Repression,Cooptation,and Movement Fragmentation in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from the Youth Movement in Egypt

Activism and Protest Movements

Protest movements consist of informal networks among different organizations and individuals based on shared beliefs and solidarities. These networks are capable of mobilizing people around certain conflictual issues, through different forms of protest, and engaging in conflictual relationships with specific opponents (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). The boundaries of protest movements are primarily defined by a sense of collective identity amongst their actors (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). In the following discussion, I refer to individuals in protest movements as “activists.” Activism refers to a person’s efforts to influence policies through traditional representations, such as holding membership in a political party, contacting politicians, campaigning on certain issues (Roets et al., 2014), or participating in voluntary organizations and nongovernmental organizations. Activism also refers to an individual’s attempts to influence the political system from outside it, such as participating in demonstrations, signing petitions, or boycotting certain products. It also includes online attempts to influence politics and policies, for example, through blog posts. Throughout this article, I refer to all informants as “activists” within a youth movement.

In his analysis on the problems of generations, Karl Mannheim asserts that members of one particular generation are similar to members of a single social class. They are able to form common group solidarities and develop their own collective power. He argues that when a large number of young people develop a consciousness of themselves as “youth,” this becomes a moment of collective identity in which youth develop a political or social force for change (Mannheim, 1952). Alberto Melucci further argues that youth movements “take the shape of a network of different groups, dispersed, fragmented, submerged in everyday life” (Melucci, 1996: 12). The mere presence of young people who are subject to moral and political discipline is not necessarily a sign of a youth movement, since age as such is not able to develop a collective challenge to the social and political authorities within a polity (Bayat, 2017). Nevertheless, when youth in urban cities experience and establish a consciousness about being young, and begin to defend or extend their youthfulness in a collective manner, a “youth movement can be said to have developed” (Bayat, 2010: 119). To “serve as transformative agents, the young would often have to go beyond their exclusive youthful claims to draw on the broader concerns of citizenry” (Bayat, 2017: 23).

Young people within the sample analyzed for this study ¹ were all informally networked, shared the same conviction about reforming their polity, through either social or political participation (Sika, 2016). They had the capability of mobilizing others around their causes through different forms of protests, through civic engagement, or through participating in political organizations. They also shared a collective identity of being “young” and had the feeling of “us” (young people) versus “them” (the older generation) (Diani, 2007). Hence, activists who were interviewed during the fieldwork are identified as a youth movement throughout this article.

Protest Movements and the Attribution of Political Threat

To ascertain how regimes impose political threats that lead to movement fragmentation, the mechanisms and processes approach formulated by McAdam et al. (2001) is relevant. They define mechanisms of contention as “delimited sorts of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam et al., 2001: 24). These events are contentious, and could develop into uprisings, rebellions, or revolutions (Beissinger, 2002). Within this framework there are various mechanisms and processes, such as the context of mobilization in which the perceived opportunities and threats are developed and the contentious repertoires employed (Beissinger, 2002). According to Xi Chen (2017: 911), an analysis of state responses to contentious repertoires should also include “bargaining, emotion work, persuasion, co-optation, procrastination, and institutional absorption.” For the purposes of this study, I will only analyze cooptation to understand state responses to contentious repertoires and how it leads to fragmentation.

When looking at the political opportunity structure within a given polity, the prospects of developing certain claims and mobilizing individuals to a movement’s cause is dependent on the political context. This context either enhances or inhibits the movement’s ability to mobilize, develop a certain claim, develop some alliances, develop new political strategies, and affect institutional politics (McAdam et al., 2007; Meyer, 2004). This approach has been criticized in the literature for being overly structural and because the perception of opportunity is subjective, while a structure is objective (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Goldstone, 2004; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Jasper, 2004, 2010; Kriesi, 2004; Kurzman, 1996; Meyer, 2004). But it still provides an important analytical tool for the purposes of this study for several reasons. For instance, the political opportunity approach perceives protest movements as having a disadvantaged position in respect to the regime and to its various means of repression (Ming-Sho Ho, 2015). Some scholars argue that a favorable political climate in addition to a positive public opinion within a polity are able to help activists achieve their political goals for change (Burstein and Linton, 2002; Soule and Olzak, 2004). Other scholars have advanced our knowledge on the success or failure of protest movements in attaining political change by analyzing the political and cultural contexts in which they live (McCammon et al., 2007). In authoritarian regimes like Cuba, for instance, it is argued that citizens’ evaluations of bloggers and the political content of their messages is influenced by the political context itself (Stefania Vicari, 2014). Similarly, Tova Benski et al. (2013) contend that to understand the mobilizational processes that occurred in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), scholars should look at two main analytical dimensions, the context of mobilization and the actors’ contentious repertoires. Sidney Tarrow (2012) argues that opportunity structures are more open in some political settings than others, since elites in various states are not neutral when dealing with activists and movements.

