Abstract
This article explores the factors that contribute to the success or failure of gender quota campaigns through an analysis of two case studies from the Pacific Islands region: Samoa and Papua New Guinea. While Samoa became the first Pacific independent state to implement a parliamentary gender quota in 2013, a campaign for 22 reserved seats in the Papua New Guinea Parliament before the 2012 general election was unsuccessful. Drawing on media analysis and interviews with key players in the gender quota debates in both countries, this article examines why the push for a quota succeeded in Samoa and not in Papua New Guinea. The local, external and structural factors commonly found in gender quota literature can help to explain the divergent outcomes of the gender quota campaigns in these two countries. In particular, I highlight one structural factor – political stability – as fundamental to our understanding of the different outcomes in the two cases.
Introduction
In the Pacific Islands region, women are significantly under-represented in the political sphere. Women hold just 3.3 per cent of seats in national legislatures, one of the lowest levels of women’s representation in the world. Three Pacific states – the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau and Vanuatu – have no women in their single or lower house of parliament. Outside of the Pacific region, there is only one other state – Qatar – with no women in its legislature. 1
To address the issue of gender imbalance in politics, various countries have sought to increase women’s representation through quotas. They generally take one of three forms: legally or constitutionally mandated quotas, which require parties to present a certain proportion of female candidates; party quotas, which are voluntarily adopted by individual parties; and reserved seats, where a certain number of legislative seats are set aside for women. 2 Over 100 countries have introduced some form of quota to increase the number of women in politics. 3
Gender quotas are used at a sub-national level in the Pacific region – notably, in the legislative assemblies of the French Pacific territories and in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. At the national level, Samoa became the first independent Pacific state to introduce a parliamentary gender quota in 2013, when the Constitution was amended to guarantee a minimum of five women Members of Parliament (MPs). In the lead-up to the 2012 general election in Papua New Guinea, there was a high-profile campaign for the establishment of 22 reserved seats for women. This campaign was ultimately unsuccessful, with the reserved seats not implemented before the election. The two gender quota campaigns have potential lessons for future campaigns in other Pacific Islands states. Furthermore, research into these recent and relatively unknown case studies can add to the academic literature on gender quota adoption. This article explores the factors that contribute to the success or failure of quota campaigns through an analysis of two case studies: Samoa and Papua New Guinea. Both are recent examples of state-level parliamentary quota campaigns in the Pacific Islands region. Both have histories of low levels of women’s representation. Crucially, one campaign was successful, while the other failed to institute a gender quota. Drawing on media analysis and interviews with key players in the gender quota debates in both countries, 4 this article examines why the push for a quota succeeded in Samoa and not in Papua New Guinea. First, I review the explanatory factors for quota adoption identified by the existing literature. I then present an overview of the quota campaigns in Samoa and Papua New Guinea. A final section analyses these campaigns and the extent to which local actors, external actors and structural factors influenced the different outcomes. A structural factor – political stability – is highlighted as a key factor explaining quota adoption or non-adoption in these two case studies.
