The positive perception of reduced gang violence through a public safety initiative

Abstract

Gang violence poses a significant concern for the police and the public. In response, in 2008 policing agencies in British Columbia introduced Restaurant Watch, a targeted strategy aiming to deter unwanted gang-involved patrons from attending participating restaurants. In response to a lack of research, the present study examines the perceived success of the programme, through semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders participating in the programme. The findings suggest the programme has value based on three important themes: (1) impact on public safety; (2) importance of partnership and open dialogue; and (3) ability to deter inadmissible patrons from participating establishments.

Keywords

Gangs intervention gang violence problem-oriented policing gang suppression

Introduction

This study examines the Restaurant Watch programme in the city of Vancouver, British Columbia (BC). Restaurant Watch is a voluntary (and therefore self-selecting) community-based initiative, which followed the success of Barwatch, a community programme introduced in December 2007 after a series of violent events occurred in bars and nightclubs in Vancouver, BC (Centre for Problem-Oriented Policing, n.d.). In essence, the Restaurant Watch programme was created to target gang members frequenting popular Vancouver restaurants and in doing so, to respond to the ongoing concerns expressed by restaurant owners and police about the risk of victimisation that gang members brought with them in public places.

Restaurant Watch is a public safety initiative, implemented in July 2008, and a programme designed to help quell the scenes of public violence perpetrated by the gangs. According to Bolan (2015) and others (Bailey, 2012; Bains, 2013; Skelton, 2009), much of the violence took place in and around the licensed premises in the city of Vancouver, and thus provided for greater concern around public safety. Ultimately, 86 people were victimised by serious violence (shot or stabbed) between 1987 and 2014, and when these same violent acts began to occur in upscale restaurants where many of the city’s elite socialised, public concern was piqued, the police became concerned and the media became frantic. As gang-related shootings increased, the restaurant industry showed still greater concern for the safety of patrons, who may unwittingly become the by-product of gang violence, and initiated talks with the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) regarding the provision of a public safety initiative. The programme allows police officers to eject ‘inadmissible’ individuals from (any of the 130) participating establishments, thereby reducing levels of violence.

According to VPD, the objectives of the programme focus on three principles: patron safety, staff safety, and public safety (Lott (personal communication), 12 December 2017). The objectives are to (a) reduce the threat of collateral violence to restaurant patrons by deterring individuals who pose a risk to public safety; (b) reduce the interaction, intimidation, fear and harassment between restaurant staff and individuals who pose a risk to public safety; and (c) deter public violence caused by organised crime groups and their associates by making it known that they are unwelcome and will be removed (VPD, 2016). Interested establishment owners are educated on the risks associated with gang activity and are informed of the potential risks that gang members pose when dining in their establishments. The legal framework of the Restaurant Watch programme relies on sections 1, 4, 8, and 10 of the British Columbia Trespass Act, whereby the owner/occupier or agent of the restaurant, which is considered a private establishment, can authorise any person to act on their behalf to eject an individual. In this scenario, the police department becomes the ‘authorised person’ who is permitted to remove inadmissible patrons on behalf of the participating establishment (VPD, 2016).

Restaurant owners follow specific protocols if they have reason to believe that someone is known or suspected to be an associate of a gang member or involved in serious criminal activities (VPD, 2016). If the police are called to an establishment to remove an inadmissible patron, specific procedures are followed and are set-out in the Vancouver Police Department Ejection Flowchart (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Vancouver Police Department Ejection Flowchart.

While patrons within the establishment are not legally required to provide identification to the authorised person, the establishment’s owner is able to create specific rules and regulations for that establishment. If patrons refuse to provide identification, the police advise the patrons that they will no longer be served and will be asked to leave the premises. Consequently, if the patrons choose not to leave, they are notified that by not complying with the request, they are deemed to be trespassing (VPD, 2016). In cases where the inadmissible patrons do not leave, the patrons can be found to have committed an offence under section 4 of the Trespass Act and, as a result, can be subject to arrest under section 10 of the British Columbia Trespass Act (2010) (VPD, 2016). The Restaurant Watch programme identifies inadmissible patron[s] as individuals whose lifestyles, associations and activities pose a risk to public safety, either directly or from a third party (VPD, 2016). The Restaurant Watch Authorization Agreement (RWAA) utilises the specific wording of ‘…individuals known to be associated to or involved in serious and/or violent criminal activities’ as a definition (VPD, 2016: 2). Although the Restaurant Watch programme does operate independently, it is similar to that of the Barwatch programme, which also allows for police to eject inadmissible patrons from the participating establishment.

It is also important to note at this juncture that, although this discourse does not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the programme, it contributes knowledge to the literature on crime reduction and it provides an assessment regarding the programme’s efficacy from the perspectives of key stakeholders. We would add that to date there have been no serious evaluations of the Restaurant Watch programme in Vancouver, and there are no evaluations available for similar operating programmes, such as the Barwatch programme. Indeed, while acknowledging that other interventions (similar to Restaurant Watch) may exist elsewhere, we have been unable to find a comparable programme from which to better evaluate this public safety initiative.

