Updating Perceptions of (In)Justice

Abstract

Objectives:

This study evaluates the malleability of judgments of procedural justice. Drawing upon various literatures, five factors are hypothesized to be related to changes in procedural justice: (1) prior judgments of procedural justice, (2) direct experiences of arrest, (3) vicarious experiences of arrest, (4) individual arrest history, and (5) age.

Methods:

Using 11 waves of data from the Pathways to Desistance Study (N = 1,354), multilevel models relate within-person covariates including individual, family, and peer arrests, and age to changes in procedural justice, controlling for stable, individual characteristics.

Results:

Judgments of procedural justice are anchored in prior perceptions. They are also a function of direct and vicarious experiences of arrests with the effect of individual arrests varying across individual arrest history. Evidence also suggests a developmental component. Age has a direct effect on judgments of procedural justice and conditions the effect of individual arrests on changes in procedural justice.

Conclusions:

Judgments of procedural justice are not static. Given these results, future research should continue to investigate the varying effects of other interactions with legal authorities on changes in judgments of procedural justice in order to form stronger policies aimed at increasing citizen cooperation.

Keywords

procedural justice legal socialization multilevel models age Bayesian learning

Theoretical and empirical research demonstrates the importance of procedural justice on general cooperation with the “law” in the form of police empowerment, obedience with legal directives, and compliance with the law (National Research Council 2004; Tyler 2003, 2011). While at times the effect of procedural justice on cooperative behavior is direct (Paternoster et al. 1997; Penner et al. 2014; Tyler et al. 2007), the majority of research demonstrates that the effect of procedural justice on cooperation is indirect through perceptions of legitimacy (for a review, see Tyler, Jackson, and Bradford 2014). Regardless, the implications of this body of work are significant from a policy perspective—if legal authorities are evaluated in a more procedurally just manner, then they can increase citizen cooperation and reduce crime.

Although the procedural justice doctrine is increasingly influential, the study of how judgments of procedural justice are formed is small in comparison to the effects of procedural justice on behavior. Furthermore, the majority of this work focuses on time-stable factors as predictors of procedural justice (e.g., age, gender, and race/ethnicity). Rarely, does theory or research address how or why judgments of procedural justice change over time. For instance, we have little knowledge regarding the relative influence and the overall general direction of the effect of various interactions (i.e., personal and vicarious) with legal authorities on changing perceptions of procedural justice. We also do not know whether the effect of personal interactions is uniform across individuals. This is particularly true for arrest experiences. Arrests are involuntary contacts with legal authorities that can be evaluated positively or negatively by the arrestee and vary in personal significance (Tyler, Fagan, and Gellar 2014). Thus, further theoretical and empirical development regarding the malleability of judgments of procedural justice is warranted.

The present work builds upon Tyler’s ([1990] 2006, 2003) theoretical foundation for the importance of procedural justice and first demonstrates that judgments of procedural justice do in fact change over time. Then, by integrating the procedural justice and legal attitudes doctrines with various learning perspectives, this work examines the relevance of the following factors proposed to be associated with changes in judgments of procedural justice: (1) prior judgments of procedural justice, (2) personal experiences of arrest, (3) vicarious experiences of arrest, (4) individual arrest history, and (5) age. Data for the analyses come from 11 waves of the Pathways to Desistance Study, which follows a sample of serious adolescent offenders from adolescence through young adulthood. These particular data were selected for multiple reasons. First, the data cover a period in the life course when attitudes and perceptions, including those regarding legal authorities, are most likely to change. Second, this period of the life course is also when individuals and their peers are most likely to be arrested (Brunson and Weitzer 2011; Fagan and Tyler 2005; see also, Tyler et al. 2014). Third, the arrest histories of this sample increase the likelihood that these youth will experience a subsequent arrest either directly or indirectly and allow for the examination of whether or not the effect of an arrest on subsequent judgments of procedural justice varies across arrest history. Finally, serious and/or chronic adolescent offenders commit a disproportionate share of crime (Blumstein 1986; DeLisi 2005); therefore, the study of how judgments of procedural justice are formed and potentially updated among these individuals may be particularly informative with respect to crime reduction strategies based on citizen–justice agent interactions.

Procedural Justice

Procedural justice refers to the fair and ethical treatment of citizens by officials in the criminal justice system. It is perception based as individuals make judgments regarding the level of procedural justice (or fairness) demonstrated by legal authorities in interpersonal interactions. Based on the work of Thibaut and Walker (1975), people define their experiences with legal authorities as “fair” to the extent that they have the ability to express their “voice” or state their case regarding the matter at hand. Procedural justice also includes the quality of decision making and the quality of interpersonal treatment by authorities (Blader and Tyler 2003; Leventhal 1980). This includes neutrality or the use of facts and transparency in decision-making processes by authorities (Tyler 2004; Tyler et al. 2014) and trustworthiness where authorities convey that their motives are genuine (through honesty and sincerity). The final element of procedural justice includes authorities demonstrating a genuine respect for citizen rights regardless of social status or previous interactions (Mazerolle et al. 2012:347; Tyler and Lind 1992).

Judgments of procedural justice are important for many reasons. First, they are informative assessments of the general activities and behavior of the police and other legal authorities including court officials such as judges (Fagan and Piquero 2007). Second, they are the key component in supportive values toward authorities, such as legitimacy, which in turn influences general cooperative and law-abiding behavior (Jackson et al. 2012; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2003). Finally, judgments of procedural justice independently promote deference to authorities and law-abiding behavior (Paternoster et al. 1997; Tyler and Huo 2002).

