The police of the Sudan

Abstract

The police force is one of the oldest institutions in modern Sudan. Since its establishment, political instability and internal armed conflicts have beset the country. Security problems and political instability have played a determining role in putting a centralised and militarised model of policing. Depending on archive materials and other sources, this article uses the historical approach to trace how centralised and military ideas have affected the police structure, role and practice. The impact of these ideas has contributed in establishing authoritarian model of policing rather than a professional one. Restoring peace and stability is a fundamental factor in any long-term plan of police reform.

Keywords

Police in Sudan police in Africa rule of law Sudan security

Introduction

The police are a symbolic institution in Sudan; they represent both the law and the prestige and power of the state. As in most African countries, police legal conduct and practice in Sudan can tell us much about the nature of the state, especially regarding issues related to the rule of law, human rights conditions and corruption (Francis 2012: 14). Police officers primarily define their job as ‘fighting crime’. (Cotterrell 1992: 277) This definition posits that police are a legal institution which derives its legitimacy from the law. Predicated on this theory, most international legal documents prefer to describe the police as the law enforcement agency (UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 1979). Accordingly, police functions and duties have to be in full compliance with the rule of law (Wade, 1977: 23). At the same time, nobody can deny the nature of the police as a coercive institution with a duty to maintain peace and order in society (Bard 1971: 151–160). In this direction, the police are considered one expression of the state’s ‘monopoly of legitimate physical coercion’ (Weber, 2000: 739). This duty becomes problematic when the state falls into the swamp of violence, severe political disputes or internal armed conflicts. In such situations the police are responsible for taking effective measures to maintain peace and order. A civil model of policing will not be adequate in encountering such serious challenges and therefore a quasi-military style of policing is needed. The state itself will turn to manipulate police powers and legal boundaries to ensure its survival, but this will be at the expense of police sensitivity to the rule of law and human rights norms.

The police of the Sudan constitute a good example of this problem, as since the Sudanese state has come under pressure from internal armed conflicts and serious political disputes, it has resorted to an authoritarian mode of policing which usually leads to the development of a military style. Moreover, the success of this militarised style of policing requires a central system of police administration that is capable of ensuring the state’s control over police in the way that described as ‘to enforce political decisions taken by political authorities’ (Potholm, 1969: 139).

The history of the police in Sudan could be summed up in this context as the swinging between centralised/decentralised and civil/military styles, and thus reflects an unstable and fragile state. Police officers and other staff tend to react to this situation by fearing a loss of the legal character and independent identity of their institution. This fear justifies their ambition to build a stronger and central police institution capable of encountering and absorbing the significant and frequent political changes at the centre of the state. However, police officers do not generally find themselves in favour of the military style of policing, which prejudices their professional identity as a civilian and bureaucratic service which is also ‘accountable and responsive to citizen concerns’ (Baker, 2006: 25). They strongly avoid presenting their institution to the public as a suppressive and blind tool in the hand of the political apparatus of the state (Berridge, 2011a: 12), but at the same time they need to show their obedience and support to the state’s general policies and the existing laws, just as in many African countries the police are a mirror of the regime’s interests and political elite’s desire to return power (Hills, 1996: 271).

This paper will analyse how the contemporary Sudanese state has swung between two contradictory models of policing: the authoritarian model, which is capable of maintaining peace and order, and the bureaucratic and civilian model, which is legally sensitive to the principles of human rights and the protection of individual freedoms. It also traces the impact of centralising and military ideas on these two models. It also aims to study the response of the police as an institution to this volatile situation that threatens its integrity and independence and seriously affects its legal status and professional stability.

The influence of colonial vision in the establishment of police apparatus in Sudan (1898–1955)

Police establishment

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Regime in Sudan was established according to the Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreement of 19 January 1899 (Agreement between Britain & Egypt, 1899). The condominium government divided the country into provinces, districts (Markaz), towns and villages, the provinces were governed by British military governors assisted by inspectors, mamurs and sub-mamurs.

Since the British-Egyptian invasion of Sudan and prior to the condominium agreement (from September 1898 to January 1899), police duties in Sudan were covered by the British military police (Abu Haraz, in press: 40).

In May 1899, the Governor-General of the Sudan appointed an Egyptian military officer assisted by 12 other officers to establish police work in the newly-conquered provinces. Shortly afterwards, another Egyptian military lieutenant was appointed as Prisons Officer to take responsibility for prisons in Sudan (Sudan Gazette, 1899: 7). During that period the police force was entirely controlled by the central government (Salim, 2005: 97). This continued till 1905, when the Governor-General abolished the police department of the central government in Khartoum. This decision gave the province governors full authority over the police force of their provinces. including recruitment, deployment, salaries and all other powers regarding police duties and administration. At this time, the major challenge confronting the government of the Sudan was the establishment of a local governmental system that was capable of suppressing uprisings which erupted immediately after the defeat of the Mahdist regime (Abu Haraz, in press: 42–43).

