Understanding and Preventing Ideologically Justified Violence in Custodial Settings: The MICO Paradigm

Abstract

Internationally, secure institutions face a range of challenges presented by detainees convicted or suspected of terrorism-related crimes and those interested or involved in groups that support ideologically justify violence (IJV). Currently, there is an apparent absence of a theoretically grounded but operationally focused paradigm (or conceptual lens) for understanding and preventing IJV within such settings. In response, this article presents such a paradigm, to inform and direct the implementation of coherent organizational policies and practices to address this issue. The paradigm, its theoretical basis, its implications for correctional policy and practice, and limitations are outlined and discussed.

Keywords

extremism terrorism prisons policy

Introduction

The challenges presented by ideologically justified violence (IJV) in secure settings internationally are widely publicized and increasingly better understood (see Basra & Neumann, 2020; Neumann, 2010; Silke, 2014). These include the challenges presented by the crime-terror nexus; the rising number of individuals remanded or convicted for terrorist-related crimes; and the risk of detainees becoming “radicalized” to IJV and carrying out attacks either inside places of detention or in the community (see Basra & Neumann, 2020). Measures to prevent this have been implemented through a range of organizational policies and practices, such as the use of specialized assessment protocols (see Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Pressman & Flockton, 2012), tailored interventions (see Dean, 2014; Koehler, 2017), targeted security operations and intelligence gathering (Newman & Clarke, 2008), and tailored regimes (see Butler, 2020; Jones & Morales, 2012). These vary significantly in the extent to which they are theoretically or evidentially informed, their aims and outcomes are understood, or they are coordinated within institutions. While many secure institutions recognize that preventing IJV is important, this is often not informed by a shared and evidence-based understanding. Some consequences of this are that policies and practices are implemented without clear aims or appreciation for their likely outcomes or how these may integrate and work together, so that staff are less able to judge whether these are effective or counterproductive. Perhaps most importantly, this lack of shared understanding may also obscure how perverse outcomes may be remedied. To address these issues, this article outlines an accessible, theoretically informed paradigm (or conceptual lens) to help staff understand why detainees become involved in IJV to inform decision making about how this can be effectively and appropriately prevented.

Theoretical and Applied Basis of the Paradigm

The term IJV is used to more accurately characterize and define the nature of this behavior than other terms referred to in the literature, such as violent extremism (see Khalil et al., 2019a, 2019b). IJV is primarily distinguished from other forms of violence by being influenced by the sociopolitical context in which it occurs (Cooper, 1985; LaFree & Dugan, 2004). However, it is not so different that it cannot be conceptualized or managed in similar ways (Dean, 2016; Mullen, 2010). Commonalities between IJV and other forms of violence have been identified by major criminological theories (Lafree & Freilich, 2016) and confirmed by recent meta-analyzes (Wolfowicz et al., 2020, 2021). Over several decades, correctional policies and practices internationally—especially those relating to assessment and rehabilitation—have been informed by the General Personality and Social Cognitive Learning model of criminal conduct (as translated through the Risk Need Responsivity Model) and decision or action theories (Andrews & Bonta, 2017; Hart et al., 2016). Such theories include rational choice theory (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Clarke & Cornish, 2014); conjunction of criminal opportunity theory (Ekblom, 2001); the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975); and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985). In essence, these conceptualize criminal behavior as the product of a decision-making process that involves an intention to act (Hart et al., 2016, p. 22). Individuals decide to commit crime following an evaluation of its potential rewards and costs. In response, correctional services encourage them to act prosocially and discourage decisions to act illegally or violently (Hart et al., 2016). In recent years, such theories have also been used to understand how and why people make the decision to commit IJV and how this can be prevented; they include situational crime prevention theory (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Hsu & Newman, 2016), situational action theory (Wikström & Bouhana, 2016), conjunction of terrorist opportunity theory (Roach et al., 2005) and routine activity theory (e.g., Gill et al., 2018). It is important to note that the term committing IJV here incorporates any actions that facilitate or contribute to such violence, even when an individual does not enact violence themselves.

