The “last railway mania”: The Light Railways Act of 1896 and local railway construction in Britain

Legislative constraints on light railway development before 1896

Light railways were not a new concept in the 1890s. Ireland already had a scattered network of 3 foot gauge lines, many of which were light railways, ¹³ and similar systems in France and Belgium had been developed from the 1870s. Light railway practice was well established in British India and there had been legislative attempts in the 1860s to encourage the development of light railways in mainland Britain. The principal difficulty with promoting any low-cost railway in the UK was the need to apply for a special Act of Parliament. The only railways that could be built without a special Act were those built wholly on private land, with the agreement of the landowner, such as the Brill tramway in Buckinghamshire. ¹⁴ When the case of Regina v. Train (1862) effectively banned the laying of a tramway across a street without an Act of Parliament, even the legality of these types of railway was questionable. ¹⁵ The Railways Construction Facilities Act of 1864 attempted to liberalise practices for rural railway construction, enabling railways to be built without recourse to a special Act, providing all landowners and other local parties consented. Unfortunately, obtaining unanimity for railway construction was always difficult, especially as even small landowners knew they could effectively hold railway companies to financial ransom. In consequence, very few railways were built under the 1864 Act. ¹⁶ A further attempt to facilitate rural railway construction came when a “light railway” clause was added to the Regulation of the Railways Act, 1868. This attempted to define a light railway in law and allow lighter construction in exchange for speed and operational restrictions. A light railway was defined as one that operated at a maximum speed of no more than 25 miles per hour and with an individual axle weight limit of no more than 8 tons. The Act proved to be of limited utility. The axle weight limit meant that only very small industrial or contractors’ locomotives could be operated. The limitations of locomotive technology ensured that train loading had to be very light or the railway had to be limited to a ruling gradient of more than 1 in 40. Limited train loading restricted profitable operation, while building a railway with few gradients usually implied expensive bridges, cuttings and embankments. Only eleven light railway lines were built under the 1868 Act, representing a total mileage of only around 130 miles. ¹⁷

Lobbying for further changes in legislation continued, but there is little evidence that the major railway companies were particularly active in campaigning for a change in the law. The costs of promoting a conventional railway Bill in Parliament could be substantial and, at a time when British railway companies were suffering declining profitability, this cost represented an important barrier to market entry – making it difficult for new companies to challenge established operators and giving established railway companies some degree of protection from competition. Existing railway companies could, and often did, challenge railway proposals in Parliament, increasing substantially the promoter’s costs. Some accounts suggest that a Bill rejected at Second Reading stage could result in costs of around £15,000 (equivalent to 1,464,396 in today’s US$) for a promoter, excluding any private settlements that may have been made to buy off opponents. In the case of a small light railway of 3 or 4 miles, this sum could be the equivalent to the entire actual construction. This barrier to entry was convenient for established companies and mitigated against new companies wanting to develop competing light railway alternatives on the French or Belgian model. However, professional engineering opinion increasingly highlighted the strategic value of light railways abroad in reducing transport costs in the colonies. ¹⁸ Ultimately, it was the long agricultural depression at home that eventually stimulated legislative action.

The Royal Commission on Agriculture of 1894 took extensive evidence on the conditions of British agriculture and noted that transport costs were a significant factor in the difficulties facing the sector. ¹⁹ Lower land costs overseas and cheap international transport meant that agricultural products from abroad could flood into the British market, lowering domestic prices. ²⁰ British farmers in remote districts were faced with high local transport costs and inadequate access to the rail network, although some were sceptical about whether light railways were really a solution to this problem. ²¹ Before the Royal Commission presented its final report, James Bryce MP hosted an official Board of Trade conference on the development and promotion of light railways. This conference raised the question of whether Board of Trade regulations could be relaxed “in the case of lines built through sparsely populated and agricultural districts” and whether changes were needed to make legal approval more straightforward. ²² The consequence was that the then Liberal government backed proposals to give elected county councils a greater role in the planning and construction of light railways, relieving promoters of the onerous duties of bringing special bills to Parliament. Bryce’s committee suggested that, in the first instance, proposals should be submitted to the relevant county council, with the Board of Trade arbitrating over matters of the compulsory acquisition of land and technical questions. ²³ This would have, in effect, given county councils the same power over light railways as they already had over public highways, encouraging local councillors to take a strategic view of local transport development. Had the legislation passed, this may have led to a British version of the vicinal rail systems seen in France and Belgium. Unfortunately, the unexpected general election of 1895 meant that this Bill had insufficient parliamentary time and never became law.

