An Integrated Review of Recent Research on the Relationships Between Religious Belief,Political Ideology,Authoritarianism,and Prejudice

Theoretical explanations

In the decades since Allport’s work in the 1960s, researchers have developed a number of theories to explain why people hold religious beliefs and how the mechanisms behind such beliefs may relate to political ideology, authoritarianism, and prejudice. One of the prevailing frameworks is Terror Management Theory (TMT), which posits that due to a fear of death, people compensate by forming worldviews that will act as a buffer (Harmon-Jones et al. 1996). These may include religious beliefs as a way to escape death or adherence to traditional cultural or societal norms, which they feel provide safety. These worldviews serve as the basis for ingroups and outgroups, as those with similar views act to decrease anxiety (e.g., through religious or political conformity), while those with differing views act to increase anxiety (e.g., atheists or those seeking to reform government). This can result in the proliferation of religious dogma, conservatism, and authoritarian tendencies.

Explanations based on TMT rely largely on the function of mortality salience. When individuals are more keenly aware of death, and thus have high levels of mortality salience, this heightened concern and accompanying anxiety require some sort of coping mechanism (Weise et al., 2012). Thus, TMT suggests that behavior is partly motivated by the need to manage anxiety and the awareness of death, and religious belief serves as the coping mechanism that manages anxiety. Most religions assert that life continues after physical death, which acts to mitigate death anxiety and allow believers to deny the finality of death. This is why group identification and members having common worldviews are important. Threat salience is minimized in such a situation, but when outgroup members with different worldviews are encountered it increases anxiety and death awareness, often resulting in hostility and lowered self-esteem. Reminders of fear lead to increased defensiveness. In turn, characteristics explained by TMT and mortality salience have been linked to RWA and negative attitudes toward immigrants.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) is a related concept that proposes that individuals can maintain and enhance their self-esteem by viewing outgroups in a less favorable light (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Mason & Wronski, 2018). In regard to cultural learning, people tend to model their beliefs and behaviors after cultural practices they perceive as normative, common, and those they associate with prestigious members of their society (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013). If a group is not viewed as blending into that accepted structure, then bias results. When one’s religious belief is viewed as the primary source of truth and morality, a common outlook among religious fundamentalists, the outcome is often that those from other groups (religious, racial, ethnic, sexual orientation, etc.) are viewed in a lesser light, which in turn leads to prejudice (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). TMT is consistent with SIT with both positing that group membership provides a source of meaning and self-esteem but also leads to derogation of outgroups, though TMT adds the component of mortality salience which SIT does not necessarily consider (Weise et al., 2012).

When individuals build their identities around group status, as SIT would suggest, the next stage is social sorting. This identity-based sorting leads to stronger partisan ties, not because one inevitably agrees with a political platform or certain religious dogma but because others like oneself are members of the partisan group (Mason & Wronski, 2018). Thus, in such a scenario, political or religious identity is not necessarily defined by issues, but partisan loyalty grows as a result of social sorting. Mason and Wronski emphasize that when interests of different groups overlap and mesh (“cross-cutting cleavages”), bipartisanship should be achievable, but when parties align with narrower, more singular issues, possibly based on social sorting, then this becomes less likely and groups become more isolated. And as more ingroups converge on a single identity, such as anti-abortion or second amendment activists may, social identities become more durable, further strengthening ingroup biases.

Another framework, Realistic Group Conflict Theory, holds that religion-based tensions and prejudice are exacerbated when the groups perceive themselves as competing for resources, such as the erroneous belief that immigrants are in competition with White evangelical citizens for jobs (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). One study found that the more a person overestimated the size of a minority population, the stronger their bias was against that minority group, ostensibly because they viewed people from that group as a greater threat and potential competitors for resources (Cuevas, 2015). This prejudice may be partially a result of individual differences (e.g., individuals tending toward fundamentalism or holding RWA orientations). In this scenario, the bias would be the consequence of an interaction effect between personal characteristics and intergroup relations as described by SIT. However, the two models are not fully congruent. Realistic Group Conflict theory suggests that prejudice and intergroup tensions emerge when different groups are in conflict over valued resources (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999). In contrast, SIT suggests that the more strongly one identifies with group membership, the stronger their favorable ingroup biases and less favorable their outgroup biases become, as these are tied to self-esteem rather than competition for resources.

A different school of thought, Schwartz’ Value Theory, has been used to explain the dichotomy between seemingly contradictory ideologies such as religiosity and atheism or conservativism and liberalism. Schwartz defines values as desirable, trans-situational goals that vary in importance and serve as guiding principles (Calogero et al., 2009; Roccas, 2005). He identified 10 motivational goals such as power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. Some of these are in contrast to each other (e.g., self-direction and conformity; power and benevolence). These can be broken down into four main groups that comprise two basic conflicts: self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus conservatism. This theory has been tested in more than 65 countries and 210 samples with consistent results that have largely confirmed the dichotomous relationship between the various opposing characteristics (Roccas, 2005).

Roccas (2005) used Schwartz’ Value Theory as a lens for understanding religious belief. According to Roccas, the theory yields several predictions that research has verified in regard to monotheistic religions. For instance, there is a positive correlation between religiosity and conservative values, resistance to change, and tradition. Conversely, there is a negative correlation between religiosity, openness to change, and hedonism values. And there is a positive correlation between religiosity and both power and achievement. These correlations have been revealed across different countries and cultures, with the notable exception of Eastern religions that are not monotheistic and tend emphasize self-improvement over infallible truths. Essentially, Western religion provides a basis for maintaining social order and prevailing norms while discouraging questioning, innovation, and self-discovery. It reflects the need to reduce uncertainty, which is also supported by TMT. As a result, religious people may react negatively to those holding different values than them because of the importance they place on conformity, tradition, and adherence to social expectations.