A paradigm to understand and prevent IJV specifically in secure institutions should integrate established criminological and psychological theories with those for conceptualizing and preventing IJV—such as those previously outlined (see Herzog-Evans, 2019). The motivation, intent, capability and opportunity (MICO) paradigm outlined here attempts to do just that. It is an evolution of the paradigm underlying the Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG22+),developed by His Majesty's Prison Service for England and Wales (see Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Powis et al., 2019). This applied risk framework supports the assessment of individual risks and needs associated with IJV, with the primary aim of identifying effective risk management strategies to inform security classification, suitability for release, and intervention planning. It is not used to inform wider institutional policy and practice. A defining feature is that it focuses not only on which factors may facilitate or prevent an individual from committing IJV, but also how they do this—that is, whether they motivate, disinhibit or enable IJV (see later). IJV is hypothesized to occur when facilitating factors combine in the absence of sufficient protective factors. This provides insight into the possible “causal mechanisms” that contribute to or protect against IJV (Wikström & Bouhana, 2016).

There are however some limitations with the conceptual basis of these guidelines being applied to inform institutional policies and practices beyond assessment, in that: (1) it only focuses on the behavior of individual detainees (as opposed to institutional staff or other significant others); (2) it does not focus explicitly on institutional environmental circumstances that may influence behaviour; and (3) it does not incorporate emerging theory and research about the significance of situational vulnerabilities or opportunities in contributing to IJV. The MICO paradigm addresses these limitations and in doing so provides a paradigm that is fit for this specific purpose because: (1) it directs attention toward factors associated with IJV that institutional policies and practices may impact in different ways; (2) it provides a holistic focus on detainees, staff, and institutional culture; (3) its wider operational utility has been evidenced in the Moral-Situational Action Model of IJV that the MICO paradigm informed and that was developed specifically to bridge academic theory and operational needs in law enforcement (Warren et al., 2019); (4) it has already been successfully translated into an assessment framework to inform decision making in secure institutions; (5) it is operationally accessible and comprehensible to staff regardless of their roles.

The MICO Paradigm

This paradigm draws on decision-making theories to explain why detainees may or may not cross the threshold from being interested in or involved with groups or causes that justify violence ideologically to intending to commit such acts. It focuses on four different dimensions which together determine whether individuals will commit IJV or not. Essentially, detainees will commit IJV if they are motivated, ready, capable, and find the opportunity to do so; they will not do this if they are apathetic, unwilling, lack capability and opportunity to do so (further details about these specific dimensions are provided later). Figure 1 represents the dynamic relationship between the four dimensions included in this paradigm. None of these dimensions are static, and individuals can move over time between having or not having the motivation, intent, capability, or opportunity to commit IJV. They are also not entirely independent of one another. For example, becoming involved with a group that ideologically justifies violence may increase motivation to commit IJV, but this may also increase exposure to those who justify or condone such acts and is likely to increase their combined capability, intent, and opportunity to take action.

Figure 1.

A diagrammatic representation of the MICO paradigm.

The paradigm recognizes that context (social, political, religious, economic, etc) is fundamental to understanding and managing the threat of IJV in places of detention (Logan & Lloyd, 2018). Contextual events—from the global, national, and societal to the organizational, institutional, and situational—influence detainee motivation or apathy, intent or desistance, capability or disruption, and provide either opportunity or constraint. This is implicit and explicit both in general criminological theories (e.g., see Clarke, 1995; Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Ekblom, 2001) and in those applied to IJV specifically (e.g., Roach et al., 2005; Wikström & Bouhana, 2016). As Logan and Lloyd (2018) note: “violent extremism, more than any other form of harmful behaviour, is influenced by the social, political, economic, religious, cultural, and historical context in which it occurs” (p. 144). For example, there may be sociopolitical circumstances when tolerance or support for IJV may rise, such as within Muslim diaspora communities during times of war in the Middle East. This can influence whether individuals develop motivation (they are encouraged by others, including other detainees, to become involved), develop intent (where this is glorified or sanctioned by other people, including detainees), acquire capability (are provided with resources by others, including other detainees) or create the opportunity for action (they are encouraged by others, including other detainees, to take risks). Conversely, sociopolitical initiatives such as the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland may shift public opinion in favor of desistance, support disruption of terrorist plotting, and create constraint.