Political threat is mainly driven through repression, which is “the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities” (Gerschewski, 2013: 21). Repression can also include the banning of political parties, using informants as provocative agents against dissent, censoring newspapers, arresting movement actors, torturing, disappearances, and execution of movement actors or dissidents (Davenport, 2007, 2009; Tilly, 2003). However, repression is a double-edged sword. It could lead to more contention, as protest movements might perceive a regime’s tactic to be threatening and costly, and accordingly believe that they would suffer if they do not take action (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; Ming-Sho Ho, 2015; Vicari, 2015). Yet it can also deter protest movements from further mobilization against an authoritarian regime (Lichbach, 1987). It can decrease political dissent and has a direct impact on movement fragmentation, when the costs of joining a protest movement are believed to be higher than the gains (Davenport, 2009; Tilly, 2005). Eva Bellin (2012: 28) argues that “the exceptional will and capacity of the coercive apparatus to repress” in the Middle East is the major reason behind the robustness of its authoritarian regimes. Heydemann and Leenders (2014) argue that authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa increased their “repertoires of suppression” against protest movements to deter them from further mobilization.

Since scholars have argued that repression may either be linked to more contention, or could deter activists from protesting, we need to analyze other measures enacted by a regime to fragment protest movements and to deter them from further mobilization. The major thrust of scholarly work on social movements highlights the importance of repression and concessions. However, it is argued that concession is utilized more in democratic regimes, while in authoritarian ones, political elite depend more on repression (Davenport, 2007; Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2011). There are various types of concessions that are utilized by autocrats, like the regime’s attempt to negotiate with opposition leaders, the release of political prisoners, the changing of bureaucrats, or the arrests of controversial figures from the elite (Rasler, 1996). While concessions play a significant role in fending off protest activities, this article shows that in regimes where mass uprisings and regime breakdown occur, and are followed by authoritarian reversals, the amalgamation of cooptation and repression are pivotal in movement fragmentation and in deterring a movement’s ability to mobilize for dissent.

Cooptation entails a political exchange whereby the authoritarian leader exchanges rewards for acquiescence, which frequently turns into a patronage system (Svolik, 2012). The distribution of benefits to individuals, in the form of monetary rewards, or awarding different positions of power, like becoming member of a parliament or minister, provides individuals with interests in the continuation of an authoritarian regime. These patronage systems enable dictators to extend control over those who receive these benefits, and over those who become included in the political process, even if they are in the opposition. “The decision over whether to ‘accept’ the offer of co-optation often divides the opposition, increasing the coordination costs associated with challenging the regime” (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014: 335). It takes place by distributing benefits to regime opponents, which gives the opposition a vested interest in maintaining the dictatorship (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Geddes, 2003; Gerschewski, 2013; Wintrobe, 1998). Analysis on cooptation is mainly concerned with cooptation of political elite and political parties, with no attention to the impact of cooptation on protest movements’ fragmentation. However, a closer look at regime responses to protest movement activities and contentious events in the ME NA demonstrates the impact of both cooptation and repression on movement fragmentation. In Jordan, for instance, major demonstrations took place from January 2011 until March of the same year. When activists refused to disperse, the police used force against protestors, and one person died (Yaghi and Clark, 2014). In this event, repression was applied, however, the regime also utilized cooptation measures through establishing the National Dialogue Committee that promised to introduce Constitutional amendments (Bank and Sunik, 2013). Authoritarian regimes in other areas of the world like in China have also been able to fend off political threats from protest movements through coopting their members (Chen, 2012). In Eurasia, where the colored revolutions have threatened authoritarian rule, some autocrats have used “pre-emptive” strategies to fend off further demonstrations and regime breakdown. An important pre-emptive strategy is supporting elections to provide some space for the opposition in Parliament (Finkel and Brudny, 2012). It is therefore important to understand the impact of cooptation and repression on protest movement fragmentation. Instead of analyzing contentious politics in authoritarian regimes by looking at concessions and repression, this article demonstrates the interplay between repression and cooptation in these regimes.