While Roccas (2005) focused on how Schwartz’ Value Theory may explain religious thought processes, Calogero et al. (2009) examined how it applies to political ideology. Their research dealt with the contrast between openness and conservation (tradition, conformity, and security) and how those characteristics relate to the need for cognitive closure (NFCC). Those high in NFCC prefer structure, predictability, quick decisions, rigidity of thought, and have a low tolerance for ambiguity. Those low in NFCC prefer variety, uncertainty, slow decision-making, flexibility of thought, and have a high tolerance for ambiguity. NFCC has been associated with intergroup processes such that those with similar levels of NFCC tend to cluster in like-groups. Calogero et al. investigated how NFCC related to the conservation/openness dichotomy from Schwartz’ Value Theory and hypothesized that NFCC should be positively related to conservation and its component parts and negatively associated with openness. They found that NFCC was positively correlated with the desire for security, conformity, and tradition and negatively correlated with the desire for stimulation, self-direction, and achievement. Preference for order was negatively associated with achievement. The predictions were confirmed in that NFCC was positively associated with conservative values and negatively associated with liberal ones. Importantly, closed-mindedness was related to the desire for tradition, suggesting those who display a desire to maintain tradition are unwilling to update their beliefs upon new evidence and experience. This may indicate a resistance or inability to learn or accept new concepts. In contrast, low NFCC may be more beneficial in allowing people to process new social information.

Two final theories are worth noting in regard to the topic. Altemeyer’s research (2003) focused on Tajfel’s minimal group effect, and it was found that when people are divided into groups, individuals begin to favor the group they have been assigned to and denigrate the outgroup even if they know the assignments are arbitrary. In this case, it was group affiliation that drove the prejudice rather than any individual characteristics or inherent beliefs. This does not speak directly to either religious belief or political affiliation because it could apply to all group affiliations, but it should be noted that most religious groups are formed rather arbitrarily, based on the place of a person’s birth or upbringing. Those born in North or South America tend to be raised in and adopt Christian beliefs, while those in the Middle East tend to be raised in and adopt Islamic ones. Thus, according to Tajfel’s minimal group effect, the arbitrary group affiliation may be the cause of outgroup denigration, and religious affiliation may be the vehicle for that arbitrary grouping.

Finally, high socioeconomic levels in a country tend to attenuate the relationships between values and religion, possibly because when citizens are economically contented religion may become a form of superficial group identification rather than a perceived solution to life’s hardships (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013; Roccas, 2005). Religious involvement is stronger in societies with shorter life expectancies, a lack of social services, and which are high in poverty, infant mortality, and economic inequality. When social conditions become more secure and life more predictable, religious attendance declines. This finding has been consistent across cultures. In regard to how social and economic security impacts values, Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism makes the assertion that Western societies are currently undergoing a “values revolution” wherein worries about economic security are being pushed aside for new cultural concerns such as social (in)equality, energy, nuclear disarmament, and environmentalism (Ciuk et al. 2018). This occurs because much of the society has enough wealth that they become less concerned with financial well-being and can divert their attention to cultural aspects. However, this was not confirmed by Ciuk et al.’s research. Instead, they found that while Democrats and Republicans hold significantly different value preferences there were no significant differences in value preferences between income groups among either group. Conservatives tended to value freedom and law and order compared to liberals who valued more equality and economic security regardless of the status of financial security of those in either party. Besides Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism, which is still tentative, each of these theories has some explanatory power, and there is some empirical evidence supporting each.

Individual cognitive and psychological differences

Most of the above-mentioned theoretical frameworks can assist in explaining religious belief and its correlates at the group level. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, social and political attitudes may be a result of underlying psychological traits rather than logical, philosophical, or cultural factors (Jost et al., 2008). There may also be a link between ideology and certain psychological and personality factors such as authoritarianism (Devine, 2012). While RWA and social dominance orientation, both of which are linked to conservatism, have been studied empirically more than left-wing perspectives, it remains a legitimate question as to the extent that certain psychological traits are associated with conservatism (Jost et al., 2003). Similar to all belief systems, people likely adopt religious and conservative views because they fulfill some psychological needs or due to the individual’s underlying psychological characteristics.

Cognitive and evolutionary theories of religious belief suggest that cognitive biases have evolved to predispose people toward religious belief (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013). As a result, cognitive styles are one factor that may explain why people choose to adopt a particular religious belief system to interpret reality (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). For instance, fundamentalists may think in less complex ways, with less nuance and flexibility and in starker, black and white terms. Those high in fundamentalism have been shown to think in more convergent ways, whereas new information is rationalized in such a way that it bolsters their original beliefs. In contrast, those low in fundamentalism are more likely to incorporate new information and use it to adapt or change their religious views. A growing body of research has begun to indicate that one’s inclination toward an intuitive cognitive style, as opposed to an analytic or reflective cognitive style, is associated with the likelihood of holding religious beliefs as well as the strength of those beliefs (Cuevas, 2013; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013; Zhong et al., 2017; Zuckerman et al., 2013).

