.⁶ Since 2014, however, conflicts between formally organized groups have dominated the picture. Of the 18,300 deaths recorded in non-state conflicts in 2018, at least 14,800, or 81%, occurred in conflicts between formally organized groups.

Although less lethal than the recent interrebel and intercartel violence, conflicts between informally organized groups increased in intensity in 2018, reaching the highest level of fatalities since 2011. Two countries driving this trend were Ethiopia and DR Congo.

In Ethiopia, the political reforms of the new regime under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed have resulted in economic liberalization and increased political openness, which in turn enabled the peace processes of 2018 discussed below. However, this loosening state control also led to an upsurge in ethnic violence, resulting in five different communal conflicts, and more people becoming internally displaced in Ethiopia than in any other country in the world during 2018 (ICG, 2019).

In Western DR Congo, a longstanding history of rivalry between Nunu and Tende ethnic groups resulted in heavy fighting during December 2018. Although the burial of a Nunu leader in Tende territory sparked the recent violence, some reports attributed increased tension to the December elections, with Tende supporting the then ruling coalition and Nunu the opposition (ACAPS, 2019). By the end of the year, the conflict had caused almost 900 deaths.

The 2019 version of the dataset is the first to code troop support from an external state in non-state conflicts, covering the 1989–2018 period. This change in the non-state conflict data was made in order to capture a type of situation that has become more common following the expansion of transnational groups such as al-Qaida and IS. State support in non-state conflicts became an important feature in Syria following the IS declaration of an Islamic caliphate in 2014. A pertinent example of a non-state conflict with external involvement is the fighting between IS and the Kurdish-led alliance Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) supported by US-led coalition airstrikes as well as ground troops. This conflict alone has caused almost 19,000 deaths over the past four years, more than any other non-state conflict recorded by the UCDP.⁷

The total number of non-state conflicts with external state involvement is too small to draw any clear conclusions from, but most of the cases occurred in the past four years. The number peaked in 2015, with seven of the 67 non-state conflicts having external state support. In 2018, this number had dropped to three out of 73.

One-sided violence 1989–2018

UCDP recorded a decrease in one-sided violence in 2018, in both the number of actors registered and the number of civilians killed.

UCDP has recorded a total of 274 actors engaged in one-sided violence since 1989, with a yearly average of 33 active actors. In 2018, 32 actors were included in the UCDP data, a decrease by one compared to 2017. The most substantial reduction in one-sided actors took place in DR Congo, from eight actors in 2017 to three in 2018. The country experienced an escalation of violence in 2017, following President Kabila’s postponing of elections and the spread of the Kamuina Nsapu movement. Kamuina Nsapu was a tribal leader who supported the opposition. When the government refused to recognize his chiefdom, he and his followers launched a rebellion, which spread to several provinces of the country.

Figure 5.

Fatalities in one-sided violence, by type of actor, 1989–2018

During 2018, this movement disintegrated and many fighters surrendered after the victory of Félix Tshisekedi in the presidential elections. Violence continued in other parts of the country, albeit with a lower intensity, and created problems for the response to the Ebola outbreak in conflict-ridden North Kivu province in August 2018 (Moran, 2018).

Figure 5 shows that the number of civilians killed in one-sided violence also dropped, reaching its lowest level since 2012. UCDP estimates that governments or formally organized groups targeted and killed at least 4,500 civilians during 2018. Only four years in the 1989–2018 period have witnessed fewer fatalities incurred in this type of violence.

With nearly 1,800 civilian fatalities recorded in 2018, IS continued to be the actor most heavily involved in this type of violence. However, the number of people killed by IS has decreased steadily since 2015 and last year reached its lowest level in seven years. The geographic focus of IS attacks changed drastically during the year. In previous years, Syria, Iraq, and Nigeria have seen the vast majority of killings. Although Syria remains hardest hit, violence in 2018 shifted to Asia, more specifically to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, IS did not carry out any large-scale terrorist attacks in Europe during 2018.