The Fieldwork

The argument in this analysis is based on empirical evidence from fieldwork conducted in Egypt between April and November 2015 within the scope of a research project entitled Power2Youth. ² The research consisted of 34 semi-structured interviews with 21 young men and 13 young women and five focus groups (FGs) conducted with 36 young people, aged 18–30. The selection process of young activists in this sample was based on mapping the existing organizations that are either led by young people, or whose main activities are youth-relevant and have been functioning in the Egyptian public sphere since 2001. This year was important for youth movements, as it was the year in which al-Aqsa intifada occurred in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. During this year, many young activists started to network and develop their protest activities, leading up to the 25 January uprising (El-Mahdi, 2009;Maha Abdelrahman, 2015; Shehata, 2010; Sika, 2017). Selection was also based on seven different criteria:

The semi-structured interviews were carried out with members of human rights organizations, student unions, issue-based protest movements, political parties, football fans, religious-based movements, members of NGOs, charity organizations, young people who have established youth campaigns or initiatives, and independent activists. ⁴ The majority of the interviewees (23) resided in Cairo, had a Bachelor’s degree (21), and attended public tertiary education (24). The first focus group was conducted with five young people, four from different human right organizations and one a member of a private university student union. The second focus group included 12 young people, all of them members of NGOs and charity organizations. Eight young people participated in the third focus group. These were members of eight different political parties, two of which were also members of religious-based movements. The fourth focus group was carried out with three independent activists, while the fifth consisted of eight participants from different backgrounds, two members of political parties, two activists who each established a youth initiative, three members of NGOs, and one a member of a public university student union.

A random sampling frame of young people who are civically and politically engaged in Egypt does not exist, and cannot be constructed due to security constraints, therefore, this research is based on the snowball sampling method (Coleman, 1958; Goodman, 2011). First, the research group mapped 200 youth NGOs and charity organizations, which are either established by youth or work for the empowerment of youth, 102 political parties, 134 youth groups, youth initiatives, and independent activists, and 24 human rights organizations in Egypt which have been present in the Egyptian public sphere from the year 2001 until 2014. ⁵ From these, we selected a convenience sample for the participants in the five focus groups. After each focus group, we asked participants to select other young people who work in these various fields. This method has some flaws, including the difficulty in making statistical inferences, and bias in the selection process of the first people included in the sample, which may lead to unknown biases in the continuation of the research process (Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004). Nevertheless, given the difficulties in conducting a random sample analysis with youth activists, the method is useful for this analysis, in particular due to the ability of this techinque to produce various accounts and understadings of participants’ lives and self perceptions (Brown, 2005).

Mobilization after Mubarak: The First Wave of Fragmentation

The Mubarak regime, with its police force and dominant political party, broke down during and after the January 2011 events, but authoritarian rule swiftly re-emerged with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assuming executive rule (Stacher, 2015). As a consequence of mass mobilization against Mubarak, the state apparatus lost much of its power. The National Democratic Party (NDP), which had been the dominant political party since Sadat’s era, was dismantled, and the Parliament was dissolved. Both had functioned as major coopting institutions under the Sadat and Mubarak regimes (Brownlee, 2007). The Ministry of Interior and the security forces were weakened because of their failure to withstand the uprisings. A result of this was the perception by the new incumbents that youth activists and mass mobilizations were a political threat to their own existence. The SCAF moved quickly to protect its economic interests, and aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood to negotiate a “smooth” transitional process (Abul-Magd, 2016). This process was dependent on the utilization of both cooptation and repression, however, during this phase, more cooptation than repression was employed.

