Opposites attract? India–New Zealand relations in the contemporary Indo-Pacific

Introduction

Viewed in the wider context of the emphasis on Asia in New Zealand’s foreign and trade policy since 1990, and certainly in comparison with East Asia in general and China in particular, India has often seemed of peripheral concern. This is notwithstanding the increased efforts put into the bilateral relationship by Helen Clark’s Labour-led governments from 1999 to 2008. These efforts saw then Foreign Minister Phil Goff visit India in March 2001 (the first by a New Zealand foreign minister for over nine years) and the prime minister herself three years later in October 2004 (the first state-level visit since David Lange’s almost 20 years previously in April 1985). Although India was not a notable feature of the last Labour-led government’s overall Asia strategy released in 2007, the document did state that: ‘The Government will ensure that enough attention is paid to China and India as rising powers, while reinvigorating relationships with our traditional partners in North and Southeast Asia’. ¹ That New Zealand should pay more attention to India in economic terms was spelled out clearly by then Trade Minister Phil Goff the same year, when he recognised India’s rapid economic growth and the potential market that it could provide. ² Importantly, for subsequent developments, in April 2007, New Zealand and India agreed to conduct a joint study looking at the feasibility of negotiating a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement (CECA) or free trade agreement (FTA). ³

This article argues that although India and New Zealand are situated at opposite ends of the Indo-Pacific, and thus effectively ‘bookend’ the region, ⁴ they have sufficient common concerns and interests that the bilateral relationship can, and should, be stronger and less peripheral than has often been the case. Partially explaining the degree of weakness and inattention that has existed at times is the fact that New Zealand and India can be seen as being in an asymmetric relationship. Although the theory of asymmetry in International Relations is most often applied to cases where power disparities act to create very different perceptions, which can lead to conflict, it can help to explain any relationship between a more powerful and a less powerful state. Where two states differ in various measurements of size and power, it is argued, there will be important differences in the risks and opportunities that exist for both of them. ⁵ For the larger state in an asymmetric relationship, Womack contends, that relationship will constitute ‘less of a share of its overall international interests’, with domestic matters attracting the greater part of its attention. For the smaller state, the converse is true: ‘international relations in general are more important because there is a smaller domestic mass and the relationship with [the larger state] … is much more important to’ it. ‘Even in the case of a transaction of equal value for both sides, such as trade, the transaction will be proportionately much more important’ for the smaller than the larger state. ⁶ Elements of this asymmetry can certainly be seen in some aspects of India–New Zealand relations.

Following a brief examination of the concept of the Indo-Pacific and what it means for both states, the article then looks at the current importance of India to New Zealand and how the bilateral relationship is perceived in Wellington. The efforts that New Zealand has made to inject renewed vigour into, and give more substance to, it are then considered. An assessment of how successful, or otherwise, these efforts have been follows, in which it is contended that far from being the hoped-for platform from which the relationship can move to a higher level, the proposed India–New Zealand FTA now seems to have become something of a stumbling block. Substantial progress has instead been made in the area of people-to-people links, at the United Nations (UN) and in terms of defence cooperation (especially with regard to maritime security).

The Indo-Pacific region

As has been widely remarked upon, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has increasingly been in fashion over the past few years, being used by political ‘leaders and senior policy figures from such countries as Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan and the US’. ⁷ Although there are evidently different ways in which the Indo-Pacific is conceptualised by various analysts, as the author of the first chapter in the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS’s) Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2015 notes, they suggest that a useful way of thinking about the term is provided by an amalgam of two of the main ones. Thus, ‘the idea of an Indo-Pacific region involves recognising that the growing economic, geopolitical and security connections between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions are creating a single strategic system’. ⁸ In effect, therefore, the Indo-Pacific can be seen as ‘a maritime “super-region” with its geographical centre in South-East Asia’. ⁹ It is this maritime dimension that provides a very important link between India and New Zealand and effectively ties the opposite ends of the Indo-Pacific region together. ¹⁰

