The End of Public/Private Partnership Prisons in the Department of Correctional Services of South Africa

Abstract

South Africa has two fully privatised prisons, each housing some 3,000 prisoners. Their history has been mired in controversy from the start, and this has not improved over a period of nearly 25 years. Recent events affecting the security and integrity of the two facilities provide a useful opportunity to reflect on these private prisons as well as wider issues regarding private sector involvement in the prison system. The intersection of politics, organised labour, private sector interests, and corruption have in all likelihood rung the death knell for private prisons in South Africa.

Keywords

South Africa private prisons prison system history

Introduction

Private sector engagement in the prison system is regarded by many with suspicion, if not outright rejection. It is also the case that such strong opinions are often based on limited information. The proponents of private sector involvement are also often selective about what they share with the public and other stakeholders. The opponents’ position is frequently based more on a ‘gut-feel’ than actual facts.

In South Africa, there are two fully privately operated prisons, each accommodating some 3,000 prisoners. The first is Mangaung Correctional Centre and operated by the UK-based firm, G4S, and the second is Kutama-Sinthumule Correctional Centre, operated by the US-based company GEO Group. In this article, the net will be cast a little wider and not only focus on Public Private Partnership (PPP) prisons but also examine general private sector involvement in the prison system. To this end, several issues will be explored. First, it is important to review the ideological issues related to private sector participation. Second, a closer investigation will review the nature of private sector interests in the prison system and the impact, or lack of thereof, on the existing two PPP prisons. Third, an overview of the legal framework is presented to delineate the powers of the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) versus that of the operator of a PPP prison. Fourth, an overview is provided of the impact of private sector engagement in the prison system. Last, and based on the preceding, some lessons learned about private sector involvement, and particularly from the two existing PPP prisons, are extracted. The article does not assume a ‘for or against’ position on private sector participation. Rather, it raises issues that need to be addressed within the given reality of private sector involvement in the prison system.

As background, it should be noted that at present South Africa's prisons are under one national department, the DCS, which falls under the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services. From 1991 until May, 2014, there was a Minister of Correctional Services in cabinet, but thereafter, the portfolio was absorbed into Justice and Correctional Services. With reference to Parliamentary oversight, the DCS and Minister are accountable to the National Assembly's Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services. After May, 2014, the correctional services portfolio was merged with the justice portfolio to become the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services. The Correctional Services Act of 1998 is the principal legislation governing the prison system, and the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services (JICS) is mandated to inspect prisons and report on the treatment of inmates. It is headed by a judge of the High Court, or higher, and is staffed by dedicated inspectors as well as lay visitors.

Ideological, Budgetary and Policy Concerns

The debate about private sector engagement in prison systems is by and large delineated by opposite ideological positions. The opponents to private sector involvement claim that it is the state's responsibility to impose and manage punishment. This is based on the Weberian principle that the state has the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. That is, this is such a fundamental principle to the state's functioning that it must not be sub-contracted or delegated. Following from this, the argument goes that because the monopoly on the legitimate use of force is critical to the sovereignty of the state, the risk is too high for it to be delegated or outsourced. A further position at this end of the spectrum is that it is unethical to make profit from punishment and suffering (ACLU, 2011; Appleman, 2018). From this position, it is argued that it is unethical for the state to use its unique position as holder of the legitimate use of force, and sell components of this to private sector interests who, in turn, perform at a profit the state's regrettable, but unavoidable duty to punish.

The proponents of private sector integration into prison systems take a far more pragmatic approach. They argue that the private sector can and does create value for money by rendering better services to incarcerees under superior conditions (Austin & Coventry, 2001; Johnston, 1990). Moreover, the cost to the taxpayer is no more than what would have been paid in any case. In short, the argument goes, the private sector is doing the taxpayer a favour by using his or her money in a more efficient and effective manner compared to the state's utilisation of tax money on the prison system. Proponents of private sector involvement may also argue that the impact is better (i.e., in reducing reoffending and improved re-entry results) than in state-run prisons. However, the research findings in this regard are not supportive of this position or conclusive (Duwe & Clark, 2013; Mamun et al., 2020; Spivak & Sharp, 2008).