For instance, Shenhav et al. (2011) investigated whether an individual’s cognitive style influences their belief in god by testing whether people with a more intuitive thought process were more likely to hold religious beliefs than those who made more reflective judgments. Theoretically, the intuitive-style thinkers would tend to rely on their gut feelings when making decisions, while the reflective thinkers would use a more logical, critical, and rational approach. Shenhav et al. posed questions to participants, and each question had an answer that was attractive and seemed correct at first glance but was incorrect. The number of times each participant picked the intuitive but incorrect answer was compared to their responses reflecting their relative certainty of their belief in god and level of piety. The participants who gave more intuitive (and incorrect) responses consistently reported more confident belief in god. These findings held true even when the researchers controlled for such variables as education, conservatism, and family factors. On the other hand, they found that the number of correct responses correlated with Intelligence Quotient (IQ).Those with higher IQs had a more reflective style and held less belief in god, while those with lower IQs were more intuitive and tended to answer incorrectly. However, when the results were examined after controlling for IQ, the effect of cognitive style was still present.

Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) likewise describe two modes of information processing used by humans, intuitive processing and analytic processing, which take place simultaneously and in parallel. The analytic system can override the intuitive system when necessary if a problem needs to be solved and the required resources, or clues, are available. If this is correct, then activating the analytic thinking process in order to override or inhibit the intuitive process would also undermine religious belief since intuitive thinking has been shown to be associated with belief in god. Gervais and Norenzayan tested this assumption and found that analytic thinking was indeed negatively associated with religious belief. Across five experiments, they subtly manipulated the participants in the experimental groups to encourage them to take a more analytic perspective. Those participants who were stimulated to think analytically scored higher on the problem-solving questions. In addition, in each of the five experiments analytic thinking was significantly correlated with greater disbelief in god. Thus, participants who used a more rational, logical, analytic approach were more likely to come to the correct conclusion on the problem-solving tasks but less likely to report a strong belief in god, while those who used a more intuitive method were more likely to choose incorrect answers and also more likely to report a stronger belief in god.

Beyond an individual’s specific cognitive style, Norenzayan and Gervais (2013) argue that in order to hold religious belief one must maintain four psychological conditions. First, the person must be able to form mental representations of supernatural agents. They must be motivated to commit to supernatural agents as real sources of meaning, comfort, and control. They must have received cultural influences that plant the seed for particular religious beliefs, and they must maintain that commitment without further analytic processing that would cause them to doubt or reject the beliefs. If all four conditions are met, then it would encourage religious belief. It should be noted, however, that an analytic approach to processing information could undermine any of the four conditions, and if just one is not met, then religious belief becomes less likely and perhaps unfeasible.

Another explanation for religious belief and the variables that correlate with it can be attributed to personal motives. Whether one is driven by directional or nondirectional motives can influence their religious and political belief systems (Jost et al., 2003). Nondirectional motives compel the desire to come to an understanding regardless of the content of the conclusion. This may be viewed as a scientific or analytic approach in that the validity of the information gathering process is critical and as long as that is maintained, then the person accepts the conclusions as accurate regardless of preconceived notions. In contrast, directional motives have to do with the intention to arrive at an outcome that conforms to some desired perspective, and this may be synonymous with confirmation bias. Certainly, those who seek to use religious doctrine to justify their political ideology in absence of empirical support for the underlying beliefs would fall into the latter category. But Jost et al. point out that not all motives for embracing conservative traditions are the same. Disadvantaged people may gravitate toward them due to fear, anxiety, and resistance to change, while more advantaged ones may adhere to them due to self-interest and the desire for social dominance. In either case, the rationale would be directional in nature.

As noted, the concept of directional motivation is similar to confirmation bias. One specific type of confirmation bias is myside bias, which deals with reasoning meant to bolster personal, subjective beliefs (Cavojova et al., 2018). If information conforms to our preconceived notions, we tend to rely on intuition and readily accept the information, but if it contradicts those notions, we resort to more analytic thinking to decide whether to accept or reject the information. If myside bias is activated, we are more likely to reject correct information that contradicts our beliefs and also to accept incorrect information that conforms to them. This relates to dual process theory regarding the dichotomy between intuitive and analytic thinking described earlier. The ability to resist myside bias has been associated with higher cognitive ability and open-minded thinking, which as we have seen, are both negatively correlated with religious belief and conservatism. Myside bias has been shown to be particularly prominent in religious thinking, suggesting that the participants use double standards when assessing information.

Cavojova et al. (2018) investigated myside bias by assessing how well people were able to draw valid conclusions when provided with information that contradicted their religious or political beliefs. They found that people with stronger pro-life attitudes accepted more logically invalid pro-life assertions than logically valid pro-choice conclusions. These participants also rejected more pro-choice invalid ones than pro-life invalid ones, given the same logic requirements, just as would be predicted if myside bias were to have an effect. When the groups were compared statistically, the significant difference was that pro-life participants were more likely to reject pro-choice valid statements to a greater degree, suggesting that pro-life participants had the strongest myside bias. Interestingly, prior experience with formal logic, as defined by participants having taken a course on logic, was associated with the acceptance of more logically invalid conclusions, suggesting that the coursework increased students’ self-efficacy but not their accuracy. Cavojova et al. concluded that myside bias does affect formal reasoning ability, as participants had difficulty accepting the validity of conclusions that conflicted with their beliefs as well as problems with rejecting invalid conclusions consistent with their beliefs. Biased responses were ultimately caused by the inability to override or suppress intuitive responses just as dual process theory suggests. However, people are often unaware of their biases and prejudices against others and therefore unlikely to experience the cognitive dissonance of conflicting positions (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005).