New legislation, financial support and new opportunities

The general election gave opponents of the original proposals the opportunity to lobby for revisions. The Conservative government that replaced the Liberals in 1895 was committed to new light railway legislation but open to changes. Some light railway promoters, such as Arthur Paine, were particularly critical of plans to give county councils such a key role. Paine was convinced that county councils would increase the cost of railways by demanding extensive and unreasonable improvement to roads as the price of supporting railway proposals. Instead, he favoured giving the Board of Trade or the Local Government Board powers to hold a local inquiry and report recommendations that could be confirmed by a government order. ²⁴ Some MPs were also nervous about giving delegated legislative authority to councils and the views of light railway promoters eventually held sway. Three Light Railway Commissioners were appointed to consider railway proposals under the 1896 Act. They were empowered to hold local public inquiries and report their recommendations to the Board of Trade. The Board of Trade could then confer a Light Railway Order, authorising construction in essentially the same way as an Act of Parliament. Local authorities could object, although there was no straightforward power of veto. The Act also gave all major local authorities, county, borough or district councils, the right to apply to the Commissioners for permission to build and operate light railways, in the same way as private companies, and no longer be constrained by the restrictive clauses of the 1870 Tramways Act. Under these new rules they could operate individually, with other local authorities, or with private promoters. ²⁵

It was realised that the construction of some light railways would not be able to proceed without the financial support of local or central government. Promoters were permitted to apply for grants and loans from relevant local councils and the Treasury. Unfortunately, the Act of 1896 and the subsequent Act of 1912 placed strict limits on the amounts that could be advanced. Treasury advances under Section 4 of the 1896 Act could only be for up to one quarter of the total costs of construction. Contributions under Section 5 of the Act could only be for one half. The Treasury was empowered to impose restrictive conditions and contributions under Section 4 of the Act took legal precedent over ordinary share capital, making the investment of private individuals less secure than those of the state in the event of the company getting into difficulties. ²⁶ The legal priority given to state loan capital over private capital differed from similar provisions overseas and made contributions under Section 4 particularly unattractive to investors. Five years after the passing of the 1896 Act not a single loan had been made under Section 4 of the Act. Grants and loans under Section 5 were more successful, with £181,750 (equivalent to 17,737,629 today’s US$) being made in grants and £15,500 (equivalent to 1,512,397 today’s US$) in loans. Tellingly, however, there remained £57,750 (equivalent to 5,634,898.5 today’s US$) unallocated, demonstrating that even in this initial period of “light railway mania” the Treasury scheme was largely unsuccessful. ²⁷ The Ministry of Transport’s 1921 Light Railway Investigation Committee was particularly critical of the operation of these Treasury grants. Of the £1m made available (equivalent to 97,605,861 today’s US$) only around one fifth had ever been distributed. Restrictive Treasury clauses and the difficulties of obtaining matching capital from private sources were cited as the main difficulty; many schemes clearly needed Treasury support in excess of the one half of total costs allowed under law. ²⁸ Although local authorities were also empowered to make advances to light railway companies, in practice, this was rare. The Investigation Committee found the principal reason was that local councils generally lacked confidence in private promoters spending public money in the public interest and there were concerns about the lack of local government powers of scrutiny of public money invested in private light railway concerns. ²⁹ Poor relationships between local authorities and light railway promoters certainly bedevilled many light railway schemes and the fear of dishonest speculators and money launderers was an ongoing concern. ³⁰

The formation of the Light Railways and Tramways Association (hereafter LRTA) was, in part, an attempt to protect the reputation of the industry. Established in 1900, it came to represent the “official” voice of light railways and collaborated with the Board of Trade in setting basic standards for railways built under the 1896 Act. It was particularly important in making recommendations for light railway safety, working with the Board on questions of speed indicators on tramcars, braking systems and sanding gear. ³¹ By 1908 it had become a powerful voice for not only the light railway industry, but also for electrical contractors associated with the promotion of electric tramways. For example, the British Electrical Federation subscribed 100 guineas a year to the LRTA, representing as it did some 55 federated companies. ³² The organisation fostered both strong connections with the Board of Trade and with Members of Parliament. Arthur Stanley MP was president for many years and by 1911 the LRTA was essentially a professional regulatory body, trusted by government to propose rules and regulations that would govern the industry. The LRTA’s regulatory advisory committees had regular official meetings with the Board of Trade and the association played a key role in developing the Board’s model regulations for light railway and tramway construction. ³³ However, in trying to protect the reputation of light railways, the LRTA helped produce tighter regulations that increased the cost of construction.