While the above review may over-simplify the broad ideological positions in the debate, the distinction suffices for now. What has been perhaps more distressing in the South African PPP prisons debate since the mid-1990s was the policy ‘flip-flopping’ by the DCS on private sector involvement, at least from 1994 to 2010. After 2010, the policy position firmed up and that will be explored further below. It was clear that under the immediate post-1994 government that PPP prisons were acceptable, if not desirable; this remained the position for a considerable period of time. It should also be kept in mind that under the government of national unity (GNU) and post the GNU until 2006, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) held several cabinet portfolios, one of which was correctional services. From 1994 to 2004, Correctional Services was headed by an IFP minister, and it was, in particular, the first Minister of Correctional Services, Sipho Mzimela, who was strongly influenced by American thinking about imprisonment, noting especially private sector involvement and super-maximum prisons (Buntman & Muntingh, 2013).

Mzimela's successor, Ben Skosana, on July 1, 2003, at the Mangaung PPP prison said: ‘The success of privately run prisons has convinced government that partnerships with private companies were necessary’ (News24, 2003). However, less than a year earlier (in November, 2002), the DCS gave an extensive presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on the existing PPP prisons, in which it identified a series of problems and made several recommendations to create ‘more value for money’ (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2002a, 2002b). This was within a year of the two PPP prisons’ opening. It was thus clear that even between the ministry and the department, there were divergent views on the desirability of PPP prisons. It is not impossible that these differences in views were reflective of the tensions between the IFP and the ruling ANC, and that the senior management of the Department would naturally be more inclined to side with the ruling party.

Some 3 years after Minister Skosana's emphatic support for PPP prisons on May 2, 2006, the DCS briefed the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services and it was reported as follows:

The Department made a significant policy shift away from public private partnership (PPP) prisons. This was based on the cost of the two already existing PPP prisons, on the basis of international debate about the constitutionality of private companies being responsible for the incarceration of citizens and on the basis of the assessment that in a number of respects the current situation was not enabling the management of the correctional system in a fashion that was in line with the Department's White Paper. Private companies did not have a clear understanding of the White Paper, they were not as focused as Department officials and they were not addressing critical problems such as overcrowding and rehabilitation. These processes had a direct impact on the financial interests of role players in the Department and there was much dissatisfaction with the direction the Department has taken. The Department was creating better institutional capacity that would enable delivery on the White Paper. The interests of individual service providers would not sway him. The Department was mandated to ensure that South Africa had correctional services that would contribute to the protection of a just, peaceful and safe society. It had to ensure the safe custody of offenders as well as their human dignity and the promotion of social responsibility. (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2006a, p. 2)

This strong affirmation of government-run facilities and the rejection of PPP prisons were most likely prompted by a review done by the National Treasury which found that construction costs were vastly underestimated (Farlam, 2005). As well, it was mainly National Commissioner Mti who frequently complained about the high cost of the existing PPP prisons (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2002a, 2002b). The contracts were also linked to guaranteed returns of 25% and 29%, respectively (Sloth-Nielsen, 2003).The frequent references to the White Paper (on Corrections in South Africa) in the above extract were perhaps overestimating the abilities of the DCS to deliver on the White Paper, but, nonetheless, added further support to the anti-PPP prison sentiment. The narrative being created at the time was built on fragile stilts, as the DCS itself was riddled with problems as was uncovered by the Jali Commission and the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) (Jali, 2006).