The first parliamentary elections to be held after Mubarak’s ousting were due for 28 November 2011, and SCAF met with political party leaders a month earlier to discuss the electoral law (El Gundy, 2011). Although the media had generally presented this meeting as a “concession” from SCAF to political leaders, this analysis demonstrates that these concessions were initiated as a means to coopt activists. Political party leaders who accepted to meet with SCAF faced much criticism from youth activists within their party ranks (Al Masry al-Youm, 2011). A few weeks after the SCAF and the political party leaders’ meeting, and just 10 days before the parliamentary elections, a major protest event occurred: the Mohamed Mahmoud protest event. This event was instigated through a sit-in that was organized by the families of those who were injured or killed during the 25 January uprising. In this event, SCAF used excessive violence, injuring and killing a large number of protestors (BBC, 2012). When news about repression was out, some youth activists mobilized for more demonstrations against SCAF. Although these activists were able to mobilize for protest activities during the week that followed, the regime intensified its repressive strategies against them. According to Amnesty International’s (2012) estimates, almost 50 people died and more than 3000 people were injured or imprisoned. However, while repression against youth activists was mounting, the party and movement leaders who attended the SCAF meeting did not criticize the regime, nor did they protest in Mohamed Mahmoud with their own party or movement rank and file (Sika, 2017). ⁶ This event was a milestone for movement fragmentation, where youth activists voiced their discontent with their leaders, and decided to split from their existing movement and/or party membership (Sika, 2017). As Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) suggest, the decision to negotiate with the regime was essential in movement fragmentation. In this case, some members of movements and parties like the Muslim Brotherhood, 6 April Youth movement, and al-Adl political parties preferred to negotiate with SCAF and to hold the parliamentary elections, while others did not (Al Masry al-Youm, 2011; Sika, 2017).

Later, when the Brotherhood won the majority of seats in the parliament and subsequently their presidential candidate, Mohamed Morsi won the presidential election, more movement fragmentation occurred. A large number of the Brotherhood’s members were also participants in and members of various protest movements during the decade preceding the 2011 uprising. This decade witnessed the enlargement of the youth movement, with different protest movements like the 6 April Youth Movement and the Kifaya having horizontal leaderships and being issue-based, rather than ideological-based (Abdelrahman, 2015; El-Mahdi, 2009; Shehata, 2012; Sika, 2017). Nevertheless, after the Mohamed Mahmoud protest event, in addition to the Brotherhood’s ascendance to power, a rift between secular and religious movements occurred. In addition, fragmentation amongst the Islamist movements also occurred. Some young Brotherhood members defected to establish their own political parties, while the majority of secular activists started mobilizing against the Brotherhood and their youth members, who initially were a part of the same protest movements prior to Mubarak’s fall (Focus Group, May, 2015). During this period, a surge of youth activism occurred. A total of 29 new political parties and almost 70 youth movements and youth-led initiatives were established in 2011 and 2012. ⁷ The highest increase was in 2012, when 20 new initiatives were created, compared with three in 2014. This occurred to a large extent because of defections within original (pre-January 25) movements.

Morsi coopted many of the Brotherhood adherents through providing them with positions in the government. Hence, when repression was enforced against secular activists during many protest events, the Brotherhood youth were willing to accept the use of repression against their previous “friends” (Focus Group, May, 2015). ⁸ The Revolutionary Socialists and the young Brotherhood members became enemies in the aftermath of Morsi’s ascendance to power, for instance (Focus Group, May, 2015). ⁹

Mobilization after Morsi: The Second Wave of Fragmentation

The Brotherhood failed to stop mass mobilizations or to uphold the military’s interests, and Mohamed Morsi, was ousted from power in 2013. SCAF finally brought in Field Marshall Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi as leader, who was elected President in May 2014 (Stacher, 2015). Since his inauguration, youth activists have been perceived as a political threat to his power. According to Joshua Stacher (2015), in order to build and consolidate their power, state elites have to increase violence against citizens. In this sense, “regime hardliners block, obfuscate, and delay democratization, often using violence against society. This tends to split the opposition and discredit the so-called moderates” (Stacher, 2015: 264).