Assessing the impact of the 1896 Act

There can be little doubt that the Light Railways Act of 1896 was greeted with much enthusiasm from light railway promoters and rural communities. In its first few years of operation it stimulated an almost unprecedented increase in new railway schemes in England, Scotland and Wales. Not since the 1840s had the United Kingdom seen such a large number of new railway proposals and this burst of activity can justly be seen as the last great “railway mania” in the country. By 31 December 1910, a total of 511 plans had been presented for consideration to the Light Railway Commissioners, the new government body responsible for overseeing the approval of new light railways. These schemes represented more than 4,500 miles of proposed new railway that, if all had been built, would have cost a total capital outlay of over £32m (equivalent to 3,124,485,621 in today’s US$). ³⁴ Yet, although the Act of 1896 was meant to make it much easier to build light railways, a very large number of railway proposals were rejected by the Commissioners. Of the 223 proposals for conventional light railways across private land, only 144 were submitted by the Commissioners to the Board of Trade for approval. The approval rate for lines running alongside or in public roads was even lower. Of the 270 schemes, only 146 reached the Board of Trade. ³⁵ The number of railways actually built was even fewer. By 1921, England, Scotland and Wales had constructed barely 450 miles of standard gauge conventional light railways on private land and little over 110 miles of standard gauge light railways alongside or in public roads. Less than 300 miles of narrow gauge light railways had appeared. ³⁶ This raises important questions, therefore, about how the “last railway mania” came about, the way it promised a massive expansion of rural railways and why, ultimately, far fewer schemes were proposed than delivered.

Evaluating the overall impact of the new legislation is not straightforward, not least because so many new lines were proposed by so many different interests. There are some valuable historical studies aimed at railway enthusiasts, but these tend to focus on famous light railways that were built, rather than schemes that failed, so we have only a partial understanding of what was necessary for the success of light railway schemes. ³⁷ The few attempts to write a more comprehensive history of light railways are mainly in the nature of introductory or photographic surveys. ³⁸ Peter Bosley’s Light Railways in England and Wales is a more systematic attempt to understand light railways in their wider, comparative context, but this study has major limitations. The most serious problem is that it focuses chiefly on just one type of light railway, the steam-worked railway across private land, serving mainly agricultural districts. ³⁹ Although this was the type of railway for which the 1896 legislation was designed, in practice a very wide range of light railways were proposed and built in accordance with the new Light Railways Act. The legislation was somewhat overtaken by advances in technology, with the result that many of the railways proposed were effectively suburban tramways using new forms of electric traction. As these were often quickly incorporated into wider tramways networks, they have been neglected by historians. ⁴⁰ The promoters of the Act were primarily concerned with stimulating the growth of railways in sparsely populated agricultural districts or linking remote fishing ports with their markets: however, speculators, influenced by USA railway practice, began to see the potential of the legislation to promote new suburban and inter-urban electric railways that might offer competition to local conventional railways. ⁴¹ Many of the larger schemes were rejected due to opposition from mainline railway companies.

A new generation of railway entrepreneurs shaped the development of the industry. Perhaps the most prominent was Emile Garcke, chairman of the electric tramway cartel, the British Electric Traction Company. ⁴² Garcke lobbied for the liberalisation of the railway approval process and attended the conference called by the Board of Trade that paved the way for the 1896 Act. By 1899, his company had control of 40 operational tramways; by 1914 that figure had doubled. ⁴³ Other light railway kings also appeared, developing diverse portfolios of light railway interest. The most famous and eccentric was Holman F. Stephens who came to control an eclectic collection of mainly steam-operated rural light railways throughout the country, few of which ever paid significant dividends. The diversity of Stephens’ portfolio demonstrates the many uses to which light railway legislation was put. His Kent and East Sussex Railway was typical of the type of line that the originators of the Act wanted to promote – a rural line supplying transport for a remote agricultural district. Yet he also promoted the Edge Hill Light Railway, essentially a cheaply built industrial railway designed to serve an ironstone quarry. Finally, he came to operate the Weston, Clevedon and Portishead railway, a steam-operated inter-urban railway, mainly catering for the heavy holiday traffic between the main towns it served. ⁴⁴ A similar diversity of interest can be found in the railway portfolio of Stephen Meyer, dubbed the “Light Railway King of the North”. Some of his railways were agricultural lines, but others, such as the North Lindsey Light Railways, carried substantial industrial traffic, including coal and ironstone. ⁴⁵ The Light Railways Act was often used for the construction of railways very different from the ones originally envisaged.

