Abstract
Institutional security level is one of the most consistent predictors of aggregate-levels of violence in prisons. Informed by administrative control theory, this study explores the impact of two types of social order administrative controls on prisoner-on-prisoner violence. Grounded theory was used to analyze in-depth semi-structured interviews with former Canadian male prisoners. From the participants’ perspectives, the reliance on formal, coercive mechanisms in higher security prisons decreased feelings of safety and led to increased violence, while the informal, remunerative mechanisms used in lower security prisons deterred aggression and encouraged desirable behaviors. Implications for prison management and administrative decisions are discussed.
Introduction
The pervasiveness of violence in prisons is a well-documented issue. According to the Census of U.S. State and Federal Correctional Facilities conducted in 2000, 34,000 prisoner-on-prisoner assaults took place between 1995 and 2000 (Stephan & Karberg, 2003). In 2000, physical assaults by prisoners were experienced at a rate of 28 per 1,000 prisoners, representing a 32% increase over this 5-year period. Moreover, incarcerated populations face physical victimization rates that far exceed those of the general community; numbers suggest that rates are over 18 times higher for males, and 27 times higher for females (Catalano, 2005).
Canadian data are more limited, although official statistics indicate that the rate of major assaults has been increasing steadily since 1989 and the number of prisoner homicides remained consistent in the 1980s and early 1990s (between four and 11 annually; Correctional Service Canada, 1992). Recent media reports, drawing on interviews with the Office of the Correctional Investigator, indicate a vast increase in prisoner-to-prisoner violence in federal facilities as well prisoner assaults on officers (MacCharles, 2012). Furthermore, MacCharles (2012) reported that the number of assaults reported by Correctional Services Canada increased 15% between March 2009 and March 2012. Official statistics, however, fail to capture the full extent of in-prison violence, due to the underreporting of incidents by prisoners and under-recording by prison staff (Bowker, 1980; McCorkle, 1993; Wooldredge, 1998). Estimates of prison violence based on self-report data, not surprisingly, are higher than official statistics (O’Donnell & Edgar, 1998; Wolff, Blitz, Shi, Siegel, & Bachman, 2007; Wooldredge, 1994), with one review of existing research concluding that official records capture only about 10 to 20% of all sexual and physical assaults in prison (Byrne & Hummer, 2007). Evidently, violence, and the threat of it, is a fixture in the everyday lives of prisoners.
Rates of violence and victimization vary considerably across prisons and over time. These differences are commonly explained by deprivation and importation theories. The current study does not discount such theories; rather, in applying an administrative control framework, we seek to illuminate the role of administrative policies and practices in contributing to variations in rates of violence in Canadian federal prisons.
Theoretical Explanations of Prison Violence
Prisoner behaviors, including acts of misconduct and violence, are typically accounted for by deprivation and importation theories. Deprivation theorists focus on the role of scarcity and the loss of personal liberties faced by prisoners in shaping their behaviors, arguing that violence is an adaptive response to these restrictive conditions (e.g., Sykes, 1958; Sykes & Messinger, 1960). Importation theory emphasizes pre-incarceration history and socialization experiences, and proponents view the attitudes and values held by prisoners prior to entering prison as key determinants of deviant or aggressive acts during incarceration (e.g., Irwin & Cressey, 1962). More recently, prison scholars have conceded that an integrated approach that incorporates both environmental conditions and individual characteristics best accounts for dynamics of in-prison violence (e.g., Lahm, 2008, 2009; Sparks, Bottoms, & Hay, 1996).
Although these models have received some empirical support, they have also been criticized for focusing on the characteristics of the prisoner social system while overlooking decisions of prison management (Huebner, 2003; Reisig, 1998). Administrative control theory addresses this shortcoming by examining the influence of administrative policies and practices on social order in correctional facilities. Advocates of this model argue that prison officials’ capacity to manage prisoner populations is instrumental in determining levels of misconduct (e.g., non-violent and violent infractions, collective action; DiIulio, 1987; Useem & Kimball, 1989; Useem & Reisig, 1999; Reisig, 2002). Moreover, organizational characteristics, such as overcrowding, high prisoner-to-officer ratios, inadequate training for officers, poor staff-management relations, and scarcity of resources, encourage “administrative breakdown” (Useem & Kimball, 1989), whereby the capacity of prison staff to enact security measures weakens, conditions of confinement worsen, and prisoners’ abilities and willingness to engage in prohibited acts, individual and collective, increase (DiIulio, 1987; Useem & Kimball, 1989). Effective management policies and practices, then, are essential to maximizing prison order.