Given the significance of procedural justice, it is important to recognize that individual and social contexts affect these process-based judgments (see, Leiber, Nalla, and Farnworth 1998 for a similar argument). In particular, evaluations of procedural justice likely vary across personal demographics (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1990:84). For instance, evidence suggests that youth, males, minorities, and those of lower socioeconomic status (SES) are more likely to perceive their treatment by the police, courts, or the entire justice system as biased and unfair (Buckler, Unnever, and Cullen 2008; Engel 2005; Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005; Sampson and Bartusch 1998; Sun and Wu 2006; Weitzer and Tuch 2002). These findings are replicated among adolescents as well (Leiber et al. 1998; Schuck 2013), with marked differences in perceived biases among minorities and males (Matsueda and Drakulich 2009). As such, individuals with these characteristics, whether adult or adolescent, are likely to hold more negative judgments of procedural justice compared to their counterparts (Tyler and Huo 2002).

Socialization and Judgments of Procedural Justice

Several perspectives exist regarding the nature of attitudes and perceptions over the life course (Olson and Zanna 1993). Some even address how legal attitudes and evaluative judgments of legal authorities unfold over time. For instance, Bobo and Johnson (2004) argue that views about the criminal justice system and its representatives are rigid. Once formed at an early age, these views are resistant to change, echoing the increasing persistence hypothesis (Krosnick and Alwin 1989). Alternatively, Tyler and Schuller (1991) found support for the lifelong openness model of change with respect to judgments of fairness of legal authorities and perceived legitimacy. This latter finding suggested that people are open to change in opinions regarding legal authorities throughout their lives.

One source for this change is socialization. Socialization is the process through which individuals acquire or learn information. Learning can occur through direct experiences or vicarious experiences relayed by others. With respect to judgments of procedural justice, socialization can be thought of as a learning process by which individuals acquire information through experiences to form judgments of procedural justice and update these judgments over time. This is very similar to the concept of legal socialization where experiences inform judgments and perceptions of the law, legal authorities, and legal institutions (Piquero et al. 2005:267).

Prior literature stresses the importance of experiences or interactions with legal agents on changes in perceptions of legal authorities (Gau 2010). “Encounters with authorities provide a teachable moment in which people learn about the law and legal authorities” (Fagan and Piquero 2007:719) and alter previously held opinions or judgments. One implication is that judgments of procedural justice are not static; rather, they form and change as a part of one’s socialization which unfolds over time (Tyler et al. 2014). This leads to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Judgments of procedural justice change over time.

Updating Judgments of Procedural Justice

Initial theory on procedural justice suggested that judgments of procedural justice are independent from prior views (Tyler and Huo 2002). In other words, each distinct experience-based judgment should have an independent influence on subsequent behavior. Learning theories (i.e., behaviorism and constructivism) challenge this assumption arguing that orientations developed early in life cascade through adolescence and adulthood to affect subsequent judgments. Take, for instance, the Bayesian learning perspective based on the application of Bayes’ probability theorem¹ to human cognition (Jacobs and Kruschke 2011). Individuals begin with a prior subjective judgment based on all the information accumulated to that point (Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga 2006:97). As an individual comes into contact with new information, they update their prior judgment. This is referred to as the “posterior judgment” or current judgment. Applications of this perspective to attitude and perception formation range from evaluations of products for consumption (McFadden and Train 1996) to risk perceptions (Anwar and Loughran 2011; Matsueda et al. 2006).

Importantly, this work does not make the claim that judgments of procedural justice follow a strict Bayesian model. Rather, Bayesian learning is used as a guiding heuristic to suggest possible hypotheses that will help us understand how individuals form and change perceptions of procedural justice over time. The Bayesian learning perspective suggests that current judgments of procedural justice are not likely to be independent from prior perceptions as previously suggested; rather, current judgments of procedural justice are a function of prior perceptions of procedural justice plus new information resulting from socialization. In other words, individuals anchor their current judgment of procedural justice in prior perceptions and then use new information gained from subsequent socialization experiences to inform one’s current perception of procedural justice. As such, the second hypothesis emerges:

Hypothesis 2: Judgments of procedural justice are a function of prior perceptions of procedural justice and subsequent socialization.

The most immediate context for socialization or new information regarding procedural justice is a direct or personal experience with police and/or court officials (Tyler et al. 2014:4017). Information ascertained from these interactions shapes subsequent subjective judgments of procedural justice because it speaks to the evolving perceived relationship between citizens and legal authorities. Moreover, direct experiences are a key source of information regarding the criminal justice system as they are germane to one’s legal socialization (Tyler et al. 2014:757). For example, personal contacts with the police and other legal authorities directly affect legal attitudes among adults and adolescents alike (Schuck 2013; Skogan 2006). In fact, Gau (2010) found that evaluations of procedural justice from one’s most recent contact with police were the strongest predictor of attitudes toward the police (see also Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002). Therefore, it is expected that an arrest experience will serve as a form of socialization that affects subsequent judgments of procedural justice. Not only do arrests include interactions with police, but they often lead to subsequent court experiences. For instance, recent research indicates that 78 percent of juvenile arrests are handled formally and processed to some degree in either juvenile or criminal court (Puzzanchera and Adams 2011). Thus, a corollary to the second hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 2a: Judgments of procedural justice are a function of prior perceptions of procedural justice and new, personal experiences of arrest.