Factors explaining quota adoption
The existing literature on quota adoption identifies various factors that contribute to the success or failure of quota campaigns. 5 None of these factors, or combinations of factors, can fully explain quota adoption in all cases. All can play a role, although their significance varies depending upon the context. They can be grouped into three categories: local actors, external actors and structural factors. 6
Locally, the strength and influence of the women’s movement can impact the outcome of a quota campaign. Scholars consider women’s groups to have played an important part in quota reforms in Latin America, Asia and other regions. 7 Individual women actors, particularly those with connections to male political elites, can influence the success or failure of a quota campaign. 8 Furthermore, male political elites themselves can affect the outcomes of quota campaigns through their support or opposition. Political elites who support quota campaigns tend to do so on pragmatic rather than ideological grounds, such as if they consider their support or perceived support to be personally advantageous. This support can be a tokenistic gesture. 9 Nevertheless, the support of one high-level male political actor can ensure the adoption of a quota in some cases. 10 Other local actors could include civil servants, academics and journalists, who can play an advocacy role in quota campaigns, 11 and members of the judiciary, who can pose a significant challenge to the introduction of gender quotas, for example, if the legislative measures are found to contravene constitutional anti-discrimination provisions. 12
At the external level, international organisations can be important actors in quota campaigns. Bush argues that international influences can be more significant than domestic pressures in quota adoption. 13 International organisations have played a supportive role in quota campaigns in most cases, 14 although they have acted to block the implementation of quotas on occasion. 15 International and regional diffusion of quotas can also occur, with international networks of activists sharing campaign strategies, 16 and quota debates being influenced by the quota policies of other countries in the region. 17
Structural factors can contribute to the success or failure of a quota campaign. Political culture can encourage or prevent the adoption of quotas. 18 The ‘fit’ between a quota and political culture is important, with the success of the campaign for the parity law in France, for example, partly attributed to the rhetorical links drawn by campaigners between the concept of parité and French political culture. 19 Electoral institutions can affect the type of quota proposed and the success of a campaign. The characteristics of party systems and the level of competition between political parties can also have an impact on quota adoption. 20
This article highlights one structural factor – political stability – as key to our understanding of the divergent outcomes in quota campaigns in Samoa and Papua New Guinea. While political instability has been viewed in other cases as providing a window of opportunity for quota advocates, 21 in these two Pacific case studies, political stability can be seen as a positive factor with regards to quota adoption. Using the context of Samoa’s and Papua New Guinea’s respective levels of political stability, the success of the former’s quota campaign, and the failure of the latter’s, can be more fully explained.
Samoa 22
Samoa adopted a parliamentary gender quota in 2013. The quota will be in place for the 2016 general election and will ensure a minimum of five women MPs. It will operate under a ‘best loser’ system, whereby the highest-polling unsuccessful female candidates occupy additional seats in the Parliament to ensure that there are at least five women members.
Background
After Samoa won independence, only matai (chiefs) were eligible to vote and stand for Parliament. This rule restricted women’s political participation, as only a small fraction of matai are female. 23 Universal suffrage was introduced in 1990 after a referendum found just over half of voters in favour, creating an influx of female voters. While all adult Samoan women have been eligible to vote since 1990, eligibility to stand for election is still restricted to matai. Despite the relatively low number of female matai, some women have been successful in national politics (see Table 1). Following the 2011 election, there were two female MPs in the Samoan Parliament.
Women MPs in the parliament of Samoa, 1962–2011.
Notes: a In 1991, the number of MPs increased by two; a constitutional amendment in 1992 increased the parliamentary term from three to five years.
b Four women were initially elected in the 1996 election, but two lost their seats after electoral petitions. Another woman was elected in a 1998 by-election.
c Five women were initially elected in the 2006 election, but one lost her seat after an electoral petition.
Source: Ministry of Women Community and Social Development, Samoa.
In October 2011, Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi made an announcement that he was seeking to implement legislation to reserve 10 per cent of parliamentary seats for women. Discussing his plans, the prime minister said: If we do not put in the necessary stipulation in our legislation one never knows whether in the next elections there [will] be absolutely no women in Parliament. So this is part of our intention to ensure that there shall always be women in Parliament.
24
The Constitution Amendment Bill 2013
According to the constitutional amendment, the Samoan quota will ensure a minimum of five women parliamentarians. If five or more women win seats in a general election, the quota will not be activated. If fewer than five women win seats in a general election, additional seats in Parliament will be occupied by the female candidates who gained the highest percentage of the vote in their constituencies.