Jost et al. (2008) also examined how psychological traits may relate to political ideology, noting that core dimensions of the left–right divide are relatively stable and enduring, suggesting they may be products of internal characteristics rather than shifting environmental ones. They argue that left–right preferences stem from underlying psychological traits that cause one to accept one approach over the other. The researchers identified a range of tendencies specific to those on opposite sides of the political spectrum. Liberals favor flexibility over stability, progress over tradition, feminism, social and economic equality, egalitarianism, creativity, novelty, diversity, pleasure-seeking, atheism, concern with social justice, education, and interestingly, holding an occupation that requires one to consider multiple perspectives and conflicting arguments. In contrast, conservatives favor traditional values, system justification (which includes the acceptance of inequality as part of established systems), order, traditional family structures, mainstream activities, religion and prayer, support for wealthy people, women staying at home, and approval of a wide range of institutions and authorities such as the police, military, politicians, corporations, and the flag. Both sides show preferences for higher status groups (straight over gay, White over Black, etc.), for order over chaos, and for conformity over rebelliousness, but conservatives’ preferences are stronger and more consistent is this regard.

Other psychological predictors positively associated with conservatism and negatively associated with liberalism were intolerance of ambiguity, need for order, threat management, system threat, death anxiety, and authoritarianism (Jost et al., 2008). These correspond with many of the theoretical frameworks described earlier in this section. Jost et al. concluded that rather than political ideologies necessarily being instilled, people may in part choose an orientation based on underlying psychological tendencies, depending on whether they crave stability and hierarchy or flexibility and openness or have tendencies toward fear and anxiety.

Thus far we have examined how religious belief is commonly associated with certain political ideologies, RWA, and prejudice. We have discussed theoretical models that explain why people may adopt such views at the group level, and we have touched upon individual cognitive and psychological differences that may predispose people to such tendencies. But research has also shown there to be negative psychological and cognitive implications for those holding extreme religious beliefs that tend toward authoritarianism such as limitations in intelligence, factors of well-being, a lack of cognitive flexibility, and limitations in brain function. These detrimental factors will be examined next.

Intelligence

There is the potential that intelligence is related to religious belief and its associated characteristics, and indeed many studies have borne this out. Research has repeatedly shown that a negative correlation exists between intelligence and strength of religious belief, which holds true across a range of cultures and countries (Stankov & Lee, 2018). It is possible that the relationship between religiosity and intelligence may be part of a broader set of interrelated constructs, and such a nexus will be discussed shortly. The link between intelligence and religious belief, along with the common political ideology it entails, has been so thoroughly documented that it prompted Stankov to coin the term “Conservative Syndrome” due to the wealth of evidence showing that social conservatism is related to both intelligence and religiosity. Lynn et al. (2009) assert that research evidence showing an inverse relationship between intelligence and religious belief comes from four main sources: (1) studies showing a negative correlation between the two constructs, (2) lower percentages of religious belief among those in occupations that require higher intelligence (e.g., scientists, professors, doctors, etc.), (3) a decline in religious belief as children age and their cognitive abilities mature, (4) a decline in religious belief across the 20th century during a time when intelligence in populations has risen.

Nearly 100 years ago, a wave of studies were published that showed the negative correlation between intelligence and religiosity, though in the following decades interest in the topic waned and several studies were published disputing the original conclusions (Zuckerman et al., 2013). In the late 20th century and early 2000s once again research began to focus on the relationship between the constructs with studies showing the effect in postcollege adults (Kanazawa, 2010; Lewis et al., 2011; Sherkat, 2010) and adolescents (Nyborg, 2009). The negative relationship also appeared when an analysis was conducted for all 50 states in the United States. (Pesta et al., 2010). Based on the conclusions of the majority of studies on the topic, currently the consensus is that there is a negative correlation between intelligence and religiosity, though extraneous variables may influence that relationship such as gender, education, and quality of life. Several recent studies will be examined next to illustrate details underlying the current evidence.

Zuckerman et al. (2013) recently conducted a meta-analysis of 63 studies that explored the links between intelligence (g factor) and variables such as religiosity, gender, race, and bias. They examined data beginning with the famous Terman longitudinal study (1925–1959) on highly gifted children. The Terman subjects grew up to be less religious than the general population, a reliable finding across four different measurements over the span of their lives. Yet, many of them grew up in religious households, which suggests they went through changes as they aged and chose to reject religious belief. Zuckerman et al. found that a common trend in longitudinal studies on gifted children was that high intelligence levels at an early age predicted lower religiosity many years later in middle age. Thus, intelligence can predict religiosity years later, which was a surprising finding, particularly considering that religiosity at an early age does not strongly predict later religiosity.

Overall, the studies examined by Zuckerman et al. (2013) revealed a reliable negative correlation between intelligence and religiosity. They found that 35 studies showed negative correlations while just 2 showed positive ones. A uniform trend throughout the research findings was that the higher a person’s intelligence, the lower they tended to score on religiosity scales. However, school performance, as measured by grade point average (GPA), was not consistently associated with religiosity. As Zuckerman et al. note, GPA does not correlate as strongly with intelligence as SAT or ACT scores so it may not correlate as much with religiosity.Intelligence was thus more negatively related to religiosity than was education, and controlling for education did not change the relationship substantially. They concluded that education does not ultimately mediate the intelligence–religiosity relationship.