The establishment of the state

By the year 1908, the new government had succeeded in suppressing most internal disorders in the country and a degree of stability was achieved. This new situation was directly reflected in the police organisation and personnel. During the period between 1905 and 1908, the professional duties of the police revolved around stabilising the local government system and suppressing any attempt to disturb the public order (Salim, 2005: 93). Moreover, the organisation of police forces during this period was vastly decentralised. The administration of the police forces was entirely controlled by the province governors, and each province established its own police force, which had its own structure. Professional qualifications, training standards and duties were locally ruled by each province. The total number of police in 1905 was estimated at 1,819 (Governor-General of Sudan, 1905: 87).

In 1908, a Police Ordinance was adopted by the Government of Sudan. The ordinance and its general regulations of 1910 extended their jurisdiction to all police personnel in all provinces and other departments, including the prisons authority (Police General Regulations 1910: 376). However, recruitment, salaries and training still fell within the term of reference of the province director (The Finance, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, 1905). Moreover, the police force in each province had its own uniform according to special provincial uniform regulations (Abu Haraz, in press: 43).

The decentralised model of police administration, accompanied by the insufficient national legal guidelines, training standards and recruitment regulations, led to a poor level of qualifications, lack of professional practice and a degree of inconsistency in the police forces’ conduct in the different provinces in Sudan. This situation led the central government to adopt the recommendations of Mr GH Blumberg, who was delegated from the Indian Police in April 1910 for the post of Police Superintendent of the Omdurman area of Khartoum province. Blumberg’s task was to design an effective policing strategy capable to confront the political and security challenges in Omdurman area (the capital of the defeated Mahdi state). Blumberg developed his plan in Omdurman and called it ‘re-policing’ (Abu Haraz, in press: 48). The plan restructured the organisation of police forces in Omdurman according to the population density of the area. He divided Omdurman into quarters and eighths and deployed patrols in a way that made each policeman responsible for a circle with a 3 km radius. The plan also accelerated the replacement of Egyptian police officers by local Sudanese ones (Salim. 2005: 117). He also designed a new police training programme, and established the first police school in the country for this purpose. Moreover, he re-equipped each policeman with a unique constabulary number, diary, whistle and truncheon (Abu Haraz, in press: 50–51). In this context, it is remarkable to mention that Blumberg decided to arm his policemen with the same weapons as the military, but that they would carry them only during night patrols. He also established the first police school to train police rank and files in Omdurman. Shortly before the beginning of the First World War in 1914, the government of Sudan promoted Blumberg to Khartoum Province Commandant and decided to expand his plan to the whole country. This decision constituted a fundamental step towards centralising police training, armament and police supervision at the national level (Salim, 2005: 117).

The relaxation of the state

After the defeat of the Fur Sultanate in Darfur in 1916, and the suppression of the cadets’ mutiny in 1924, which is known as the White Flag Movement, the Sudanese struggle against the condominium regime had entered a new phase. The national struggle was changed to be more peaceful and civil. It was led by the Graduates’ General Congress, which represented the educated elites of the society, and by trade unions, which represented the working class in cities (Salim, 2005: 44–52). The role of these two emerging groups in the Sudanese social and political context forced the government to rearticulate its vision regarding security challenges in Sudan. Once again the Sudanese government decided to seek the assistance of another expert from the Indian Police. Mr John Ewart was appointed shortly after the White Flag revolution in August 1924 (Sudan Intelligence Report, 1924). Ewart’s work could not only be considered as a second step towards establishing central policy of police administration, but also as a step towards the adoption of a civil mode of policing. Despite the fact that both Blumberg and Ewart were seeking a central policy to standardise police recruitment, training, professional conduct and legal framework, Ewart had a different vision for the nature of the police and their duties. In his report to the civil secretary of the Sudan government, Ewart focused on two major points. First, he heavily criticised the legal boundaries of police powers in the Police Ordinance and Police General Regulations of 1908 and 1910 respectively, he claimed that they were inconsistent with the Sudanese criminal procedure code of 1899. Ewart wrote in his report, ‘The code of criminal procedure is the true foundation of any system of civil police organisation. Moreover, regularised training of the police in their duties in respect of the criminal administration must be based on the code’ (1925b: 1). The report continued criticising the police legal framework to the extent that it recommended the adoption of a new police ordinance and general regulations. He stated ‘A decision on the above point will permit of the revision of the present police ordinance and police central regulation. These are both out of date and inadequate to modern recruitment and will have to be remodelled entirely’ (1925b: 1).

For the first time in its history, the police had been presented as a law enforcement institution rather than a regular force for keeping order. The second point was his eagerness to differentiate between police and military duties. In another report, Ewart illustrated that military police and civil police are two different organisations; police functions should essentially revolve around ‘prevention and detection of crime, and preservation of law and order up to and including the suppression of riot’ (1925a: 1). The distinction between the police role and military duties in maintaining peace and order was clearly explained in the report and accordingly the report stated that the police training should never go beyond confronting an ordinary riot. Instead Ewart (1925a: 1–10) was concerned about the capacity of police personnel in crime prevention and detection, and suggested the establishment of a police school for commissioned police officers alongside police schools for the police constabulary which were already established by Blumberg. Moreover, the report focused on building the capacity of mamurs and police personnel to be able to record all crimes in their areas. Furthermore, in order to consolidate the criminal investigation practices, the report suggested the establishment of ‘a body of especially trained police men employed for the assistance of local police in the more complicated cases of their work’(1925a: 8).