On June 2, 2006, then Minister of Correctional Services, Ngconde Balfour, told the National Council of Provinces that the PPP prison model was ‘very expensive’, and that the DCS, together with Treasury, is looking at other options and noted a so-called ‘hybrid model’ (Hansard Report, 2006). Minister Balfour was frank in his misgivings about the existing PPPs by as late as 2006: ‘[He] responded that the Private Public Partnership (PPP) arrangement with the two privately owned prisons had been inherited from the then Minister of Correctional Services, Mr. Mzimela. He was very critical of the way in which this arrangement had been implemented. The DCS was faced with the difficult task of reviewing what had happened in 1998 when the agreements had been made’. (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2006b, p. 3). Looking at a hybrid model was indeed a different position from what was presented to the Portfolio Committee a month earlier by the DCS, in which it was clearly and categorically stated that the private sector cannot and should not operate prisons.

The DCS, however, continued to be under pressure to build new prisons, but the only solution seems to lie in entering into a partnership with the private sector. Plans to build the initially announced eleven 3,000-bed facilities (Farlam, 2005) had by then been dragging on for many years, and only the prison at Kimberley had since then been completed. In September, 2009, it was announced that the tender process for four new prisons had been suspended. It was reported that ‘the Minister wants to review the philosophy underpinning PPP prisons as there is concern about sub-contracting a core competency of the Department, namely the secure custody of prisoners’. (Slabbert, 2009). However, by March, 2010, the Minister's (Mapisa-Nqakula) unease was apparently settled as she announced in her budget vote address that four new PPP prisons will be constructed (Hansard Report, 2010). However, this never happened, and it is most likely that increasing pressure moved prison construction to the backburner.

It should also be noted that since 2005/6, following a wide-reaching remission of sentence and the release of some 36,000 sentenced prisoners, the prison population stabilised at around 155,000 (Department of Correctional Services, 2006). The original pressure for increased prison space had waned (see Figure 1). In more recent years, the size of the total prison population further reflects the dysfunction of the criminal justice system. From nearly 200,000 prisoners in 2006, the prison population on March 31, 2023 was 157,056, with 101, 186 sentenced prisoners and 55,870 pre-trial detainees (Department of Correctional Services, 2023).

Figure 1.

South Africa prison population as of April 1.

While South Africa's aging apartheid-era prison infrastructure was buckling under the size of the prison population and increasingly unable to meet the minimum standards of humane detention, successive ministers and commissioners held contradictory and inconsistent views on PPP. The lack of firmness in strategic direction on prison construction and more particularly the preferred route to create more and better space has not served South Africa's prison system well. The suitability of apartheid-era communal cell accommodation as the norm has also not been placed under the magnifying glass, despite the risks posed to inmates in general and especially those deemed vulnerable. While the possibility of further private sector involvement in prison construction and operations had effectively been terminated by 2009, it remains the case that the existing infrastructure is in a steady decline and maintenance has been poorly managed (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2012) and unable to keep up with demand, especially at the large urban remand detention facilities (Cameron, 2020). The DCS rated the condition of nearly two-thirds of its facilities as ‘fair to poor’ and ‘poor’ (Department of Correctional Services, 2022). The failure to create new capacity and do timely maintenance over the past 15–20 years may now place ‘catching-up’ out of reach.

The Role of the Private Sector in the Prison System

The DCS has a duty, as required by the Correctional Services Act, to be, as far as is practicable, self-sufficient and operate according to business principles (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 3(2)(b)). It must use its resources well and harness them to reduce reliance on bought-in services and goods. Given this obligation, the question is then posed: what is or should the role be of the private sector in the prison system? It is important to view the role of the private sector not only in respect of the PPP prisons, but also in relation to the myriad of other functions that have been sub-contracted to the private sector over the years.

What is sub-contracted?