Several recent studies analyzed data from a wide range of countries to control for the possibility that the apparent negative correlation may be due to cultural variables specific to the United States or industrialized Western societies. Stankov and Lee (2018) collected data from a large sample (N = 8883) from 33 countries using a range of assessments including math, science, and reading scores in addition to religiosity measures. They found that math scores appeared to be more strongly related to fluid intelligence, while reading and science scores were more strongly related to crystallized intelligence. Religiosity was negatively related to each of the three achievement constructs at both the individual and country levels, with moderate to moderately high effect sizes, with reading having the strongest negative correlation. Some evidence suggested that this relationship may be moderated by aspects of conservatism (i.e., religiosity may be serving as a proxy for conservatism, and it is the combined traits of conservatism that are related to cognitive ability). Stankov and Lee speculated that this may be because people who show limited cognitive abilities could have difficulties understanding complexities and dealing with challenges which makes them prone to characteristics of conservatism such as being resistant to change, accepting of existing inequalities, and prejudiced toward outgroups.

Another study that examined data from many different countries arrived at similar conclusions. Lynn et al. (2009) compiled a variety of data from 137 countries and from additional studies. First, they ascertained that of the members of the National Academy of Sciences, only 7% reported that they believed in the existence of god, as opposed to 90% of the general population. Like Zuckerman et al. (2013) and Lynn et al. (2009) found that individuals tend to become less devout as they mature and develop cognitively. They also note that over the last 150 years, the intelligence of the population has risen (the Flynn Effect) while simultaneously religiosity has decreased in terms of the percentage of people who attend church or who identify as highly religious. And like many researchers before, they discovered there to be a consistent negative correlation between religiosity and intelligence. Atheists’ mean IQ scores were found to be six points higher than the combined group of religious believers. The above findings held across nations, and the countries that had the most atheists also tended to have the highest average IQs. Their data revealed a positive correlation of r = .60 (p < .001) between national IQs and a disbelief in god. However, Lynn et al. point out that the United States tends to be an exception because it represents a country with a higher average IQ whose citizens also tend to continue to have a strong belief in god where only 10.5% are nonbelievers according to their calculations.

Stoet and Geary (2017) collected assessment data from the Programme for International Student Assessment and Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study over three different periods from 2000 to 2015 in addition to various measures of religiosity. They found negative correlations as high as r = –0.74, p < .001, between religiosity and achievement as determined by science and math scores across 50 countries. Higher levels of religiosity were strongly and consistently associated with lower levels of performance in both science and math. In addition, there was a negative relationship between time spent on religious endeavors and both science and math performance, r = –0.40, p = .02. The relationship between achievement and religiosity was the same for both math and science, which does not support the idea that religiosity is more strongly related to either fluid intelligence or crystallized intelligence but is interesting nonetheless because while science is often seen as conflicting with religion, mathematics is religiously neutral.

Pesta et al. (2010) took a somewhat different approach. They examined state-level data across all 50 states in the United States, and instead of investigating the direct link between intelligence and religious belief, they hypothesized the existence of a g-nexus. The g-nexus is related to overall well-being and is an intercorrelated network of variables with g (general intelligence) at its center. General mental ability (g) is a consistent predictor of success in life and correlates strongly with educational achievement, income and wealth, health, longevity, job performance, and law-abidingness. Thus, state-level well-being is related to state-level general mental ability and its covariates. It has been suggested that religiosity can benefit health, both mental and physical, by providing a support network, a social structure, sense of meaning, and charitable support while discouraging harmful behaviors such as smoking, drinking, and criminal activity. However, at the country-level higher religiosity has been linked to poorer health outcomes in regard to infant and maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy.

In contrast to previous assertions that religiosity may have some physical and mental benefits, Pesta et al. (2010) found that religious belief was consistently and strongly negatively associated with state well-being, while IQ was positively associated with well-being. States such as Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut were high in the various constructs positively related to well-being such as IQ, income, health, and so on but low in religious belief. Conversely, states such as Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas were high in religious belief but low in the variables that were positively correlated with well-being. These trends were consistent throughout the nation with similar dynamics repeating across all 50 states. Religious affiliation also correlated moderately strongly with the other variables, with Protestantism being positively associated with detrimental variables at the state level such as crime and negatively associated with beneficial ones such as education, income, health, and IQ. Interestingly, compared to Protestantism, Catholicism and godlessness had the opposite relationships across those variables. While the variables measured seem relatively diverse, they explained 67% of the variance in well-being. Ultimately, the idea that religiosity is related to better outcomes in any of the areas was strongly refuted by the data. Thus, evidence revealed that well-being can be achieved in the absence of religiously based morality-focused environments, and actually thrives in the absence of it. Pesta et al. concluded that there is substantial overlap between the g-nexus and well-being nexus, and that a central component, intelligence, is strongly and inversely related to religious belief.

Cognitive flexibility

Beyond intelligence, cognitive flexibility is a separate construct that recent evidence suggests could be pivotal in influencing religious belief, authoritarianism, and prejudice. Cognitive flexibility refers to the ability to fluidly shift thought processes rather than being relegated to a fixed, rigid information processing approach. It is a trait that has been the focus of much recent research. Recent studies on it have spanned an array of animal species including mice (Marwari & Dawe, 2018; Morris-Schaffer, et al., 2018; Piantadosi et al., 2019), rats (Dhawan et al., 2019; Kougias et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2017), rhesus monkeys (Shnitko et al., 2019), chimpanzees (Lacreuse et al., 2018), horses (Fortin et al., 2018), parrots (van Horik & Emery, 2018), pigeons (Darby et al., 2018), and bees (Loukola et al., 2017). Increasingly, scientists have begun to realize that cognitive flexibility may be crucial in shaping certain higher order thought processes in humans, and that those processes help to shape personal characteristics and worldviews.