There are mixed opinions regarding the future effects of implementing the proposed quota. It was generally thought that the legislation would result in more women being encouraged to run for Parliament. 25 The legislation had generated more public dialogue around gender roles, and around women’s representation, and civil society leaders hoped that having at least five women in Parliament would help to normalise women’s representation and lead to greater acceptance of women in politics. 26
Doubts were raised by women leaders in civil society and the public service about the ability of five women MPs to make an impact in Parliament. The quota was described as ‘minimal’, 27 and ‘not enough’ to make a real difference. 28 They were concerned that women who became additional MPs rather than being elected outright in their constituencies would be perceived as ‘second-rate citizens in Parliament’ and respected less than MPs who had won constituency seats. 29
Among urban Samoan women, the legislation was expected to have little effect for Samoan women living in rural areas. It was thought that it would be mostly educated Apia-based women putting themselves forward as candidates. There was not a wide awareness programme regarding the quota, and many people involved in the debate doubted that women living in rural areas fully understood the significance of the legislation. 30
Papua New Guinea 31
Since gaining independence, Papua New Guinea has only had seven women elected to Parliament (see Table 2). In the 2007–2012 term of Parliament, the sole female MP at the time, Dame Carol Kidu, introduced a private member’s bill that would have established a parliamentary gender quota. The Equality and Participation Bill, colloquially known as the ‘Women’s Bill’, would have allowed for one reserved seat for women in each of the provinces of Papua New Guinea. If introduced before the 2012 election, this would have created 22 reserved seats for women in a Parliament of 133 seats.
Women MPs in the parliament of Papua New Guinea, 1977–2012.
Note: a In 1982, Nahau Rooney was re-elected after successfully challenging the election results in her electorate.
Source: Adapted from Orovu Sepoe, ‘To Make a Difference: Realities of Women’s Participation in Papua New Guinea Politics’, Development Bulletin, No. 59 (2002), pp. 39–42.
Background
In Papua New Guinea, women have never made up more than 2.8 per cent of parliamentary seats, although the number of female candidates contesting elections has risen significantly over time. In the first post-independence election in 1977, 10 women stood as candidates; in the 2012 election, there were 135 women candidates. 32
Following the 2007 general election, advocates for greater women’s representation began to push for special measures to increase the number of women in Parliament. First, there was an attempt to create nominated seats. A provision in the Papua New Guinea Constitution provides for the establishment of up to three nominated seats in Parliament: ‘The Parliament may, from time to time, by a two-thirds absolute majority vote, appoint a person (other than a member) to be a nominated member of the Parliament’. 33 These seats are not specifically for women, but could in theory be used to increase the parliamentary representation of any societal group. Kidu had attempted to implement this provision to bring in additional women in the previous parliamentary term, but her proposal had been defeated in cabinet. 34 Following the 2007 election, she made a second attempt to institute nominated seats. In this case, the prime minister then selected three women nominees following a recruitment process, but the leader of the opposition refused to support the move, and when Parliament voted to confirm the nominations, they were voted down.
While the nominated seats process was ongoing, a proposal for reserved seats was being developed. The legislation advocated by Kidu would amend the Constitution to add special seats for women as a category of parliamentary seats along with open seats, governors’ seats and nominated seats. 35 It would be accompanied by enabling legislation to institute the reserved seats before the 2012 general election. When the Equality and Participation Bill was first mooted, the prime minister at the time, Sir Michael Somare, was supportive of the legislation. 36
The Equality and Participation Bill
The Equality and Participation Bill was tabled in Parliament on 9 September 2011. The debate over reserved seats for women in Papua New Guinea was highly polarised and followed closely by national media. Kidu claims: ‘I would say, in the fifteen years I’ve been a member, I think it was the most…public campaign type of legislation in the whole time’. 37 The Equality and Participation Bill was passed by 72 votes to two on 23 November 2011. The Constitution was henceforth amended to include a provision for 22 reserved seats for women.