As a result of Ewart’s recommendations, the Police Ordinance had been amended in 1925 (Sudan Government Gazette, 1925) and his vision of police duties and organisation culminated in the adoption of the subsequent Police Ordinance and the Police General Regulations (1928). It is worth mentioning that this ordinance continued in effect till 1970 to constitute the longest-acting police ordinance in the history of police. The ordinance provided a reasonable environment for the development of a professional and civil model of policing to the extent that it encouraged some Sudanese policemen to think of forming a police federation similar to the one they had heard about in Britain. Several years later, this idea led to what was called the police strike in 1951 (Berridge, 2011b: 121).

The police strike and the retreat of the state

During the period between the late 1940s and Sudanese independence in 1956, the elite’s movement and the trade unions’ struggle managed to gain significant political and social achievements, especially in the field of service conditions and welfare. This situation imposed tremendous pressure on Sudanese policemen, who saw their colleagues in the civil service sector succeed in gaining significant benefits by using civil and democratic means that the police were not allowed to use. Furthermore, the association of this movement with the struggle for national liberty and independence was another factor that made Sudanese policemen think critically about their role and duties within the existing colonial state (Berridge, 2011b: 121).

From an internal point of view, and unlike most historical analysis of this strike, the development of this movement could be traced back to the mid-1940s. The Police Annual Report of 1947, mentioned, under the subtitle ‘General Conditions of the Police’, that: ‘Police officers continued to nurse their old establishment grievances, in particular their status as compared with the administrative officers’(1948: 3). The report moved on to describe the situation among the rank and file, stating that: ‘Dissatisfaction among other ranks is limited largely to a complaint about housing conditions’ (1948: 3). These grievances were aggravated over time and by the negligence of the colonial regime, which convinced the police constabulary that the only way to improve their service conditions was to follow in the footsteps of the trade unions. In May 1951, 70 of the police constabulary organised a secret meeting to discuss a declaration of a police federation. Although the constabularies were peacefully dispersed, the problem developed, ending up with the police march in Khartoum North on the 5 June 1951. The following day a strike was declared to encompass all police and prisons departments in Khartoum province (Berridge, 2011b: 121).

Immediately after the strike was suppressed, the Acting Governor General established a commission of inquiry which was led by Mr JRS Watson, to enquire into and ascertain the causes of the recent failure of the Khartoum police force to perform their duty. The findings of this commission led to the dismissal of several British police officers and a number of Sudanese police rank and file (Harrison, 1951). Although the report admitted the legitimacy of the grievances and poor conditions of police service, it had a strong tendency to attribute the strike to personal issues such as the leadership skills and the personality of the British police officers rather than addressing the effect of the whole social and political picture on the police. Moreover, the report denied the legitimacy of the constabulary’s demands to form a police federation to the extent that it described the situation as a ‘failure’ and in some parts as ‘mutinous’ (Watson, 1951). It is obvious that the report committed itself to the conclusions of the Conference of Colonial Commissioners of Police, which decided to maintain the training and organisation of police forces in a way similar to the military fashion (Sinclair, 2006: 65).

In conclusion, following Watson’s report, the conduct of officials of the condominium government constituted a clear retreat from Ewart’s vision of the police’s role and practice in Sudan.

Self-determination and the sunset of colonial epoch (1952–1959)

During the period between 1952 and 1956, and especially as a result of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on Sudanese self-government and self-determination of 1953, Sudan went through an intensive transitional process (Daly 1991: 280). After independence, the new national government faced many serious challenges, including the relationship between North and South, the slow pace of economic development and stability, and issues related to civil and political freedoms. The formation of the first national government in Sudan was followed by the armed rebellion movement in Torit city in 1955. Moreover, the government had to deal with the accelerating labour movement against the background of the social and political policies of the old colonial state.

Police under the contradicting views of the national governments (1965–2016)

The instability in Southern Sudan

By the dawn of independence, instability and political tension beset the three provinces in South Sudan. The most serious incident was the mutiny in Torit and Nzara cities in the Equatoria in August 1955 (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances that Occurred in Southern Sudan, 1955: 92). Civilian deaths in these incidents were estimated at 261 Northern Sudanese and 75 Southerners. A number of police constables supported the mutiny (Salim 2005: 56), and one police constable was convicted in a military court and sentenced to death (Alsaraha, 1956). In this context, it is essential to recall that in 1925 the central government in Khartoum had exempted Darfur and the southern provinces from Ewart’s plans for the professional and civil model of police training (Ewart, 1925).

The tragedy of the Joda Farmers Strike

Mr Ahmed Khair, the lawyer for the Joda farmers, wrote in the Alsaraha newspaper:

The police have violated the law and stepped on it with their feet, but the government will never settle an account with them, because the government is capable only of sending a squad to kill farmers. (Khair, 1956: 7).