Cognitive flexibility allows us to quickly reconfigure our minds and switch between different tasks (Braem & Egner, 2018). Along with inhibition and working memory, cognitive flexibility is recognized as one of the three core functions of cognitive control or alternately, executive function. These cognitive control systems allow us to synthesize internal goals with information from the current context to guide information processing. When appropriate, this prompts us to adapt and override previously learned information and habitual actions, which may be its most important function. Cognitive flexibility may be viewed as the pinnacle of cognitive control, a meta-control that influences other thought processes and produces adaptive behavior as a result.

Zmigrod et al. (2018) define cognitive flexibility as the ability to shift between different modes of thinking and adapt to new and changing environments. Goal-directed behavior can either be guided by cognitive persistence when stable goals are maintained or cognitive flexibility when methods of achieving goals or even the goals themselves are adapted. Religious believers tend to adhere to strict views of the world, such as what is right or true, and have well-defined guidelines for how people should behave, which represents cognitive persistence, the antithesis of cognitive flexibility.

To test the relationship between cognitive flexibility and religious affiliation, religious practices, and religious upbringing, Zmigrod et al. (2018) used a variety of measures to assess the constructs in a sample of 744 mostly U.S. residents. They found that neither educational attainment nor gender was correlated with any of the three variables. There was no difference in educational attainment between religious and nonreligious participants, which aligns with some of the previously mentioned studies that suggested that while intelligence tends to be negatively correlated with religious belief, educational achievement is more weakly related to it. In terms of cognitive flexibility, across three different measures, nonreligious participants scored higher than religious participants, indicating a greater degree of cognitive flexibility and also showing greater accuracy when tasks switched. This finding held true regardless of whether the religious person was a practicing or nonpracticing believer, as determined by the amount of religious service attendance, though those who attended more often performed more poorly in terms of accuracy than those who attended less frequently. On one measure, higher educational attainment was associated with greater flexibility. On another measure, those with a nonreligious upbringing showed more flexibility than those with a religious upbringing. However, among strictly nonreligious participants, those nonreligious people with religious upbringing scored higher on cognitive flexibility than nonreligious people with nonreligious upbringing, suggesting that a greater amount of cognitive flexibility might be necessary to discard religious beliefs instilled in childhood.

Zmigrod et al. (2018) concluded that religious nonbelief is associated with greater cognitive flexibility and greater adaptivity, and religious belief with greater cognitive perseverance. Nonreligious participants showed a tendency to restructure thought when the present approach was unproductive. In general, practicing religious participants showed less cognitive flexibility than nonpracticing ones, suggesting religious involvement during adulthood may work to limit cognitive flexibility. Importantly, current religious affiliation, including a lack of affiliation, has a greater influence on flexibility than the orientation of one’s religious upbringing. The most cognitively flexible of the groups studied were the ones who had experienced a religious upbringing yet chose to reject that and become nonreligious as adults. This suggests that it may require a certain depth of cognitive flexibility to make such a change. The question remains, however, as to whether a lack of cognitive flexibility causes one to choose religious belief, if religious affiliation stifles cognitive flexibility, or if there is an interaction effect.

Cristofori et al. (2016) studied patients who had had traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and found that they had lower scores on a sorting test that has traditionally been one measure of cognitive flexibility. Those patients also reported having had significantly more mystical experiences, defined as experiences interacting with supernatural forces, than the healthy controls. There was a negative correlation between scores on the sorting test and scores on the mysticism scale for those with TBI, indicating that lower levels of mysticism were related to higher performance in executive function. Patients who had lesions in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in addition to TBI performed more poorly on the sorting task. Thus, it appeared that damage to the brain was associated with less cognitive flexibility and increased religious belief.

Traditionally, cognitive flexibility has been thought to be generalizable such that if a person showed strong cognitive flexibility in one context they should be able to show similar performance across different contexts (Braem & Egner, 2018). Thus, this provided hope for implementing cognitive training programs which could provide benefits to those with TBI and others. However, this proved to be more difficult than originally believed with cognitive training programs showing limited transfer. Instead, cognitive flexibility may be more context-specific with certain environments or stimuli triggering it. It is also worth noting that extremists, authoritarians, and individuals with strong nationalistic tendencies tend to score low on cognitive flexibility scales so the ability may be related to political and nationalistic beliefs in addition to religious ones (Zmigrod et al., 2018).

The next section will examine a host of studies that assessed brain structure and function in healthy and previously injured participants in order to determine whether neurological function influences religious and political beliefs. Some of the studies also correlated neural anatomy with cognitive flexibility, which was briefly introduced above.

Neurological and biological evidence

Some of the most interesting new evidence in the study of religious belief and political orientation comes from the fields of cognitive neuroscience and medicine. Only recently have such studies begun to confirm the links between the various constructs that cognitive psychologists had previously compiled statistical evidence and theoretical rationales for. These new studies have been able to bring together evidence of genetic, environmental, and biological influences to describe how these interact with cognition and the structure and function of the brain. Many of these studies have been conducted in the medical field with patients who have suffered brain injuries in order to isolate the function of different areas of the brain in relation to religious belief, intelligence, cognitive flexibility, and political ideology. Several of these will be discussed in an attempt to provide further explanation for the phenomenon of religious belief and its associated variables.