Although the tenets of importation and deprivation theories have been subjected to considerable empirical testing in the study of prison violence, administrative control variables have received considerably less attention (Huebner, 2003). Nevertheless, the explanatory power of this model has been supported in studies of collective prisoner action, such as collective violence, protests, and riots (e.g., Colvin, 1992; DiIulio, 1987; Useem & Kimball, 1989; Useem & Reisig, 1999), and, more recently, assaults on prisoners and/or staff, prisoner homicides, and non-violent misconduct (e.g., Huebner, 2003; Reisig, 2002; Steiner, 2009; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2009; Wooldredge, Griffin, & Pratt, 2001). In both cases, increased social order was found in facilities where the officers’ capacity to exercise control over prisoner populations was higher. This was indicated by higher levels of morale among front-line staff, effective suppression of prisoner gangs, better relations between officers and the administration, lower officer turnover, and higher availability of prisoner programming. In other words, findings from these studies affirmed the key role of prison management in maintaining prison order.
Coercive and Remunerative Controls
The question, then, becomes how can control in prison environments be best achieved by management? Two types of formal controls, originally conceptualized in organization theory (e.g., Etzioni, 1961), have been examined in prison research (see Colvin, 1992; Huebner, 2003). Coercive controls are mechanisms that punish or discourage deviant behavior through the threat or use of disciplinary measures (e.g., administrative segregation, physical force), and restrictions of prisoner freedoms and liberties (e.g., regulation and restriction of activities, surveillance; Huebner, 2003; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2009). In contrast, remunerative controls encourage socially desirable behavior by providing “rewards” and resources for conformity to prison rules and reducing opportunities for participation in disorderly actions (e.g., employment opportunities, educational and vocational programs; Huebner, 2003; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2009). According to administrative control theorists, differences in the use of coercive and remunerative controls contribute to variations in levels of order and violence between facilities.
Empirical tests of the effects of controls have yielded mixed results. The association between coercive controls and prison violence is particularly unclear. For example, although one study found greater prisoner surveillance, operationalized as the ratio of correctional officers to prisoners, to be negatively associated with levels of prisoner assaults (Steiner, 2009), others have found no relationship between this variable and rates of individual or collective violence (McCorkle, Miethe, & Drass, 1995; Useem & Goldstone, 2002). Findings are similarly mixed regarding the effects of disciplinary sanctions for misconduct on prison violence. Here, Steiner’s (2009) study of 512 state prisons indicated that the increased use of administrative segregation resulted in reductions in levels of prisoner-on-prisoner violence. Yet, Useem’s (1985) analysis suggested that the greater use of administrative segregation led to anger among prisoners, which contributed to the start of the New Mexico Prison Riot. Finally, Huebner’s (2003) national study of state prisons (n = 185) found that the use of administrative segregation had no effect on rates of prisoner assaults.
Findings investigating the effects of remunerative controls are, however, more consistent. The provision of work assignments and programming can be used as incentives for prisoners to comply with prison rules, thus discouraging violent conduct (Huebner, 2003; Reisig, 2002; Steiner, 2009). Participation in these opportunities also occupies prisoners in approved activities, and limits the amount of “idle” time that can be spent engaging in misconduct or deviant behaviors (Steiner, 2009; Useem, 1985). Numerous studies have found that prisoner participation rates in work, educational, and vocational training programs are negatively associated with rates of assaults on prisoners and staff (e.g., Gaes & McGuire, 1985; Huebner, 2003; McCorkle et al. 1995; Steiner, 2009) and rates of collective prisoner action (Useem & Reisig, 1999). Consistent with these findings, a recent study of offenders in Canadian federal prisons reported that prisoners who had work assignments had fewer institutional charges and rates of admission to segregation than those who did not (Correctional Service Canada, 2008). Moreover, Colvin (1992) and Useem (1985) have argued that the removal of prisoner programming at the New Mexico Prison preceded a rise in incidents of interpersonal violence which ultimately culminated in the riot.
Therefore, while empirical studies confirm the merits of the administrative control model, researchers have not yet produced a clear understanding of the effects of various coercive and remunerative controls on prison violence. Moreover, few studies have examined the effects of these two types of controls in correctional environments with different needs and capacities for management, such as prisons with different security designations. Institutional security designation is one of the most consistent predictors of prisoner violence, with higher security level prisoners facing higher likelihoods of violent misconduct (Berk, Ladd, Garziano, & Baek, 2003; Jiang & Fisher-Giorlando, 2002; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2009) and physical victimization (Cooley, 1993; Gaes & McGuire, 1985; Perez, Gover, Tennyson, & Santos, 2010). This positive association is commonly attributed to the greater criminal propensity of maximum security prisoners (i.e., the importation model) or the adaptive responses of prisoner cultures to the more restrictive conditions (i.e., the deprivation model). However, as noted by Steiner (2009), the security level of a facility is also indicative of certain controls that affect prisoner conduct. Maximum prisons, for example, feature greater surveillance and restrictions on freedoms, which may cause stress and anxiety among prisoners who then react by engaging in misconduct or violence (Colvin, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1984).