According to what was published in Alsaraha, Joda was a privately-owned pump scheme located to the south of Kosti in Blue Nile Province. Its 700 tenant farmers had not been paid for the cotton harvest of season 1955. The next year, they refused to deliver any more cotton without payment (Alsaraha 1956: 1a). Supported by the Federation of Trade Unions of the Sudan, the Trade Union of the White Nile Schemes in Kosti organised a strike demanding higher payments, limited working hours, housing and health services (Alsaraha 1956: 5b). The government tried to negotiate, but when this failed it tried to put pressure on the farmers by taking administrative and legal measures against their leaders. Eventually these measures led to a violent clash between the farmers and the police, and three police officers and more than 100 farmers were killed as a result of this confrontation. Immediately, the police responded by mobilising an aggressive campaign against the farmers, which led on 22 February 1956 to the arrest of 281 farmers by the police. Because of the lack of space in the prisons, they were detained in the local garrison and by the next day, 195 farmers were found to have died from heat stroke and suffocation as a result of poor ventilation in the armoury.

This incident had a deleterious impact on the new government.¹ Politicians and senior figures in the state tried to blame this disaster on the police and the leaders of the farmers’ trade union (Alayam, 2003: 3). A court was established to try three police officers and three union leaders, but – as Berridge (2011a: 103) highlighted – the most serious administrative result of the incident was the subsequent abolition of the post of police Director-General, which returned the police to the control of administration officials (province governors and district commissioners).

The police under the first military government

In November 1958, the military took power in Sudan, and all legislative, executive and judicial powers were monopolised by the supreme council of the armed forces (Elamin 1995: 230). The new military regime adopted a military and central model of administration and local governance. The Province Administration Act 1960 and the Local Government Act 1962 abolished the posts of the province governor and the district commissioner and replaced them with military governors (Elamin 1995: 230). The new system consolidated police powers at the expense of local administrators, who no longer had effective control over the police in their areas. Police commandants would report to both the military governor of the province – who represented the supreme military council in Khartoum – and the Police Director-General, who was restored by the regime. In spite of this step, which established a central model of police control, the new military regime did not take significant measures towards imposing a military model of policing. At the provincial level, the police were more independent and they were free from the domination of administrative officers. However, at the central level, the role of the CID and its political branches in the surveillance and suppression of political opponents in Khartoum and other big cities inflated to the point that it seriously affected the relationship between the police and the public (Salim, 2005: 277–282). A few years later, the police had to face this problem when a civilian parliamentary regime was restored in 1964, and civil and political freedoms returned fundamental norms to the legal framework of the state.

The October Revolution: The return to parliamentary government

In October 1964, large demonstrations and wide civil disobedience succeeded in overthrowing the military government and restoring the parliamentary regime again. The movement was led by students, trade unions and professional bodies and joined towards the end by the political parties. The incidents started when police were held responsible for shooting a student during a political forum organised by the student union at the University of Khartoum which had been critical of the government’s strategy towards the armed conflict in southern Sudan.² The civil disobedience and riots which erupted after the death of the student led to the fall of the regime. Immediately after the resignation of the military regime, harsh criticism was directed at the police role and its methods during the period of military rule. As a consequence, senior police officers including the Police Director-General were arrested and forced to take early retirement and they were not replaced (Salim, 2005: 282), which put the police in a similar situation to that in the aftermath of the Joda incidents. The police were now returned to the effective control of the provincial administration officers, and police officers considered these measures a sign of mistrust and an attempt to undermine the role of police. In response they submitted a memorandum to the cabinet requesting the appointment of a new Police Director-General, the ratification of amendments to the Police Ordinance which had been drafted by the police headquarter, and the establishment of a commission of enquiry to investigate the role of police in the killing of the student at the University of Khartoum (Salim, 2005: 283).

Nevertheless, police officers in their memorandum showed a strong tendency toward adopting a professional and accountable model of policing. Police involvement in political suppression during the military regime, and the circumstances of the death of the university student, encouraged both police officers and the new ruling politicians to adopt a new model of modern and civil policing. This model gradually turned police forces towards becoming a law enforcement institution which performed its duties under the effective control of the judicial authority (Berridge, 2011a: 158). Because of the new model of policing, police had to improve their image and redevelop their relationship with the public.

The government was very keen to establish a modern and professional police force. This resulted in the establishment of a forensic laboratory in 1965, a telex system for the police that covered all of Sudan’s provinces, and a system of mobile radios in cars and steamboats (Berridge, 2011a: 158). The same year, the police dogs unit was established, drawing on Egyptian expertise. In 1967 the Police College started to accept university graduates instead of secondary school graduates. Also, by the beginning of 1968, officers were required to take examinations in order to rise through the ranks.

Police military tension and institutional fragmentation (1970–1989)

Police under ‘May Regime’: A new formula of policing

In May 1969, a group of military officers overthrew the parliamentary regime. The ‘May Regime’, as their government was subsequently called, continued in power until 1985. Like the previous military government, the new regime inherited the challenge of armed conflict in South Sudan, and strong political opposition in the North. This opposition was aggravated by the regime’s socialist and pan-Arab vision for the future of the country, which was different from that of its predecessors. Within three years, the regime succeeded in putting an end to the armed conflict in Southern Sudan by signing a peace agreement with the rebellions in 1972. The agreement created Regional Government in South Sudan (Shinn, 2004: 239), which was ultimately enshrined in the permanent constitution of 1973 (Stevens, 1976: 247).