Literature review

The rationale for Restaurant Watch – gang violence and the pursuit of hedonism

The violence related to gangs has been a concern for Canada throughout much of the past 20 years, and certainly the last decade. For example, Khenti (2013) argued that the rate of violence and homicide amongst young black men in around the Toronto area should be considered a public health concern, a consequence of growing levels of poverty, income inequality, sustained racial inequality, health and mental health issues. In a similar way, British Columbia has been of significant concern due to rising levels of violence, which pose significant public safety concerns. This concern was noted by Walker et al. (2014), when investigating the prevalence of violent trauma hotspots in Vancouver, British Columbia, reflecting on the findings of Cusimano et al. (2010), who note a concentration of violent injury clustered around establishments which serve alcohol.

It may be argued that British Columbia has a gang problem because of the lucrative marijuana cultivation business (see Haines-Saah et al., 2014; McConnell, 2016; Pearce, 2009; Plecas et al. 2012). Marijuana is the primary industry of profit for gangs in British Columbia because of its accessibility and the relative ease with which it is illegally exported and exchanged for other illegal drugs and firearms. As Pearce (2009: 18) states, marijuana has had various gangs in British Columbia fighting for the ‘largest slice of the pie’. Thus, as the gangs fight for a percentage of the drug trade, their presence has continued to pose a significant threat to public safety (Criminal Intelligence Services Canada [CISC], 2010). This has also been considered by Prowse (2012), when explaining why new-age gangs (otherwise termed ‘hybrid gangs’ – see for example Howell and Griffiths, 2016) participate in violence. These ‘new age gangs’, says Prowse, are associated with a much more fluid membership and have far less organisational structure than traditional gangs. Therefore, it is possible that the violence occurs when these gangs try to seek affiliation at the organised crime level, because of the lack of rigidity and structure, consequently resulting in inter-gang rivalries.

The Provincial Gang Police also describe the gang situation in BC as being unique from other places of the world, as ‘gangs and gang violence transcend ethnicity, socio-economic status and geography (CFSEU Understanding Youth and Gangs. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, April 2014: 5). This is an important distinction about BC, and why an anti-gang patron programme like Restaurant Watch is invaluable, as gang members and the violence are not confined to certain neighbourhoods. In Vancouver, a high-level gang member is as likely to be sitting in an expensive restaurant surrounded by the city’s elite as they are to be sitting in a car in a low-income housing project.

Between October 2007 and October 2008, VPD noted that there was a total of 14 fatal gang shootings within the city of Vancouver (VPD, 2009a), and a year later gang violence across British Columbia reached its peak at 44 homicides (Jingfors et al., 2015). This drew a public statement from the Chief of Vancouver Police, Jim Chu, which noted that although the police are never supposed to admit to having a gang problem, the city of Vancouver was in the midst of a gang war and public safety was the prominent consideration in police efforts (VPD, 2009b). Not only was British Columbia in the middle of a gang war, but police warned the public that the recent violent events were ‘…seen as new rules of engagement for gangsters…and [Gangsters] are now shooting each other when they don’t have to’ (CBC, 2009: para. 16). Gang members were reportedly engaging in shootings in public venues such as bars, hotels, clubs, and restaurants. Indeed, Totten (2012: 5) has stated that in 2009, social media outlets dubbed the city of Abbotsford (BC) as the ‘Murder Capital of Canada’. Yet, the cause of such violent behaviour in British Columbia has proved elusive to examination (McConnell, 2016).

Studies in the United States have examined family socioeconomic status (i.e. poverty), family structural characteristics (e.g. single family homes and structures), ethnicity, parenting styles, negative influences (e.g. family members/peers involved in gangs) and the effect they may have in increasing the risk of future gang membership (Esbensen et al., 2009; Howell and Egley, 2005; Klein and Maxson, 2006; O’Brien et al., 2013; Thornberry et al., 1993). Although these causal factors apply to many cities in the United States and perhaps even some in Canada, they are not necessarily true of gangs in British Columbia. In fact, where Sanchez-Jankowsi (1991) states that although gangs are a rational response to irrational circumstances (e.g. lack of alternatives, poor socioeconomic status, lack of opportunities), McConnell (2016) has noted that gang members in British Columbia seemingly make irrational choices in life circumstances that appear to be otherwise rational. In other words, some gang members rationally choose the gang lifestyle as a means to satisfy their needs. This is an important distinction, because in other countries, being excluded from nice restaurants would not deter gang members. In Vancouver, gang members are often motivated by glamorisation (Gottenbos, McConnell and Bain, forthcoming), while in other places, gang members are motivated by more basic instincts, such as survival and protection.

With regard to characteristics of gangs, in his research in British Columbia, Gordon (1994) noted that half of the youth involved in gangs came from traditional at-risk homes (e.g. poverty, substance abuse, poor socioeconomic status), while the other 50% joined gangs for financial reasons, status and power. Furthermore, it has been argued that gang members in British Columbia are mostly diverse, multicultural and typically come from middle-class homes (Gordon, 2000; McConnell, 2016). This has also been seen in the research conducted by McCuish et al. (2015), where they have also suggested that gangs are distinctively different in British Columbia in the sense that they are not ethnically based or from poor socioeconomic environments. Therefore, it is important not to generalise the American research to the Canadian context, particularly in British Columbia (McCuish et al., 2015). As these gangs differ from those in other cities or countries (McCuish et al., 2015), it is not surprising to see gangs congregate in marginalised neighbourhoods in places like Toronto or Chicago; however, McConnell (2016) notes that this is not applicable to the Lower Mainland. He argues that, for British Columbia, gang members congregated in the local popular restaurants and for that reason, anti-gang initiatives in British Columbia must go where the police can target these individuals to reduce violence, including in licensed premises, such as bars, clubs and restaurants.