Current Study
The present study applies administrative control theory to understanding the variations in prisoner-on-prisoner violence in Canadian federal prisons. Specifically, we examine parolees’ experiences of violence and perceptions of safety in correctional facilities with different security classifications. Next, we explore how maximum, medium, and minimum security facilities differ in their use of coercive (i.e., surveillance and regulation) and remunerative (i.e., prisoner programs) controls. Finally, we examine parolees’ perceptions on the impact of these two types of controls on the presence of violence in correctional environments.
The Research Setting
Currently in Canada, convicted offenders begin their federal sentence (i.e., sentence of 2 years or longer) in a reception unit where their internal security risk (i.e., their potential danger to correctional staff and other prisoners), external security risk (i.e., their potential threat to the general community), and needs (i.e., treatment or medical requirements) are assessed (Department of Justice, 2012). These assessment scores are used to determine each prisoner’s security classification as prisoners are physically segregated by their security classification which corresponds to that of the facility in which they are housed. Canadian federal prisons are assigned one of three possible security classifications that signify differences in physical design, administrative policies, and interpersonal dynamics. Maximum security facilities are secure and restrictive settings characterized by lethal perimeters, remotely controlled cells, constant supervision achieved by video surveillance and high staff-to-prisoner ratios, strict regulation of prisoner movement and activities, and long periods of lock-up. At the other end of the spectrum, minimum security institutions feature lighter (and sometimes no) perimeter security, increased opportunities for weekend furloughs (i.e., escorted and unescorted temporary absences), dormitories for housing prisoners, fewer and shorter (if any) periods of mandated in-cell time, and minimal monitoring, surveillance, and management of prisoners’ movements and activities. The relatively open and unregimented environment of these prisons reflects a weaker preoccupation with containing security risks.
Prisons designated as medium security facilities constitute a diverse group. All medium security facilities are surrounded by fences at the perimeters, but availability of recreational activities and prisoner programs vary substantially across institutions, as do living conditions and the degree to which prisoners are restricted and managed. These facilities can be meaningfully categorized into high-medium prisons, which are more similar to maximum security prisons, and low-medium institutions, which more closely resemble minimum security facilities.
Method
In-person, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 56 men, ranging in age from 19 to 58 (M = 37), who had served at least one sentence in a federal Canadian penitentiary. Many men had served more than one federal sentence, and almost all had spent time in more than one federal facility. In total, 45 participants had served time in at least one minimum security penitentiary, 31 in at least one medium, and 36 in at least one maximum—not including reception. Across the sample, types of convictions varied widely from violent crimes (e.g., manslaughter, second degree murder, armed robbery, and assault; n = 33), non-violent non-sexual offenses (e.g., drug trafficking, manufacturing, and possession; n = 14), and sex-related offenses (e.g., child pornography, sexual interference, and sexual assault on a minor; n = 9). One participant chose not to disclose the nature of his conviction. Most had received statutory release (i.e., paroled after serving two thirds of a sentence), rather than parole (i.e., paroled after serving one third of a sentence).
Recruitment occurred as persons in the community or in direct contact with parolees as part of their work informed former prisoners about the nature of the study. In-person recruitment was used rather than advertisements, emails, and posters, to ensure that functional illiteracy, limited technological competence, and parole conditions that restricted internet use would not prevent parolees from taking part in the study. All interviews were conducted by the first author and took place between February 2011 and February 2012 in a private office or boardroom at the same location in Ontario, Canada, and lasted between 45 min and over 3 hr. Prior to each interview, consent was obtained. Interviews were audio recorded, field notes were taken, and a demographic survey was administered at the end of the interview. Upon completion of the interview, each participant was given an honorarium for his time.
A 35-item interview guide that focused on parolees’ personal perceptions and experiences of risk and violence in prison, opinions on conditions of incarceration, and their daily routines and involvement in programs and activities was used at the beginning of an interview to draw respondents into conversation. It was abandoned, once conversation progressed freely as participants were encouraged to tell their stories and speak about their experiences. Participants expressed that they enjoyed the opportunity to talk about their experiences without judgment.
During the process of transcribing the recordings, any and all identifying information was removed. Interviews and field notes were coded into emergent themes using a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Major themes and core variables were identified, while less relevant data were omitted from the analysis (e.g., axial and selective coding). An emergent theme was determined if similar feelings, experiences, or views about a particular topic were described by multiple respondents. Both authors reviewed the transcripts and reached an agreement on all emergent themes noted in these results (e.g., a qualitative inter-rater reliability). The Research Ethics Board (REB) of the principal researcher’s university approved this study.