Inter alia, the success in bringing peace to South Sudan had helped the regime in foiling number of military coup attempts and several plots to overthrow it during the period between 1972 and 1976. By the beginning of 1977, it was obvious that the regime had managed to defeat all of its opponents and succeeded in imposing a degree of stability. The atmosphere of peace and constitutional stability, along with relative success in applying the popular local governance system in the North, which coincided with the self-government system in the south, encouraged the state to consolidate these achievements by assigning more powers to the local level. This culminated in The Regional Government Act, 1980 and the Local Government Act, 1981. Accordingly, three levels of governance (central, regional and local) were established and have remained in one way or another until today.

These political and legal developments expressed a determining influence on the state’s policy towards the police, especially in terms of structure, legal status and practice. The ruling regime adopted a new formula of policing which can be described as semi-military and with a decentralised structure.

When the regime was under the threat from armed conflict in the South and the violent activities of its political opponents in the North, the state showed a strong tendency to establish the central and military mode of policing to some degree. The long-lasting Ordinance of 1928 was finally replaced by the Police Act of 1970 and, for the first time in the history of the police, the act explicitly defined the police as a regular force (Police Act 1970).

A few years later, when the challenges of peace and stability had been relatively addressed, the state turned to a different strategy of police administration; it attempted to impose a decentralised mode of police structure, but for some reason it refrained from restoring the civil model of policing. Articles 5 and 10 (5) of the Police Act (1977) gave wide powers to the Province-Governors over police forces in their provinces. At the same time, the act included several provisions that imposed a military style of policing, such as the current ranking system for officers and rank and file, which is the same as the military one (arts 15 and 19 of the Police Act 1977).

The Republican Decree No. 52 of 1979: The defragmentation of police structure

One could argue that Decree No. 52 constituted a major milestone in the history of the police. The decree dissolved the Ministry of the Interior and liquidated the police headquarters organisation. The decree itself clearly stated that the intention was to empower and consolidate the decentralised government system (Salim, 2005: 322). By decree, police units were scattered among different departments at both the regional and central levels. At the regional level, the control and command of police forces were put in the hands of the Regional-Governors. Central departments of the police were dispersed among other government departments and ministries. For example, the CID was attached to the office of the Attorney General (Berridge, 2011a: 175) and the passports, immigration and nationality police were annexed to the Ministry of Finance. As expected, the application of this decree involved serious practical complications in parallel to strong opposition among police officers themselves. Once again the idea of a police strike was secretly circulated (Salim, 2005: 315). The policy of imposing a semi-military model of police training along with the contradictions between the decree and the provisions of the Police Act of 1977 created severe interruptions in the police’s legal and administrative practice at all levels. For example, activities such as recruitment policy, training standards, promotion procedures, salaries, armament and financial issues were by law centralised and under the effective control of the Minister of the Interior and the Police Director-General, who no longer existed. The dispersal of these sensitive tasks between different institutions at both central and local levels created a degree of inefficiency and uncertainty in everyday practice. Junior police officers who had trained as officers in regular force over the previous seven years complained that the absolute authority of local administrators (who were described by them as civilians and politicians) would be fatal for the disciplined model of policing. Senior police officers argued that the absence of a central body to articulate one national policy for police ethics and practice and enforce homologous standards among all police forces would lead to chaos in police practice and create a conflict of powers between different police forces of different provinces (Salim, 2005: 316–324).

As a result of the practical complications that accompanied the application of this decree and the strong opposition from police officers (Salim, 2005: 311), a series of measures were taken to redress the situation, but the most important ones were the establishment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the promulgation of the Police Act of 1979 and the release of Republican Decree No. 475 in September 1979, which re-established a police headquarters under the supervision of a Police Inspector-General (Berridge, 2011a: 175). The powers and duties of the new headquarters included strict coordination, supervision and general policy, while the de facto power over police staff was shared between the Regional-Governors and regional police commandants (Salim, 2005: 330). Accordingly, a number of police directorates such as passports, immigration and nationality, the prisons force and the firefighters were returned to the newly-established Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Police Ordinance of 1979 continued to define the police as regular forces. Regarding the structure and organisation of these forces, the act remained silent and delegated the head of state to determine the chain of command, structure and responsibilities of each police force individually.

The chain of command and establishment of a police headquarters were provided in Republican Decree No. 475 and the Police General Regulations of 1979 (Salim, 2005: 330–334). The decree established the post of Police Inspector-General instead of Police Director-General. The general regulations made the Police Inspector-General the senior officer in police forces; he would report directly to the head of the state. At the same time, the regulations confirmed that the police would be composed of several forces under the control of the Regional-Governors and relevant department directors, except the CID and the police college, which would continue under the direct control of the Police Inspector-General. The decree went further, explaining in detail the powers of the Police Inspector-General versus the Regional-Governors and local administrators over police forces at the regional and local levels. It also did the same at the level of the special central police forces which serve in some departments, such as the railway police.