India’s use of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, it has been noted, first came to prominence under then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who emphasised it in 2012 and 2013 as ‘a way of defining his country’s relations with Australia and Japan’. Similar language has also been employed by Singh’s successor, Narendra Modi, as a way of describing ‘his vision for relations with Australia’. ¹¹

One of the reasons for India starting to use ‘Indo-Pacific’, rather than ‘Asia-Pacific’, was linked to the sense that the Indian Ocean itself was becoming of greater importance amid ongoing strategic changes. The most significant of these changes has undoubtedly been the rise of China and the fact that the Indian Ocean is now clearly an area of interest to Beijing. Indeed, it has been contended that ‘it is the very extension of China’s interests, diplomacy and its strategic reach into the Indian Ocean that most defines the Indo-Pacific’. ¹² India has been acutely concerned about China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which threatens to undermine India’s traditional maritime dominance. Of particular concern in this regard has been the presence of Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines. ¹³

These strategic changes are now combined with the traditional, central importance of the Indian Ocean to India. As one Indian observer has stated:

At the same time, it is also a region of growing global strategic attention. India continues to make efforts [to ensure] that the Indian Ocean emerges as an uncontested region, able to cope with piracy or instability whether on its own or in partnership with the littoral states. ¹⁴

Unlike its trans-Tasman neighbour, Australia, with whom New Zealand has its closest bilateral relationship, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has not yet been included in the official New Zealand lexicon. ¹⁸ This is not to say, however, that the idea and importance of the Indo-Pacific region has not been recognised. Indeed, in the 2014 ‘Defence Assessment’, the section on South Asia noted how the world’s busiest trade route passes through the Middle East, Indian Ocean and South-East Asia. Thus, ‘New Zealand too has an interest in the maintenance of a stable trade route through the region’. ¹⁹ That India and New Zealand are effectively part of the same wider region, whatever label is attached to it, is made explicit in the country information paper produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) in Wellington. This information paper clearly states that: ‘We have a common stake in the prosperity and stability of our region’. ²⁰

Traditional ties and contemporary importance

Although the Indo-Pacific region connection is a significant one, it is not the link between the two countries that tends to feature in official statements on the nature of the bilateral relationship. Instead, it is the shared historical ties, traditions and values. These include membership of the Commonwealth, language, democracy, legal systems and, of course, sporting links – particularly cricket. ²¹ The equivalent document produced by India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is very similar in this regard. It begins by stating that ‘India and New Zealand share a common historical connection with the British Empire and have cordial and friendly relations rooted in the linkages of Commonwealth, parliamentary democracy and the English language’, and then goes on to note that the two have been ‘fellow travellers’ over a number of international issues, including disarmament and global peace, as well as human rights and countering international terrorism. ²²

That these aspects can sometimes lead to a degree of complacency in the relationship should not be ignored, but they also give it a solid foundation. As was noted at the first India–New Zealand Track II Dialogue in 2009, it is very easy for Indians and New Zealanders to begin talking to one another because they have things in common and, therefore, do not have to spend time getting to know one another and feeling comfortable. ²³ There is, in other words, warmth to the relationship, particularly at the people-to people level.

The idea of warmth is certainly evident in the MFAT information paper on India, the first sentence of which states: ‘India and New Zealand have a longstanding and warm relationship’. This overview section also says that ‘India is a priority relationship for New Zealand and our most developed relationship in South Asia’. ²⁴ A sceptic might argue that the latter point is not saying all that much since the relationship with, for example, Pakistan is a ‘warm but modest’ one, and that with Bangladesh is ‘friendly, although interaction is limited’. ²⁵ That India has been accorded greater significance in New Zealand’s foreign policy in recent years is without doubt. It has been acknowledged, however, that New Zealand was slower than others to recognise India’s increased importance and that it was much quicker off the mark as far as China was concerned. ²⁶