Results
In this section, findings regarding the relationship between prisoner violence and the use of administration controls are presented. First, parolees’ experiences of violence and perceptions of safety in Canadian federal prisons are discussed. Next, variations in the presence of coercive and remunerative controls across prisons of different security classifications are explored. Finally, parolees’ perceptions of the effects of these controls on penal violence are examined.
Differences in Experiences of Violence and Perceptions of Safety by Security Level
All respondents reported witnessing some form of prisoner-on-prisoner violence while incarcerated. As well, almost all parolees described involvement in at least one confrontation with another prisoner where verbal abuse or threats of physical harm, and/or physical aggression were present. These vicarious and personal experiences of violence created strong perceptions that personal safety was absent: “There’s no safety, there’s never safety,” “[I] never felt safe in there. Even when you’re in your cell at night time and your cell’s locked, you still don’t feel safe,” and “No one feels safe in prison . . . No one.” Many participants noted that despite having avoided high-risk activities (e.g., gambling, drugs, altercations), the potential for getting caught up in violence was always present. At the same time, participants also described variations in the presence of violence in prisons of different security levels.
The assessment unit (which was housed in a maximum security institution), maximum security prisons, and high-medium security prisons were reported to be the most violent. All of the respondents who had served time in these facilities had heard about, witnessed, or been involved in physical altercations, ranging from fist fights, to multiple stabbings that sometimes resulted in death(s). Two accounts of the pervasiveness of violence in these facilities were as follows: “When you go out to the yard or to the gym, there’s always something happening out there . . . Somebody’s getting beat up, somebody’s stabbed, somebody’s jumped, there’s always confrontations” (re: Maximum security facility) and “It’s violent, it’s gotten worse, it’s gotten really bad. There’s a stabbing like every two weeks” (re: High-medium facility). Among parolees, there was agreement that these facilities were “very violent” and “rough,” and that the violence permeated the very atmosphere. For example, Martin described the assessment unit as “tense and loud,” and a high-medium prison as having an “underlying current of hostility [as] violence was always, always present.” In these environments, respondents spoke of a “need” to be “ready to do something if somebody’s going to do something to you” and to be “aware of your surroundings . . . [as] a situation could happen at any time.” There was a shared belief that if a prisoner let down their guard, even for a split second, they greatly increased their likelihood of becoming victimized.
In lower security prisons, namely, low-mediums and minimums, violent incidents were reportedly less common, although the threat of violence was still felt. For example, one low-medium prison was described as “there is not a whole lot of violence, not a whole [lot] of tension.” Similarly, the atmosphere of these facilities was described as “more calm” when compared with high-mediums, and a number of parolees noted that a prisoner who feared or felt unsafe around another prisoner could, and sometimes would, make false reports of that prisoner being aggressive or violent to try to have him transferred, often back, to a more secure institution. Although most parolees reported feeling safer in less secure facilities than higher security and, thus, more able to let down their guard as a result, the threat of physical harm by other prisoners was still experienced by some and evident for all.
Institutional Characteristics: Coercive and Remunerative Controls by Security Level
Maximum security prisons
A preference for using coercive controls over remunerative controls to maintain social order was evident in the assessment unit and in maximum security prisons. Here, prisoners’ movement and activities were highly regulated and restricted, as they were confined in their cells for 22 to 23 hr a day. Prisoners could choose how to pass their time while they were locked up, but the menu of options was limited to eating meals, playing video games, reading books, and watching television; “it’s like lock-up, lock-up, lock-up all the time. You’re alone in a room. You just come out 15 minutes to have a shower every other day, use the phone, and then [you are] back in the cell again.” As the excerpt shows, the monotony of this routine was evident in all parolees’ accounts of a typical day in reception or in maximum security.
These extensive periods of cell confinement gave rise to considerable anxiety over how time out of lock-up would be best spent. The need to choose between making a phone call and taking a shower was a dilemma recalled by most respondents, as was the sense that “you don’t have time”: You gotta do everything fast. When you shower, it has to be a two minute shower. Five minute phone call. By the time you use the phone, you can hardly even get to take a shower . . . You don’t take a shower every day, it’s every other day if you want to make a call to your family, and you want to chit-chat . . . you don’t get enough time to talk and take a shower.
Adding to the anxiety was the knowledge that out-of-cell time was not guaranteed as incidents of violence, which were frequent in these facilities, would move the prisons into lock-down. Lock-down involved prisoners being held in their cells for 24 hr a day, and at times, this state lasted for weeks. Opportunities to leave cells could also be denied if the administration determined the number of staff on duty was insufficient for safely managing prisoners outside their cells. Fittingly, one parolee summed up his time spent in the reception unit, stating, “You might as well be in segregation.”