It was obvious that these measures, especially the Police Act of 1979, deprived the police of any independent character. This was the main reason behind the ambiguity and uncertainty that characterised police practice during that period. Furthermore, due to the poor and undeveloped legal system in the regions, the vast majority of police work revolved around enforcing the administrative orders of the local authorities rather than professional legal duties. To redress this situation, another Police Act was issued in 1984. This embedded the post of Police Inspector-General as an organic component of the police organisation, but still the powers of the Inspector-General were far fewer than the powers of the Police Director-General in the Police Acts of 1971 and 1977. Once again, they were limited to the articulation of general policies, training standards and coordination between different police forces (Police Act 1984). The Act also provided that the powers related to the professional administration of the forces and disciplinary issues in the regions would exclusively fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Police Director-General.

Nevertheless, it is essential to acknowledge that in rural areas, the administrative orders were deeply affected by political and clan issues. As a result, the control of local administrators over police practice has seriously prejudiced the image of police. This situation has raised again the question of the identity of the police as an independent institution, and the nature of the police’s duties in terms of legality and impartiality (Salim, 2005: 337). It is important to mention that the professional satisfaction of the forces was badly affected by this situation during the last years of the May Regime.

The April Uprising and the Restoration of the Ministry of Interior

In April 1985, a popular uprising put an end to the May Regime. A transitional military council (TMC) and interim government were appointed to prepare for general elections in a year’s time. One of the top priorities of the TMC and the interim cabinet was the re-establishment of the Ministry of the Interior. The vast majority of political players, who in practice had an influential role during the interim period, agreed that establishment of a professional and united police force under the umbrella of an effective Ministry of the Interior would be an essential prerequisite for successful general elections.

The Police Act of 1986, which was ratified by TMC, restored the post of Police Director-General, and all police forces were put under the effective control of the Minister of the Interior and the Police Director-General (Police Acts Over One hundred Years 2011: 215). Encouraged by the open political atmosphere and supported by provisions of the police ordinance, the Ministry of the Interior and police headquarters started to gather police departments that had been scattered during the May Regime (Berridge, 2011a: 187). It also made tremendous efforts to restore the Public Security Organization (PSO), which had been removed from the Ministry of the Interior in 1978, and merged with the National Security Organization (NSO), subjecting it to the direct supervision of the head of state and commanded by the vice president of the May Regime (Berridge, 2011a: 170).

After the general elections, the policy of the new parliamentary regime could be considered as an extension of the policy of the interim government. This was to restore the civil model of policing. It promoted the provisions of the police ordinance, removed direct presidential powers over the police, and gave the Police Inspector-General – who became the deputy of the Police Director-General – greater monitory and supervisory powers over all the police forces (Berridge. 2011a: 194). However, the pressure of the armed conflict in South Sudan, which erupted again during the last three years of the May Regime, and the political instability which prevailed during the parliamentary epoch significantly affected police performance during that period.

Police under the tightening grip of the state (1990–2014)

The formation of the Unified Police Forces

In June 1989 another military coup occurred. Its leaders established the ‘Salvation Revolution Command Council’ (SRCC). For many years, all executive and legislative powers were concentrated in this council. From a very early stage, it was obvious that the regime was motivated by a radical Islamist agenda in both its domestic and foreign policies. As we have seen during the early stages of all military regimes in Sudan, the severe armed conflict in Southern Sudan in addition to the strong opposition of the northern political parties constituted the major challenges that the new regime had to confront. This time, the regime decided to face these challenges by mobilising a wide political and military campaign against its opponents in both the southern and the northern regions of the country. The campaign was accompanied by a huge Islamic propaganda that aimed to engage a wide sector of the community. As a consequence of this policy, a big militia under the names of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) and the Community Police Forces (CPF) was established simultaneously under the control of the military and police. Islamic groups in the political apparatus of the state exercised wide powers over these forces. The objective of these militias was to participate in the military efforts in the South and to protect the regime against any militant movement that might be organized by its opponents targeting the centre of the state.

According to this policy, the new regime’s leaders, inspired by their military background, showed an eagerness to adopt a central and frankly military model of policing, especially over issues related to police organisation and duties. Police officers themselves, who were influenced by the semi-military training and still traumatised by the fragmentation of their institution during the May Regime, considered this strategy to be a useful tool to consolidate the institutional unity of the forces. It seems that there was an implicit agreement between the military officers in power and the police headquarters to accept this model of policing, in which the police would act as reserve in the military operations in Southern Sudan in exchange for the regime preserving the unity of the police force and strengthening the central mode of administration.

To this end, in May 1991, the Minister of the Interior established the Technical Committee for the Re-organisation of the Ministry of Interior. The terms of reference of this committee suggested an organisational structure for the Ministry of the Interior, determining the vertical and horizontal relationship between the different departments in the ministry. The mandate of this committee was to prepare an organisational and job description that determined responsibilities and powers and determined the actual human resources requirements (Salim, 2005: 346).

The final report of the committee recommended merging all forces attached to the Ministry of the Interior, including the police force, prisons forces, firefighting forces and wildlife guards in one force, under the name ‘The Unified Police’ (Salim, 2005: 346).

The committee tried to justify its proposal by mentioning that the duties of all these forces complement each other, and therefore unifying these forces would positively contribute to their efficiency. Moreover, the unity between these forces would provide the maximum use of the available resources and decrease the sense of competition between different forces. In addition, unifying these forces would lead to uniformity of service conditions and privileges in these forces, which would contribute to the elimination of any sense of competition between them.