The light railways that followed from the 1896 Act: Rural light railways or suburban tramways?

The 1896 Act was promoted as a way of providing cheap transport in agricultural districts and as a way of linking remote fisheries to markets. However, several developments ensured that it was also used in ways its original promoters did not anticipate. The rapid development of electrical technology meant that while electric trams were very rare in 1895, by 1905 they were present in most major towns. The real estate boom that accelerated in the late 1890s saw the rapid development of speculative suburban housing and a demand for rail transport links on the edge of towns, beyond existing networks. Finally, the last decade of the nineteenth century saw the rapid expansion of smaller seaside resorts, such as Llandudno, Minehead and Weston-Super-Mare, many of which had inadequate transport links in the summer season. Consequently, many of the new light railway schemes were aimed not at the agriculture and fisheries industry, but were designed to support suburban property speculation and the development of seaside resorts. The new construction and holiday industries were not always welcomed by local authorities and study of local cases suggests that the Board of Trade was reluctant to support such schemes against local opposition.

While developments in electric traction were important in creating new opportunities for lucrative tramway investment, the more relaxed rules of the Light Railways Act also provided a great incentive for a wave of new tramway speculation. Before 1896, the legislation governing the construction of tramways was problematic. Regina v. Train 1862 forced all tramway promoters to apply to Parliament for authorisation, even when local authorities agreed to a scheme. The 1870 Tramway Act was supposed to reduce the cost of gaining parliamentary approval but was described by one promoter as “the most disastrous legislative experiment which has been attempted in England during the last half century”. ⁴⁶ No land could be taken for street widening under this form of authorisation. If local authorities or property owners representing more than a third of street frontages objected, then the scheme automatically failed. Finally, the Act required a “purchase clause”, allowing local authorities the power to purchase the tramways after just 21 years’ operation. ⁴⁷ The consequence was, of course, that tramways were very expensive to build and the purchase clause made it difficult for investors to make a gain on capital in more suburban districts where traffic was light. The purchase clause was particularly problematic for electric tramways as they required much higher levels of initial capital investment than horse or steam tramways, at a time when the exact efficiencies and productivity improvements inherent in the new electrical technology were not always understood by potential investors.

The Light Railways Act liberalised the approval process for street tramways in a number of important ways. It allowed land to be acquired by compulsory purchase after a local inquiry and the authorisation of the Board of Trade. Local authorities could no longer straightforwardly veto schemes, a change brought about partly due to the concern that railway promoters were interfering in local elections. ⁴⁸ Finally, there was no automatic purchase clause, giving more security to investors. Yet not everyone was delighted by the remarkable number of street tramways schemes promoted under the new Light Railways Act. A common complaint was that the original legislation was being misused because the concept of a “light railway” was not defined in the Act. One commentator in the Contemporary Review noted that light railways were being built chiefly in urban areas and “instead of relieving distressed agriculture, they are enriching joint-stock companies”. ⁴⁹ This was not strictly true as a glance at the list of schemes suggests that at least half were planned to serve rural areas, but the comments reveal a great deal of suspicion of the new “tramway interest”. There was particular anger at the way the three Light Railway Commissioners and the Board of Trade appeared to be ignoring the views of local councils, allowing “an alien money-making company to take possession of the streets of a town without paying anything for the privilege”. ⁵⁰ In the early years of the Light Railways Act, there were frequent complaints that the Board had too much discretion and were giving too much leeway to promoters. Lancashire County Council, in appealing against the Wigan Light Railway Scheme, complained that the Board of Trade was “exercising practically legislative powers without the slightest idea of how they were going to be exercised”. ⁵¹ The dispute around the development of the nearby Middleton Light Railway was similarly bitter. The town clerk of Middleton complained that the effect of the new Act was “to enable capitalists and others to come into our borough and monopolise our streets without our consent”. ⁵² Both of these schemes were electric tramways schemes, intended to link new suburbs with urban centres. Complaints eventually reached the House of Commons where, on 14 August, one MP argued that the new Act “had been taken advantage of by speculators who had obtained permission from the Board of Trade to construct tramways on very easy conditions”. ⁵³