The limited availability of work and educational programs in maximum security prisons is also illustrative of an administrative overreliance on coercive controls. The function of such opportunities as remunerative controls is evident, as parolees noted that in such restrictive circumstances, having a job was rewarding such that it guaranteed prisoners an opportunity to “get to come out every day” and to break up the monotony of their days: I was on the work range, so I was working all day in the kitchen so time went by pretty fast. You’re locked down most of the time if you’re not working. So [name of prison] was alright, for the fact that I was working, I was doing something. But it was too much of a lockdown.
Unfortunately, the low ratio of employment opportunities to prisoners meant that most prisoners could not obtain a work assignment: “It’s hard to get a job there because there are 120 guys there in [a] unit and there is only a certain amount of jobs. So if you’re not working, you’re locked in your cell all day.” Overall, experiences in reception and maximum security prisons stood out as “very hard,” “rough,” or simply “hell.”
High-mediums
Compared with maximum security prisons, high-medium prisons use a greater balance between coercive and remunerative controls. This difference was prominent for parolees who were transferred to a high-medium either directly from the assessment unit or from a maximum security institution. Arguably, the most notable difference for parolees was the eased restrictions on movement, going from being locked up for 23 hr to having “a lot more freedom, a lot more movement, a lot more activity.”
Also noteworthy was the greater availability of remunerative controls, such as sports, recreational facilities, cultural and special interest groups, jobs, and educational and vocational training programs. When speaking about these opportunities, parolees made it clear that they were highly valued, and, more importantly, taken advantage of—they were used. Education, training, and work were incorporated into daily routines by many parolees: I went to school every day, I got my grade twelve while I was in there. I did school in the morning and worked in the afternoons and I never missed a day . . . After I finished my grade twelve . . . I moved into the welding program at [institution], and I was in there every day . . . I was very active, you know? I attended the programs. I had my hand up in class.
As this excerpt suggests, many parolees who entered these penitentiaries with less than a high school education used their time to complete the necessary credits to earn their high school diplomas. Sometimes they felt they did so in the face of dissuasion from staff: [The staff] said if I had my grade 10, I didn’t need school . . . I’m like, “well I have my grade 10 and I want to finish my high school . . . I know that there is more I could have achieved, so you want to stop me at grade 10?” I’m like, “no no no I’m going to finish it off, you know? And see what I can learn.”
This parolee’s words demonstrate the lack of support at times they endured when seeking education. Despite these opportunities, some respondents still stated that it remained difficult to “pass the time” in such prisons, consistent with the sentiment framing time passing in maximum security, however, for many others, the contrast between maximum and high-medium prisons was like “night and day.”
Low-mediums and minimums
Low-medium and minimum security penitentiaries share a number of administrative features as noted by a parolee who described one low-medium saying, “It’s a medium because it has a fence, but it’s run like a minimum,” and another who referred to a different low-medium as a “camp,” a label commonly used in reference to minimums. In these institutions, coercive controls were minimal, and there was a marked decrease in the use of remunerative rewards to motivate conformity to rules, in comparison with available controls in higher security prisons. Regulations on movement were reportedly minimal, as prisoners were only required to be in their cells for head counts and sleeping, and were otherwise free to roam the grounds. Parolees referred to their living quarters as shared “houses,” and noted that their “rooms” (i.e., not cells) were not controlled remotely by staff, meaning they could leave and return when they wanted.
Prisoners could partake in different group and cultural activities, use a variety of sports and recreational facilities, and, again, incorporate school and work into their daily routines. Dave, like many others, summed up his time at a minimum security institution as “a learning experience,” and attributed this learning to the various job positions he had held. Prisoners could also apply for escorted and unescorted temporary absences and work releases, which a number of parolees were granted. These features, along with the absence of fences around the perimeter, signaled to prisoners that a degree of trust and accountability was extended to them.
Overall, these accounts confirm that prison security classifications signify differences in the balance of formal controls used to maintain social order (Steiner, 2009). Maximum security prisons feature a heavy reliance on coercive controls, and an almost complete absence of remunerative controls. As institutional security levels decrease, restrictions and regulations on prisoner populations are lessened, as rewards are increasingly used. In minimum security prisons, remunerative controls are the dominant method of inducing conformity, while coercive controls are limited. In theory, both types of controls function to influence the behaviors of prisoners. As discussed above, however, previous findings suggest that remunerative and coercive controls may in fact differently affect social order (e.g., Colvin, 1992; Huebner, 2003). The relationship between administrative controls and prisoner violence is examined next.