The acquisition of knowledge regarding the behavior of legal authorities occurs through personal interactions as well as vicarious interactions with legal authorities (Piquero et al. 2005:267). Although the influence of vicarious or indirect encounters with legal authorities on perceptions of legal authorities and overall legal attitudes is vastly understudied compared to direct contacts, evidence suggests that these perceptions are influenced by both personal experiences and the experiences of others such as peers (Brunson and Weitzer 2009; Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Weitzer and Tuch 2005).

The relevance of vicarious experiences with the police and other legal authorities in evaluations of procedural justice may be particularly important among youth, given that the majority of what children and adolescents learn is through secondhand information/experiences (Allport 1935). Additionally, vicarious experiences with legal authorities are fairly common among youth, especially adolescent offenders who are more likely to have offending family members and peers (Brunson 2007; Warr 2002). It is also important to note that a key aspect of procedural justice is equitable treatment, and the best way to know if one is being treated equitably is to compare personal treatment to the treatment of others, especially peers (Bednar and Fisher 2003). As such, an additional corollary to the second hypothesis emerges:

Hypothesis 2b: Judgments of procedural justice are a function of prior evaluations of procedural justice and vicarious experiences of arrest.

With respect to Hypotheses 2a and 2b, it should be acknowledged that interactions with legal authorities stemming from an arrest can result in either positive or negative evaluations of procedural justice (see Tyler et al. 2014). The initial goal of this work is not to predict the general direction of how these interactions affect judgments of procedural justice; rather, it is to examine the overall importance of personal and vicarious arrests as a source for change. Thus, no a priori assumptions are made regarding the general direction of the effect of personal and vicarious arrests on changes in procedural justice.

While it is hypothesized that both personal experiences and vicarious experiences of arrest affect subsequent judgments of procedural justice, the relative weight of these experiences on subsequent judgments of procedural justice is unknown. Perhaps, the importance of information gleamed from firsthand experiences of arrest outweighs any information obtained from arrest and subsequent court experiences of family and friends. On the other hand, given the salience of family and peers in particular during adolescence (Brown, Clasen, and Eicher 1986; Steinberg and Silverberg 1986; Warr 2002), vicarious experiences of arrest may be equally influential in the formation of judgments of procedural justice. Either of these scenarios may be likely among “experienced” individuals due to their arrest history, their greater likelihood of rearrest and reconviction, and their increased likelihood of family members and peers with a history of arrest. Therefore, this work will also investigate, although not formally test, the relative importance of personal experiences of arrest compared to vicarious experiences of arrest in the formation of judgments of procedural justice.

Updating and Arrest History

With respect to judgments of procedural justice, one’s arrest history can be thought of as an accumulation of interactions with legal authorities (prior experiences). Thus, persons with fewer previous arrests may be less saturated with information regarding the nature of citizen–justice agent interactions in terms of procedural justice and be particularly emotional or reactive to new experiences in perception formation (Albert and Steinberg 2011). On the other hand, individuals with numerous prior arrests may be influenced to a lesser extent by new arrest experiences given their greater accrual of information regarding citizen–justice agent interactions. This accumulation of experience may also affect subsequent behavior setting the tone for ensuing arrest and court experiences and potentially preventing the acquisition of new information (procedural just or unjust treatment) that departs from previously held beliefs. These notions lead to the third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: The effect of a new, personal arrest on changes in judgments of procedural justice declines as one’s arrest history increases.

Age and Procedural Justice

Behavioral learning perspectives suggest that only experiences should affect the learning process. Applied to procedural justice, this would mean that only direct and indirect interactions with legal authorities should influence judgments of procedural justice. Cognitive learning theorists, on the other hand, argue that learning goes beyond experiences, asserting that the “black box” of the mind must be opened to truly understand the learning process. One component of this black box that may directly affect evaluative judgments and attitudes is age (Olson and Zanna 1993). In fact, age is one of the most consistent predictors of negative perceptions of the police (Brown and Benedict 2002). Among adolescents, Schuck (2013) found a negative relationship between age and attitudes toward the police, and Piquero et al. (2005; see also Fagan and Tyler 2005) found that overall positive attitudes toward the justice system declined throughout adolescence. Importantly, these negative changes were not always associated with experiences; rather, age itself had an independent, negative effect. The question is, “why?”

Adolescence and young adulthood are periods of the life course, when individuals start to seek identity achievement and become self-sufficient (Blakemore and Mills 2014). This period of development also frames how evaluations of others unfold. The dynamics of identity formation and individual autonomy can interact to lead youth to feel threatened or alienated by agents of social control that are tasked with the regulation and control of behavior (see also Reisig and Correia 1997). The criminal justice system (including the police and courts), in particular, occupies a position of authority that directly challenges one’s desired autonomy. For instance, police engage in more surveillance of youth (e.g., presence in schools and local hangouts) and both police and courts exercise more discretion over whether or not to intervene in the lives of young adolescents. Thus, adolescents may feel that police and courts are unjust or unfair in the administration of their job and be especially negativistic toward legal authorities regardless of whether or not they interact with legal authorities. Furthermore, adolescents are increasingly surrounded by peers who may similarly hold these negative attitudes and reinforce perceptions of injustice. This generates the fourth hypothesis guiding this research:

Hypothesis 4: Judgments of procedural justice are a function of age, with evaluations of procedural justice decreasing with age.