To implement the law, however, an amendment to the organic law on elections, requiring a two-thirds majority in Parliament, was needed. On 22 February 2012, the Organic Law on National and Local Level Government Elections (Amendment No 2) Bill was debated. The amendment received 58 votes in Parliament, short of the 73 needed for a two-thirds majority. While only one MP voted against the amendment, 21 MPs left the chamber shortly before the vote commenced. 38
Despite reserved seats not being in place, the 2012 election still saw a record number of female candidates. Three women were elected to Parliament, 39 the highest number of female MPs since the first post-independence election in 1977. Given the highly publicised campaign for reserved seats in the years leading up to the election, it was suggested that the public awareness of women’s under-representation raised by the campaign contributed to the success of the three new women parliamentarians. Other factors raised as potentially significant by observers of the election were party support, notably, from the Triumph Heritage Empowerment (THE) Party, which endorsed two of the successful female candidates, and the high profile of the three women in their respective electorates. 40 After being sworn into Parliament, all three women MPs stated that they would not support a resumed call for reserved seats, arguing that women should compete alongside male candidates in the open and regional seats. One claimed: ‘If I can do it others can too’. 41
Some campaigners for reserved seats believe that there is still a chance that they will be implemented in Papua New Guinea. 42 Kidu, however, believes that there is little hope of advancement without a sitting female MP who is committed to advocating for the reserved seats proposal. 43 Alternative methods to increase women’s representation have been mooted, including a 10 per cent party candidate quota, which was one of the proposed changes to the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC). 44
Factors in quota adoption
As outlined, important factors in quota adoption can be grouped into three broad categories: local actors, external actors and structural factors. The influence of local actors differed in the level of involvement of the women’s movement, with women’s groups playing a much larger role in the campaign in Papua New Guinea than in Samoa. In both cases, however, male political elites at the highest level were advocating for gender quotas in Parliament. The role of external actors in both campaigns was similar, with international organisations, notably, the United Nations (UN), featuring significantly in both campaigns. With regards to structural factors, both countries had conservative political cultures, and the ‘fit’ between electoral institutions and quotas may have influenced the type of quota proposed in each country. To explain more fully the divergent outcomes of the quota campaigns in these two countries, a structural factor – political stability – is highlighted.
Local actors
One aspect in which the campaigns in Samoa and Papua New Guinea differed was in the role of the women’s movement, with women activists in Papua New Guinea playing a much greater role than their Samoan counterparts. In Samoa, women’s organisations were engaged to an extent in the quota campaign, although women in civil society were discouraged by what they perceived as the government’s unwillingness to consult with them over the issue. Concern was expressed that there was no public consultation over the bill prior to its drafting, despite the proposal first being mooted about a year before the bill was drafted. 45 The lack of consultation meant that while non-governmental actors could and did voice their opinions on the legislation, they lost any influence they may have had over the provisions of the bill. 46
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been the main advocates for greater women’s representation in Samoa in the past. The Samoa Umbrella of Non Government Organisations (SUNGO), 47 a coalition of over 120 civil society organisations, consulted on the legislation and held a national forum on 1 March 2012 to gather the views of civil society communities. Around 100 people attended the forum, which resulted in a submission that SUNGO presented to Parliament. The submission stated that an ‘overwhelming majority’ of forum participants agreed with the intent of the legislation to increase the number of women in Parliament, but expressed concern over the design of the proposed quota. A separate women’s electoral roll to elect five female parliamentarians was suggested as an alternative option, although the submission did not provide details on how the separate roll would be implemented. 48
The extent and nature of grassroots involvement in the gender quota campaign is contested. Some claim that it was a grassroots movement, ‘though the Government has made that doorway, they just turned the knob to the door and we push’. 49 It is argued that women from the grassroots were active participants in the forums on the issue. Others, however, maintain that the campaign could not be characterised as grassroots, and that village-based women had little influence on the campaign. 50
In contrast to the Samoan campaign, the push for a gender quota in Papua New Guinea came primarily from women’s groups. The sponsor of the proposed Women’s Bill was Kidu, the only female MP at the time the bill was proposed. Kidu, however, stresses that she was a ‘political conduit’ and that the drive for reserved seats came from outside of Parliament,
51
particularly from the National Council of Women (NCW) and other women’s organisations. The NCW and the Women in Politics group were heavily involved in promoting reserved seats, and established a roadshow that travelled through the four regions of Papua New Guinea to promote reserved seats for women. The NCW had significant organisational capacity throughout the country, with a network of provincial councils that was utilised extensively during the reserved seats campaign.
52
While activists claimed that attempts were made to raise awareness of the issue outside the urban centres of each province, funding restrictions and geographical barriers made this difficult: we tried to reach out to some villages…but not as extensively as we [might have], not in the geographical terrain in PNG [Papua New Guinea]. You probably need helicopters to go out to the most remote villages tucked away behind these big mountain ranges so [there were] those practical difficulties.
