The 5-to-4 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelly v. South Carolina represents an important turning point in the death penalty sentencing procedure. Expanding on their prior ruling in Simmons v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court, in Kelly, determined that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction regarding parole eligibility when the only alternative to a death sentence is life without parole and the implication of future dangerousness is present. In this article, the controversial Kelly decision is examined, and both the majority opinion and the two dissenting opinions are analyzed. The broad as well as the more specific implications and ramifications of this important decision are presented.
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