Besides the direct effect of age on judgments of procedural justice, there may be a developmental aspect to the role of individual experiences of arrests on the formation of judgments of procedural justice. Literature on cognitive development across the life course suggests that attitudes result from childhood intuition early in life and from more mature, deliberative evaluation based on personal experiences as one ages (Albert and Steinberg 2011:214-15). Therefore, arrests experienced early in life may have less of an effect on judgments of procedural justice because youth tend to rely on intuition instead of experience to inform attitudes and judgments. Then, as one ages and experiences become more salient to perception formation (in addition to prior perceptions, Albert and Steinberg 2011), personal arrest experiences may carry more weight in the formation of judgments of procedural justice.

Cognitive development and maturation may also affect how one perceives arrest experiences. Young offenders may be especially negativistic toward legal authorities and susceptible to feelings of unjust treatment even without actually being treated unfairly (see Reisig and Correia 1997; Woolard, Harvell, and Graham 2008). Then, as they become more reflective in their judgments of interactions and the world around them with age (Kitchener, King, and DeLuca 2006), views of police and other legal authorities who regulate one’s behavior through sanctions may be seen less as an obstacle to individual autonomy and more as an agent who is justifiably tasked to protect the citizenry (Reisig and Correia 1997). This leads to the fifth and final hypothesis guiding this research:

Hypothesis 5: Age moderates the effect of new arrests experiences on subsequent judgments of procedural justice.

Method

Data and Sample

The data come from the Pathways to Desistance Study, a prospective longitudinal investigation of adolescent attitudes and behaviors and were obtained through Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR; ICPSR 29961 and ICPSR 34605). Study participants are juveniles charged with or found guilty of a serious offense (mostly felonies) in the juvenile or criminal court systems in two urban jurisdictions: Philadelphia, PA, and Maricopa County, AZ. The original Pathways to Desistance Study sample consists of 1,354 adolescent offenders (ages 14 to 18 at time of the baseline interview), representing approximately one in three adolescents adjudicated on eligible charges in each locale during the recruitment period (November 2000 to January 2003). To ensure heterogeneity in the presenting offense, the percentage of males convicted of a drug offense was limited to 15 percent in both cities since male drug offenders make up a large proportion of the offenses committed by this age group (Schubert et al. 2004; Stahl 2003). Further information regarding the rationale of the study and details regarding recruitment and study methodology are described in Mulvey (2004) and Schubert et al. (2004), respectively. The original sample is predominantly male (86 percent) and on average 16.05 years old (SD = 1.4 years). The sample consists largely of minorities (41 percent Black, 34 percent Hispanic, and 5 percent listed as other) and is from Philadelphia (52 percent). Also, the respondents had an average of 3.3 (SD = 2.4) prior petitions to court before entrance into the study. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the original pathways sample.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics of Pathways Sample (N = 1,354).

	Mean	SD
Site (proportion)
Philadelphia	0.517	—
Phoenix	0.483	—
Gender (proportion)
Male	0.864	—
Female	0.136	—
Race/ethnicity (proportion)
White	0.202	—
Black	0.414	—
Hispanic	0.335	—
Other	0.048	—
Age at baseline	16.5	1.1
Age at first arrest	13.8	2.0
Number of priors	4.3	4.8
Baseline offense (proportion)
Person	0.446	—
Property	0.254	—
Drug	0.157	—
Weapon	0.101	—
Other^a	0.051	—

^aOther category does not include respondents where information about baseline offense was missing (n = 12).

Each respondent was interviewed for the first time (i.e., the baseline interview) shortly after adjudication/conviction (usually within 30 days) and was reinterviewed at six-month intervals for a period of three years (i.e., periods 1 to 6, respectively) and one year intervals for the following four years (i.e., periods 7 to 10, respectively), resulting in a total of 11 waves of data collection for a duration of seven years. This self-report data were supplemented and validated with interviews from collateral reporters (predominantly a parent at the baseline interview). Official criminal records of each respondent were constructed from juvenile and adult records of arrest from Maricopa and Philadelphia counties and Federal Bureau of Investigation records to document arrests that occurred outside one’s original county of residence for the duration of each subject’s participation in the study.

This analysis relies upon data from each of the time point interviews and the official criminal histories of the respondents. Unfortunately, not all participants remained in the study for its duration. Therefore, subjects needed to complete at least three consecutive time point interviews and have available official record information for the same time periods to be included in the sample. Twenty-eight subjects did not meet these criteria (N = 1,326).

Measures

Procedural justice: This work is interested in the formation of overall judgments of procedural justice. In the Pathways study, the procedural justice inventory was created to measure the respondent’s perception of fairness and equity connected with arrest and court processing and is consistent with other research using formative measurement of procedural justice (Fagan and Tyler 2005; Hinds and Murphy 2007; Jonathan-Zamir, Mastrofski, and Moyal 2015; Penner et al. 2014; Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler et al. 2014). Respondents answered 38 Likert-type scale questions (adapted from the work of Casper, Tyler, and Fisher 1988; Paternoster et al. 1997; Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002) regarding his/her interactions with police and judges/courts that form an individual’s perception of procedural justice.² Individual items were recoded so that higher scores indicate more positive experiences of procedural justice and each item was then converted to a five-point scale for standardization across items. Procedural Justice is the mean of these scores with higher values indicating more positive evaluations of procedural justice. Overall, reliability was excellent (α > 0.80) and the measure approximates a normal distribution.³

Lagged procedural justice

Prior judgments of procedural justice are included to ascertain whether or not prior judgments of procedural justice serve as the foundation for subsequent judgments. The first lagged indicator of procedural justice is one’s score of procedural justice from the previous time period (measured at t − 1). A second lagged measure of procedural justice (measured at t − 2) is also included to see if further removed judgments of procedural justice have lasting effects.