Prowse (2012) has suggested that when gang members know that they are targets of violence from rivals, they perceive that the safest place for them is in public places, as they hope this will be a deterrent for those pursuing them. However, she goes on to point out that if the only opportunity to reach a gang member is in a public place, rival gangs will seize the opportunity, regardless of the risk it may pose to the public. Jingfors et al. (2015) concur, finding that in British Columbia, the majority of the gang-related homicides occurred in public venues as opposed to private areas. Both these studies are further supported by the work of Descormier (2013) and Pinizzotto et al. (1997). In the latter, Pinizzotto et al. examined violence against law enforcement in the United States, and found that in examining the offender’s perspective, respect, honour, status and loyalty all had an influencing factor in the decisions to use violence. Descormier (2013) interviewed 73 self-identified gang members from British Columbia and found that violent crime was often used to demonstrate loyalty, and as a means of initiation of new members. In this circumstance, and due to the perceived risk for violence to occur in public areas, the implementation of problem-oriented policing programmes such as Barwatch and Restaurant Watch has become well situated through the fundamental goals of preventing gang-affiliated persons from participating in public venues.

Theoretical perspective

We have concentrated upon Routine Activities Theory, as we believe that this most clearly explains the behaviour associated with gang (violence) in British Columbia. For example, Strain theory explains crime and deviance through the pressures faced by the individual in pursuit of the ‘American Dream’. Gangs in British Columbia are somewhat different. As noted above, a common explanation is that membership is driven by the need to ‘survive’ and can even be related to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Need (1943). Yet in British Columbia, membership is often an attraction to the glamorised notions of a status lifestyle. Thus Felson and Clark (1998) argued that most criminological theories focus on understanding why some people may be more criminally inclined than others. However, Felson and Clark (1998) correctly note that it is similarly important to acknowledge the role of the environment and how environmental influences facilitate behaviour. These (social) theories assert that everyday activities can place individuals in environments or situations where they are more, or less, likely to have contact with the offender, thus increasing the risk of victimisation (Finkelhor and Asdigian, 1996).

Previously, Cohen and Felson’s (1979) theory had suggested that three elements needed to be present for a crime to occur: a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Therefore, the rate of crime increases when these three components converge in space and time. In other words, the everyday activities that people engage in make some people more likely to be perceived as a suitable target by a motivated offender. Furthermore, it is important to note that in addition to the intent to commit a crime, the offender must be able to carry out his desire to commit crime (Akers and Sellers, 2012). Suitable targets can take a number of forms depending upon the nature of the crime (i.e. the intent) and the situational context (i.e. the available opportunities). Finally, Akers and Sellers (2012) suggest that there needs to be a lack of guardianship, which would otherwise increase the risk of being detected. According to Cohen and Felson (1979), the most formal types of guardians have previously been law enforcement members. However, other forms of guardianship can include CCTV cameras, security systems, physical barriers and a wide range of environmental characteristics that might inhibit offenders.

Routine Activities Theory may lend support to understanding the nature of the Restaurant Watch programme and its overall goals of increased public safety and reduced victimisation. The suitable targets are the gang members, pursued by rival gang members. The reason for the founding of Restaurant Watch was the fact that potential victims may also include innocent bystanders, caught up in the associated gang violence, present at the wrong time and in the wrong place. The motivated offenders are gang members who are looking for the opportunity to take out rival gang members when their guard may be down. Unfortunately, given the context explained above as to the expected lifestyle of a gang member in British Columbia, restaurants are places where rival gang members are more likely to encounter one another. This has been evident in the some of the shootings within restaurants, where gang members have targeted one another because they appeared at the same eatery (Mercer, 2011). While historically the capable guardian may have been provided by the public domain, which may be considered as ‘off limits’ to some gangs given the risk of unnecessarily attracting police attention, in British Columbia, motivated gang members have not been deterred by the public. Given this, there was an opportunity for the Restaurant Watch programme to provide this missing element and, subsequently, reduce the level of gang-associated crime.

Sampson and Lauritsen (1990) argued that gang membership involves close proximity to fellow offenders and criminal events, and, as a result, the chance of violence and subsequent retaliation is high. This has also been seen in some of the gang violence in British Columbia, where police have previously warned the public of possible gang retaliation between rival group members in public places (Bolan, 2012). With reference to the Restaurant Watch programme, ejecting gang members removes the element of the suitable targets. Moreover, with police officers doing random walk-throughs in the restaurants, gang members know that Restaurant Watch establishments have a heavy police presence and, due to this capable guardian, gang members would be less likely to engage in violence. In this sense, according to Routine Activities Theory, the suitable target is removed, and a capable guardian is provided.