This second wave of fragmentation was also marked with repression and cooptation. However, during this period the regime’s dependence on repression was higher than cooptation. The increased repression manifested in various ways. For instance, there has been a growing number of civilian cases in military courts, a surge in jail sentences against activists, and the use of violence against demonstrators, often leading to hundreds of civilian deaths (Armbrust, 2017; Stacher, 2015). The repertoires of contention, specifically street demonstrations, graffiti, and public awareness campaigns developed into a political threat to the regime, which perceived them as having a large influence on public opinion. For instance, according to graffiti artists (Focus Group, May, 2015), the police only harass them if they think that their art might draw attention from passers-by. Before the ousting of Morsi, his adherents mobilized for large sit-ins in major squares of urban Cairo. To disperse these sit-ins, the military and police used excessive violence against protestors, what is often referred to as the Raba’a massacre. ¹⁰ Immediately after this massacre in 2013, the ruling elite, backed by the military, decided to crack down on young people’s participation. The impact of repression was significant in decreasing the number and scope of protest activities (Grimm and Harders, 2018). “Now we just froze because of the security issues and the political situation which threatens youth activists. In addition, I am not interested in political participation anymore. People have either been jailed or had their reputation tarnished by the media” (Interview, 14 October 2015). After the Raba’a massacre, young activists were clustered as either Islamist—against the regime—or liberals, in favor of the regime. One young activist contended that “we used to be able to sit down — seculars — liberals — leftists — Islamists and discuss politics, especially concerning contentious issues” (Interview, 7 September 2015). For instance, prior to the Raba’a massacre, new protest movements were established to mobilize other youth to become politically engaged in fighting for young people’s right to participate in peaceful demonstrations. Some youth activists also worked on citizens’ housing rights (Interview, 10 September 2015).

Young activists in our sample argued that the main problem holding them back from more activism and participation in civic and political life was the regime’s perception of them as a threat, and its excessive use of repression against them and their peers. For example, a young woman who developed an initiative to conduct 5-km runs on Egyptian streets, maintained that she was always faced with the problem of security crackdowns, even if young people only gathered for a run. “I feel insecure because the government can shut us down anytime … My group and I are always at risk … because they might shut us down, without any prior notice or explanation” (Interview, 14 October 2015). Street activism became constrained not only if it was perceived by the regime as “political” in nature, but also if it was for different social or cultural activities. The regime perceives any social gathering that would bring large numbers of citizens, especially young people, to the streets as a threat.

The Ultras Youth groups (fans of Egyptian football) which had mobilized against Mubarak became empowered after his downfall through painting graffiti against SCAF, chanting, and demonstrating against the police and the state security apparatus. Nevertheless, they were outlawed after many encounters with, and demonstrations against, the police during matches. One consequence has been that members of the group are afraid to demonstrate: “We gave up the streets, because if you go to the street you will get arrested again” (Interview, 13 August 2015).

Security forces have also increased their grip on university campuses while curtailing the power and activities of civil society organizations. Public protest became virtually outlawed, reducing their number and scope (Adly, 2016). The new 2013 Protest Law mandates jail sentences for those who participate in any demonstration not approved by the Interior Ministry, and dictates a minimum sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment for an indeterminate range of offenses, including “violating public order” (Dunne and Bentivoglio, 2014; Hamzawy, 2017). Youth activists from different protest movements and opposition political parties were active on campuses, especially in conducting public events to promote parliamentary or presidential candidates for the 2011 and 2012 elections. They also became adept at mobilizing and demonstrating for their own rights and freedoms of expression on campus (Abdalla, 2016). “Today, however, these young activists are repressed through the security apparatus and are unable to develop or participate in public events, let alone demonstrate” (Interview, 29 July 2015).

Cyberspace has also fallen under government control, and activists who have voiced their opinions online against the regime have been detained (The Atlantic, 2015).In addition, the new “Terrorist Entities law” employs vague terminology, making it easily applied to human rights activists and/or peaceful demonstrators (The Atlantic, 2015). These legislative efforts have been accompanied by a new discourse propagated by al-Sisi, which has underscored the purported “threat of the Internet” as a tool for terrorist groups to recruit and gain funding (Saad, 2015). An interviewee who was a member of a group that developed a website called Morsi Meter, which was concerned with documenting Morsi’s accomplishments and setbacks during his tenure in office, argued that due to his own security concerns, “I am uncomfortable to mobilize people on the streets or online or to talk negatively about politicians or even the mainstream media” (Interview, May 2015). Repression had a major impact on stopping young activists from participation and contestation on the streets. According to one young activist: “The regime is at enmity with young people today, whoever is not supporting the authority is either imprisoned or killed … therefore I am frustrated and am not even interested in becoming politically active anymore” (Interview, 2 June 2015).