That the time was ripe for an improved bilateral relationship was a feeling held not just in Wellington, but also in New Delhi. In 2009, a member of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses referred to it as being ‘spring time’ in the bilateral relationship and that it was now better placed than for some time. ²⁷ Another added that there was an ‘emerging convergence’ of interests between India and New Zealand ²⁸ and that the stage was now set for a ‘quantum leap’ in the bilateral relationship. ²⁹ New Zealand’s renewed interest in India was occurring, fortuitously, at just the same time as India’s foreign policy was becoming more diversified: a policy into which New Zealand could fit well.

Giving momentum to the relationship was the appearance in March 2009 of the aforementioned joint study into a CECA/FTA. After noting the ‘significant complementarities’ that existed between the two countries’ economies, and that a CECA/FTA would provide broad benefits to both India and New Zealand, the study recommended that negotiations should begin ‘as soon as possible on a comprehensive CECA/FTA agreement’. The agreement should cover ‘substantially all trade in goods and services; investment; trade facilitation; and other areas of economic cooperation, as a “single undertaking”, leading to additional trade flows and economic gains’. ³⁰ The commencement of negotiations for an FTA was announced in January 2010 by New Zealand’s Trade Minister Tim Groser and India’s Minister of Commerce Anand Sharma, and the first round of talks was held in Wellington that April. ³¹

The overall importance of India to New Zealand was clearly signalled in MFAT’s 2011 Statement of Intent, as well as the strategy that would be pursued to further the relationship. India was specifically identified (along with Japan and the Republic of Korea) as a key regional economic and political power with whom New Zealand wanted to build a relationship. ³² ‘In-depth environment scans’ of four countries, including India, were conducted in 2010/11 and ‘whole-of-government NZ Inc engagement strategies for these countries’ were subsequently initiated. ³³ These strategies were scheduled to be completed by July 2011. ³⁴

‘Opening doors to India’ – the FTA

The India strategy, entitled ‘Opening Doors to India. New Zealand’s 2015 Vision’, was eventually released in October 2011 and became the first NZ Inc strategy to appear. Like the other country strategies, ‘Opening Doors to India’ was seen by the New Zealand government as a component of a wider strategy to internationalise New Zealand’s economy and thus further the overall Economic Growth Agenda that it has placed such emphasis on. ³⁵ Recognising the importance of India as an emerging ‘Asian superpower’, the vision for New Zealand was that it should ‘become a core trade, economic and political partner’ by 2015. ³⁶

At the heart of this strategy, or, as the document itself says, ‘pivotal’ to it, was the attainment of the FTA. At the time the NZ Inc strategy was released, Prime Minister John Key hoped that this would be finished as early as 2012. The completion of an FTA was deemed essential in order to achieve the first of the strategy’s goals: an increase in New Zealand’s merchandise exports to India to at least NZ$2 billion by 2015. The other goals, in order, were: to increase trade in services by 20% per annum; to improve the bilateral investment framework and enable growth in the investment relationship; to attract and retain skilled Indian migrants; to engage more deeply with India on regional and global issues; and to raise the profile of New Zealand’s value proposition in India. ³⁷ The signing of an FTA was widely regarded as being the ‘big ticket’ item necessary to push the relationship to a new level and to keep it there; parallels being drawn with the China–New Zealand FTA that was signed in 2008.