53
While the women’s movement was less prominent in the Samoa campaign than in the Papua New Guinea campaign, both campaigns had high-level male political elites advocating for gender quotas from inside Parliament. In Samoa, the prime minister has been the primary advocate for the proposed gender quota. Within the Samoan government, he was the initial proponent of the legislation. Given that his party holds a two-thirds majority in the Samoan Parliament, his support has been crucial to the success of the quota campaign.
Female MPs have taken a less prominent role in the Samoan campaign. There are two female MPs in the current term, both members of the governing Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP). While both MPs have spoken in support of the legislation in Parliament and in the media, they have largely assumed a background role in the quota debate. Fiame Naomi Mata’afa, the current minister of justice, explains: there’s also a lot of room for misunderstanding I think, being a woman and a politician, that could be interpreted as a very sort of a personal thing. And I think it’s very important that men are seen to be active.
57
In Papua New Guinea, male politicians were divided over the Women’s Bill. Both Somare, who was prime minister when the legislation was first mooted, and his successor, Peter O’Neill, publicly stated their support for the Women’s Bill. Kidu credits Somare as a firm supporter of greater women’s representation,
60
while O’Neill claimed that greater women’s representation would improve governance in Papua New Guinea: ‘Only with the input of women will PNG go on and thrive to become a great nation’.
61
The support of both Somare and O’Neill, however, did not guarantee the success of the reserved seats legislation: we had assurance from the prime minister but he is just one person…it meant that he had to convince those others who were with him to vote for what he believed in. And not everybody was with him when it came to the final casting of the votes.
62
External actors
In both cases, international organisations played a role, with the proposed quotas gaining support from international actors. In Samoa, the UN provided funding and support for public discussions on the legislation. The UN also sent a technical advisor on special temporary measures to Samoa after the legislation was announced. She met with civil society leaders, although the involvement of the UN in this way was not universally welcomed: The UN technical advisor came and said, you know, just be happy that there’s political will behind the government’s bill, to support it, I said that’s not my point, so there we have a technical advisor, who is very, to me, like imposing her ideas…[they] want a tick in the box, we want something that is progressive.
66
Donors played an important role in the campaign, through providing significant technical and financial support. The UN offices in Papua New Guinea provided assistance to the campaign in the form of advocacy skills training and campaign materials. 70 UN Women ran media campaigns in support of the reserved seats, with print media, radio and television advertisements. 71 The UNDP’s role included support in drafting the Women’s Bill, lobbying MPs, gender-sensitising projects and funding for projects, including a billboard advocating for reserved seats that was placed in a prominent position on the road leading to Parliament House. 72 AusAID also provided technical and funding assistance, often channelling funds through the UNDP. 73
There were suggestions in both cases that international organisations and donor agencies had applied considerable pressure on the national governments to institute quotas. Tautua Samoa MP Levaopolo Talatonu argued that the UN was heavily involved in the Samoan campaign: the United Nations is behind the push, and my concern is that if it’s left unopposed, it will lead to Samoa’s traditional form of government becoming lost eventually. It’s an indication we’re going backwards to the days before Samoa became independent…it’s the UN which is calling the shots and the HRPP is sucking up to them.
74
No independent state in the Pacific region had adopted a gender quota before the Samoa and Papua New Guinea campaigns, thus limiting the opportunities for the regional diffusion of quotas. The extent to which women’s activist networks coordinate and influence other quota campaigns in the Pacific region is hard to determine. Coordination between women’s groups in the Pacific is limited by the geographic spread of the region, a lack of funding and language barriers.