Many young activists have voiced their “fear” not only of demonstrating on the street, but also of creating street art, graffiti, attending music festivals, or even just taking photographs on the streets. They fear political violence both from the authorities and from the citizens at large, who have been exposed to the media campaigns against young activists. “I feel that all my freedoms and rights were all of a sudden taken away. So now I am afraid to work in the public space. I have a lot of fear” (Interview, 13 May 2015). One activist, who previously belonged to the Youth for Change Movement, contends that in 2010 he was able to go to informal settlements and receive signatures from the inhabitants to call on the governor to develop access to basic goods in these areas. He argues that “today this is not possible, due to violence and the media campaigns against activists. Citizens who used to sympathize with young activists, no longer do so today … I used to be able to go to informal settlements and discuss issues of injustice and political marginalization with inhabitants; I used to mobilize people there to sign petitions. However, today I do not even attempt to enter these informal areas anymore, since exactly the same citizens who used to listen to me, would [now] call the police and try to imprison me” (Interview, 20 August 2015).

According to another activist, “The streets were open, we used to mobilize a lot of people to call for their housing rights. After the June 30 events, things changed. The public discourse turned against youth activists, and after having had much sympathy from the people, now everyone is against us” (Interview, 10 September 2015). In such circumstances, some activists believe that it is easier and more efficient to be an independent activist, or to abstain from participation than to be a member of a movement (Interview, 13 August 2015).

Movement Cooptation and Fragmentation

The previous section shows the effect of repression on movement fragmentation, which is in line with most analyses on the fragmentation of protest movements. Although repression was utilized in these events, cooptation was instrumental for the sustenance of violence against activists and for the further fragmentation of movements.

After Morsi’s ousting, members of the then National Salvation Front (NSF)—which had been established by a group of liberal and leftist activists, movements, and political parties against the Brotherhood—were coopted by providing some of its major figures with roles in the executive office. For example, Mohamed ElBaradei, the former IAEA Director was announced Vice President to the Interim President Adly Mansur. ¹¹ Cooptation was essential for movement fragmentation after the Raba’a massacre. Although this massacre is mainly analyzed as a major repressive event (Grimm and Harders, 2018; Hamid, 2014; Stacher, 2015), the dynamics of cooptation in the aftermath of this affair are important for understanding why and how more movement fragmentation occurred. The NSF fragmented when its members disagreed on whether or not to condemn the excessive use of violence against protestors and support the military. ElBaradei, for instance, resigned his post, however, other members like Hamdeen Sabbahi, backed the military’s use of violence (Bassiouni, 2017). The same fragmentation occurred with the youth movement. Young activists from the Tamarrod movement ¹² were promised monetary perks and guarantees to join the post-Morsi Constitutional Committee. This silenced their criticism against the excessive use of force by the military and police against other activists who were previously “friends” during the 25 January uprising (Focus Group, May, 2015). As one member of an opposition political party argued during a focus group: “I do not know why the Revolutionary Socialists and us had accepted to join forces with Tamarrod in 2013 in the first place” (Focus Group May, 2015).

Further efforts at cooptation developed by providing youth activists with political positions in some ministries and creating a Constitutional Committee in which many of the previous protest movements’ figures and youth activists became members. While conducting an interview in 2013 with two young deputy ministers, who were members of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition that was established during the 25 January 2011 uprising, both insisted on blaming the Brotherhood for the violence and repression which ensued in the aftermath of the Raba’a massacre (Interviews, November and December 2013). ¹³

The Parliament became another site for coopting regime loyalists and youth activists. Parliamentary elections were held in 2015, with the majority of seats won by independent loyalists from the military and some by new, tolerated political parties like al-Masryyin al-Ahrar (the Free Egyptian Party) (Halawa, 2016). The public discourse that was advanced by the ruling elite also transcended to the coopted youth activists. Their major concern now is to legitimize the current regime’s hold on power, to uphold their new positions and status, while at the same time portraying the Brotherhood and other youth activists who refused to become coopted as “terrorists” (Focus Group May, 2015). Youth activists who are willing to be coopted by the regime, by participating in its sponsored events or in Parliament, are important to showcase the regime’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, they are marginalized in the regime’s institutions, and their opinions are not taken into consideration for policy reforms. “Today the regime got rid of the various types of political activists. It created a rift between them, those who were willing to be co-opted are at enmity with those who are not: the first are marginalized, and the second are imprisoned” (Interview, 26 August 2015).