Navigating the constraints: The role of local authorities

Those wishing to develop larger networks were forced to apply for multiple small-scale light railway or tramway schemes, often using independent companies to do so. The British Electric Traction Company attempted for forge partnerships with local councils, taking over local companies where they could, but also offering to participate in council-owned tramway ventures where possible. Its chairman, Emile Garcke, saw the Light Railways Act as a great opportunity for new electric tramways companies, although he was realistic enough to realise that close collaboration with municipal authorities was essential. Garcke even advocated the separation of ownership of the track from the trams, with municipalities owning the tracks and infrastructure and private companies operating the trams. ⁵⁴ Although the latter suggestion was not widely adopted, his more flexible approach to relationships with local authorities helped BET become the largest private operator of tramways by 1914. The South Lancashire Electric Traction and Power Company was a good example of a classic holding company that gained gradual, piecemeal control of regional tramway networks. By 1902, it had obtained powers for 105 miles of tramways in the Manchester, Warrington and St Helens districts, often through buying up smaller independent companies. The Liverpool and Prescott Light Railways was an example of an independent tramway, opened as a light railway, linking larger concerns – in this case the Liverpool tram system to the South Lancashire system at St Helens. Although built by the Lancashire Light Railway Company, this company was controlled by the South Lancashire and there was complete through running onto the South Lancashire system. ⁵⁵ The use of subsidiary companies was, in part, a way of concealing the power of holding companies over emerging networks. The experience of South Lancashire also suggests that, in some cases, piecemeal developments concealed the ambitions of tramway companies from neighbouring railway companies who may otherwise have provided substantial opposition.

The attitudes of local authorities had an important impact on the shape of local light railway and tramway systems. There were some cases, such as Middleton, where local authorities’ opposition to new lines was overruled by the Board of Trade. More commonly, local councils demanded particular concessions in order to withdraw their opposition and facilitate a smooth local public enquiry. Occasionally this led to a game of “cat and mouse”, as in the Ramsbottom and Rawtenstall Light Railway, which temporarily withdrew its proposals, blaming what it saw as the unreasonable concessions demanded from the local council. ⁵⁶ As time passed it became more common for smaller town councils to apply for permission to own and operate their own tramways. Farnworth District Council in Lancashire became the first district council to own and operate its own system in 1899 and others soon followed. ⁵⁷ However, a major difficulty in local councils operating their own tramways was the highly fragmented nature of British local government. Suburbs often lay outside municipal boundaries, with the result that while urban areas came under city councils, many new suburban areas typically fell under county councils. In some cases these suburbs would also have their own district councils, adding even greater complexity to network planning. Local and territorial rivalries were often overlain by political differences, with city and town councils more likely to be Liberal controlled and county councils largely Conservative. Gloucestershire was the source of a particularly intensive dispute when Gloucester town council sought to build tramways over its boundary on to roads administered by Gloucestershire county council. The county council complained to the Light Railway Commissioners about the “great inconvenience” that this would bring to their area and instead backed a rival tramway proposal put forward by a private company. ⁵⁸ The Light Railway Commissioners were not enthusiastic about the county-backed scheme as it involved building lines between Cheltenham, Gloucester and Stroud, duplicating railway links and providing what they saw as unfair competition. They were also not prepared to permit a town tramway company to build into the territory of the county council without the approval of the latter. Authorisation of any tramway would need both local authorities to come to an agreement. ⁵⁹ The case was important in that it demonstrated that even a county council-backed scheme could not overcome local railway interests and that the Commissioners were reluctant to arbitrate between competing local authorities. Although there was no official veto in law, by 1902 the Commissioners were unwilling to overrule one authority in favour of another.