Despite the overall policy of the state, which adopted the federal system in Constitutional Decree No. 4 on 4 February 1991, the SRCC issued Decree No. 61 of 1992 (Mishika, 2009), which adopted the recommendations of the committee report, and merged the forces mentioned above into one force called ‘The Unified Police’. The Decree also merged the customs authority with the police. Shortly afterwards, the Police Forces Act of 1992, which had suspended the previous acts relevant to these forces, was ratified.

The act stated that the police were national and regular forces working under the higher command of the head of state, yet under the effective control of the Minister of the Interior and the direct command of the Police Director-General.

For the first time in the history of police acts, this act has added a particular section specifying the institutional police objectives and duties, alongside the traditional section which specifies the duties of police members. Previous police acts usually expressed the duties of police officers and the rank and file, but contained nothing about the objectives of the police as an institution. However, in addition to the ordinary duties of police, the duties in this section revolved around protecting the higher values of the community and the preservation of public morals. Important elements of good policing such as civil, democratic, independent and impartial service were not expressed in this section. This situation could be justified through the ideology of the regime, which considered Islam to be the sole source of morals and values. Moreover, civil and democratic values were unwelcome in the regime’s political agenda towards police.

A further step towards police militarisation and also the Islamisation of police duties was the formation of the CPF. This force was established in accordance with a Republican Decree in September 1992. The decree was based on art. 6(1) and (2) of the Police Act of 1992, which gave the head of state the power to form a reserve force and to give them police powers. The duties of this force were clarified in the explanatory memorandum of its establishment as being to help police forces in strengthening the values of Sharia as well as in its contribution to the military efforts in South Sudan (Salim, 2005: 429). In this context, it is important to mention that the police were regularly contributing to the military operations in South Sudan, with a number of policemen operating under the name of ‘peace support forces’, and the CPF formed part of these forces.

The Police Act of 1999

The Police Act of 1999 has been considered the most militarising act in the history of the police, but this was mainly because it was intended as a response to the serious military situation in the south. That conflict eventually spread to encompass most of southern Sudan and adjacent regions in the western and eastern states of Sudan. The military and its supporting militia (PDF) were unable to put an end to the rebellion, which was aided by broad alliance with most of the former political parties in the northern region. This situation fatally threatened the stability of the central government in Khartoum, which was under great pressure to mobilise more men and resources from both state and community sectors to contribute to the military operations. The police were an obvious early candidate for playing that role. One of the complications that faced the government in this regard was that the Police Act of 1992 barely allowed police forces to play an active role in armed conflict. The police could play this role only under the provisions of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Act when they were attached to the military according to art. 8 of the Police Act 1992. Police forces, when practising their ordinary duties in areas of active military operations, did not have the legal obligation or the powers to engage in combat operations. The need to modify the legal framework to enable them take part in active combat operations was one of the major factors behind the adoption of the Police Act of 1999.

For the first time in police legislation, the act of 1999 used the term ‘enemy’, which is of course wholly alien to civil police functions (Police Act, 1999: art. 4). The term was defined in art. 4 of the act as ‘Armed groups and gangs, rebels and the outlaws of the legitimate authority’. A further step in the same direction was art. 61, which imposed the death penalty on police officers or rank and file when they were convicted of certain actions related to combat operations such as fleeing before the enemy and surrendering of any site or equipment without justifiable reasons (Police Act, 1999: art. 61a and b). Article 62(a) and (b) of the act also imposed the death penalty for surrender to the enemy in a manner that showed cowardice and for those who forced their commandants’ surrender of any site or police equipment to any unauthorised person during combat. In light of arts 60, 61 and 62, it is clear that combat operations had explicitly become a part of police duties. This situation deeply affected police conduct in conflict areas during the following years.

Most serious of all was the engagement of police forces in the wide military campaign against rebel groups in Darfur. In the beginning, the government tried to deny the political character of the armed conflict in the region and declared the rebels to be mere outlaw gangs and pirates. Large numbers of the Police Central Reserves (PCR), which are the combat arm of the police, were mobilised to lead the campaign against those rebels in Darfur, and a large number of ordinary police officers were deployed to serve in Darfur State’s police. At this point, it is crucial to highlight that police training and protocols at that time did not include either professional or legal training relating to rules of military engagement, the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and other legal obligations during international or internal armed conflicts – these were totally unknown to police staff at that time. This situation aggravated their poor capacity in combat engagement and resulted in the high numbers of casualties on both sides which recorded during the period between January 2003 and November 2004 (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 2005). Furthermore, serious crimes against civilians were also committed by police, other security forces and their supporting militias. Eventually, this Situation led the UN Security Council to intervene in resolution 1593 to declare the situation in Darfur to be threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (United Nations Security Council, 2005).

The role that police played in Darfur and other rebellious parts of the country constituted a very important milestone in contemporary police ethos and practice. One could argue that the police had entered a new phase of its history by adopting a very militant mode of policing, which was aggressive, highly unchecked, authoritarian and powerful.

Interestingly, a considerable majority of police personnel supported this new model of centralised and military-style policing. This has become clear during the drafting of the Police Act of 2008 in the aftermath of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).