The hope that the FTA would be finished by 2012 was not, of course, realised. Even the negotiations over the FTA were effectively stalled from July 2013, when the ninth round was held in Wellington, until May 2015, when the latest round was held in New Delhi. The resumption of talks came after New Zealand Primary Industries Minister Nathan Guy’s visit in November 2014, when he was quoted as saying that it had been ‘too long’ since the previous round, which saw the Indian Agriculture Minister Radha Mohan Singh commit to scheduling a tenth round. In addition to giving impetus to the FTA talks, Guy’s visit saw a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the India–New Zealand Business Council and the Confederation of Indian Industry. ³⁸

That an FTA had not been signed by the original target date of 2012, and still has not, is perhaps unsurprising. After all, India’s exports to New Zealand are miniscule. In the period from April 2012 to September 2013, for example, these totalled US$175.11 million, a percentage share of only 0.12% (equal to that of Benin and Ireland) and well below Australia’s 0.7%. ³⁹

Besides the low value and volume of India’s exports to New Zealand, the two countries also have some different views on what is most important in such agreements and there is considerable opposition in India to the liberalisation of trade in general and, in the case of trade with New Zealand, to granting dairy access in particular. Indeed, from the New Zealand perspective, this is the main sticking point in the negotiations it seems. ⁴⁰ For India, restrictions on dairy access (unlike those on other commodities) are regarded as non-negotiable. In return, New Zealand seems unwilling to open up its market to Indian information technology (IT) services, and to allowing greater numbers of Indian IT professionals to work in New Zealand to the extent that New Delhi wants. ⁴¹

Overall, it has been argued, New Zealand is in a difficult negotiating position. In the first place, already having very low tariff rates, Wellington has relatively little to negotiate with, and thus the view in New Delhi is that New Zealand almost certainly has more to gain and thus will benefit most from an FTA. Second, India is now more aware of the power asymmetry that exists between the two (the same argument can also be applied to other countries negotiating with India) and has become more self-confident in recent years amid surging national pride. The Indian position has, therefore, become one where it is expected that it can state, and obtain, what it wants. ⁴²

It has also been noted that Indian officials have drawn attention to India’s previous, unhappy, experience with FTAs and have disliked them focusing only on the trade in commodities. ⁴³ Since New Zealand’s exports to India have traditionally been weighted towards primary commodities, despite an increase in recent years in the trade in services, and this is the principal area in which New Zealand is seeking concessions from India, this Indian mindset is something that New Zealand will have to overcome. ⁴⁴

The failure to sign an FTA has undoubtedly affected the outcome of the NZ Inc strategy for India and has meant that the first goal was not attained in 2015 as planned. At the end of December 2014, New Zealand merchandise exports had only reached NZ$618 million. This figure is also accounted for by the fact that New Zealand coal exports to India have steadily decreased over the past few years. In the absence of an FTA, the Bilateral Investment Framework has not been improved either (the third goal of the strategy). ⁴⁵

That the FTA has not been concluded has created the impression that rather than being a stepping stone to an improved bilateral relationship, it has instead become a stumbling block. It may be reading too much into it, but it is hard to avoid the sense of a loss of momentum in New Zealand’s India policy in MFAT’s 2014–2018 Statement of Intent when it is compared with the previous one. There is no mention at all of India in the minister’s foreword this time and under the ministry’s nine strategic priorities, India does not specifically feature. ⁴⁶

Efforts to conclude an FTA will continue – Prime Minister John Key, for example, raised the subject with Modi during their talks at the East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in November 2015 – but, sensibly, there is no longer a target date. The previous emphasis on it should be reduced, however, and it should no longer be regarded as ‘pivotal’ to the attainment of a wider, stronger India–New Zealand partnership. ⁴⁷ The other goals of the NZ Inc India strategy have, in contrast, seen substantial progress and it is enhanced cooperation in these and other areas through which such a partnership will best be achieved it seems.