Promoters hoping to use the 1896 Act to build lines to emerging holiday resorts had mixed experiences. Where schemes also catered for expanding suburban districts, local authorities and the Light Railway Commissioners generally viewed applications favourably. For example, the electric line between Colwyn Bay, Rhos-on-Sea and Llandudno filled an obvious gap in the railway system and served the small but rapidly expanding suburbs of Llandudno. ⁶⁰ The Weston, Clevedon and Portishead Tramway was a similar line, although local authority opposition helped prevent a potentially lucrative extension that relied on street running. The line’s original promoters failed to agree a sale price with British Election Traction and built the line as a more conventional steam-operated light railway, serving the three seaside towns. ⁶¹ The Bideford, Westward Ho! and Appledore Railway was less successful and again found itself in dispute with a local authority. It too courted British Electric Traction, who even contemplated extensions to Cloveley and Hartland. However, Bideford Town Council refused to allow the new railway to cross a road bridge and make a direct connection with the town’s main railway station. The Light Railway Commissioners refused to press the matter and the promoters were left with an isolated railway that could not benefit from through goods traffic or compete with motor buses that could serve the main station directly. British Electric Traction withdrew their interest, the light railway struggled financially and the whole line was surrendered for war scrappage in 1917. ⁶² The more successful and long-lived holiday lines tended to be those promoted or taken over by the major railway companies, with a few surviving into nationalisation in 1948. ⁶³

Somewhat ironically, given that the 1896 Act had been designed to promote railways in remote districts, lines designed to promote new resorts in more remote areas often failed to get beyond the drawing board, with local authorities sometimes showing little interest. There were several attempts to build a light railway between Bridgwater and the villages on the West Somerset coast. One scheme got as far as a Light Railway Order, but the high cost of a river crossing and the reluctance of local authorities to invest in the scheme saw it fail. ⁶⁴ Attempts to build a 20-mile railway between Minehead and Lynmouth failed to get beyond the stage of a local enquiry. Buoyed by the success of the narrow gauge Lynton and Barnstaple Railway, built under a private Act, promoters saw a similar opportunity to build a similar railway east from Lynton, with the possibility of forming a narrow gauge network in the district. The Light Railway Commissioners took the view that it was mainly a touristic speculation, that it would not be of great benefit to farmers and would not, therefore, sanction compulsory powers of land purchase. With the staghunting community and landed gentry in opposition, the scheme died. ⁶⁵ A proposal to link Penzance with new touristic developments near Land’s End was no more successful, despite support from farmers, as insufficient capital was raised. ⁶⁶ These cases suggest that, although the 1896 Act liberalised the approval process, the problems of local authority opposition, landowner objections and the difficulties of raising finance remained significant.

The Board of Trade, the railway lobby and the question of fair competition

One major concern was that the Board of Trade, by giving a franchise to a particular company to build a line, was effectively creating a speculative commercial asset that could then be sold on at a profit to another group of investors. There were instances of companies applying for construction rights that they themselves never intended to activate, but instead sell on to another group, such as the British Electric Traction Company who took over many lines. The lucrative 2-mile link line between the large towns of Leeds and Bradford was a case in point. ⁶⁷ Although all Light Railway Orders issued by the Board of Trade was time-limited, it was common for the Board to renew powers for a longer period if promoters declared that they needed a longer time to raise capital. On some occasions this happened even when there was little prospect of raising the capital, as in the case of the Leicester and District Light Railways. ⁶⁸ Aware of the danger of creating powerful local monopolies, the Board of Trade became gradually more reluctant to approve extensive schemes that may have created an economic asset that could be sold or transferred. This restriction did not just apply to private companies, but also to the few local authorities that applied to build tramways under the new Act. Middlesex County Council proposed an extensive network to link up with the London County Council system, but several of its lines were rejected. ⁶⁹