This is further supported by the work of McConnell, interviewing former gang members in BC. His research found that the glamour of the ‘gang’ lifestyle was a significant reason gang members wanted to be in restaurants and bars. In interview with a former independent soldier, the experience of being a known gang member in a licensed premise was described as being a ‘rock star’ (2016: 152). This status created the motivated offender that routine activity suggests as part of the reason for the criminal activity to occur. In fact, in McConnell’s research a former gang member referred to the period before Barwatch (Anti-Gang Patron Ejection Programmes) as the Golden Years (2016). This is not uncommon and has been noted in other works, for example, Katz (1988) speaks of the seduction of crime, and of the desire to have success, albeit through illegal means, as a significant motivator.

While there exists strong theoretical support underlying the objectives and purpose of the Restaurant Watch programme, the programme has not yet been evaluated. Thus there is a need for exploratory research to discuss the motivations for developing such a project, describing the process involved in creating the programme, and assessing the perceptions of those participating in the programme.

Methodology

The purpose of this research is to qualitatively examine the perceptions of the effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch programme in Vancouver (BC). A purposive sampling technique was implemented to generate the sample of key programme stakeholders from both the police and restaurant sectors who participated in semi-structured interviews. As this was an exploratory qualitative study focusing on an under-researched topic, three preliminary themes were considered in the examination of the perceived effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch programme: (a) the programme’s effect on public safety; (b) the importance of partnership and dialogue; and (c) the deterrence of inadmissible patrons. A semi-structured interview schedule was designed to explore these themes in depth. Each interview provided for between 45 to 60 minutes and a total of 11 questions were prepared and follow-up questions were asked where necessary to obtain greater depth of understanding.

The decision was made that, as we wanted to examine the perceptions of stakeholders, we would select participants which very much fit Etikan et al.’s (2016: 2) description of a purposive sample, in which there is a ‘…deliberate choice of a participant due to the qualities the participant possesses’. They go on to note that as it is used in qualitative methods to ‘…identify and select the information-rich cases’, it is important to identify and select individuals ‘…that are proficient and well-informed with a phenomena of interest’ (ibid.). To this end we selected our participants from the restaurant owners and general managers (many of whom were responsible for more than one establishment) and the officers working as part of the gang unit in Vancouver.

As indicated in Table 1, the participants included: (a) police officers with the VPD, who had current or past experience enforcing the Restaurant Watch programme in Vancouver (BC); (b) restaurant personnel who had decision-making authority, specifically owners or managers whose establishments were enrolled in the Restaurant Watch programme (in addition, a small number of these participants also had responsibility for franchise locations outside of the city of Vancouver); (c) the Restaurant Watch programme creator; and (d) the current Restaurant Watch police coordinator. In total, 15 participants were interviewed, all of whom were key stakeholders in the Restaurant Watch programme, and as suggested by Etikan et al. (2016), their knowledge and experience provided rich data regarding their experiences with and perceptions of the effectiveness of the programme. In seeking to maintain the confidentiality of the programme of research, all participants were provided pseudonyms to protect their identities.

Table 1.

Research participants.

Alias	Position	Relevance to Programme
Vincent	Vancouver Police	Gang unit member
Victor	Vancouver Police	Gang unit member
Vinn	Vancouver Police	Gang unit member
Vaughn	Vancouver Police	Gang unit member
Robert	Owner and operator	Oversees multiple locations
Richard	Director of operations	Oversees multiple locations
Raymond	General manager	Oversees one location
Ronald	General manager	Oversees one location
Randy	Maître d’	Oversees one location
Russell	Chief executive officer	Oversees multiple locations
Robyn	Owner and operator	Oversees multiple locations
Ricky	Owner and operator	Oversees multiple locations
Rodney	Owner and operator	Oversees multiple locations
Riley	Vice president	Oversees multiple locations
Rusty	General manager	Oversees one location

In order to recruit police participants, contact information for the research team was given to a police officer working in the gang unit at the VPD, who further distributed this information. Individuals who were interested in participating in the study voluntarily contacted the team directly. Correspondence with the Restaurant Watch programme coordinator provided for the recruitment of restaurant personnel via email, providing contact information to be further distributed to various restaurant owners who (in keeping with our research requirement for volunteers) wanted to participate in the study.

The research team made use of N-Vivo to examine the interview transcript, and to group words/phrases that were associated with public safety, programme strengths, weaknesses, future improvements, benefits and gang violence deterrence. During the analysis of the data, the team sought out commonalities, repetitive concepts and specific responses to the three predominant themes: (a) the programme’s effect on public safety, (b) the importance of partnership and dialogue and (c) the deterrence of inadmissible patrons.

As noted previously, the focus of the research was to add to the existing literature on anti-gang strategies to reduce violence and to increase community safety. In doing so we wanted to assess the perceived effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch programme by exploring how the programme was deemed to be effective and successful from the point of view of the key stakeholders. The objectives were to examine: (1) perceived benefit; (2) perceived programme effectiveness; and (3) perceived programme deterrent value. The overarching question was: Did the programme instil more confidence in the public in frequenting restaurants that participated in the programme?