Quotas are used at sub-national level in the Pacific region, with the parity law mandating equal representation between genders on party lists in the French Pacific territories, and three reserved seats for women in the legislature of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. The quota used in the French territories was not referenced by campaigners in Samoa and Papua New Guinea. The reserved seats in Bougainville were referred to in the Samoan campaign, but in a negative manner. Supporters of the proposed quota argued that it was superior to a system like that in Bougainville, claiming that this kind of system led to the reserved seats being considered ‘women’s seats’ and the general seats, therefore, men’s seats. 77 As Bougainville is a region of Papua New Guinea, lawmakers were undoubtedly aware of the region’s reserved seat system, although it is unclear whether that was a significant influence on the Papua New Guinea campaign. Supporters of the campaign argued that a reserved seat system was the only logical choice for Papua New Guinea: ‘It was the only thing that seemed possible, to get a reasonable number of women on the floor.’ 78
Structural factors
Conservative political cultures are a feature of politics in most Pacific Islands states and could contribute to lower levels of women’s representation and a resistance to measures to increase the number of women in Parliament. 79 In the Pacific region, the strict enforcement of gender roles in the colonial era meant that in communities where women previously had significant input into decision-making, they were then relegated to the domestic sphere; in others, colonial and Church administrations replaced one set of customs that restricted women’s access to the public sphere with another. 80 Huffer has argued that it is not, in fact, culture and custom, but rather their interpretation by those in favour of the status quo, that results in women’s political under-representation. 81
During the debate over gender quotas in both Papua New Guinea and Samoa, culture was invoked by opponents of the quotas. In Samoa, one of the most common arguments against instituting a quota was that it was a foreign idea and not compatible with Samoan culture. Opponents suggested that Samoan society was not ready to elect more female representatives.
82
They emphasised the high status of women in traditional society,
83
and argued that Samoan women themselves were not prepared to put themselves forward as candidates.
84
Others contended that while some cultural traditions may be discriminatory, the proposed quota was not an appropriate solution: there are some cultural practices that may be counterproductive to the advancement of women’s development. But you have to use culturally acceptable ways to address those kinds of things. It’s very difficult to bring in…an idea or a way from overseas, which works overseas, and apply to here and hope and believe that it will work. Because most likely it won’t.
85
In culture men are warriors. They go and protect women. We go and die for woman [sic] Mr Speaker – not a woman going to the war. No, we go and fight! And we support them and provide what they need also at the same time.
88
Kidu explained that some of the opposition to quotas also stemmed from the belief that they were incompatible with democracy: it’s not only pushing cultural boundaries but…people’s perception of what democracy is, also. Often people don’t understand there are many, many forms of democracy. And they’ve had this fixed idea of the elections and how they should be run and, because that’s all they’ve known since independence…something different is…seen as favouring one segment of the population, when that segment has no voice anyway.
90
The electoral institutions of each country may have affected the types of quota proposed. Samoa primarily uses a first-past-the-post (FPP) voting system, although in certain electorates, a block vote (BV) system is used as two MPs are elected. The proposed quota legislation would operate under a ‘best loser’ system. The quota is designed so that if fewer than five women are elected in a general election, additional women will enter Parliament. If five or more women won seats in the general election, there would be no additional seats.
The voting system used in Papua New Guinea is limited preferential voting (LPV). It was changed from FPP ahead of the 2007 general election. Under the LPV system, voters must vote for three candidates who are ranked according to preference. This change was expected to help female candidates, 93 although no new women MPs were elected in 2007. Following this election, the reserved seat legislation was proposed. The Papua New Guinean proposal was for one reserved seat per province. While there was debate over whether to specify a set number of reserved seats in the legislation, the decision was ultimately made to tie the number of reserved seats to the number of provinces, which was previously 20 but increased to 22 in 2012. 94 As the electoral boundaries for provincial representation were already in place for the election of governors’ seats, tying the reserved seats to the number of provinces was considered a practical move. 95 The reserved seats would have increased the size of Parliament to 133 seats after the 2012 election, with 89 general electorate seats, 22 governors’ seats and 22 reserved seats for women.
The effect on parliamentary politics of the two quota proposals could have been quite different. In Papua New Guinea, the establishment of 22 reserved seats for women would have ensured a minimum of 16.5 per cent female representation in Parliament, a huge increase from the current 2.7 per cent. In contrast, the Samoan proposal would have a smaller impact on the gender make-up of Parliament, as five women would represent between 9.3 per cent and 10.2 per cent of MPs, depending upon how many additional members were required to meet the quota. Both of these quotas, however, are relatively low compared to quota requirements in other countries. While legal quotas range from 5 per cent to 50 per cent, a quota of around 30 per cent is most common. 96
Political stability as a key factor
In both Samoa and Papua New Guinea, campaigners for gender quotas had support from male political elites at the highest level. The difference lies in how male political elites in Papua New Guinea were unable, or unwilling, to translate their support of reserved seats into a successful parliamentary vote for the enabling legislation to become law. In this section, the political contexts of each quota campaign are examined, and political stability is proposed as a determining factor in the quota outcomes of these two cases.