The Police Act of 2008 and the influence of the CPA

The 2005 CPA provided for self-determination for the people of South Sudan at the end of a six-year transition period. The CPA also established a regional government in South Sudan with wide autonomy from the central government, and recognised the armed forces of the SPLM as an autonomous part of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). In addition, the CPA provided that for the purpose of holding national and regional elections at the end of the transitional period, the transitional government should draft and ratify a transitional constitution and should enact wide social and political reforms for the sake of promoting democracy and general freedoms (CPA, 2005).

The position of police under the CPA and the anticipated constitution was one of the sensitive issues during negotiations. To control the volatile situation in Darfur and other areas, the government of the Sudan was eager to keep the organisation of police forces and their legal framework as they were. However, the SPLM, supported by the international community and the opposition northern political parties, wanted to introduce radical reforms to the legal framework and structure of the police and other security forces in order to restoring the previous civil and decentralised fashion of policing in the country.

The CPA adopted a model of police administration composed of three levels: the national level, the South Sudan government level, and the state level (CPA, 2005: Schedules A[8], B[2] and C[2]). The subsequent Interim National Constitution (NIC), which was ratified in July 2005, adopted the same three levels of police administration, but the NIC provided that the powers and functions of each level should be ‘prescribed by law’ (NIC, 2005: art. 148[2]). A few years later, and during the drafting and ratification processes of the Police Act of 2008, the police used this term to expand police powers at the national level and restrict the state’s powers over the police.

The majority of police officers were not very welcoming to these provisions, which they considered to be a second attempt to fragment and undermine the police. The fear of repeating what the police had experienced during the May Regime justified the aggressive reaction of police officers at all levels towards any provision that could be considered an imposition of effective powers over the police force at the state level. Therefore, although art. 5(2) of the Police Act (2008) had provided for a decentralised police structure recognising three levels of police administration (federal police, South Sudan police and state police), one can hardly find any substantial statutory powers at the state level mentioned under the security arrangements in chapter 6 of the CPA. Instead, the Police Act (2008) strengthened and determined in detail the duties and powers of the Minister of the Interior and the Police Director-General relating to recruitment, promotion, deployment, supervision, legal and administrative powers over police staff according to the provisions of arts 17(2), 21(1) and (2), 30(2), 34(1) and (2), 55 and 58(1) and (2). In addition, although most of the military terms and combat duties stipulated in the 1999 Act were withdrawn, police continued exercising those functions on the practical level.

Conclusion

The Sudanese state has usually resorted to tightening its grip over the police by imposing a centralised mode of police administration to confront any threat of political or social disorder. Nevertheless, the state itself does not basically prefer this mode of policing, which it considers temporary. When such measures have been prolonged for a period of time, the police structure and practice have been deeply affected by them, and switching back to the decentralised model of policing has been a slow and expensive process.

The same generalisation is applicable to civil and military models of policing when the state is in danger from violence or armed conflicts. At such times it has adopted a military and authoritarian model of policing, but at the expense of general freedoms, human rights and democracy. Therefore, one of the first demands during all political reconciliations (the Addis Ababa agreement 1972 and CPA, 2005) or in political changes (October 1964 and April 1985 uprisings) in the Sudan has been the reconstruction of the police according to a civil and decentralised model of policing.

The major interest of police officers and other staff is focused on how to develop their profession and to protect their institution from arbitrary political power in the country. The behaviour of the Sudanese political class can hardly be described as democratic, or sensitive to the good models of policing, especially when it comes to the rule of law, institutional neutrality, impartiality and independence. Career security and satisfaction are one of the main methods used to force or even to blackmail police officer in their daily practice. For example, when the current regime came to power in 1989, one third of police officers were dismissed within three months (Abu Haraz, in press: 178), the same strategy adopted by all regimes since independence, including parliamentary regimes.

Professional police officers have been made nervous by the contradictory and inconsistent behaviour of the state, and have considered that the only way for them to protect themselves is to build a large and central institution capable of confronting any arbitrary acts against them. This has been obvious in their tendency to expand the number of staff whenever they have a chance; the number of police officers has increased from fewer than 400 officers in the 1970s to more than 6,000 today. Other ranks were expanded from fewer than 6,000 at the dawn of independence to more than 100,000. We have also seen, as in the aftermath of the CPA, that they desperately fight any attempt to decentralise their institution. They believe that a large and central police force will advance their position when negotiating professional issues with the political and executive apparatus of the state. However, the police still need to seek ways to protect themselves and their institutions by making compromises with the state (Salim, 2005: 311). Unfortunately, to prepare the ground for this negotiation and to gain some leverage, the police have had to present themselves as the heavy stick in the hand of the state rather than as the public servant or the protector of human or civil rights.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

First I would like to thank the Chevening Scholarship Programme, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the government of the UK, for funding this research. My thanks is also extended to Dr Tarik Kochi, Dr Martin Daly and Dr Michael Kearney for their advice and comments. My appreciation is also due to the University of Sussex, School of Law and Political Science for providing an excellent environment for this research, as well as to the staff of the Sudan National Records Office, and the Archives and Special Collections library, University of Durham, for help in providing the materials for this work.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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