The perceived benefits of the Restaurant Watch programme

The Restaurant Watch programme is voluntary in nature and it involves a partnership between the VPD, Restaurants Canada, British Columbia Restaurant and Food Association (BCRFA) and participating restaurant establishments. The concept of maintaining a strong partnership alongside an open dialogue was a recurring sentiment from all interviews. These key components were viewed as being the strengths contributing to the success of the programme and proved of greatest importance to the perception of the benefits provided by the programme and were best exemplified by statements made by Vincent and Victor (both officers with VPD) and Rusty, Richard and Riley (restaurateurs). Vincent explained it as:

…a partnership between us [police] and them [restaurants], and we have to be respectful of that and kind of limit disruptiveness when we go through these places, and kind of cater to how busy it is that night, the history of the place, who we think is actually in there…[and] being minimally intrusive.

Victor added that with two meetings a year for participating establishments and the programme coordinator, there was an even greater opportunity for a two-way communication. Victor went on to underline the importance of communication, noting that:

The information that [the police] share when you’re at those meetings…you can actually bring back into the actual restaurant to share with your staff, share with the management team.

He added that it was about having an open dialogue not only with the participating restaurants but also with the general public and the inadmissible patrons themselves:

[m]ost people, I believe, like it…we’re very nice, we don’t walk around like a bunch of robots and soldiers, right? We talk to everybody who’s out there, we’re nice to them and we explain it to them. And that explanation goes a very long way.

This was similarly stated by the participants from the restaurant industry. Rusty (a General Manager for a [single] large establishment), Richard (the director of operations of several participating establishments) and Riley (vice president of various participating establishments) also reflected on the importance of having an open dialogue and underlined how important it was that the police took the time to explain procedures, train and share information with participating partners. Rusty began:

You go in, the VPD sits down with the manager, or the chef, or the Maître d’, whomever actually is the contact person for the Restaurant Watch program in each restaurant…They actually train you on how to implement that [the program].

Richard added:

Beyond anything, it’s been great to secure those ties…I think it’s strengthened our knowledge. So, from a conflict-resolution side, I think it’s actually improved our training…because they [staff] just know now what to look for; and knowing that they can call the police if they feel that they’re not comfortable, I think has been a huge part for us.

Riley also discussed the significance of programme integrity and trust within the partnerships, stating that:

…I think that’s key, because if you didn’t have that trust, you’d never be able to move forward. They [officers] come in, they do their job, they shake our hands, they’re very discreet about doing whatever, right, and they’re actually really nice about it…and if there’s something that we have to be aware of…they won’t hesitate to pick up a phone.

Programme effectiveness (with regard to public safety)

Within the context of the Restaurant Watch programme, both police officers and restaurant personnel viewed public safety as the idea of preventing the public, staff and management, from being innocent victims of gang-related violence. To this end we asked participants to explain in their own words the effect of such a programme. Vincent and Vin (members of the VPD gang unit) provided a great discussion of the programme effectiveness. Vincent noted that from a policing perspective, the programme was exclusively created as a public safety initiative. Keeping the public safe from gang-related violence was the foundation of the programme and it continues to do so:

Police officers out on patrol will sometimes do restaurant walk-throughs…[as] a public safety initiative. That’s the whole reason it came about. The industry didn’t want to have their staff, their customers shot up because there’s some guy in there who had a hit on him, or had ripped somebody off the week before, and they’re now actively being hunted, as they’re trying to go out and enjoy a meal.

Vinn added that ejecting an inadmissible patron from participating establishments reduced the likelihood that gang-related violence would occur in areas nearby, explaining that if the gang members were not in the restaurant, there was less chance that violence would occur, simply concluding that:

If they’re not here [the gangs], it’s safe.

Eric, the creator of Restaurant Watch, concurred, arguing that public safety was the fundamental reason the programme was created. Getting restaurants to enrol in the programme started with having the conversation of how the programme design discourages unwanted individuals from coming into participating establishments. He emphasised this, by stating that:

We have one focus. When we sign up a new owner, it is very clear. This is a program to dissuade people involved in a certain kind of lifestyle from coming into your restaurant…

Officers were also asked to comment about the targeting of staff, when they have refused service, and Vincent noted that from a police perspective, they are very cautious in how they approach inadmissible patrons for possible ejection:

We don’t involve the staff, we don’t go up to the manager and be like, ‘Hey, is it that table over there?’ pointing to the other side of the restaurant. Because that’s the whole reason we have this program, it takes staff completely out of it. If the guy wants to be a dick about it, it’s the police he’s mad at, not the manager for calling it in. So that’s kind of the big side of it too.

Vincent further added to the discussion of the programme as a safety initiative by stating that it is important to provide a service in which members of the public can go out in the city of Vancouver, and feel safe:

You don’t have to worry about sitting next to a guy who’s had three Duty to Warns, and has been shot four times, and is a high-level drug trafficker. I think, for restaurants, it’s like peace of mind. They call the Vancouver Police, we’ll come and deal with these guys. Back in the day, you’d have staff trying to tell a full-patch Hell’s Angel, ‘Uh, can you go?’ They shouldn’t have to do that, that’s not their job, right? If they do, they’ll just phone the Gang Unit up or the Patrol and they’ll come and kick these guys out for us.