Apart from the wholly privatised prisons, such as the existing two, a number of other services have also been sub-contracted to the private sector. These range from the maintenance of gardens to hi-tech services, such as security and CCTV. A number of prison kitchens were privatised. As well, the recruitment of staff had been sub-contracted to private companies, and there were also reports of sub-contracting the prison pharmacies. As the findings of the Jali Commission (2006) emerged, it was evident that certain services had to be secured from outside the DCS, such as the recruitment of staff due to the widespread findings of corruption, manipulation, and intimidation in this arm of operations. As such, this was a risk management response from the DCS senior management and was under the circumstances a logical response. The sub-contracting of recruitment does, however, raise questions about the utilisation of staff that were already appointed to fulfil this function. The sub-contracting of security (CCTV and access control) to the private sector at more than 60 prisons was undertaken at an enormous cost to the tax payer. More importantly, it was done at a time when escapes had already been reduced from 1,340 in 1996 (Department of Correctional Services, 1997) to 120 by 2005/6 (Department of Correctional Services, 2006). The privatisation of kitchens to the BOSASA company was reportedly driven by the enormous stock losses suffered by the DCS, and, as such, was another risk management response, but it later became apparent that this was fundamentally a corrupt relationship (Frazer, 2019). The close relationship between DCS and BOSASA ultimately formed a substantial focus of the Zondo Commission into state capture, resulting in some 96 recommendations for prosecution (Zondo, 2022).

From these examples, several issues emerge in respect to private sector involvement. First, the question arises as to whether the sub-contracting is a value-adding measure in the sense that it provides goods or services that the DCS cannot provide due to their nature or specialisation – or is the sub-contracting a risk management response due to problems around governance and corruption? Second, the question must be posed whether the conditions that existed and defined the sub-contracting will persist (e.g., it is outside of the Department's control), or whether steps can be taken, or have already been taken, to address the conditions that necessitated the sub-contracting initially? The central issue here is that conditions may exist at a particular point that requires sub-contracting, but that these conditions should not be assumed to continue to exist. Further, in some instances, it is necessary to address those conditions as they are in the general interest of the DCS. The sub-contracting of staff recruitment is a case in point. Third, the history of the relationship between DCS and BOSASA demonstrated the very real risk of corruption, but also of the seeming inability of the state to hold perpetrators accountable. The findings of the Zondo Commission regarding BOSASA and the high-level corruption in DCS at the time will undoubtedly work against future private sector involvement in DCS.

The Legal Framework for the two PPPs

Having set out the broad ideological, budgetary, and policy issues on private sector involvement, this section turns to the legal framework governing the existing two PPP prisons. Chapter 14 of the Correctional Services Act regulates public/private partnership prisons and allows that the Minister responsible for correctional services can award such a contract, but with the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Public Works’ concurrence. This would cover design, construction, financing, and any prison's operation or part thereof, as well as the duration of such a contract. The legislation lists functions that the contractor is obliged to fulfil, functions it is prohibited from doing, and actions it can take with permission from DCS. These are set out below.

The contractor is obliged to fulfil three functions:

enforce the sentences imposed,

ensuring safe custody and human dignity, and

promoting social responsibility and human development (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 104(1)(a-c)).

The contractor is prohibited from performing the following functions:

take disciplinary action against sentenced prisoners and sanction them,

be involved in the determination and computation of sentences,

allocate prisoners to prisons,

decide on placement and release of sentenced prisoners,

be involved in the implementation of community corrections,

grant temporary leave, and

subcontract, cede, assign or delegate any functions unless authorised (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 104(4)(a-g)).

The Act also provides for a Controller who is appointed by the National Commissioner for every PPP prison(Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 105) and who must monitor the daily operation of the PPP, reporting to the National Commissioner (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 106(1)). Practically, it means there is always one or more officials from DCS present at the PPP facility. The Controller not only monitors, but can also grant permission for the performance of certain functions (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 106(2)) based on need and these cover the following:

conduct a search of the person which includes the visual inspection naked body; probing bodily orifice; and detain for excretory processes,(Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 27(2)(a)(b) and (e)) taking tissue samples and X-Rays(Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 27(2)(c-d)),

detain separately (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 30),

apply mechanical restraints for a maximum of 30 days (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 31),

use of force (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 32),

use of non-lethal incapacitating devices (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 33),

firearms (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 34), and

other weapons (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 35).