Personal arrests

Using official criminal records, a count measure was created to indicate how many times each respondent was arrested between interviews.⁴ A second indicator of individual arrests, a binary variable indicating whether or not the subject was arrested between interviews, was also created. Additional models were run using the latter indicator and the results were substantively similar.⁵

Vicarious arrests

This work includes two measures of vicarious experiences of arrests. At each wave, respondents self-reported whether or not one’s mother, father, or any other family member or resident in one’s household was arrested since the date of last interview. This information was used to construct a dichotomous variable. If the subject reported that one’s mother, father, or other household resident was arrested in the given time period, the respondent was coded as 1. If the subject indicated that nobody was arrested, then the subject was coded as 0.

At each time period, interview respondents nominated up to four friends who they considered to be most important in their life at that time. Then, subjects were asked whether or not this peer was ever arrested. The second measure of vicarious arrests is a measure of peer arrests indicating the proportion of peers, at each time period, that had a history of arrest.

Total arrests

This work uses official data to generate the total number of arrests each youth experienced up to the current period.

Age

Age is self-reported at each wave and it is a continuous measure ranging from 14.47 to 25.65 years of age.

Time

Given that the time between interviews varies across periods of data collection, all analyses include a count variable indicating the number of months between interviews.

Individual-level variables

Male is a dichotomous variable (coded 1 for male and 0 for female). Two binary variables of race/ethnicity were created to indicate whether the respondent was Black (coded as 1 for Black and 0 otherwise) or Hispanic (coded 1 for Hispanic and 0 otherwise). White adolescents and those of other racial/ethnic groups serve as the reference group. SES is an index of parental social position (Hollingshead 1971) based on information from the subject and a collateral reporter in the baseline interview regarding parental education and parental occupation. Finally, all models include an indicator of city of residence (coded 1 for Philadelphia and 0 for Maricopa County). Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample used in this analysis.

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Analysis.

	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	N
Time-varying covariates
Procedural justice	2.838	0.481	1	5	9,015
Lagged procedural justice (t − 1)^a	2.862	0.478	1	5	9,015
Second lagged procedural justice (t − 2)^a			1	5
Age^a	19.129	2.041	14.470	25.650	9,015
Individual arrests^a	0.276	0.657	0	16	9,015
Total arrests^a	3.957	2.993	1	25	9,015
Family arrest	0.169	—	0	1	9,015
Peer arrests^a	0.478	0.400	0	1	9,015
Months^a	7.714	2.908	2	14	9,015
Individual covariates
Male	0.853	—	0	1	1,326
Black	0.406	—	0	1	1,326
Hispanic	0.330	—	0	1	1,326
Socioeconomic status (SES)^a	51.173	12.060	11	77	1,326
Philadelphia	0.511	—	0	1	1,326

^aIn all analyses, the variable is grand mean centered.

Analytic Strategy

Multilevel models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) were used to address the research hypotheses for the following reasons: (1) they take into account the nested structure of the data (time-varying factors nested within individuals), (2) they consider the individual as a random factor, (3) they allow within-individual (level 1) and between-individual (level 2) characteristics to be modeled simultaneously, and (4) they use estimation procedures that are robust for an unequal number of data collected at each time point. Specifically, four separate multilevel models were estimated. First, a fully unconditional model was estimated to examine the level of variation in judgments of procedural justice within and between individuals. Next, a model was estimated without any time-varying covariates (level 1) to examine the relevance of individual-level predictors (level 2) on overall judgments of procedural justice. The third model estimated the effects of the time-varying covariates (level 1) on the change in evaluations of procedural justice while accounting for the effect the time-stable individual characteristics (level 2) on the intercept. All nonbinary covariates were grand mean centered, and the slope of the variable individual arrests was allowed to vary randomly across individuals in order to ascertain whether the effect of personal arrests on evaluations of procedural justice varies across individuals. Finally, the last model built upon the previous model and included an interaction between individual arrests at time i and the total number of times the subject was arrested by time i and an interaction between individual arrests at time i and age at time i to determine if the effect of an arrest varies across arrest history and age, respectively. All models were estimated using xtmixed in Stata (Version 12; Stata Corporation 2011) using maximum likelihood estimation procedures and robust standard errors.