In addition, Richard, the Director of Operations of multiple locations, stated that it really was about making his patrons feel as safe and comfortable as possible:

For us, I think it’s more about the safety of our customers and our staff, and obviously a protection for the community as well. And it’s a program that’s worked very well for…all the restaurants that have gotten onboard…

He added that the programme had helped to create a culture of increased staff confidence that neither they nor their customers would be accidental victims of gang-related violence, thus reducing fear of violent crime. Richard explained it thus:

Over the years [the police] created a culture that gang members are not welcome in our restaurants. So, our customers, in turn, can feel comfortable that they’re not going to worry about a drive-by shooting or a fight that’s going to break out in the restaurant.

Deterrence of gang violence

It became apparent throughout the interviews that deterring inadmissible patrons from attending participating establishments was highly relevant in the work of the Restaurant Watch programme. As noted previously, the gangs in British Columbia differ considerably from those in other places. For example, McConnell (2016) stressed that gang members in British Columbia have historically been treated as equivalent to celebrities. This was something that participants evidenced, with Rodney stating that gang members would come into the establishments and spend thousands of dollars because of the lifestyle they were accustomed to. Yet, even with the financial gains available, the interviewees also revealed that both the police and the restaurants were on the same page about wanting to eject gang members (regardless of how much money they spent in the restaurants). This demonstrated that although some restaurants understood, that financially, gang members were more likely to spend money at their establishments due to their lifestyles, having gang members in the establishment was not worth the risk to patrons and future business. To address this, the Restaurant Watch programme works in a way that it simply removes the opportunity for the ‘flash’ lifestyle. When questioned, Eric (the programme creator) utilised an example from the 1970s:

In the ’70s, so when you used to have the park gangs, right, Riley Park, Clark Park, those kind of gangs, right? But back then…they’d congregate, right, no cell phones, none of that. They congregate around parks and they geographically identify themselves. Okay. So, take that away. Enforce your Parks bylaw. Enforce your ten o’clock curfew on parks. Take that away. Take away the part that lets them congregate and do business.

Although the authors cannot claim through these research findings that the implementation of the Restaurant Watch programme reduced gang-related violence, it was evident from the interviews that stakeholders felt that they saw less inadmissible patrons in their establishments, and therefore reduced fear of violence. Robyn, who oversees four participating establishments, stated that:

Since the start of it, it has been so successful. It’s unbelievable; actually, being someone that started with this programme probably in my 20s, and then seeing it now and the difference in the clientele in a lot of the restaurants in Vancouver is totally different. Because these people [gang members] used to venture out to downtown. It was like a night out, like a special occasion…They’re intimidating, and they would come in and be flashy and loud…You barely ever see that anymore. So, I feel the success of weeding them out has been huge.

Ricky further evidenced the sentiment that today there were less inadmissible patrons, noting the reduction in numbers in the two establishments he owned, saying:

Sometimes I don’t even know our staff’s calling, which is fine, I prefer that. I almost prefer they don’t even contact me, they just do it on their own. The need for that [police contact] has severely diminished over the years. Again, whether it’s because the program’s being effective or because it’s just the way the outside world is going right now…

Similarly, Rodney, who owns and operates eight participating establishments, echoed similarities and highlighted why inadmissible patrons stayed away:

We know that their [gangsters] not downtown anymore, because it used to be so often. Oh God, every day we used to be ‘there is a table that’s got $4,000’. Every day, constant, constant. We used to have them coming in three nights, three times a night. Right. But now maybe once every three weeks you see somebody in the restaurant. So, the message has got so loud and clear for them ‘Don’t go downtown, you’re going to get harassed by the cops, you’re going to be asked for your ID.’

When asked if he felt the programme deterred gang violence, Rusty stated that ejections have sent out a message to certain individuals that they were simply not welcome in the Vancouver core, and if they did come to any participating establishment, they ran the risk of getting ejected:

I think it’s been huge. If you remember back when there was the shooting outside of Gotham Steakhouse a few years ago, and that shooting that took place at the Wall Centre in the restaurant there, it [Restaurant Watch] definitely has deterred gang members. I think that with all the ejections that have happened over the past five or six years, a lot of the gang members actually have got the message that they are not welcome here in the downtown core or in any other restaurants just due to the fact that they ran that risk of being ejected.

Finally, we asked the same of Vincent and Vinn, from VPD. Vincent said he also saw a difference in how inadmissible patrons acted prior to the programme compared to implementation, pointing out that prior to the programme:

…gangsters wore it [ejection] like a badge of honor, and that’s from me personally seeing it. Now it’s like they’re embarrassed, they don’t want to get kicked out…especially if they’re paying money to get in for some place. Or, they order their food and then pay for their drinks, and they’re like, ‘No. Sorry, you’ve got to go.’ And it bugs them now, I think, and they’re embarrassed.

Agreeing with this, Vinn added:

They can’t have a proper dinner, whether it be with their girlfriends or their other friends. They want to show how much money they have, and they want to blow it. So, they can’t do it here. And the last thing they want to do is get embarrassed by police.