The Director of a PPP prison is appointed by the contractor and subject to certification by the National Commissioner (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 107(2)). The Director has the same powers as a Head of Centre, but subject to the restrictions listed above and elsewhere, and specific reference is made to Chapter 3 (Part C) of the Correctional Services Act which deals with Security and section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Act which deals with reporting on pre-trial detainees and witnesses detained for longer than 90 days.

In case of urgency, the Director may authorise the temporary application of the measures ordinarily requiring the approval of the Controller – if the Director believes that waiting for such approval would defeat the objective and he/she reasonably believes this would have been granted, but must report this immediately to the Controller (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 106(2)). The Act also gives the National Commissioner emergency powers to appoint a temporary manager if it is apparent that the director of the facility had lost control, as has happened at Mangaung in 2013 (Correctional Services Act, 1998, sec. 112(a)(i); Hopkins, 2013).

The Impact of the two PPPs

Recent events during 2022–2023 concerning the two PPP prisons may cloud the discourse on the merits, or not, of privately operated prisons. This concerns a high-profile prisoner escape from the Mangaung facility. It was initially announced in May, 2022 that Thabo Bester had escaped. As events unfolded, it became apparent that it was an assisted escape, and the employees of the operator were at least complicit and most likely bribed to facilitate the escape (Damons & Steyn, 2023). Indeed, there had been substantially fewer escapes from Mangaung facility than from government-operated facilities (Sibanyoni, 2023a). Moreover, it became apparent that it had been known since November, 2022 that Bester had escaped. In late March, 2023, the DCS relieved G4S, the operator, from its control of the Mangaung centre (Damons & Steyn, 2022). Some 4 months later, on August 7, 2023, prisoners at the other PPP prison, Kutama-Sinthumule Correctional Centre, staged a protest and set fire to three of the four units, destroying most infrastructure (Singh, 2023). The net result was that the building was no longer fit for use, and some 3,000 inmates were transferred to other facilities. Reportedly, the protest had been in the making for some time, and a memorandum of grievances was handed to the Director of the Centre. The grievances related to treatment, quality of food, allegations of torture, rape, and solitary confinement. If these grievances are substantiated, it will not reflect well on DCS since, as noted above, the DCS has a Controller in place who must monitor and report on compliance with the contract. Deviations from the contract stipulations are punished with monetary penalties against the operator. If there were indeed deviations from the contract, this then occurred under the watch of the DCS Controller and the applicable penalties should be on record. It is also noted that the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services visited Kutama-Sinthumule in 2022, and its report of September, 2022 raised no substantial concerns. In fact, it remarked as follows: ‘The Committee is impressed with what they have observed in Kutama-Sinthumule Correctional Centre during their oversight visit and acknowledge the cooperation between DCS and Kutama-Sinthumule Correctional Centre’. (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2022a, p. 9).

Over the years, there had been numerous and sensational allegations concerning the treatment of prisoners at both private prisons, and particularly at Mangaung (Hopkins, 2020), but to date this has not resulted in any further action from either DCS, JICS, police, or the National Prosecution Authority (NPA). A 2005 review by Treasury confirmed that services were indeed superior to that rendered in DCS facilities (Farlam, 2005). Annual reports of JICS of the preceding 3 years (2019/20–2021/22) did not indicate that there were any serious concerns about the treatment of inmates. As noted above, a year prior to the riot and fire at Kutama-Sinthumule, the Portfolio Committee visited and reported no substantial concerns.