Political stability is not always seen as a possible indicator of success for gender quota campaigns. Some scholars point to periods of political instability, or significant political change, as constituting a window of opportunity during which the adoption of a gender quota is more likely. In a period of political transition or instability, quotas for women can be framed as a positive development, one that would have a transformative influence on democracy. 97 Conversely, in the cases of Samoa and Papua New Guinea, political stability was a positive factor in quota adoption. While both countries have been continuously democratic since they won independence, in 1962 and 1975, respectively, Samoa has a high level of political stability, while Papua New Guinea is relatively unstable.
Samoa is an outlier in the Pacific Islands region in terms of political stability. 98 The HRPP, Samoa’s first political party, was formed in 1979 and it has been in power since 1982, save for a period in opposition from 1985 to 1988. The HRPP currently hold a two-thirds majority in Parliament, with 37 seats. The only other party officially registered at present is Tautua Samoa, which was formed in 2008. The 12 non-government MPs are all aligned with Tautua Samoa.
Prime Minister Tuilaepa has held the post since 1998, making him the longest-standing current political leader in the Pacific Islands region. He has presided over several controversial political changes. In 2009, Samoan drivers shifted from the right-hand side of the road to the left-hand side. The change was intended to make cars cheaper, as they could be imported from New Zealand, Australia and Japan instead of the USA. Prior to the change, there was strong opposition, including an almost 20,000-strong march in central Apia in April 2008, and a legal challenge in the Supreme Court. Then, in 2011, Samoa moved across the international date line from Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) –11 to UTC +13. In practical terms, the move meant that Samoa jumped from 29 December 2011 to 31 December 2011. This change was intended to improve business connections with Australia and New Zealand, countries that had previously been approximately a day ahead of Samoa. Both moves were initially divisive, but neither affected Tuilaepa’s long-term popularity significantly. He has established control of both his party and Parliament, even following controversial law changes, to the extent that a piece of legislation that he has personally advocated for, such as the gender quota bill, is considered a ‘fait accompli’. 99
Tuilaepa’s personal political dominance has allowed him to drive the gender quota bill forward even though his previous position was against the use of quotas. A former senior public servant claimed: the current prime minister used to say…why 30 per cent when you have a 100 per cent? And so in all of our international meetings, that was the position of the government of Samoa…if we want equality, in terms of representation, you compete on the same level. No special provisions, because the opportunities are the same.
100
In contrast to Samoa’s relative political stability, the post-independence political history of Papua New Guinea has been characterised by weak political parties and frequent changes of government. The OLIPPAC, introduced in 2001, was intended to encourage stability and promote strong parties, but its provisions generally proved difficult to enforce. 102 Another law, aimed at slowing the rate of administration changes, protected governments from votes of no confidence for 18 months following a general election, 103 and a year preceding a general election. 104 Somare, who had been prime minister twice before, led the first government to maintain power through a full parliamentary term from 2002 to 2007. He again became prime minister following the 2007 election.
Papua New Guinea has a multiparty political system, and the number of parties has proliferated in recent years. While 10 or fewer parties contested national elections before 2002, in that year, 43 parties were registered to contest the election. In 2007, the number of registered parties was 34. In addition, a large number of independent candidates stand for Parliament, with independents making up over half the total candidates in the 2007 election. Following the election, 23 parties won at least one seat. Twenty independent candidates also won seats, although most aligned themselves with a political party soon after the election. 105
The passage of the Equality and Participation Bill was affected by a constitutional crisis beginning in 2011. 106 In April, Somare had travelled to Singapore for medical treatment. When he had not returned by August, a motion of no confidence was passed in Parliament and O’Neill was appointed prime minister by the governor-general. Somare subsequently returned to Papua New Guinea and challenged O’Neill’s appointment in the Supreme Court. In December, the Court, in a three to two ruling, declared the appointment unconstitutional and called for Somare to be reappointed. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling, however, O’Neill was re-elected as prime minister by the house, and the speaker of the house announced that he would only recognise a government led by O’Neill. Both Somare and O’Neill appointed separate cabinets and police commissioners. In this context, the O’Neill government took on the ‘Women’s Bill’, developed by Kidu while she was a cabinet minister in the Somare government.