An interesting case is that of Shabab Jabhet al-inkaz (The Rescue Youth Front). This Front is composed of young people who were a part of the 6 April Movement and were ousted by its members. Its leader, Tarek al-Kholy, is coopted by the regime through providing him with perks and television airtime. Nevertheless, this is only to increase the rift between his front and the rest of the 6 April Movement front. “Another example is that of Khaled Telema, who served as Deputy Youth Minister after the June 30 events. When problems occurred between him and the Youth Minister, he was fired from his position. A few weeks later all young deputies to ministers were ousted” (Interview, 23 August 2015).

In dealing with youth activists, the regime is very clever. They coopted some youth activists who were in opposition to Mubarak and SCAF. They bring them to the spotlight through media outlets … When they gave these youth activists some windows of opportunity, they let them fight on air. So for public opinion these youth activists are perceived negatively. On the other hand, those who were unwilling to be coopted, like April 6 and Revolutionary Socialists, were coerced and imprisoned. But at the end of the day the regime got rid of both types of youth activists. They were able to create a rift between those willing to be coopted and those who are not willing to be coopted, so they weren’t defending one another, and hence their image became tarnished in society (Interview, 11 September 2015).

The inescapable reality is that when faced with demonstrations, contestations, and strong contentious repertoires, authoritarian regimes are not necessarily caught in a “repression/concession dilemma” (Bishara, 2015). They are quick to utilize different measures for their survival vis-à-vis protest movements, making them more resistant to change as well as more durable.

One of the latest cooptation initiatives was the convening of four youth conferences from October 2016 until November 2017, which were directly sponsored by al-Sisi. This conference brought together various young people from the tolerated opposition political parties, and some others who had belonged to protest movements in the past but have since reneged. Through these conferences, the regime is coopting young by promoting the development of economic perks and facilitating the establishment of youth initiatives that are concerned only with entrepreneurship or apolitical issues, such as small business initiatives. Thus, young people who are interested in socio-economic development become easily coopted by the regime, and are separated from other young people who are more concerned with political reform. For example, a young man who set up an initiative to help other young people build business start-ups, argues that Egyptian youth have many opportunities to develop, regardless of the political regime type. “If you want to become part of the social and economic development process you certainly can; inclusion depends on young people themselves … I was able to discuss my thoughts and ideas on technology and innovation with the Minister of Communication, he was very attentive, and promised to help me out with my business start-up. I was also invited to the economic conference in Sharm el Sheikh to discuss my business start-up organization with other young people and with policy makers” (Interview, 20 June 2015).

Cooptation in this case is interesting, since young people who developed small business start-ups have argued during the fieldwork that they are not interested in working with or attracting any of the politically active young people. They argued that since they are more concerned with developmental issues and not “political” issues, they do not want to be associated with any opposition political activities that would draw the regime to crack down on their developmental activism or business activities (Focus Group, April 2015).

Conclusion

The impact of repression and concessions on protest movements has been widely analyzed in the literature. This literature has added much to our understanding of state–society relations, especially in democratic regimes (Davenport, 2007, 2009; Lichbach, 1987; McAdam et al., 2001). In authoritarian regimes, the literature has mainly concentrated on a regime’s repressive strategies against protest movements, and the impact of these strategies on movement fragmentation (Della Porta, 2014; Grimm and Harders, 2018; Stacher, 2015; Volpi, 2014). However, scant attention has been paid in the social movement literature to the impact of repression and cooptation on movement fragmentation, especially in regimes that have seen large uprisings, regime breakdown, and authoritarian reversals. This article tried to fill this gap through showing that autocratizing regimes utilize an amalgam of repression and cooptation strategies to fragment protest movements and to entrench their rule. Fieldwork for this article has shown that even though repression is essential in combating the immediate threat posed by movements, cooptation is critical for legitimating repression and for weakening and further fragmenting protest movements to fend off any potential political threat. Extreme repression alone could stimulate the emergence of even more movements, rather than their elimination (Della Porta, 2014; Schock, 2005). The regime therefore relies on other tools to fragment movements, mainly cooptation. For instance, the regime’s cooptation of young Egyptian activists who previously belonged to youth opposition movements obstructed political opportunities for other youth activists. The coopted activists became essential for the authoritarian regime’s survival strategies and for movement fragmentation. While this finding is important analytically, further studies should be developed to understand the extent to which ideological differences within a movement could add to the process of fragmentation and enable regime cooptation of the various actors.