Effects on Violence: Coercive Controls
Heavy surveillance and strict regulation and restriction of prisoners’ movement and activity were the primary mechanisms for exerting control in maximum and, to a lesser extent, high-medium security penitentiaries. From the perspective of respondents, the heavy presence of coercive controls contributed to undesirable behaviors and violence in these facilities. The institutional practice of regularly keeping prisoners in lock-up for 22 to 23 hr a day, for example, was believed by many parolees to be a cause of prisoners’ pent-up frustration and aggravation: “Some people were shaking up rough when they were in there . . . They’re just pacing back and forth, and they just can’t cope with just being locked down that much” (re: Reception). Stephen also noted that these conditions made maximum security “an intense place [where] your mind has to be strong or you just lose your mind.” As his words suggest and those of many others this psychological resilience was integral for getting through the experience of being confined for long periods of time.
Indeed, the practice of keeping prisoners locked up extensively was a double-edged sword. On one hand, confining prisoners to their cells prevented violence because prisoners lacked physical contact with one another—although the anxiety and tension from the lock-up could be self-destructive—and, for a few respondents, it also provided some sense of safety. On the other hand, when the cell doors were unlocked, bottled up tensions were frequently discharged in confrontations and fights with other prisoners. Jake explained this process as follows: “I felt safe for the most part . . . during that 23 hour period . . . But during that one-hour period, you’re on alert . . . Just being totally aware of your surroundings, who’s around you and so forth.” Accordingly, prisoner-to-prisoner confrontations frequently took place in areas where prisoners congregated during this hour, such as the yard, the showers, and around the phones.
The administrative decision to achieve constant surveillance of prisoners via video monitors linked to cameras overseeing the ranges and yards also seemed to facilitate violence. In these facilities, in-person supervision of prisoners by correctional officers is minimal, as even cell doors are opened by pressing buttons. This physical distance may provide a heightened sense of safety for correctional officers but it appears to have the opposite effect on prisoners. From the view of respondents, the cameras provided little security, as prisoners keen on instigating violence could easily do so in the “blind spots” as the locations of these cameras were well known among prisoners. Some prisoners also noted that many incarcerated men did not care about being caught on camera—these men were thought to be more interested in the violence. Furthermore, the challenges involved in alerting the attention of officers (e.g., by approaching the guard station or “jumping the fence”) made it more enticing for prisoners to start an altercation. As a result, parolees described taking responsibility for ensuring their safety in prison, by, ironically, asserting their dominance over others. This was frequently achieved by responding to verbal or physical challenges from other prisoners with violence. For example, Nate, echoing many others, explained, That’s what led to all the fights—one guy who would want to come up to you, talk to you, and disrespect you. If you don’t do anything about it, everyone else looks at you differently. So you have got to do something about it to show you’re not a punk, and you’re not going to take that kind of stuff.
Nate’s words show that if a prisoner opted not to fight, he would be viewed by others as a “punk” who could not stand up for himself and that this would lead to future victimization.
The pre-emptive use of aggression to avoid or deter victimization by other prisoners has been understood as an “active” precautionary behavior, driven as much by fear of future threats as by past experiences of physical altercations (McCorkle, 1992; O’Donnell & Edgar, 1999). According to parolees, the propensity to use violence was greater in higher security institutions where prisoners felt less safe, experienced more threats, and where correctional officerswere physically distant. Moreover, as has been proposed by previous researchers (e.g., Goodstein et al., 1984), they also linked this inclination for aggression to the tension and anxiety resulting from having their liberties severely limited.
Indeed, as the use of coercive controls decreased in low-medium and minimum security facilities, so too did the threat of violence. Parolees described using their freedom of movement within the prison grounds to avoid any potential altercations. In some of these prisons, correctional officers mixed openly with prisoners, and some parolees noted that the ease of reporting threats or acts of violence by other prisoners created a strong deterrent for aggressive interactions. It appeared that both granting prisoners’ access to the “flight response”—allowing them to choose who to associate with, where, and when—and making the presence of correctional officers overt increased the safety of these institutional environments.
Effects on Violence: Remunerative Controls
Although coercive controls were perceived as a source of tensions leading to prisoner confrontations, remunerative controls were reported to provide the necessary stimulation and release to reduce feelings of frustration and emotional stress. Recreational activities, schooling, and work assignments had the additional benefit of providing prisoners with means to pass the time and create structure in their day. John, for example, recalled his time in a minimum, saying, My time was just devoted to school, [working in the] kitchen, and my girl, that’s it, that’s all I did. I spent an hour, two hours on the phone with my girl. I’d wake up in the morning, eat breakfast, go to school, come back, eat lunch until one o’clock, go work till three or four, go back, eat dinner, prepare my food for after my work out, and then at five o’clock, go to yard, work out from six thirty to nine thirty . . . I’d do that workout until ten fifteen, ten thirty. By then I’m pooped and just want to eat. Go upstairs, take a shower, eat my food, and start the same routine over every day. I was busy. I wasn’t into politics . . . You get involved in politics, you get involved in getting stabbed or having to stab somebody.