In each of the interviews there was a sense of a more positive outlook produced by the Restaurant Watch programme, which had in turn produced a heightened reduction in fear of gang-violence. This is important, because in serving as a public safety initiative, it requires a sense, or perception, of accomplishment. In order to generate public confidence and support for the local policing endeavours to provide a public service, there needs to be a real sense of change, and Restaurant Watch seems to have effectively captured this positivity within the community (Bain, 2016; Bain et al., 2014; Born, 2015).

Discussion

As the literature on programmes such as Restaurant Watch is limited, the purpose of this study was to contribute to the existing literature in an effort to better understand the benefits of such a programme and how it might be improved. The main findings from the interviews were valuable because they portrayed the previously unheard perspectives of the key stakeholders. The participants stated that the programme was a public safety initiative designed to keep gang members, organised criminals and their associates out of participating establishments. Moreover, the restaurant participants felt that the programme was effective in protecting both patrons and management because they observed a reduction in the number of gang members attending their establishments. Further, restaurant participants felt that the programme alleviated the stress that staff encountered when requesting that an individual leave the premises. This, in turn, supports the wider ideals of a reduction in the fear of crime, violence and harm, as police are now able to intervene within the parameters of the programme.

As we noted, the concern for violence in public places was supported by Prowse (2012), who suggested that when gang members know they are targets of violence, they often perceive public places as the safest place to be. However, the Restaurant Watch programme added a deterrent effect by allowing the police to engage, and eject, the inadmissible patron, thus further decreasing the chance that crime and violence will occur. Bain et al. (2014) note that public opinion of the ways in which policing is conducted plays a significant role in perceptions of public safety and overall fear of crime.

With these points in mind, we can restate that the success of the programme lies in the collaborative nature of the partnership, with both police and restaurant participants reporting good lines of communication with one another. Restaurant participants felt that attending the Restaurant Watch meetings was beneficial to obtaining information, addressing any issues and receiving feedback. Moreover, police participants felt that the restaurant participants were consistent in their calls for service. Also, police participants commented positively on the proactive nature of the programme; they stated that all calls were important, regardless of whether the individual met the criteria for removal or not. Police participants stated that they felt restaurants were being observant, alert, and were proactively engaging in the programme. This was added to through the process of information sharing which took place. The Vancouver Police Department were able to inform restaurant staff about particular individuals who were publicly mentioned in the media, provide updates on gang conflicts in the city, and inform the establishments of gang members’ propensity for violence.

This partnership and open dialogue also sends a message to gang members that the restaurant industry is collaborating with the police to respond to and prevent future gang violence. This type of collaborative relationship demonstrates that the two are working together to achieve a common goal – to ensure public safety. From a routine activities perspective, it could be argued that once these two groups are able to share information effectively, they present a stronger ‘united capable guardian’ with an enhanced ability to deter motivated offenders, such as those that attend Restaurant Watch establishments. For instance, each of the restaurant participants commented that after they joined the programme, they felt that the number of gang members dining at their establishments decreased. Moreover, restaurant participants reported that currently the number of calls to police about an inadmissible patron have also decreased, suggesting that fewer and fewer gang members are coming into these establishments. This shows that since the implementation for the Restaurant Watch programme, participants are noticing a decrease in the number of inadmissible patrons attending their establishment, thus reducing both risk or harm and the associated fear of violence.

Observations and limitations

As the Restaurant Watch collaboration between the police and community has been perceived to be effective in providing a united front, other multi-agency collaborations should review these successes in information sharing to determine how they too could benefit from engaging in public safety strategies similar to those of Restaurant Watch. Thus, in this final section we wanted to take the opportunity to reflect upon the work of the programme and the findings of this exploratory study. To do this we considered a number of observations that came to light in the work, and some of the limitations, which will be important moving forward, for this and any future study seeking to examine the gangs/gang membership in British Columbia.

Observations

The implementation of restaurant watch in neighbouring cities

Although similar programmes (such as Barwatch) have previously been implemented in jurisdictions across the Lower Mainland, the Restaurant Watch programme is independent of Barwatch, and operates free of charge and on a voluntary basis. This openness to support the community and reciprocal engagement on the part of the restaurants has produced a good deal of positivity. However, and rightly so, it has also led to some concern amongst participants who oversaw multiple dining locations within the province of British Columbia. They suggest that the success can be noted in fewer calls being placed to VPD to help with inadmissible persons, the effect has been a wish to see similar services in other locations (outside of Vancouver), where there had been a perceived increase in gang membership. These included cities such as Surrey, Burnaby, Port Coquitlam and Langley, each of which are areas that may now benefit from modelling similar programmes. The engagement in these other cities has yet to be examined and we would recommend that a comparative analysis be conducted to chart the development and success of the programme as it grows.

Enhanced programme training for general duty officers

Restaurant participants noted that they felt the general duty police officers were less familiar with how to carry out an ejection compared to the gang crime unit police officers. There was a general consensus amongst the restaurant participants that although the general duty police officers were a lot more familiar with the programme since its implementation, the gang crime unit police officers were still more consistent with enforcing the programme (e.g. how to approach the table, explaining the programme to the inadmissible patrons and others, carrying out the ejection and consulting with staff). It is recognised that the officers in the gang crime unit are specialised in their duties, but consistency is key, and the notable differences suggest a need for further training of rank and file officers, with an external audit and review process. This would better support the officers in the work they do on a day-to-day basis, and could increase public confidence in policing, and therefore public support for the programme of intervention (see Bain, 2016).