The constitutional amendment to allow for reserved seats was eventually passed under the O’Neill government at a time when its sponsor, Kidu, was leader of the opposition. To institute reserved seats, however, enabling legislation was needed, which, as a change to the electoral law, would require a two-thirds majority. This piece of legislation – the Organic Law on National and Local Level Government Elections (Amendment No 2) Bill – was debated in early 2012. The O’Neill government allowed MPs aligned to them a conscience vote, despite government coalition MPs being bound to vote for other amendments to the electoral law, including one to increase the number of governors’ seats in Parliament.
This treatment of the reserved seats amendment by the O’Neill administration led to accusations that the quota had been supported merely as a token gesture, and that the government had no intention of establishing the reserved seats.
107
The ongoing constitutional crisis also hindered the potential passage of the enabling legislation, as MPs loyal to Somare were boycotting parliamentary sittings at the time that it was debated, thus reducing the number of potential votes, as one advocate of the reserved seats explained: it all happened because of the impasse…like there was two governments, right? Two of everything, and so people are not on the floor of Parliament in full numbers in order to have the voting take place. That was our disaster.
108
Ultimately, the political environment in which the Women’s Bill and subsequent enabling legislation were debated did not prove conducive to the progress of the reserved seats campaign. The political instability of Papua New Guinea, characterised by the 2011–2012 constitutional crisis, may have appeared to offer a window of opportunity for the quota legislation, with both Somare and O’Neill publicly supporting the Women’s Bill. As the crisis continued, however, MPs loyal to Somare stayed away from Parliament and the MPs of O’Neill’s coalition, made up of various parties and independent MPs, were offered a conscience vote on the enabling legislation.
Conclusion
This article has explored the factors that contribute to the success or failure of quota campaigns through an analysis of two case studies from the Pacific Islands region: Samoa and Papua New Guinea. The local, external and structural factors commonly found in the gender quota literature can help to explain the outcomes of the gender quota campaigns in these two countries. In this article, I highlighted one structural factor – political stability – as fundamental to the divergent outcomes of the two campaigns. While both campaigns had the support of male political leaders, the relatively stable nature of Samoan politics ensured that this support would translate into the successful passage of quota legislation. Conversely, the fractured nature of parliamentary politics in Papua New Guinea meant that the support of successive prime ministers could not guarantee the implementation of the constitutional amendment enabling reserved seats. Thus, the quota campaigns in Samoa and Papua New Guinea show that political stability can be a positive factor in explaining quota adoption.
Samoa’s 10 per cent quota will be implemented in the 2016 general election. It will become the first independent Pacific Islands state to introduce a parliamentary gender quota, and the first example of a successful campaign for a national-level quota in the Pacific. It is important, however, to consider how we define an unsuccessful campaign. While the 22 reserved seats were not established in Papua New Guinea for the 2012 election, the Women’s Bill did succeed in amending the Constitution to provide for reserved seats for women, so it is possible that the provision will be implemented in the future. Furthermore, the 2012 election proved to be a significant one for women. Three women were elected to Parliament, the highest number of female MPs since the 1977 election. It is hard to gauge the wider impact of the gender quota campaign in Papua New Guinea, but the awareness raised by the campaign about the issue of women’s political under-representation, and the public debate on the merits of increasing the number of women in Parliament sparked by the campaign, could have had a positive effect on women’s representation even without reserved seats for women in place.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this article was presented at the ‘Electoral Quotas and Political Representation: Comparative Perspectives’ workshop at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Sessions, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, 11–16 March 2013. The author would like to acknowledge the convenors and participants of this workshop for their comments.