With a few exceptions, most notably Rwanda in 1994, non-state actors have targeted civilians more frequently than states have. 2018 followed this trend with governments being responsible for a mere 18% of the fatalities. The accountability costs induced by civilian targeting are generally higher for governments than for rebel groups, which may lead states to delegate suppression of civilians to pro-government militias.⁸ It may also be cost-effective to employ locally based militias in areas where the state presence is weak (Carey, Colaresi & Mitchell, 2015). Examples of this type of outsourcing include Sudan, where Janjaweed carried out large-scale violence against civilians for the better part of the 2000s, and Colombia where the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) targeted opponents of the regime during the 1990s and early 2000s.

Although states have been less frequent in targeting civilians in recent years, one of the new actors recorded in 2018 was the Nicaraguan government, which violently cracked down on protesters opposing a new social security reform. The response to this state repression was further protests, which intensified and eventually called for President Ortega to step down. Protests, both peaceful and violent, continued well into 2019.

Trends in peace agreements, 1975–2018

One suggested explanation for the decline in the number of armed conflicts after 1991 is that the ending of the Cold War rivalry made conditions fortuitous for solving many longstanding conflicts, as well as making new conflicts shorter (Eck, Lacina & Öberg, 2008). The updated version of the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, which includes all peace agreements between warring parties active in the UCDP data in the 1975–2018 period, indeed shows that in 1991, the peak in the number of armed conflicts corresponded with a similar peak in the number of peace agreements. Figure 6 shows that between 1991 and 1994, UCDP reported 192 active conflict years. In the same period, 82 peace agreements were concluded in 28 conflicts involving 40 dyads. In contrast, the most recent rise in armed conflicts has not been followed by a similar rise in the number of agreements. In the 207 conflict years recorded between 2015 and 2018, only 23 peace agreements were concluded in 14 conflicts, involving 15 dyads.⁹

According to UCDP’s definition, peace agreements address the incompatibility, or conflict issue, stated by the warring parties, by either settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how to regulate it (Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen, 2006).¹⁰ In all, the

Figure 6.

Number of conflicts and number of peace agreements by type, 1975–2018

dataset covers 355 peace agreements. Peace agreements were found in 34% of all conflicts recorded in the time period and involved 27% of all dyads. Approximately half of these dyads had largely ceased their violence prior to the signing of an agreement, while the other half experienced active conflict violence in the same year as signing their agreements. Since 2015, fewer of the agreements were signed in active years, whereas most of the dyads signing peace agreements in the 1990s were still actively fighting each other while concluding their agreements.

UCDP registered termination due to peace agreements¹¹ in seven conflicts between 1991 and 1994. Since 2015, only one peace agreement led to conflict termination, the Final Colombian Peace Agreement between the government of Colombia and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016.

Unlike in the early 1990s, the recent rise in the number of intrastate armed conflicts has not been accompanied by an equivalent increase in the number of peace agreements. Previous research suggests at least three reasons for why this may be. First, in the early 1990s many longstanding conflicts became possible to settle as the Cold War rivalry ended (Eck, Lacina & Öberg, 2008). There is nothing similar occurring today. Second, the recent rise in armed conflict is driven by the expansion of IS, and the resulting large share of conflicts with explicit religious claims may also reduce the likelihood of peace agreements. In June 2014, IS declared a Caliphate, and contested the legality of all authorities in the world where the group had set their foot. Islamic laws would rule the Caliphate under the Caliph (Al-Shami, 2014). Svensson (2007) has found that termination through negotiated settlement is less likely when the parties have made explicit religious claims, explained by the parties’ perception that the issues at stake are indivisible. A third factor that may work against negotiated resolution of conflicts is the last few years’ remarkably high proportion of internationalized conflicts. Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce (2008) find that third-party interventions in armed conflicts increase the time until a negotiated settlement is reached, and that intervention on both sides of the conflict decreases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. UCDP data does not immediately mirror these findings. Rather, peace agreements are as common in dyads where one of the sides received foreign troop support as they are in other dyads. Only 1% of the dyad-years have intervention on both sides of the conflict. These are too few observations to draw any conclusions.