Results

Attrition Analyses

In the Pathways to Desistance Study, ∼64 percent of respondents have full data, ∼80 percent have data from 10 time periods, ∼87 percent have data from 9 time periods, and 90 percent have data from 8 time periods. In addition, the attrition rate (not cumulative) at each time period is as follows: 6.6 percent for period 1, 6.8 percent for period 2, 9.2 percent for period 3, 9.1 percent for period 4, 8.9 percent for period 5, 8 percent for period 6, 10.3 percent for period 7, 10.9 percent for period 8, 13 percent for period 9, and 16.3 percent for period 10. To further assess the impact of attrition, demographic variables, measures of procedural justice, and the number of petitions to court prior to the start of the study were used to predict the lost subjects at each wave using logistic regression models (lost subjects coded 1 and retained subjects coded 0). At the period 1 interview, subjects who had more prior petitions were less likely to participate. The number of prior petitions at baseline was also negatively associated with participating in the period 3 and the period 9 interviews. At the period 2 interview, subjects with lower judgments of procedural justice and lower levels of SES were more likely to be lost. Beginning in wave 4, subjects from Philadelphia were less likely to take part, and this pattern was also seen in periods 6 and 9. There were no significant differences between retained subjects and nonretained subjects in the period 5, period 7, and period 10 interviews.⁶

Unconditional Multilevel Model

The results of the unconditional model estimating changes in judgments of procedural justice over time are presented in Table 3. The intercept indicates that the average evaluation of procedural justice in this sample over time is 2.838. Also, the level 1 variance coefficient indicates that there is a significant within-individual change in judgments of procedural justice over time. In fact, 62 percent of the variation in judgments of procedural justice is within-individuals, while 38 percent of the variation in judgments of procedural justice is between individuals. This confirms the first hypothesis that judgments of procedural justice change over time. Figure 1 buttresses this finding and depicts the mean evaluation of procedural justice for the entire sample at each time period. This figure indicates that the average judgment of procedural justice in this sample decreases over time and reaffirms that this normative consideration is not static. The next step of this research investigates arrest experiences as sources of this change.

Table 3.

Unconditional Model Estimating Changes in Judgments of Procedural Justice.

	Coef. (SE)
Intercept δ₀₀	2.838** (0.009)
	Variance (SE)
Level 1 e_ij	0.141 (0.002)
Level 2 μ_0j	0.087 (0.004)
Level 1 N	9,015
Level 2 N	1,326

Note: Coef. = coefficient; SE = standard error; N = sample size.

*p < .0 (two-tailed test).

**p < .01 (two-tailed test).

Figure 1.

Average judgments of procedural justice over time, full sample.

Multilevel Model with Individual-level Predictors Only

Recall prior literature indicates that males, minorities, and those from lower SES perceive more injustice in interactions with legal authorities compared to their counterparts. The results from model 1 in Table 4 only confirm that being male (b = −0.065, SE = 0.026, p <.05) and SES (b = 0.002, SE =0.001, p < .01) are significantly related to judgments of procedural justice in this sample.

Table 4.

Multilevel Random Effects Models Estimating Factors Associated with Changes in Judgments of Procedural Justice Over Time.^a

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)
Time-varying covariates
Lagged procedural justice (t − 1)	—	0.184** (0.011)	0.184** (0.011)
Second lagged procedural justice (t − 2)		0.087** (0.011)	0.087** (0.011)
Age	—	−0.031** (0.004)	−0.034** (0.004)
Individual arrest	—	0.060** (0.008)	0.027 (0.019)
Total arrests	—	−0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Individual arrest × total arrests	—	—	−0.003 (0.002)
Individual arrest × age	—	—	0.009** (0.003)
Family arrest	—	−0.035* (0.014)	−0.035* (0.014)
Peer arrest	—	−0.020 (0.012)	−0.020 (0.012)
Months	—	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)
Individual covariates
Male	−0.065* (0.026)	−0.060** (0.020)	−0.061** (0.020)
Black	0.036 (0.027)	0.032 (0.020)	0.030 (0.020)
Hispanic	0.019 (0.025)	0.017 (0.018)	0.015 (0.018)
SES	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Philadelphia	−0.032 (0.024)	−0.022 (0.017)	−0.023 (0.017)
Intercept δ₀₀	2.772**	2.433**	2.448**
Random effects	Variance (SE)	Variance (SE)	Variance (SE)
Individual arrest	—	0.007 (0.001)	0.007 (0.001)
Level 1 e_ij	0.142 (0.002)	0.141 (0.002)	0.141 (0.002)
Level 2 μ_0j	0.085 (0.004)	0.048 (0.004)	0.067 (0.004)
Level 1 N	9,015	9,015	9,015
Level 2 N	1,326	1,326	1,326

Note: Coef. = coefficient; SE = standard error; N = sample size; SES = socioeconomic status.

^aAll nonbinary variables are grand mean centered.

*p < .05 (two-tailed test).

**p < .01 (two-tailed test).

Full Models

The next step in the analytic process evaluates the effects of the different time-varying factors predicted to lead to within-individual change in judgments of procedural justice (see models 2 and 3 in Table 4). Recall the second hypothesis that states one’s current judgment of procedural justice is a function of one’s prior judgment and new interactions with legal authorities resulting from an arrest. Confirming the second hypothesis, one’s current judgment of procedural justice is a function of one’s prior evaluation procedural justice. In fact, the significant coefficient suggest that higher prior judgments of procedural justice are associated with greater positive changes in judgments of procedural justice. The second lagged measure of procedural justice is also positive and significant, further indicating that previous evaluations of procedural justice affect the formation of new judgments of procedural justice.

The results also support the two corollaries associated with the second hypothesis. In general, individual arrests are associated with a positive, significant change in judgments of procedural justice. Indirect or vicarious experiences of arrest, on the other hand, are negatively related to changes in judgments of procedural justice. More specifically, if a family member is arrested, individual judgments of procedural justice significantly decrease. Interestingly, the coefficient for the proportion of peers who were arrested is not significant. Comparing the magnitude of significant coefficients using standardized β coefficients (not presented) indicates that the effect of individual arrests on changes in judgments of procedural justice is stronger than the effect of vicarious experiences of arrest of family members, and prior perceptions have the strongest effect on subsequent judgments of procedural justice.