Individual's motivations, perceptions, choices, and actions arise from their interaction with their environment (Wikström & Bouhana, 2016, p. 177). Secure institutions thereby present unique “situations” that can either encourage or protect against IJV. Here, detainees are more likely to be exposed to attitudes supportive of IJV than in other environments (Wikström & Bouhana, 2016, p. 177), but can also experience opportunities that encourage disinterest or apathy toward IJV (Morrison et al., 2021, p. 29). Such contexts are significantly shaped by institutional conditions, governance, policies, processes, and practices that can, with institutional awareness, avoid locating the problem within individuals and facilitate behavioral change through creating a supportive environment (Bouhana, 2019). While debate continues about the specific circumstances or factors that encourage or discourage IJV within different contexts, the role these play in IJV can be accommodated within these dimensions. Likewise, the dimensions of the MICO are theoretically robust enough to inform how the environments of different secure institutions may be structured to either facilitate or protect against IJV.

This paradigm encourages a holistic approach to addressing IJV collectively, whereby any member of institutional staff, of any seniority (including policy makers), can influence how organizational policies and practices may potentially impact on IJV. Discipline staff may have more impact on disruption or constraint through, for example, preventing a detainee mixing with known recruiters, whereas rehabilitation staff may have more impact on apathy and desistance. With or without this level of targeted awareness, policies, and practices will impact on all dimensions for better or worse. This paradigm encourages wider consideration of the impact that different staff can have through increased cooperation and collaboration. It therefore supports intelligent consideration of how policies and practices may impact on these different dimensions.

It translates theories into a paradigm that is intended to be accessible and understandable to all staff, that is, it makes intuitive sense without requiring in-depth theoretical knowledge. It essentially prompts staff to ask themselves in their practice: Is what I am doing likely to motivate someone to commit IJV or not? Is it likely to make them willing to commit IJV or not? Is it likely to enable them to commit IJV or not (either by influencing their capabilities or opportunities to commit IJV)? It focuses squarely on IJV and behaviors that may directly or indirectly facilitate this, rather than focusing on more amorphous processes such as radicalization and de-radicalization, engagement, and disengagement (e.g., Horgan & Braddock, 2010). This does not mean that an individual's relationship with a group or cause that supports IJV is overlooked by this paradigm: this relationship is seen as central to understanding motivation, intent, capability, and opportunity. The nature and strength of a detainee's interest, involvement, or identification with such groups or causes will all impact on these dimensions. A detainee who is disinterested, not involved and not identified with such groups or causes is likely to be more apathetic, more unwilling, and less capable and have less opportunity to commit IJV. In summary, the paradigm is based on the premise that detainees are likely to commit IJV if: (1) they are involved and/or identified with a group or cause that ideologically justifies violence; (2) they are motivated to commit IJV (motivation); (3) they are psychologically disinhibited from committing IJV (intent); (4) they are capable of committing IJV (capability); and (5) they have the opportunity to commit IJV (opportunity). Conversely, it is based on the premise that detainees are unlikely to commit IJV if: (1) they are not involved and/or identified with a group or cause that ideologically justifies violence; (2) they are unmotivated to commit IJV (apathy); (3) they remain psychologically inhibited about committing IJV (desistance); (4) they lack the capability of committing IJV (disruption); and (5) They are unable to find or exploit opportunities to commit IJV (constraint). For secure institutions to prevent, manage, or reduce IJV, they should seek to facilitate the aforementioned outcomes.

Paradigm Dimensions

Outlined below is further clarification of each dimension considered in this paradigm and their distinct contribution to IJV. Examples are also provided to illustrate how institutional policies and practices may specifically impact on these different dimensions.

Motivation and Apathy

The term motivation here refers to detainees in secure institutions who are motivated to commit IJV typically because they are interested, identified, or involved with a group or cause that supports IJV (Lloyd & Dean, 2015). It focuses on factors and circumstances which motivate an individual to initiate and maintain their relationship with a group, cause or ideology that supports IJV and incentivizes them to commit IJV (drivers) (Hart & Logan, 2011; Wikström & Bouhana, 2016, p. 177). These increase the perceived rewards or benefits of criminal behavior (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). A key consideration in deciding whether criminal behavior will be beneficial or not, is the extent to which it meets human needs or desires (Clarke & Cornish, 2014; Ward & Stewart, 2003). These include, for example, a desire to right injustice and bring about political/social change; meeting the need for identity, meaning, and belonging; a sense of status and supremacy; excitement and glamor, and the rewards of criminal enterprise (see for example, Bartlett & Miller, 2011; Borum, 2015; Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Webber & Kruglanski, 2016).Such desires or needs are often driven by the universal survival emotions of fear and anger in response to shame, inferiority, and humiliation, and the so-called moral emotions of guilt, hatred, disgust, etc. (Haidt, 2003). In secure institutions, physical and psychological survival, coercion and furthering criminal ends may be particularly pertinent motives (e.g., Basra & Neumann, 2016; Neumann, 2010; Trujillo et al., 2009). Some individuals may engage with a group or cause because of such motives, but have no motivation or indeed intention (see next section) to commit IJV.