Continued enforcement and police presence

Restaurant participants felt that since they saw fewer and fewer gang members coming to their restaurants, there also appeared to be less of a police presence. In further explaining this, some participants stated that one of the tactics the police used to check if gang members were dining at participating restaurants was to do random walk-throughs in the participating restaurants. Participants noted that the officers would come in, check in with the managers to see if there were any inadmissible patrons, do a quick scan of the premises and then leave the restaurant if there was no one of interest. There was some concern that the programme’s success had led to a reduction in the police walk-throughs and random visits, and that as a consequence it could see the gang-members return as the deterrent effect diminished. Nevertheless, whilst something to be considered further, we would suggest that in providing the officers the latitude to initiate contact with the restaurants and their staff, a presence can be maintained.

Continued partnership and dialogue

Bain (2016: 5) has noted the power that continued dialogue can have in supporting public–police relations, and concludes that this relationship is very often something that police departments are accused of being very poor at. The findings from the study further highlight how important it was that participants had a positive relationship with one another in respect to implementing and enforcing the programme. Participants felt the programme’s success was attributable to the fact that both the police and the participating restaurants were constantly checking in with one another, attending programme meetings, receptive to feedback and that both parties were responsive. Moreover, the fact that the police were sharing information with the restaurants, which was both practical and useful, could be viewed as an example of the open dialogues the two organisations had with one another, and is of great importance to the effectiveness of the programme.

Limitations

The current study is limited, but for good reason. First, although the sample size can be considered small in number, it is representative of the key stakeholders in research location. There are currently more than 100 restaurants and establishments participating in the programme, and these should be surveyed. In its current form this research should not be used to make generalisations as to the effectiveness of programmes of this nature. As a result, it should be seen as providing insight into the perceived effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch programme in Vancouver, and as providing the first meaningful step towards a larger evaluation of this and similar programmes.

In addition, the current research does not encompass the views of inadmissible patrons and regular patrons. This can be viewed as a limitation as this research was unable to provide an understanding of how these groups may have been influenced by the programme, if at all. It would have been interesting to gauge if the programme has altered gang members’ decisions as to where they spend their leisure time or if they were more inclined or deterred to attend participating establishments.

The current study was exploratory in nature and examined the perceived effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch programme from narratives obtained via semi-structured interviews. This is important because an understanding of the programme is integral to any future research of the area. In using a qualitative method, key stakeholders provided rich data concerning their own personal experience of programme success. Moreover, stakeholders were able to express any changes in trends prior to, and following, the implementation of the programme. We accept that in doing this we have not accounted for the numbers of ejections that have been made under the programme, and would suggest that any future study account for this in order to validate the work of the programme to reduce violence and reduce fear of violence.

Last, and as previously stated, this study did not examine the potential displacement of violence that could be caused by ejecting inadmissible patrons from the city of Vancouver to the surrounding cities. It is acknowledged that in the interviews, participants noted that, more and more, inadmissible patrons were getting the message that the police and restaurants did not want gang members attending the participating establishments. The participants added that because some of the gang members were constantly getting ejected by the police from participating establishments in the Vancouver area, gang members were often found attending the same restaurant chain but in a different city, such as in Burnaby, Surrey, Port Coquitlam or Langley.

Conclusion

Gang violence is of significant concern to many organisations that are invested in keeping the public safe. The Restaurant Watch programme shows that it is not only law enforcement agencies who are concerned about public safety in local communities, but that local businesses, such as restaurants, have an interest in keeping their patrons safe. Violence, even the perceived threat of violence, has consequences to the local community, businesses and (in the case of cities such as Vancouver) even tourism. A perceived increased in violence will inevitably work to undermine stability in the local economy, and thus whether for altruistic reasons or otherwise, programmes such as Restaurant Watch provide the local economy with a worthwhile guardian presence.

This study identified some of the perceived benefits of the Restaurant Watch programme and how stakeholders felt it has positively impacted their organisations. Moreover, it shed light on how the programme has had the ability to deter gang members from frequently visiting restaurants, as police have utilised ejection as a means of deterring these individuals. Furthermore, we also noted that the programme would benefit from further training for police officers that are not working in the gang units, consistent enforcement and police presence, and continuous collaboration between the public and private organisations. In its present form, however, the Restaurant Watch programme appears to be most effective as a counter-measure to reduce gang violence and the victimisation of innocent members of the public.

One of the key actions of the Restaurant Watch programme was the ejection of inadmissible patrons. To further understand if the Restaurant Watch programme is actually effective in deterring gang members from attending restaurants, it would be valuable to look at any available police statistics to see how ejections were occurring and if there were any fluctuations within the years. Future research in examining if gang members were actually being displaced to different cities would also be important, as that is where police resources will need to be deployed. It may also be useful to conduct further research to determine if the cities surrounding Vancouver (BC) are seeing any increase in violence or attendance of gang members within their dining establishments, as a result of gang members being displaced under the programme.

Footnotes

Authors’ note

Shaveta Gahunia is also an MA Graduate from the University of the Fraser Valley, British Columbia, Canada.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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