A belief in supernatural agents underlies all religious belief (Cristofori et al., 2016; Kapogiannis et al., 2014). Some researchers attribute belief in supernatural agents and the development of religion to the evolution of Theory of Mind, higher order thought processes that take place predominantly in the frontal lobe of the cerebral cortex. These thought processes are responsible for executive functions such as self-awareness, planning and forethought, metacognition, self-regulation, and an awareness of the existence of others’ consciousness. Kapogiannis et al. (2014) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine neural networks associated with religious beliefs in 66 participants.Their findings support the idea that religious belief is related to the development of Theory of Mind, as the two processes appeared to share the same networks. Perceptions of supernatural agents engage pathways involved in fear regulation, semantic processing, and imagery. As will become apparent in some of the studies that will be discussed shortly, fear regulation and its associated neurological anatomy are commonly linked to religious belief, a finding that seems to verify TMT.

Research has indicated that belief in supernatural agents is linked to hallucinations and psychiatric disorders, so there has been speculation that some religious experiences may be the result of dysfunction in certain areas of the brain (Cristofori et al., 2016). Studies have shown that among seemingly healthy individuals, there is diminished function in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) when they take part in the religious practice of speaking in tongues or in response to charismatic religious speakers. Alternatively, the dlPFC is more strongly activated in skeptics and thus is thought to be involved with inhibiting irrational thoughts and enabling logical thinking. Cristofori et al. determined that a fully functional dlPFC is necessary to regulate mysticism and that diminished executive function may be associated with religious belief.

In another study that investigated executive function, Barbey et al. (2012) examined the computed tomography (CT) data of 182 Vietnam veterans who had suffered penetrating brain injuries. They note that executive control and most high-level cognition are predominantly handled by the PFC and that damage to the frontal cortex and parietal regions is associated with impairments in intelligence. The frontal and parietal lobes are involved with executive control, and communication between the regions is critically important. Barbey et al. found that impairment to executive function was associated with damage to the left hemisphere in areas related to verbal fluency and cognitive flexibility. Executive control and g were associated with regions responsible for verbal knowledge, verbal reasoning, working memory, and cognitive flexibility. Impairments to intelligence and cognitive flexibility are linked to religious belief as research has consistently shown both to be negatively correlated with it.

Cognitive flexibility is defined by the ability to adapt thought and behavior, to fluidly generate ideas, and to recognize novel semantic relations (Barbey et al., 2013). It is likely that rather than being a unified construct, it depends on multiple information processing systems which together drive adaptive behaviors and creative problem-solving. Barbey et al. (2013) sought to determine how cognitive flexibility was related to psychometric intelligence and personality traits. They mapped out the areas of the brain that might be responsible for it with CT data from a similar sample of 149 Vietnam War veterans who had suffered brain damage. They found that the areas associated with cognitive flexibility were distributed broadly across the left hemisphere in regions known to be related to language processing, spatial processing, motor processing, and working memory. It appeared that while fluid intelligence engaged the right hemisphere, cognitive flexibility mainly engaged the left, showing a mirroring pattern that suggests they may function independently to some degree. Participants who had damage to the area known for supporting the formation of novel semantic relationships and problem-solving also showed deficits in cognitive flexibility. Adaptive behavior seems to depend on psychometric intelligence (a combination of verbal comprehension, working memory, fluid intelligence, and processing speed) rather than on social or emotional factors. Deficits in intelligence and cognitive flexibility, which are responsible for adaptive behavior, may help explain a tendency toward religious belief and political ideology because religious traditions and conservatism involve a resistance to adaptive behaviors and thought processes.

Zhong et al. (2017) more directly tested the links between religious beliefs and neuro anatomy in the same group of 149 Vietnam War veterans and compared their CT scans to those of 30 healthy controls. They explored whether damage to the PFC can modify individuals’ belief systems, specifically by increasing rigidity and thus religious fundamentalism. As the previous studies indicated, individuals with traumatic brain injuries have been shown to suffer from impairments in cognitive flexibility. Flexibility and openness no doubt play a role in political and religious beliefs, though some research shows that higher levels of openness are actually positively correlated with religious beliefs, likely because those displaying the trait are more susceptible to believing a wide variety of supernatural explanations.

Zhong et al. (2017) found that in the healthy controls there was not a correlation between fundamentalism and cognitive flexibility, but in the traumatic brain injury (TBI) group, there was a negative correlation.Those with damage to the PFC had significantly higher fundamentalism scores and significantly lower intelligence than those in the control group. Unlike some of the previous studies suggesting that cognitive flexibility may be partially attributable to lateralization of the cerebral cortex, in this case, there was no evidence to suggest any differences based on lateralization. More broadly, both flexibility and openness were significant negative predictors of fundamentalism. Lesion size was also associated with decreased cognitive flexibility and greater fundamentalism. Volume loss in the PFC due to lesions was indirectly linked to fundamentalism via cognitive flexibility and openness. Zhong et al. concluded that processing operations in the PFC regulate cognitive flexibility and openness, which are largely responsible for adaptive behaviors, and if TBI stifles those functions it can lead to rigidity in religious beliefs and the suppression of belief revision.

In yet another study involving the group of Vietnam veterans with TBI (n = 134) along with a group of healthy controls (n = 34), Cristofori et al. (2015) examined whether damage to the PFC was associated with extreme political beliefs, which as we have seen, are often linked to religious group affiliation. Previous studies had shown that individuals with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) can have social impairments and a decreased ability to judge moral dilemmas. Thus, damage to the vmPFC may also limit the ability to make rational political judgments. Cristofori et al. found that patients with TBI, particularly in the vmPFC, rated radical statements as being more moderate than the healthy controls did. So when posed with scenarios depicting extremist views, they were more likely to be accepting of extremism. They undervalued extreme radicalism and perceived those beliefs as more permissible than the general population would. They could, however, still differentiate where a statement fell on the liberal/conservative continuum. Such undervaluing of radical behaviors could potentially have a profound impact on everyday life, with the patient being accepting of or even endorsing inappropriate behaviors, thus leading to conflict with others. It is possible that weighing the perceived levels of extremism may put greater demands on cognitive load, requiring greater interplay between parts of the brain devoted to higher order processes, a process that may be impaired in those with TBI.