The term apathy refers to detainees who are not motivated to commit IJV because they have little or no desire to commit IJV, typically because they are not or are less involved or identified with a group or cause that ideologically justifies violence (Lloyd & Dean, 2015). Apathy occurs when the costs of IJV are considered to be greater than the rewards (Altier et al., 2014; Rabasa et al., 2010). Such individuals are unlikely to remain involved if they do not believe this will meet their needs, or if they believe these can be met elsewhere. Examples include disillusionment with ideology, leadership, and tactics; changes in personal priorities; questioning and doubting personal commitments and beliefs; contact with friends and family who oppose involvement; humane treatment by those previously viewed as members of the out-group, and physical/psychological burnout (see Altier et al., 2014, 2017; Morrison et al., 2021; Windisch et al., 2016).

Institutional policies and practices that may exacerbate motivation to commit IJV include those that: (1) are or are perceived to be inequitable, discriminatory, or persecutory and may enhance a sense of grievance against the state; (2) contribute to feelings of isolation, alienation, fear, or intimidation, thereby incentivizing individuals to turn to groups that confer an identity of resistance and justify the use of violence; (3) offer no incentive or opportunity for individuals to disengage; and (4) inadvertently remove or reduce detainee contact with friends and family members who oppose IJV—thus removing an important source of protection. Conversely, examples of institutional policies and practices that may promote apathy include measures that: (1) enable or empower detainees to resist or avoid efforts by others to coerce or recruit them to become involved with groups who support IJV, including re-location if necessary; (2) prioritize humanity, respect, safety, and order, thereby reducing grievance toward authority and the State; (3) enable detainees to fulfill personal needs through the provision of education, vocational training and other cultural activities; and (4) empower and enable detainees to reduce or end their involvement with groups, causes, or ideologies through psychological, social, or theological interventions (see Council of Europe, 2016; Dean & Kessels, 2018; United Nations, 2016).

Intent and Desistance

The term intent here refers to the mindset of detainees who have overcome their inhibitions to commit IJV (Lloyd & Dean, 2015). Even if individuals are motivated to offend, not all intend to do so (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Clarke and Cornish, 1985, 2014; Ekblom, 2001; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Intent concerns itself with what disinhibits—or overcomes—proscriptions against violence (Hart & Logan, 2011). Disinhibitors include techniques of neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1957) or cognitive distortion that decrease the perceived costs of IJV and increase its justification. Examples include demonizing and dehumanizing others (e.g., Saucier et al., 2009); the sanctioning of violence from respected sources, and absolution from its consequences (e.g., Roach et al., 2005); over-identification to the point of identity-fusion with those who share ideology and advocate violence regardless of the costs (Dean, 2019a, 2019b; Swann et al., 2012) combined with group pressure that reduces individual responsibility and capacity for self-control (Bartlett & Miller, 2011; Wikström & Bouhana, 2016). Ultimately, intent manifests in an individual shift in mindset, even though the mechanism of disinhibition may be social in nature. Disinhibition can be facilitated by involvement and identification with a group or cause that justifies violence ideologically.

The term desistance here refers to those who decide not to commit IJV and are unwilling to do so (Lloyd & Dean, 2015). It refers to processes that increase its personal costs and strengthen inhibitions. This can be fears about being caught (Clarke & Eck, 2013); seeing IJV as socially unacceptable to those they value such as family and friends and the local community (Khalil et al., 2019a, 2019b, p. 16); no longer believing that ideological violence is justified, no longer demonizing others, feeling guilt, and realizing that the costs are too great (see Altier et al., 2014; Hwang, 2017; Windisch et al., 2016). Individuals may desist if they do not fear the repercussions of desisting and wish to reclaim their lives. A distinction between primary and secondary desistance distinguishes between temporary and permanent desistance, often because individuals no longer want to identify as criminals (Maruna & Farrall, 2004). Individuals who are not or are less involved or identified with groups or causes who support IJV, may be more likely to desist because, for example, individuals may be less exposed to attitudes supportive of IJV or perspectives that demonize or dehumanize others.