The third hypothesis proposed that an individual’s arrest history conditions the effect of a new personal arrest on subsequent judgments of procedural justice. The interaction between individual arrests and total accumulated arrests in model 3 is not significant at a conventional α level of 0.05 (p < .10) but there is, in fact, more nuance to the effect of each new arrest on judgments of procedural justice across arrest history. Table 5 demonstrates that the positive, significant effect of an individual arrest actually decreases across the total accumulated arrests. Additionally, after an individual acquires 15 or more previous arrests, a new arrest no longer significantly influences the judgments of procedural justice.

Table 5.

The Effect of Each Additional Arrest on Judgments of Procedural Justice across the Total Number of Arrests of the Individual.

Total Arrests	DY/DX of Additional Arrest (SE)	Total Arrests	DY/DX of Additional Arrest (SE)
1	0.073** (0.012)	14	0.033* (0.015)
2	0.070** (0.011)	15	0.030 (0.017)
3	0.067** (0.010)	16	0.027 (0.018)
4	0.064** (0.009)	17	0.024 (0.020)
5	0.061** (0.008)	18	0.021 (0.022)
6	0.058** (0.008)	19	0.018 (0.023)
7	0.055** (0.008)	20	0.015 (0.025)
8	0.052** (0.008)	21	0.011 (0.027)
9	0.049** (0.009)	22	0.008 (0.028)
10	0.045** (0.010)	23	0.005 (0.030)
11	0.042** (0.011)	24	0.002 (0.032)
12	0.039** (0.012)	25	−0.001 (0.033)
13	0.036** (0.014)

Note: DY/DX = slope; SE = standard error.

*p < .05 (two-tailed test).

**p < .01 (two-tailed test).

The final two hypotheses predict that age affects the formation of judgments of procedural justice. As expected, the coefficient for age is negative and significant demonstrating that age is negatively related to judgments of procedural justice spanning adolescence to young adulthood.⁷ Furthermore, model 3 in Table 4 confirms the fifth hypothesis guiding this research; age conditions the effect of a new, personal arrest experience on subsequent judgments of procedural justice. The positive, significant interaction term between a personal arrest and age indicates that the positive effect of each new, personal arrest increases with age (b = 0.009, SE = 0.003, p < .01). Table 6 aids in the interpretation of this relationship by breaking down the effect of each new arrest on subsequent judgments of procedural justice across the age range of the sample. Notably, an arrest does not affect subsequent judgments of procedural justice up to the age of 16 (recall the minimum age in the sample is 14.47). However, after 16 years of age, each new, personal arrest significantly influences subsequent judgments of procedural justice, and the positive effect increases with age.

Table 6.

The Effect of Each Additional Arrest on Judgments of Procedural Justice across Age.

Age	DY/DX of Additional Arrest (SE)	Age	DY/DX of Additional Arrest (SE)
15	0.018 (0.019)	21	0.072** (0.009)
16	0.027 (0.016)	22	0.081** (0.011)
17	0.036** (0.014)	23	0.090** (0.013)
18	0.045** (0.011)	24	0.099** (0.016)
19	0.054** (0.010)	25	0.110** (0.019)
20	0.063** (0.009)

Note: DY/DX = slope; SE = standard error.

*p < .05 (two-tailed test).

** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test).

Discussion and Conclusions

This study drew upon literature regarding legal attitudes and various learning theories to inform the study of how judgments of procedural justice are formed and change over time among a group of serious adolescent offenders. Importantly, the results confirm that judgments of procedural justice are not static; rather, they are malleable as are many other attitudes and perceptions during adolescence and young adulthood. Even among this group of serious adolescent offenders with largely negative views regarding the criminal justice system and an increased proclivity to engage in crime (Mulvey 2004), judgments of procedural justice can and do change and if this change is positive, then compliance with the law is more likely (Augustyn 2015; Fagan and Piquero 2007; Penner et al. 2014).

The implications of this work also extend beyond this initial finding. Judgments of procedural justice are learned much like any other attitude or behavior. Consistent with a Bayesian learning approach, prior judgments of procedural justice serve as a foundation for subsequent judgments of procedural justice. Individuals do not have a blank slate when it comes to the formation of new judgments of procedural justice. Instead, these judgments are updated over time with new information such as direct and vicarious experiences of arrests. One implication is that the past experiences with legal authorities, whether good or bad, do not disappear from one’s memory. They serve as the foundation for subsequent evaluations and are the strongest predictor of subsequent judgments of procedural justice.

The nature of the relationship between prior judgments of procedural justice and one’s posterior or current judgment is particularly interesting. Individuals who tend evaluate the police and courts more negatively in terms of procedural justice experience less positive changes in judgments of procedural justice. This is similar to the arguments of Skogan (2006) suggesting a negativity bias toward legal authorities as negative perceptions of legal authorities spill over into successive attitudes (see also Baumeister et al. 2001; Rosin and Royzman 2001). It may be that more negative judgments of procedural justice (54 percent of the sample scored < 3 on the 1 to 5 scale at baseline with 3 indicating neutral perceptions) are tough to overcome or forgotten more slowly (Skogan 2006); therefore, less positive changes in judgments subsequently occur.

