The government financial advantage of early elections: Evidence from UK MP candidate spending

Abstract

In many parliamentary democracies, incumbents can call early elections. This is thought to provide incumbent governments with an advantage due to the ability to time elections to favorable economic conditions. This article explores an additional incumbency advantage of early elections. Due to information asymmetry about election timing, government parties can better plan fundraising and campaign spending in early elections years compared to nongovernment parties giving government parties a relative financial advantage. This argument is tested on campaign-spending data from British parliamentary candidates 1950–2019. The results supports the argument. Government party candidates gain a relative financial advantage in early elections years compared to scheduled election years. The effect is found only for non-incumbent candidates and may have been eliminated by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act of 2011, which removed government election-calling power. The results suggest that government election-calling power provides incumbent parties with a relative financial advantage.

Keywords

early elections party funding incumbency advantage United Kingdom Fixed-term Parliaments Act

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