People-to-people links

People-to-people links have always been an important part of the bilateral relationship, providing it with solid foundations. These links were certainly identified in ‘Opening Doors to India’ as an area in which significant progress could be made. The services trade (Goal 2) has undoubtedly grown, with India now being the second-largest source of international students after China and significant increases in tourist arrivals from India has occurred. ⁴⁸

The growth in the number of Indians coming to New Zealand to study has been considerable. In 2014, Indians accounted for 62% of the total increase in international student enrolments, and in September and October 2015, there was a record number of 8,300 Indian students enrolling (though this was undoubtedly influenced by impending changes in the rules concerning English-language proficiency). ⁴⁹ This growth in enrolments has not been entirely unproblematic, however. First, the vast majority of the Indian students coming to New Zealand are enrolling in various courses offered by private training establishments, when the government would prefer them to be graduating from polytechnics and universities. ⁵⁰ Second, concerns have been raised by the Immigration New Zealand office in Mumbai over ‘the issues regularly reported in New Zealand about students being in debt, exploited in workplaces, and being distracted from the key objective of their stay in New Zealand – which is to study’. ⁵¹

The number of Indian tourists rose from 29,856 in 2012 to almost 41,000 in 2014. ⁵² The growth in visitors from India has happened despite the continuing absence of direct air links between the two countries, which had been identified in the NZ Inc strategy as a ‘constraint on tourism, business people and international students’. ⁵³ Despite an air services agreement being signed in 2006, and updated in 2008, under which direct flights between Auckland and Mumbai were now allowed, neither Air India nor Air New Zealand have taken up the offer as they have not regarded the route as commercially viable. The recent signing of a codeshare agreement between the two airlines will make things much easier, however, for tourists and business travellers alike. ⁵⁴ The desire to attract more migrants from India is another area in which significant progress has been achieved. From being one of the largest sources of permanent arrivals in 2011 when the NZ Inc strategy was released, India is now the number one source of skilled migrants coming to New Zealand and thus Goal 4 has largely been realised. ⁵⁵

Lastly, in terms of people-to-people links, and a very significant component of the strategy’s sixth goal, the 11th Cricket World Cup, jointly hosted by Australia and New Zealand from February to March 2015, was an undoubted success. It would be hard to think of another country’s foreign policy that makes such a play of sport as a tool of diplomacy as does New Zealand’s. ‘Sporting diplomacy’ in general, and cricket links and diplomacy in particular, were definitely identified as such a tool in ‘Opening Doors to India’: ‘Cricket has the ability to provide an important profile for New Zealand in India – a profile which is out of all proportion with New Zealand’s size and global influence’. ⁵⁶

One senior New Zealand official, when discussing the progress made with the NZ Inc strategy, observed how cricket links and diplomacy had been a notable success. The Cricket World Cup was very important in this respect, both in terms of New Zealand as a co-host and the Black Caps reaching the final (though sadly not winning the trophy). The World Cup saw an increase in the number of Indian visitors coming to New Zealand outside of their traditional low season preference, and among them were a number of important businesspeople, which led to several commercial deals being reached. ⁵⁷

In view of the fact that a significant component of Prime Minister Modi’s more active foreign policy is the people-to-people dimension (and of India’s relations with New Zealand overall), the aforementioned developments bode well for New Zealand. So, too, does the significant increase in the number of people who identify with the Indian ethnic group in New Zealand. Between 2006 and 2013, the Indian ethnic group increased by 48.4%, making it the second-largest Asian ethnic group (after the Chinese), with 155,578 people, up from 104.583. As a proportion of the total population of New Zealand, this constitutes 3.9%. ⁵⁸ This is a higher percentage than in many other countries (excluding those in the Middle East, where there are large numbers of Indians working). In Australia, for example, 1.8% of people identified with Indian ancestry in the 2011 Census. ⁵⁹ The growth in the number of people in the Indian ethnic group in New Zealand is occurring at the same time as Prime Minister Modi is promoting a greater interest in the Indian diaspora worldwide. This interest will provide another avenue for engagement between the two countries. ⁶⁰

The UN Security Council

In addition to the progress that has been made in terms of the goals encompassing people-to-people ties, progress has also occurred in the area of Goal 5: engaging more deeply with India on regional and global issues. Some of this has resulted from New Zealand and India working together in various components of the Indo-Pacific (and Asia-Pacific) regional security architecture, but it has also been linked to the issue of UN Security Council reform and, especially, New Zealand’s election to a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for the period 2015–16. ⁶¹