The reluctance of the Board of Trade to approve extensive networks of lines shaped the way British suburban and inter-urban transport networks developed. While short suburban feeder lines connecting to existing urban systems were generally met with approval, extensive networks planned on continental lines were rejected. The consequence was a generally fragmented suburban transport network of different technical standards and gauges, with little through-running. Just as concerns about local light railway monopolies began to become more prominent, major railway companies began to realise that the revolution in electric technology meant that tramways could offer significant competition to their own suburban railway networks. Many embarked on suburban railway electrification programmes, especially in London, Liverpool and Manchester. ⁷⁰ The major railway companies were also determined, where they could, to halt any inter-urban tramway schemes that may compete with the railway network. The inaugural dinner of the LRTA heard speeches declaring that opposition from established railways was one of the “chief obstacles” to the development of the industry. ⁷¹ As early as 1899 the main line railway companies persuaded the Board of Trade to reject proposals for an extensive council-backed tramway system in west London on the grounds it would simply duplicate the existing railway services. ⁷² Railway companies also flexed their muscles in the Midlands. In 1902 there were two rival schemes for a network of light railways between Nottingham and Derby, linking mining towns in the Erewash valley and, ultimately, Chesterfield in the north. Although ambitious, the rival schemes had the backing of prominent businessmen, Sir Backe Cunard and Sir J.K. MacKenzie. ⁷³ The Midland Railway objected and the Light Railway Commissioners refused the application. Proposed lines to Ashby and Burton, Nottingham and District and Macclesfield and District were also all rejected on the ground that they competed in some way with the existing services of the Midland Railway. ⁷⁴ The Luton and Dunstable failed because of opposition from the nearby Great Northern Railway. ⁷⁵ The North Somerset and Bath scheme failed because of objections by the Great Western. ⁷⁶ Very occasionally, major railway companies took over the promotion of tramway and light railway schemes; the Ashby and Burton proposal was eventually successful under the auspices of the Midland Railway. ⁷⁷ However, the decisions of the Light Railway Commissioners in 1902, under pressure from the major railways companies, effectively killed off hopes that independent electric inter-urban tramways on the American model could ever be built in Britain or that extensive standardised networks of independent light railways could be developed on the French or Belgian model. Established railway companies had already claimed their territories and the Board of Trade was reluctant to take action that might undermine existing routes.

The high cost of British light railways?

The difficulty of raising private funds for new railways in rural districts, whether touristic or agricultural lines, was compounded by the continuing high cost of British light railways compared to those overseas. It is notable that the number of light railway proposals fell rapidly after 1905. ⁷⁸ This was partly because the most obviously profitable routes had already been surveyed. However, the “suburban boom” that fuelled many of these schemes was also slowing down. Financial panics in the United States, rising unemployment at home, fiscal austerity, a stagnating real estate market and the threat of land value taxation were all factors in lowering investor confidence. ⁷⁹ The slowdown in proposals was also influenced by an awareness that many light railways had cost significantly more to build than originally predicted by their advocates. The Ministry of Transport’s 1921 investigation into Light Railways saw the high initial cost of light railways as a major reason for parlous economic position of the industry, loading small companies with debts from the outset. The investigation found that some narrow gauge railways had cost over £6,000 per mile to construct (equivalent to 585,468 today’s US$), while one standard gauge light railway had cost over £20,000 per mile (equivalent to 1,951,480 today’s US$). ⁸⁰ The committee noted that “light railway practice rests to some extent upon tradition” and that “greater simplicity of practice is desirable and could be attained without any serious sacrifice of safety or inconvenience”. ⁸¹

The respected engineer F.R Johnson had suggested that a 2 foot 6 inch gauge light railway in Britain could cost as little as £1,500 per mile (equivalent to 146,361 today’s US$) if it followed a public road and £2,000 per mile (equivalent to 195,148 today’s US$) if it followed its own formation. ⁸² This proved hopelessly optimistic; it is doubtful if any light railway built under the 1896 Act came close to this estimate. A prediction of £5,000 per mile (equivalent to 487,870 today’s US$) for a steam-operated standard gauge line was more realistic, but even this was exceeded by many companies. ⁸³ The cost of an electrically operated line was, of course, higher, with some suggesting that £10,000 a mile (equivalent to 975,740 today’s US$) could be reached in some circumstances. ⁸⁴ This inevitable raises the question of why British light railways cost so much, especially as there was business pressure to cut railway operation costs in this period. Conventional railway operation was notoriously labour intensive and increasing labour productivity very difficult. To make matters worse, the price of coal at the mines almost doubled between the years 1896 and 1900, the most active years of light railway promotion. ⁸⁵