Although research suggests that peace agreements are less likely under the circumstances mentioned above, they do occur. A closer look at peace agreements signed in these contexts can inform future peace processes in current conflicts.

Explicit religious claims were present in the conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the secular Philippine government. On 27 March 2014, the parties concluded the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), reaffirming agreements from the 2001–13 peace process. The CAB solved the incompatibility by creating an autonomous Bangsamoro entity in Mindanao. The religious aspects were touched upon in agreements from 2012; the parties recognized the need to strengthen the Shari’ah courts in the new political entity and established that Shari’ah should only relate to Muslims. In July 2018, President Duterte implemented CAB by creating the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

Only two agreements were signed in dyad-years where both sides received warring support, both in DR Congo in 1999 and 2001. In 1999, the warring parties signed a peace agreement in Lusaka. The agreement provided for an inter-Congolese dialogue between the government – the armed groups as well as unarmed political forces of the country – to prepare for a democratic transition through general elections. All secondary warring parties involved in the conflict also signed the agreement, which stipulated the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory within nine months. In spite of this, the agreement broke down after less than a month. An agreement reaffirming Lusaka terminated the conflict in 2001 after President Laurent Kabila was killed and replaced by his son. The inter-Congolese dialogue resulted in a full peace agreement in April 2003.

During 2018, five peace agreements were concluded in four conflicts: Eritrea–Ethiopia, Ethiopia: Ogaden, Myanmar: Mon, and the conflict over government power in South Sudan. Two peace agreements were signed in an interstate conflict while the other three were in intrastate conflicts. All three categories of peace agreements were represented in 2018; these are used below to illustrate the difference between the three types.

The relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia improved after Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced the acceptance and adherence of the peace agreement signed between the countries in December 2000 and the boundary commission’s 2002 decision. In July 2018, Eritrea’s President Isaias Afewerki and Abiy Ahmed pledged to restore diplomatic relations and open their borders to each other. On 9 July, they signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which formally ended the Eritrean–Ethiopian border conflict. A final peace agreement, in which both countries agreed to implement the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s decision, was signed on 16 September 2018. Both agreements are full peace agreements since they settle the incompatibility.

On 12 September 2018, a partial peace agreement was concluded between the government of South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A - IO). The Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) is the only 2018 agreement signed in an active dyad-year. Although the conflict de-escalated following the agreement, it did not terminate the conflict between the signatories. The R-ARCSS included a pre-transition phase that ends on 12 May 2019. After this date, the agreement stipulates the forming of a transitional government and the re-installation of Riek Machar as first vice president, which is crucial to the accord’s implementation (UN Security Council, 2019). The R-ARCSS is a partial peace agreement since it did not settle the central issue on boundaries and the number of states in South Sudan.

Two peace process agreements were concluded in 2018. In Myanmar, the New Mon State Party, a group that had not been active in UCDP data since 1991, joined the national peace process through signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). In Ethiopia, the Joint Declaration between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Ogaden National Liberation Front established a joint committee to further discuss substantive issues pertaining to the root causes of the Ogaden conflict. The two agreements are peace process agreements since they provide forums for negotiations on the core issues of the conflicts.

Conclusion

The number of fatalities in organized violence decreased for the fourth consecutive year, to the lowest level since 2012. State-based violence drives this downward trend, particularly through the reduction of violence in Syria and Iraq. For the fifth consecutive year more than 30% of the state-based conflicts were internationalized, a level not witnessed before in the post-World War II period. In recent years, UCDP has also observed this type of involvement from external states in non-state violence. Research on state-based conflict suggests that external involvement tends to make conflicts bloodier and harder to solve, and there is no reason to believe that this argument does not also apply to non-state conflicts. The world has seen a new peak in the number of conflicts after 2014, matched only by the early 1990s. In 1991, the peak in the number of conflicts corresponded with a similar peak in the number of peace agreements. However, a similar rise in the number of agreements has not accompanied the recent rise in armed conflicts.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material, JPR856046_Online_appendix - Organized violence, 1989–2018 and peace agreements