Although it has been argued that there was previously no vocal support from New Zealand for India to become a permanent member of an expanded Security Council, ⁶² this changed with John Key’s 2011 visit. During his visit, Key stated that: ‘We would support India’s membership in a reformed Security Council, including in any expansion of permanent membership’. ⁶³ Key’s comments were reinforced later the same year by New Zealand’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN. After drawing attention to the fact that it was more than two years since New Zealand had expressed a view on Security Council reform in any UN forum, he said ‘a reformed Council must include a longer-term role for major powers like India and Japan’. ⁶⁴

Amid the ongoing intergovernmental negotiation process at the UN on Security Council reform, it has been evident that India wants its partners to be supportive of that process. New Zealand has certainly been so thus far. ⁶⁵ New Zealand wants to see a reform of the right to veto for the existing permanent members, reiterated by Prime Minister Key in his address to the 70th UN General Assembly in October, ⁶⁶ and views the current composition of the Security Council as inadequate. If the process initiated in the General Assembly to negotiate a text on reforms to, and expansion of, the Security Council should secure a two-thirds vote in favour and then reach the Security Council while New Zealand still has a seat on it, then New Zealand would vote in favour of reform and an expanded permanent membership. ⁶⁷

Another dimension to New Zealand–India cooperation at the UN has been in the area of peacekeeping operations (PKOs). India has a particular interest in PKOs and, like New Zealand, considerable expertise in it. New Zealand’s membership of the Security Council has seen the two countries engage in discussions on PKOs, and this is a potential area for further UN cooperation in the future. ⁶⁸ Coincidentally, peacekeeping is also an area in which engagement occurs between the New Zealand and Indian armies.

Defence and maritime security cooperation

Bilateral defence cooperation has historically always been described as ‘limited’. Although that adjective is still applied to bilateral engagement between the two militaries, ⁶⁹ it has been noted that, in recent years, defence ties have been growing closer. ⁷⁰ Defence cooperation was one area that was not specifically mentioned in ‘Opening Doors to India’: however, it has clearly been part of the New Zealand government’s overall strategy to improve the relationship. Indeed, during Prime Minister Key’s visit in June 2011, the decision to appoint a defence adviser to India was announced in the joint statement issued by the two prime ministers. ⁷¹ New Zealand’s defence representation to India has subsequently been upgraded over the last 18 months. The defence adviser accredited to India now holds a One Star rank and is based in Canberra. ⁷²

An increased tempo to the defence relationship has also been evident in the less headline-grabbing, but nonetheless still significant, area of defence education links. November 2014 saw what has been described as a ‘productive visit’ by members of the New Zealand Defence Force Command and Staff College course to India on their international study tour. ⁷³ An officer in the Indian Armed Forces has also successfully finished the Advanced Command and Staff Course in New Zealand and, in another first, a New Zealand army officer attended the 12-month staff course at the National Defence College in India in 2015. ⁷⁴

Such areas are important, but it is the defence interaction that occurs in the relevant regional multilateral-level institutions that has been valued most highly by New Zealand in recent years. This is especially so in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM+), where New Zealand has participated regularly in the Experts’ Working Group (EWG) on Humanitarian Mine Action, which India has been co-chairing with Vietnam. ⁷⁵ India and New Zealand also work together in the ADMM+ EWG on Maritime Security. Should India become a full member of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (it is currently an observer), then that would provide another useful forum for naval engagement.