Like Cristofori et al. (2015), Asp et al. (2012) also focused on how damage to the vmPFC can influence beliefs. They note that the PFC is activated during tasks that involve evaluation and doubting of beliefs. If the PFC is damaged, then the individual would have difficulty identifying invalid premises and stimulating doubt for assertions that should logically be rejected. As a result, patients with PFC deficits have been found to be overconfident, boastful, stubborn, and egocentric in addition to being gullible and vulnerable to deceptive advertising. Individuals with doubt deficit, from damage to the PFC for instance, would likely be high in authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism because they would be accepting of authority and unquestioning in their approach to religion.

Asp et al. (2012) compared patients who had damage to the vmPFC (n = 10) to those with TBI outside the vmPFC (n = 10) and those who had not experienced a TBI (n = 16). As would be predicted based on underlying theory and previous research, they found that vmPFC patients were more punitive and endorsed more immoral actions when tested on the dimensions. As many studies had also concluded before, authoritarianism was significantly and positively correlated with religious fundamentalism (r = .78). vmPFC patients were higher in authoritarianism and fundamentalism than both of the other groups. However, unlike other studies that showed a negative correlation between religious belief and intelligence, there were no significant relationships between either fundamentalism or authoritarianism and IQ, suggesting that in these patients authoritarianism and fundamentalism could not be explained by differences in intelligence or general executive function. Importantly, vmPFC patients reported experiencing an increase in the strength of their religious belief post-TBI. This could not be explained due to the patient simply having a life-threatening encounter or a brain injury because the other patients did not report the same experiences. It became clear that vmPFC patients became more fundamentalist and began to hold more extremist religious views postinjury. In the absence of TBI, for different reasons, both children and the elderly show subpar functioning in the vmPFC, which could account for why each can be more impressionable and may be disposed to accepting implausible claims. This could explain why children are more susceptible to religious indoctrination and older adults are more susceptible to deceptive advertising.

Two final studies, by Kanai et al. (2011) and Koenig et al. (2005), explored the influence of genetics in political and religious orientations, again with interesting results. Generally, environmental influences have been thought to be the cause of political and religious orientation, though, as we have seen, recent research has begun to show possible neurological and biological links. However, it is likely that genetic influences, like most human characteristics, interact with the social environment to form such beliefs.

Kanai et al. (2011) hypothesized that there would be an interaction between genotype, environment, and political phenotype that may be reflected in the structure of the brain. Across two studies and two different sets of participants, Kanai et al. used magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans to view neural structures and compare these to the subjects’ political beliefs, with both studies producing the same results. They found there was a correlation between political orientation and the gray matter volume in two distinct regions of the brain. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is associated with conflict monitoring and tolerance for uncertainty, and liberals reliably showed greater neural activity and increased gray matter in this region. Stronger liberalism was thus related to an increased sensitivity to environmental stimuli and the types of responses that would cause one to adjust their views based on additional information.

In contrast, conservatives were found to have more gray matter volume in the right amygdala (Kanai et al., 2011). The amygdala is associated with fear responses, and individuals with larger amygdalas are more sensitive to fear. This finding appears to be congruent with previous research that has shown conservatives to be prone to more aggressive responses to threatening situations than liberals. Once they verified that these relationships existed between gray matter volume and political orientation, the researchers reversed the analyses to determine whether they could predict participants’ political orientations by examining their MRI scans alone. To do this, they anonymized the brain scans so that the researchers did not know which participant each one belonged to or their political orientation prior to analyzing them. Remarkably, Kanai et al. were able to accurately categorize the participants’ political beliefs simply by examining the amount of gray matter in the ACC and right amygdala. They concluded that political orientation is at least partially influenced by the brain structures that govern fear and uncertainty, which again helps to confirm a number of prior theories such as TMT and supports the explanation for the tendency toward authoritarianism.

Koenig et al. (2005) took a different approach to test for genetic and environmental influences on individuals’ religiosity. They examined the data of a cohort of 273 pairs of adult male twins. The participants responded to questions about their relative amount of religious belief during their childhood and at the time of the study, as well as the amount of religious belief in their family environment during both times. Because both monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins were included, the researchers were able to account for the amount of genetic similarities between pairs and for the twins sharing the same environment as children. Koenig et al. discovered that the participants’ amount of religiosity differed significantly across time, with the pairs becoming less religious as adults. The DZ twins became less similar over time, but the MZ twins maintained their similarity. The researchers interpreted their findings to mean that early in life the environmental influence for religious belief was higher than the genetic influence, but that the genetic influence held as the participants aged, while the environmental influence diminished. They argued that a common environment accounted for the largest influence in childhood, while the genetic influence was the largest during adulthood, and suggested that the proportion of religious heritability increased over time.

Taken together, the studies discussed in the section above comprise a sample of some of the more interesting and innovative approaches to the study of religious belief, political orientation, and their origins. While it was previously believed that both were entirely the result of environmental influences, it is becoming clear they are also related to deep-seated psychological characteristics driven by neurological and genetic factors. This is an area ripe for more research, particularly because such studies provide additional ways to confirm or disprove previous assertions. At the moment, the findings appear to largely validate the initial conclusions of cognitive psychologists.