Institutional, policies, and practices that may exacerbate detainee intent to commit IJV include those that: (1) strengthen the “othering” of certain groups in negative and divisive ways that demonizes and dehumanizes them, such as tolerance of staff who demonize and dehumanize detainees; (2) reinforce narratives or beliefs that support or glorify IJV, such as prejudicial, persecutory, or oppressive staff practices; (3) allow access to documents or media that encourage or incite IJV; and (4) expose them to malign influencers who may encourage or incite IJV. Conversely, examples of how institutions may promote desistance include measures that: (1) encourage detainees to recognize the costs of IJV to their lives and future goals; (2) strengthen detainee relationships with meaningful others who oppose IJV (including staff); (3) prevent access to material or to individuals who justify and sanction IJV; (4) challenge beliefs that justify IJV or strengthen positive perceptions of others (such as through theological or psychosocial interventions); and (5) support constructive communication and interaction between staff and detainees that can inhibit IJV, such as assertive, tolerant, respectful, and empathic communication (see Council of Europe, 2016; Dean & Kessels, 2018; United Nations, 2016).

Capability and Disruption

While individuals may be both motivated and ready to commit IJV, they also need to be capable of committing such acts (Lloyd and Dean, 2015). Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) propose that individuals only act when they believe that doing so will bring personal and social reward, and if they believe they are capable of such acts. For a crime to occur, an individual must be “able,” “equipped,” or “resourced” to offend (Ekblom, 2001; Hsu & Newman, 2016; Roach et al., 2005). Involvement in groups that justify ideological violence can be a significant factor in strengthening an individual's capabilities to commit IJV. A range of influences may enable individuals or groups to act, such as access to resources, networks and leadership that provide training, equipment, cash, weapons and transport, as well as individual skills such as bomb making, military training, IT, or engineering skills (Hsu & Newman, 2016; Roach et al., 2005). Many such resources are positive and only become problematic when deployed for nefarious purposes and different forms of IJV can require a range of resources and levels of capability to be realized.

Disruption refers to making individuals less able or unable to commit IJV (Lloyd and Dean, 2015). Reducing the availability of weaponry, tools, and tactical information, for example, through disrupting the criminal networks that fund perpetrators and their recruitment (Roach et al., 2005, p. 18). This makes IJV more effortful, by making it harder for them to access weapons, networks, or equipment (Clarke, 1995). Individuals who are not or are less involved with groups who support IJV may have less access to resources, making it harder for them to commit IJV. It is not possible to remove capabilities such as personal knowledge, charisma, or skills, but these are only problematic if accompanied by an intent to facilitate or commit violence. These attributes can be redeployed prosocially or the opportunity to deploy these removed through constraint (see below).

Institutional policies and practices that may exacerbate detainee capability to commit IJV, include those that: (1) provide inadequate control over detainee interactions that facilitate the exchange of knowledge and skills enabling IJV; (2) allow detainees to share networks inside or outside of secure institutions that can enable IJV; (3) allow detainees to develop knowledge and skills without appropriate supervision or oversight; (4) allow staff to become casual about compliance with operating procedures such as searching detainees or visitors that allows weapons, equipment or training materials into the institution. Conversely, examples of how institutions may promote disruption include measures that: (1) carefully managing interactions between detainees for whom there are specific concerns about transfer of information, etc; (2) implement clear and comprehensive standard operating procedures preventing access to materials, knowledge, training, and networks that would enable IJV; (3) raise awareness among institutional staff about the diversity of skills, competencies, knowledge, and networks that can enable IJV; and (4) implement robust inspection of policies and processes that govern physical and procedural security (see Council of Europe, 2016; Dean & Kessels, 2018; United Nations, 2016).

Opportunity and Constraint

Even if detainees are motivated, ready, and capable of committing IJV, they still require the opportunity to do so (Clarke & Cornish 1985, 2014; Gill et al., 2018). IJV occurs when detainees make the judgment that situational vulnerabilities can be engineered or exploited: surveillance, security, and detection is poor, suitable victims/targets are accessible, and when the perpetrators have not previously been caught and remain unknown to the authorities (Gill et al., 2018, pp. 3–4). Opportunities arise when they become easy (e.g., officials open to corruption), safe (e.g., when checks on ID are inadequate), or excusable (e.g., when local communities excuse or collude with such acts) (Hsu & Newman, 2016). These considerations may apply in secure institutions when security staff can be targeted as agents of the state, when surveillance is inadequate and detainees are left to their own devices, and when staff collude with detainees or are indifferent to the threat (see Van Tets, 2015). Individual detainees may be more able to find opportunities to commit IJV when involved with groups who may actively exploit and engineer such circumstances.