Although the 1921 government report blamed the financial problems of light railways on the high cost of construction, many extra construction costs arose due to the cautious approach of the Board of Trade itself, which was concerned about the public reaction to railways built without fencing, protected crossings and poor quality station facilities. Some engineers, such as G.F. Boughey warned frankly that if light railways were to be constructed economically, they needed to follow the same practices as the continent and the public would have to get used to ungated rail crossings, unfenced roadside operation, lighter rails and stark economies in operation. ⁸⁶ Yet many engineers were very reluctant to radically change traditional railway practice, fearing an adverse public reaction, safety problems and potential legal challenges. Charles Beloe argued that the crowded nature of Britain made the adoption of continental practices very difficult and that extensive cattle farming made a fully fenced and protected railway essential. He also argued that previous attempts to promote low-cost railways running alongside roads had caused many problems, with the Mumbles Railway being forced to pay frequent compensation for accidents. ⁸⁷ Where cheaper roadside steam-operated lines were built, the Board of Trade typically imposed tight operational restrictions, with maximum speeds as low as 12 or 15 miles per hour on the Glyn Valley Tramway, the Wantage Tramway and the Wisbech and Upwell line. ⁸⁸

Lack of standardisation also increased the costs of light railways in mainland Britain. This contrasts with countries like France that developed an alternative standardised metre gauge railway network that covered most of the most important agricultural districts. Networks like the Reseau Breton reached over 150 km in length and linked up with other metre gauge networks. ⁸⁹ Belgium also had a standardised network of metre gauge light railways. ⁹⁰ Similarly, Austria, Germany and Italy all adopted clear national standards, with Austria and Germany adopting 750 mm gauge as the standard gauge for light railways, while Italy chose metre gauge. ⁹¹ This process of standardisation had significant benefits in terms of allowing individual companies to buy standard designs for locomotives, rolling stock and signalling equipment. Although Britain adopted standard practices for minor railways outside its mainland – military light railways were standardised at a gauge of 2 feet 6 inches, Irish light railways at a gauge of 3 feet and Indian rural railways at a gauge of 1 m – few standard practices were adopted within the 1896 Act, with choice of track and loading gauge left open to the promoters. Some experienced light railway engineers, such as F.R. Johnson, argued that only by adopting narrow gauge and standardising engineering practices, could light railway promoters reduce the costs of railway construction and operation to a level that would allow a viable return on investment. Johnson favoured the Belgian model, with narrow gauge railways running alongside major turnpike roads, but gained little support. ⁹²

Memories of the British “gauge war” and the Railway Regulation (Gauge Act) 1846 cast a long shadow and created a reluctance to change conventional practices. ⁹³ Many engineers insisted on the adoption of standard gauge, arguing that in lowland areas transhipment costs usually eroded any benefits from the adoption of narrow gauge. ⁹⁴ Possible technical solutions that may had reduced transhipment costs, such as the transporter wagons used on the Leek and Manifold Railway, were rarely adopted in Britain. ⁹⁵ The cautious attitude of the Board of Trade, the lack of standardisation and conservatism within the engineering profession itself made radical change difficult.

Conclusions – The 1896 Act as a missed opportunity?

The “light railway mania” was a dramatic phase in British railway history, but it faded as quickly as it began. In many respects, the new legislation was a missed opportunity. The Act did not give sufficient power to local authorities to plan networks for local needs or liberalise the railway regulatory process as much as many private promoters would have wished. The power of existing railway companies and conservative attitudes in the Board of Trade created serious barriers to innovation. Following the rejection of Bryce’s 1895 proposals, county authorities were not to become the central planners of light railway networks and, with a few exceptions, matters were largely left in private hands. Consequently, local authorities often adopted a largely negative role, treating private promoters who wanted to use public roads and verges with suspicion and opposition. Tramways on the roads and light railways by the roadside still found it difficult to get approval, with over half being refused by the Board of Trade. Opposition from major railway companies also inhibited network growth, preventing the emergence of the type of inter-urban electric light railways prominent in the United States and many parts of continental Europe. Although the new legislation allowed grants and loans to new railway schemes, the strict criteria and conditions adopted by the Treasury proved too restrictive and meant that relatively few were taken up. Only a fifth of the £1 m set aside between 1896 and 1918 (equivalent to 97,605,861 today’s US$) was actually utilised. The problem was compounded by the fact that light railway construction costs were often higher than anticipated, partly due to conservative engineering attitudes within the industry and partly due to Board of Trade concerns about public reaction to cheap facilities and the safety of roadside operation. A combination of debts and high fixed costs meant that few independent light railways survived to nationalisation in 1948. The consequence was that the Light Railways Act was unable to stimulate the rapid expansion of rural transport or make a major contribution to the economic development of remote agricultural districts. It was only with the coming of the cheap motor-lorry in the inter-war period that significant changes to the transport economy of these areas took place.