These findings also affirm the importance of experience-based procedural justice (Gau 2010) as perceptions of procedural justice are a product of accumulated social experiences (Tyler et al. 2014:222). Interestingly, the overall effect of an individual arrest on judgements of procedural justice is positive, and this finding runs counter to other literature which suggests that formal, involuntary contacts with the police lead to negative changes in legal attitudes (Leiber et al. 1998; Schuck 2013). However, it is possible to account for these divergent findings in two ways. First, the outcome of interest in this study is procedural justice measured by fair treatment by police and courts instead of general attitudes toward the police. Therefore, it is possible that subsequent interactions with legal authorities other than the police after arrest such as a judge may be driving the positive change. Second, most studies that find a negative relationship between involuntary police contacts or arrests and legal attitudes rely on more conventional samples (see Schuck 2013; Woolard et al. 2008). This study uses a group of serious adolescent offenders with a history of police and court contacts. This sample is likely to be more familiar with the police and courts making them more knowledgeable regarding the common processes involved in citizen–justice agent encounters; therefore, a new experience may convey that they are in fact being treated fairly. Future research should address these possibilities as well as search for other potential explanations for the positive relationship.

Vicarious experiences of arrest do not demonstrate the same significant, positive effect on subsequent judgments of procedural justice. The significant, negative relationship between a family member’s arrest and subsequent judgments of procedural justice may be a consequence of an individual’s protective instinct for a family member who was arrested or secondhand information that tends to emphasize or embellish negative experiences. Furthermore, the lack of effect of peer arrests is certainly unexpected, given the significance of peers during adolescence. However, this null relationship may be a result of co-offending, which is common among adolescent offenders (McGloin et al. 2008) and potentially precludes the opportunity for unique peer arrest experiences. Nevertheless, this research demonstrates that personal experiences of arrest tend to outweigh these vicarious experiences of arrest and suggests that direct, personal contacts with offenders in arrest experiences are a potential way for legal authorities to help their own cause—reducing crime (Reisig, Tankebe, and Mesko 2014:260).

This research also supports the notion that updating of judgments of procedural justice is experience and individual specific. The weight an individual gives to new, personal arrest experiences varies across arrest history with the positive effect of a new arrest on judgments of procedural justice decreasing as the number of previous arrests increases, and this effect eventually becomes insignificant echoing the increasing persistence hypothesis regarding attitude formation (Krosnick and Alwin 1989). From a policy perspective, the latter result is particularly informative. Chronic offenders are likely to meet a threshold when new personal experiences of arrest no longer influence judgments of procedural justice. Thus, when legal authorities encounter individuals further on in their criminal careers, their fair and respectful treatment of these offenders, while ethical and necessary from a human dignity standpoint, may be inconsequential reducing their ability to influence subsequent criminal behavior through normative considerations.

Finally, this work suggests that there is a developmental component to the formation of judgments of procedural justice. The negative effect of age on judgments of procedural justice implicates the arguments of legal attitude scholars who suggest that negative attitudes and evaluations of authorities are prevalent during this period of life course (adolescence and young adulthood) as a result of a perceived threat to individual autonomy and freedom (Reisig and Correia 1997). Consequently, legal authorities may be limited in some respect regarding their ability to influence judgments of procedural justice due to cognitive processes interacting with cultural beliefs and police behavior. Nevertheless, direct and vicarious arrest experiences still play an important role in the formation and updating of judgments of procedural justice. Importantly, as one ages, individual experiences of arrest are evaluated more positively in terms of procedural justice and take on greater significance. Therefore, while legal authorities should be cognizant that their position of social control and authority may work against them with respect to judgments of procedural justice particularly during adolescence, positively perceived fair treatment of youth and young adults have the ability to overcompensate for these initial feelings of negativity and encourage cooperative behaviors.

Given the implications of this research, it is important to put the findings in context. Focusing on serious adolescent offenders was beneficial to the goals of this work, and this research contributes to our overall understanding of citizen-legal authority encounters because it reveals that not all contacts with the justice system result in a diminution of positive judgments of legal authorities. The police and courts can and do have an overall positive effect on subsequent judgments of procedural justice at least among some groups including serious adolescent offenders, and this group in particular is one that is of great concern to legal authorities because they are at an elevated risk for future involvement in crime. Nevertheless, these same updating processes should be explored among other offenders and nonoffenders alike. It is possible that overall direction and significance of personal arrest experiences may vary among more conventional samples and the importance of vicarious experiences with police and courts stemming from an arrest (i.e., family and peer arrests) may be much stronger among those who have few if any encounters with legal authorities.

It is also important to acknowledge that this work only looked at the effect of arrests on judgments of procedural justice with the police and courts. This limits the discussion of the overall updating process because it does not account for all information acquired through new experiences such as police stops not resulting in arrest, court appearances not resulting from a new arrest (e.g., follow-up hearings), or voluntary police and court contacts. Therefore, future research should study a wider range of involuntary and voluntary contacts with police and courts to fully comprehend how judgments of procedural justice are formed and change over time (Tyler and Huo 2002). This may also include the study of how correctional experiences may influence more global judgments of procedural justice pertaining to all criminal justice personnel. In tandem with the results of this work, then, we can have a better understanding of entire process associated with the formation of judgments of procedural justice and further promote the importance of citizen–legal authority interactions in the study of crime and as alternative crime prevention strategy.

Footnotes

Appendix

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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