Constraint refers to the lack of opportunity to commit IJV (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Hsu & Newman, 2016). It includes control through surveillance, target hardening and environmental management, protecting potential recruits, thorough screening of staff, security patrolling, information gathering, vigilance, and the use of informants (Clarke, 1983; Roach et al., 2005, p. 20; Wortley, 2004). Individuals may be more constrained if they are not involved in groups who support IJV because, for example, they may be less aware of situational vulnerabilities.

Institutional policies and practices that may exacerbate detainee opportunity to commit IJV include those that create vulnerabilities in: (1) the physical environment: such as blind spots preventing sufficient surveillance or monitoring; (2) the social environment: such as allowing access to high-value victims or corruption, manipulation or conditioning of staff that results in staff turning “a blind eye” to the activities of particular detainees; (3) inadequate vetting of individuals entering institutions who may be sympathetic to or involved in IJV; (4) communications within the institution such as the sharing of information that may be commensurate with offence plotting or preparation; and (5) relationships between agencies resulting in poor communication and missed opportunities to detect plotting and planning of IJV. Conversely, examples of how institutions may promote constraint include measures that: (1) protect detainees vulnerable to recruitment and coercion; (2) protect the safety and security of staff who are perceived as legitimate and “valuable” victims; (3) facilitate comprehensive surveillance and monitoring of detainees and their physical environment; (4) facilitate comprehensive systems to gather, analyze, and share intelligence which may expose plotting and planning of IJV; and (5) facilitate comprehensive systems to prevent corruption (see Council of Europe, 2016; Dean & Kessels, 2018; United Nations, 2016).

Collectively, the aforementioned examples illustrate how this paradigm can help institutional staff understand how they can collectively prevent IJV by considering whether and how their actions can impact on the four dimensions of detainee motivation/apathy, intent/desistance, capability/disruption, or opportunity/constraint. They illustrate that while specific disciplines of staff may be more likely to impact on one or more dimensions due to the nature of their role, they may also impact on dimensions that are less immediately obvious. For example, rehabilitation staff may contribute to disruption and constraint (e.g., through sharing important information a detainee has disclosed that may compromise institutional security) just as discipline staff may contribute to apathy and desistance (e.g., through identifying detainees in the course of their duties who appear to need support in resisting pressure to engage with a group supporting IJV). Raising awareness and understanding about how staff may contribute to different dimensions in a coordinated manner is an important focus for policy, practice, and training.

These examples also illustrate that policies or practices intended to prevent one component may inadvertently exacerbate another. For example, isolating a detainee from other detainees over a protracted period may be effective in preventing capability and opportunity to commit IJV while they are in this setting, but is also likely to increase their motivation and intent, in addition to being unethical and potentially illegal. This resonates with the criminological critique of a contemporary over-focus in secure institutions on control, fear, security, and process, rather than humanity, trust, safety, and morality and the impact of such approaches on the potential for IJV (Liebling & Arnold, 2012; Liebling & Straub, 2012).Over-focusing on disruption and constraint may result in neglecting encouraging apathy and desistance, and vice versa. The holistic nature of this paradigm demands that institutional staff give careful and balanced consideration to the impact of policies and practices on all these dimensions and the trade-offs involved in decision making.

Finally, these examples illustrate the importance of measures to monitor the impact of the wider sociopolitical context on institutions, and vice versa. This includes the ongoing monitoring of the impact of institutional policies and practices on the institutional environment. Examples of such measures include: (1) assessment frameworks that evaluate/audit how institutional features may contribute or protect against IJV (akin to the promoting risk intervention by situational management (PRISM) assessment for evaluating environmental features that contribute to general violence in custodial environments); (2) robust procedures for investigating why increasing numbers of detainees are engaging with groups that ideologically justify violence; (3) robust procedures for investigating when and how specific contextual circumstances have contributed to IJV when this occurs; (4) pro-actively working with external organizations, such as universities or nongovernmental organizations to remain up-to-date about contextual impact and effective measures (see Council of Europe, 2016; Dean & Kessels, 2018; United Nations, 2016).