The existing two PPP prisons have 25-year contracts, and it appears that they are inflexible, or at least not flexible enough to meet some of the changing needs of the DCS. The Mangaung Centre opened on July 1, 2001 with 3,024 beds; the contract set to end on June 30, 2025. This is likely to end earlier due to the Thabo Bester escape (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2022b), but at the time of writing (December, 2023), the parties were engaged in mediation and the process appeared to have stalled (Sibanyoni, 2023b). The Kutama-Sinthumule Centre opened on February 16, 2002, with 2,928 beds; the contract will end on February 15, 2027. Attempts at renegotiation between 2002 and 2006 were unsuccessful, and the result is that they continue operating according to their initial specifications. The August 2023 fire at the facility has now rendered it unusable, a not insignificant monetary loss to the state. However, it is also a loss of some 3,000 bed spaces that had to be found elsewhere. With the end of the contracts in sight, it raises questions about the employees of the two PPP prisons and whether they will be let go and replaced by DCS officials from the existing staff – or if they will be absorbed into the DCS. The latter will, of course, be the favoured option of both the employees and the trade unions.

An original and much touted benefit of the PPP prisons was that there would be transference of skills and that the DCS staff and management would benefit directly from learning how the private sector operates a prison. The truth is, however, that the two PPP prisons existed as islands in the DCS-sea and that there had been very little, if any, transference of skills. The promised positive impact of the PPP prisons on the wider system never materialised. In all fairness, the PPP prisons are not to blame for this, but, rather, the DCS which had over the years had a strained relationship with the PPP prisons. It remains uncertain whether the DCS saw the two PPP prisons as a resource that may indeed assist it in addressing some of its most persistent problems, or whether they were perceived as a regrettable inheritance from the Mzimela-days. Minister Balfour (2004–2009) was indeed a subscriber to the second view. The policy's flip-flopping described above is perhaps what defined the relationship between the DCS and the two PPP prisons. Whatever one's misgivings may be about PPP prisons, the fact remains that the DCS did not utilise the existing two facilities to the greatest possible extent. Instead, they stand accused of marginalising them within the overall prison system. The overwhelming majority of the inmates at the two PPP prisons have sentences in excess of 10 years, with many serving life. Questions may thus be asked whether this profile was the best utilisation of such a reportedly expensive resource, and whether it would not have been a better option to accommodate first-time, younger incarcerees with shorter sentences. Such utilisation could have meant access to resources, education, and skills training available at these two facilities – ultimately better preparation for the younger cohort for release.

It is by now clear that private sector involvement in a correctional system can be an effective risk management response. Yet, as illustrated, it is equally true that it creates another range of risks. The original PPP prisons contracts also raised eyebrows as several DCS officials involved in the negotiations left the Department and found employment in the successful companies (Sloth-Nielsen, 2003). Given the large investments in sub-contracting, the risk of corruption is hardly surprising, as shown in Table 1 which lists various sub-contracted services to DCS in 2008, totalling U.S. $107 million at the time (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2008). The investigations of corruption by the Jali Commission, SIU and later the Zondo Commission, are also expensive. Notably, this is a cost that is seldom deducted from the so-called ‘value added’ by private sector involvement. The relationship between BOSASA and DCS consumed a significant proportion of the Zondo Commission's time, resulting in some 96 recommendations for the prosecution of present and past senior DCS officials and other persons connected to BOSASA (Zondo, 2022). Prosecuting these cases will add a further financial burden.

Table 1.

Sub-Contracted Services to DCS in 2008.

Service (as at 26 Feb 2008)	Duration- months	US$
Transaction Advisor Services for Public Private Partnership	24	1,380,145
Appointment of a consultant to assist DCS with Compliance and IT Audits.	36	956,416
Training of personnel in hygiene-related matters.	24	217,918
Monitoring, analysing and advisory service of daily media for Media Service Unit.	24	227,603
Appointment of independent accredited service provider (SANAS) to inspect and test textile clothing footwear etc.	24	692,494
Training of personnel in policy development.	8	78,692
Supply, delivery, installation and commissioning of security outer perimeter fences and CCTV surveillance cameras.	60	52,808,717
Maintenance of above.	48	6,145,278
Rendering of full facilities management services which include catering services.	60	14,927,361
Rendering of cleaning services Head Office.	24	302,663
Supply, delivery, installation, commissioning of television system and monitors at all Correctional Centres.	60	19,249,395
Maintenance of the above after a warranty of 12 months.	48	7,917,676
Recruitment of staff		1,864,407
TOTAL		106,768,765

DCS=Department of Correctional Services.