Supplemental Material, JPR856046_Online_appendix for Organized violence, 1989–2018 and peace agreements by Therése Pettersson, Stina Högbladh and Magnus Öberg in Journal of Peace Research

Footnotes

Replication data

The complete datasets (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, UCDP Dyadic Dataset, UCDP Battle-Related Dataset, UCDP Non-State Dataset, UCDP One-Sided Dataset, and UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset) updated to 2018 are found at http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/. Older versions of these datasets can also be found at this address (all datasets) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict (the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset). The tables and figures in this article were created directly from the Excel sheets at the UCDP web page. Detailed descriptions of the individual cases are found in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia at www. ucdp.uu.se/. Replication data for this article can be found both at http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ and .

Authors’ note

The data for all three categories included in organized violence go back to 1989; for state-based armed conflict, they extend back to 1946. The peace agreements dataset goes back to 1975.

Acknowledgements

Numerous colleagues in Uppsala have contributed to the data collection, notably Marie Allansson, Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Helena Grusell, Lukas Hegele, Jenniina Kotajoki, Gabrielle Lövquist, Fredrika Moberg, Christie Nicoson, Emil Petersson, Marcellina Priadi, Lotta Themnér, and Kajsa Tidblad-Lundholm. Intern Mert Can Yilmaz was also of great help. A special thanks to Margareta Sollenberg, Marcellina Priadi, and Lotta Themnér who provided helpful comments on earlier versions. We are grateful to Martin Tegnander for assistance with designing the figures.

ORCID iD

Therése Pettersson

Notes

Appendix 1. State-based armed conflicts

Table II

Unclear cases of state-based armed conflict in 2018

Cases that have been completely rejected because they definitely do not meet the criteria of armed conflict are not included in the list below. For the conflicts listed here, the available information suggests the possibility of the cases meeting the criteria of armed conflicts, but there is insufficient information concerning at least one of the three components of the definition: (a) the number of deaths, (b) the identity or level of organization of a party or (c) the type of incompatibility. The unclear aspect may concern an entire conflict or a dyad in a conflict that is included above.

Location/government	Opposition organization(s)	Unclear aspect
Burkina Faso	Ansaroul Islam	Incompatibility
Burundi	RED-TABARA	Number of deaths
Cameroon	Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad	Number of deaths
Iran	Jaish al-Adl	Number of deaths
Somalia	IS	Number of deaths
United States of America	Al-Qaida	Number of deaths

Appendix 2. Non-state conflicts active in 2018

This list includes all non-state conflicts that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 deaths in 2018 and fulfilled the other criteria for inclusion.¹ The column ‘Start year’ shows the first year when the non-state conflict caused at least 25 fatalities (since 1989). The column ‘Fatalities in 2018’ displays the number of people killed, in the low, best, and high estimate.

Appendix 3. One-sided violence in 2018

This list includes all cases of one-sided violence that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 fatalities in 2018 and fulfilled the other criteria for inclusion.¹ The column ‘Start year’ shows the first year when one-sided violence caused at least 25 fatalities (since 1989). The column ‘Fatalities in 2018’ displays the number of civilians killed, in the low, best, and high estimate.

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Supplementary Material

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Organized violence,1989–2018 and peace agreements

Abstract

Keywords

Organized violence 1989–2018 1

State-based conflict 1946–2018

Non-state conflict 1989–2018

One-sided violence 1989–2018

Trends in peace agreements, 1975–2018

Conclusion

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material, JPR856046_Online_appendix - Organized violence, 1989–2018 and peace agreements

Footnotes

Replication data

Authors’ note

Acknowledgements

ORCID iD

Notes

Appendix 1. State-based armed conflicts

Appendix 2. Non-state conflicts active in 2018

Appendix 3. One-sided violence in 2018

References

Supplementary Material

Organized violence 1989–2018¹