Limitations and Critique

From a theoretical perspective, this paradigm is based on an integration of theories associated with decision or action theory for understanding and preventing criminal conduct. Each of these has their own limitations and critiques, some of which resulted in the development of new theories. It is not in the scope of this article to outline these in detail, but key criticisms that apply to one or more of these theories include that they: (1) overlook structural and societal factors of crime, such as wider economic, political, cultural policies, and circumstances (Hayward, 2007); (2) underestimate or overlook the influence of emotions and impulsive decision making on criminal behavior (Exum, 2002); (3) overstate the role that situations and cognitive decision-making processes within situations contribute to criminal behavior (Hayward, 2007); and (4) focus prevention efforts on control and surveillance rather than welfare and support (Garland, 2001). A specific criticism against such theories being used to explain IJV is that such acts may not involve cost-benefit type decision-making processes where so-called “sacred values” are involved, that is, when people are prepared to act on behalf of values/groups/identities considered so important to them, that material interests are not a consideration (Nafees et al., 2019). Such general theoretical criticisms have been addressed elsewhere (e.g., Farrell, 2010), including within this specific field: for example, the specific criticism about sacred values has been addressed within situational action theories (see Warren et al., 2019; Wikström & Bouhana, 2016).

The paradigm addresses these criticisms and limitations in various ways: (1) it recognizes the central role that contextual circumstances can have on thinking and behavior, including the significant role of institutional policies and practices; (2) it recognizes the contribution of emotions as motivational factors underlying decisions to become involved with groups or causes who ideologically justify violence and to commit IJV; (3) While situational circumstances and decision-making processes are key considerations (primarily through the dimensions of intent, capability, and opportunity), it also accommodates internal factors and external circumstances which motivate involvement in IJV (motivation). This includes the role that identification and over-identification may play (incorporating sacred values) whereby individuals may commit IJV not because of a cost-benefit trade-off, but because “nothing else matters” (Dean, 2019a, 2019b; Swann et al., 2012); (4) The focus of this paradigm encourages all staff to consider how policies and practices may impact on security and welfare regardless of role; and (5) it integrates various decision theories to try and offset criticisms of each to remain useful and applicable in applied settings.

From an empirical perspective, the framework presented has not been “proven”: no specific studies have been carried out to test the underlying hypothesis of this model, that is, that motivation, intent, capability, and opportunity are necessary to the commission of IJV or that strategies to prevent, reduce, or manage these will prevent IJV. It also does not provide any explanatory insight or empirical evidence regarding whether or which dimensions may impact on IJV more or less than each other and under what circumstances. This limits insight into the extent to which organizational attention and efforts should be focused on specific dimensions to have the most positive impact.

Given that the theoretical, empirical, and applied basis for the paradigm has been developed from a specific correctional culture—from North America, Australasia, and parts of Western Europe—it may not be as suitable or easily applied in other jurisdictions. To date, however, it has been used in varying forms by administrators, managers, and front-line staff in custodial settings in regions that include North and East Africa, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. There have been no apparent issues with the generalization of this paradigm in such regions, and it has been widely welcomed as a comprehensible lens through which to develop and implement policy and practice and prevent IJV.

Conclusion

The MICO paradigm is theoretically informed and operationally focused, intended to help staff working in secure institutions understand why detainees may commit IJV and how they can prevent this. It suggests that IJV occurs because of the interaction between detainees and an environment that is shaped by institutional policies and practices. It provides a conceptual tool that can inform, guide, and evaluate institutional policies and practices. It encourages awareness of how all staff working in secure institutions can impact positively or negatively on the risk of IJV in detention. It promotes the need for policies and practices to be coordinated and as far as possible and to complement one another. It prompts correctional services and secure institutions to consider how specific policies and practices may impact on specific dimensions that contribute to specific acts of IJV. Although there are various criticisms of the theories underlying this paradigm, these are not substantive enough to undermine or outweigh its operational value. The impact of this paradigm on the development and implementation of policies and practices within secure institutions warrants further exploration and evaluation.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biography

Christopher Dean, CSci, MSc, is a registered forensic psychologist, director of Identify Psychological Services (Ltd), and a senior fellow at the Global Center on Cooperative Security. His research interests include the psychology of terrorism and violent extremism.

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