Lessons Learned

It is highly likely that 2023 was the death knell for PPP prisons in South Africa. Kutama-Sinthumule is unusable, and it is unlikely that it will be repaired prior to the contract coming to an end in 2027. If G4S regains control of Mangaung, this will be for less than 2 years, when it will then revert to the state, unless another contract is awarded, which is unlikely.

Private sector involvement in the prison system is not a question of either/or, but should be seen within the context of the overall prison system's strategic plan and how the private sector can contribute to strategic objectives. A categorical opposition to private sector engagement is short-sighted, and there is little doubt that the private sector can make a valuable contribution. In their early days, a visit to the two PPP prisons gave little reason to find fault, but it is not at this level where problems exist, but rather at the level of the whole system and the implications that large-scale private sector involvement holds for the long-term transformation of the South African prison system. What seems to have been more problematic is how private sector involvement had been managed since 1994. There remains a need for new facilities, and even a modest increase in criminal justice system effectiveness will see a rapid increase in demand for prison space. If PPP prisons are considered again, the terms of contracts should be of such a length and nature that they can be renegotiated to meet the prison system's shifting needs. Changes in inmate profiles, the size of the prison population, policy alterations, and training needs of DCS staff, etc. are issues that have arisen over the past 20 years. The existing PPPs could have been used as a resource to address some of the challenges faced. DCS chose not to.

At present, there are no independent evaluations available from the DCS on the PPP prisons or any of the other operational areas where there were or are significant private sector involvements. The relationship with BOSASA is now generally regarded as the ‘fruit’ of corruption; even if cost efficiencies were created, they are now overshadowed by it. Results of the privatisation of kitchens remain uncertain, as do the results of private sector involvement in providing security. This remains the situation despite the enormous costs that were involved. Even with respect to the two PPP prisons, there is no available research indicating whether the re-offending rate of PPP inmates is higher, lower, or the same as incarcerated individuals from state-run prisons. As far as can be established, the research was never undertaken, and it is now in all likelihood too late to start with a longitudinal study.

DCS chose to manage the two PPP prisons at least at an arm's length and went to considerable length to turn the Portfolio Committee's opinion against further private prisons. In contrast to this, the DCS engaged the services of the BOSASA group for a number of projects and services of doubtful need and uncertain results (e.g., the biometric and access control systems). The reason for this duality in relationships with the private sector, and probably the Department's two largest service providers, may lie in the fact that, on the one hand, the two PPP prisons reported to the boards of international holding companies and were thus not exposed to the domestic politics and emergent state capture. On the other hand, the BOSASA management had long historical ties with the ruling party and was, according to the Zondo Commission findings, paying bribes to senior DCS officials as well as politicians.

It must also be accepted that PPP prisons are vulnerable to the same risks as government prisons and how this is managed and prevented is dependent on the quality of management at the particular centre. At both PPP prisons, there have been problems resulting from industrial action and trade union activity has been an underestimated risk factor. The PPP prisons landscape of the past 25 years had been shaped by complex intersections between political and commercial interests. The Ministry, the DCS, organised labour and the private sector had often pulled in opposite directions. Given the costs involved in the construction, maintenance, and operation of prisons, in general, the history of the past 25 years has shown extensive corruption in the DCS's engagements with the private sector.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biography

Lukas Muntingh, PhD (Law) is based in the Law Faculty at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. His interest is in the intersection of criminal justice and human rights in southern and east Africa, focusing on policy and legislative reform.

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