It has often been remarked that India and New Zealand are both maritime nations. Concomitantly, therefore, it is enhanced naval engagement, driven by the centrality of a sharing of security interests in the Indian Ocean, through which future cooperation can most successfully be pursued. As was noted by the chief of the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), Rear Admiral Jack Steer, when he visited Kochi in June 2015, the Indian Ocean is also important to New Zealand as ‘98 to 99 per cent of our imports and exports happen by sea – a lot of it through the Indian Ocean’. ⁷⁶ New Zealand and India can, and already do, work together to keep vital sea lanes of communication open by countering the threat posed by pirates. ⁷⁷

Hitherto, naval engagement between New Zealand and India has largely occurred through port visits by ships of both navies on an ad hoc basis. In the case of the RNZN, this is usually when vessels are transiting through the Indian Ocean en route to, or returning from, participating in counter-piracy operations with the Combined Maritime Force in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the visit by the chief of the RNZN was timed to fit in with the port call by Her Majesty’s New Zealand Navy Ship (HNNZS) Te Kaha to Kochi on its way back to New Zealand. ⁷⁸ During Te Kaha’s port call, man overboard and flag sailing drills were conducted for familiarisation purposes. ⁷⁹ New Zealand is now considering plans for a more routinised programme of naval engagement that would see it move from such ad hoc port calls to a regular schedule of visits. ⁸⁰ It would be helpful if the conduct of such drills could also be regularised and, ideally, expanded.

Having attended the 2014 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium as an observer, it would be useful if the RNZN considered becoming a permanent observer. New Zealand could also consider joining the Indian Ocean Rim Association, which has begun to consider maritime security issues and which Australia is a member of. ⁸¹ After all, as was noted in the Indian Navy’s coverage of Te Kaha’s visit to Kochi, India and New Zealand share ‘common interests as Indian Ocean Littoral states’. ⁸² They also have common interests in constructing and maintaining a stable, rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

A common interest in an Indo-Pacific ‘super-region’ means that, perhaps for the first time in their history as independent states, New Zealand and India share a strategic objective, even an imperative. Moreover, from New Delhi’s perspective, having New Zealand as a partner ‘provides an effective way to further its expanding strategic interests … [which] very much coincides with Wellington’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific region’. ⁸³

Although it would be overstating the case to contend that India has become a ‘core trade, economic and political partner’ for New Zealand by 2015, especially in the absence of an FTA, substantial progress has been made towards several of the NZ Inc strategy’s other, individual goals. Those relating to people-to-people links have been a notable success, as has wider engagement, notably, cooperation at the UN. To these can be added defence cooperation (particularly naval engagement) and a growing sense of being partners in the Indo-Pacific. As it stands, therefore, India is no longer the peripheral concern that it has often seemed in New Zealand’s Asia policy and the bilateral relationship is in good shape. Indeed, one outward sign of the state of the bilateral relationship was that relations between Wellington and New Delhi were, according to a highly placed New Zealand source, entirely unaffected by the revelations in New Zealand in March 2015 concerning US National Security Agency (NSA) documents taken by Edward Snowden. These revealed that India was among the countries that New Zealand has spied upon ‘to help fill gaps in worldwide surveillance operations’ by the NSA. ⁸⁴

To ensure that the partnership with India continues to grow, and that the bilateral relationship does not become marginalised again, it is essential that momentum is sustained. Too often in the past, this has been lost and inertia has set in. This has not always been Wellington’s fault. Not only are India and New Zealand at opposites ends of the Indo-Pacific region, but they are also opposites in terms of power attributes and status. This has meant that New Zealand has sometimes seemed insignificant to India, with the corollary that it has had to work harder at the relationship to try to make itself more important in the eyes of New Delhi. In this regard, there has been a certain imbalance in the number and seniority of high-level visits. It would be helpful, therefore, if the number of high-level visits from India to New Zealand increased. ⁸⁵ As one Indian analyst argued back in 2012, a ‘Prime Ministerial visit from India to New Zealand is much overdue’. ⁸⁶ The fact that Prime Minster Modi did not include Wellington on his itinerary during his trip to Australia and Fiji in November 2014 was a lost opportunity. ⁸⁷ If momentum can be maintained by both New Zealand and India, then that old cliché that the bilateral relationship is ‘warm, but not deep’ can perhaps be removed from the record.