As this except shows, the benefits of having remunerative controls were multiple. Indeed, the simultaneous advantages of involving prisoners in pro-social activities and eliminating idle time that could otherwise be spent committing infractions or entering altercations has been noted by other researchers (e.g., Steiner, 2009; Useem, 1985).
Furthermore, the liberties and opportunities available in lower security prisons compelled prisoners to comply with institutional rules. Tom explained that in minimums, “they don’t put up with nothing. You do something wrong and they just ship you right out. So guys that make it there, they don’t want to get kicked out.” Indeed, nearly all of the respondents who had spent time in a lower security facility mentioned the threat of being transferred to a more secure facility as an effective deterrent to engaging in acts of misconduct, including violence. Carter, who had been aggressive when incarcerated in higher security facilities, for example, changed his behaviors when he was eventually transferred to a minimum: I wanted to stay there and so I was compelled to toe the line. If [you] want to stay there then you have to go along with their program. Their program is no violence [so I had to] tone that down . . . If you got caught fighting then you would be sent right back and you don’t want to leave.
His words demonstrate how his behaviors actually changed once he was in a more positive environment; he transformed himself in accordance to the institution’s rules to remain in that facility. Thus, the emphasis placed on the use of remunerative controls was an important contributor to the maintenance of social order in these environments.
Speaking directly about the personal benefits of educational and training opportunities, social skills programs, and work assignments, some parolees talked about how these opportunities opened their eyes to the possibility of walking a path different from the criminal one that they had always known. For example, Roger, who had stayed on a range where prisoners were allowed to prepare their own meals, shared, [I] got my Grade 12, got my safety food and safety handling, [and] learned that I was a better cook than I thought I was. I came out knowing that’s what I wanted to do [and I] actually enrolled for Culinary Arts in [college name].
Other parolees who had earned their high school diploma in prison also reported that they had enrolled in college programs post-incarceration, or were planning to do so. In a similar vein, Tom, who was serving a life sentence for murder and had decided to “turn [his] life around” in prison, positively reflected on the life skills that he had gained from various programs: I’m a success from that [housing] program . . . It was just like a house and we were given our money for a month, and we had to go grocery shopping, everything. I didn’t know how to cook anything. I had never done groceries in my life . . . Now I’m a pretty decent cook, I cook frequently, probably more than the average person. I cook a lot. And I’m really good at budgeting now with my groceries, and doing that sort of stuff. That’s a skill I never would have learned if I hadn’t gone to [institution] and went through that program . . . Because of that, I can put my time and energy into dealing with emotional level of my transition . . . .
This excerpt shows how programming can be viewed as both rewarding and essential for successful reintegration. Indeed, as a result of these opportunities, many parolees viewed lower security facilities as “a little more conducive to wanting to change.” A parolee summed up that, “the opportunities were there, and I think that if a person wanted to change, that he could.” There was recognition, implicit or explicit, among many parolees that participation in such opportunities facilitated and was perhaps even essential to personal change both inside and outside the prison.
Moreover, parolees felt strongly that maximum and high-medium security penitentiaries did little to promote or even allow the opportunity for personal change in a positive direction; “that’s [maximum security prison] one of the hardest places to change your life around.” Respondents spoke at length about the gradual removal of activities and programs from these facilities and the negative consequences associated with such practices. For example, it was explained that [t]he prison system is built for you to come back, that’s how I feel. They’re taking away certain things where they should be putting [in] more things. They took away the prison farms and stuff . . . Me, personally I would have benefitted from working at a farm . . . You get a job there . . . they [will] hire you but they only hire you if you have the skills… But that’s why the people are in there [prison]—because they don’t have any skills. Those people should have been first in line [to work in the farms] . . . So they can develop that skill [and later get a job].
This parolee, like many others, also predicted that, as a consequence of the rumored plans of administrators, acting in accordance to federal budget cuts for corrections, to continue to remove programming, “[prison violence] is going to get worse,” with idle time contributing to violence. Generally, remunerative controls provide prisoners with opportunities to learn new skills, to occupy their time and energy in positive, productive activities, and to explore ideas of a different future. In their absence, prisoners had more time to engage in interpersonal conflicts with other prisoners and fewer alternative outlets for releasing stress and tension (other than acts of aggression) as well as little reason to exercise self-control.
Discussion and Conclusion
The research presented explored the relationship between administrative controls and violence in prisons by examining the effects of the formal controls, remunerative or coercive, imposed by prison administrators and carried out by front-line staff. Data from interviews with parolees indicated that experiences of violence and the perceived threat of harm were generally higher in more secure facilities compared with less secure facilities. Prisoners also described variations in the use of formal controls in prisons of different security classifications, with coercive controls dominant in higher security prisons, and remunerative controls in the lower security facilities. From the perspective of parolees, the degree of regulation and restriction of prisoner freedoms and needs, on one hand, and the availability of programs and amenities, on the other hand, were contributing factors to the positive relationship between the violence levels and security classifications of facilities.
Before discussing these findings in more detail, some limitations should be noted. First, the findings have limited generalizability even within Canada, as the men interviewed served their sentences largely in federal prisons located in Ontario. The data are, however, consistent with existing empirical findings about the effects of coercive and remunerative controls on social order (e.g., Huebner, 2003; McCorkle et al., 1995; Steiner, 2009). Moreover, the use of in-depth interviews provides a comprehensive understanding of how prisoners themselves experience this relationship between administrative controls and violence in prison. Such an understanding is of particular importance, given that the majority of research regarding administrative control theory has been conducted in American correctional facilities (e.g., Huebner, 2003; Reisig, 2002; Steiner, 2009).
Second, the findings are derived from self-report data from parolees and the possibility that their reported perceptions and experiences do not represent the full range of experiences of prisoners in Canadian federal prisons cannot be ruled out. Challenges to validity of the data may stem from issues of memory recall as well as the desires of prisoners to portray themselves or prison environments in a particular light. These challenges have been noted by other researchers (e.g., DiIulio, 1991; Wright, 1991) who have studied issues of violence, drugs, and living conditions in prison using data from prisoners and/or prison officials. This limitation has been controlled for by extensive discussions and careful interviewing as well as cautious and diligent analyses.
Finally, our research examined the effects of the availability of remunerative controls on violence but did not isolate the effects of specific types of programs (e.g., vocational training, substance abuse treatment, work assignments) and amenities (e.g., recreational facilities, cultural and special interest groups) on prisoner behaviors. It is possible that the effectiveness of remunerative controls at encouraging conformity varies by type. For example, some respondents expressed their beliefs that the effectiveness of violence prevention programs was limited, given that the prisoners were immersed in an atmosphere rife with hostility and aggression. Instead, vocational training programs were believed to be more likely to result in long-lasting change and to reduce recidivism. Future research can examine whether the quality and type of different programs and amenities have differential impacts on social order in prisons.
Despite these limitations, this study provides substantial support for the utility of an administrative control framework in understanding social order in prison environments. Consistent with U.S. studies, we found that levels of violence in Canadian prisons varied in accordance with the security classifications of prison, with more frequent experiences of violence and greater concerns of physical victimization in higher security facilities (Huebner, 2003; Jiang & Fisher-Giorlando, 2002; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2009). More importantly, we found a heavy reliance on coercive controls and a limited use of remunerative controls in more secure prisons, and the inverse in less secure prisons, with these differences in administrative policies and practices accounting for variations in violence, according to parolees’ views.
Specifically, heavy restraints on prisoners’ movements and activities, and long periods of cell confinements were believed to give rise to psychological tensions and stress, which were frequently released in confrontations with other prisoners once they were let out of their cells. This connection has been made previously by Colvin (1992) and DiIulio (1991) who argued that greater deprivations of liberties can generate considerable anxiety and frustration among prisoners, which, in turn, lead to aggression and misconduct. The experiences of parolees also speak to the importance of providing adequate programming, opportunities, and training that both provide prisoners with socially acceptable and productive ways to occupy their time and energy, and aid them in making positive changes inside and outside of prison. These controls were understood by parolees as “rewards” for good behavior that could be revoked due to misconduct or violent behaviors, and were described as an effective control over prisoners’ behaviors and choices.
These findings have important implications for effective prison management, as it suggests the need for a greater balance between coercive and remunerative controls if social order is to be the outcome. This is especially needed in higher security facilities where the coercive controls currently dominate. Administrative decisions regarding formal controls influence the prison environment and prisoners’ behaviors, and prisoners deemed to be high risk may in fact be exposed to conditions of confinement that facilitate violence and discourage desirable behaviors and positive change. Indeed, many administrative control theorists acknowledge that an overly discipline-oriented, coercive regime can heighten disorder (Huebner, 2003; Reisig, 1998), and most argue that a balance of coercive and remunerative controls is ideal (Colvin, 1992; Reisig, 1998). Unfortunately, the current trends in Canadian and American prisons are decreasing availability of prisoner programming (Lahm, 2009; Petersilia, 2003), which was also observed by our participants. Although an absolute lessening of coercive functions is not ideal in the absence of evidence that all maximum security prisoners pose little threat to the safety of other prisoners and the general community, increasing the use of rewards and easing punishments are likely to be effective for managing prison populations. Although the limited research on administrative control variables has left the optimal balance of coercive and formal controls in correctional environments unknown (Huebner, 2003; Reisig, 2002), this and other studies illustrate that further research on the effects of formal controls is warranted.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received financial support from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), Standard Research Grant, for the research of this article.