Teacher motivation in Chile: Motivational profiles and teaching quality in an incentive-based education system

Abstract

This study drew on Chilean teacher survey responses from TALIS 2018 data on teacher motivation in order to examine the extent to which these data reveal different motivational profiles among Chilean teachers. Also, it explores the influence of those profiles on quality teachers’ instruction. As a conceptual scaffold, this article uses Agency Theory and Public Service Motivation theory to conceptualize and explore the data. Using latent classes analysis, multivariate regressions with survey methods, results showed three different motivational profiles: utility-laden, modal, and socially-laden. From these profiles, modal teachers seem to produce better teaching quality compared with the others profiles. These results suggest that the teachers’ profiles are more diverse when it comes to work motivation and teaching quality than what it is described in the literature. These findings give interesting insights for policymakers and school leaders to better understand the teaching workforce and think in diverse governance and teacher management tools. It also opens a set of interesting questions about how to motivate the teacher workforce in Chile.

Keywords

Teaching teacher motivation teacher incentives teaching quality new public management

During recent decades, incentives to motivate teacher work have been a key ingredient in the design of education policies in the world. Policies based either on high-stakes accountability (Fuhrman and Elmore, 2004) or merit pay (Springer, 2009) have expanded worldwide as a way to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of teaching work (Vegas, 2005). In Chile, policymakers have extensively used extrinsic incentives, which combine specific goals, performance evaluations and consequences, including both rewards and sanctions (Avalos, 2004; Manzi et al., 2011; Mizala and Romaguera, 2002; Montecinos et al., 2014). Since the late 1990s, different administrations in Chile have introduced successive waves of incentive-based policies to improve both individual and collective performance of teachers (Acuña, 2015). Some of these incentive policies are contingent on the accreditation of certain knowledge and skills through the Teacher Professional Performance Evaluation System (hereafter Teacher Evaluation) or contingent on student outcomes as measured by the National System of Evaluation of Learning Outcomes (SIMCE by its acronym in Spanish), such as the National Performance Assessment System (SNED by its acronym in Spanish). In both types of policies, extrinsic incentives are used as the main mechanism to motivate the improvement of teaching (Vaillant et al., 2017). These policy tools assume human beings function with instrumental rationality and are self-interested and utility maximizers (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Extrinsic incentives may be a powerful tool where theoretical assumptions of workers’ motivation are accurate. However, they have proven to be harmful in contexts where these assumptions do not apply, as it is the case of workers who provide public services (Frey, et al., 2013). In the case of teachers, the mismatch between actual teacher motivation and the mechanisms that incarnate the policy assumptions—that is, extrinsic incentives—may lead to undesirable outcomes such as behavioral distortions, burnout, and crowding-out effects as it is the case for high-stakes accountability or a powerless tool to change teachers’ practices, as it is the case for monetary rewards (Au, 2007; Hout and Elliott, 2011; Mintrop and Sunderman, 2009, 2013; Yuan et al., 2012).

Extrinsic incentives in Chile have not shown encouraging results. In recent years, several studies have looked at how schools and teachers respond to incentive-based policies in Chile. For example, studies focused on understanding the impact of SNED found a positive impact on SIMCE results, although limited to only a fraction of schools and without making clear the motivational or behavioral effect on teachers (Carnoy et al., 2007; Contreras et al., 2003; Contreras and Rau, 2012; Mizala and Romaguera, 2004; Mizala and Schneider, 2014). In the case of Teacher Evaluation, the impact of this policy has had modest effects and below the expectations of authorities (Avalos-Bevan, 2018; Manzi et al., 2011; OECD, 2013). Furthermore, voluntary monetary incentive programs (for example, the Bonus for Pedagogical Excellence) have not had a strong adherence by teachers and have only had a modest impact (García et al., 2011; Manzi et al., 2011). Qualitative studies have found some cases in which Teacher Evaluation has triggered virtuous training processes among teachers (Santelices et al., 2015; Sisto and Fardella, 2011; Taut and Sun, 2014). However, the predominant pattern is that Teacher Evaluation has been implemented in practice as a high-stakes accountability mechanism for teachers, without necessarily stimulating effective professional development and affecting teacher morale (Avalos-Bevan, 2018; Manzi et al., 2011; OECD, 2013). Finally, the case of the Preferential Voucher (SEP) law—which provided more resources for schools serving poor children and set high stakes accountability goals measured by SIMCE—showed a positive and significant impact on SIMCE results in the fourth grade (Mizala and Torche, 2013; Neilson, 2013; Valenzuela et al., 2013). Research shows that behavioral responses of teachers and school managers to this policy focus on meeting goals, aligning their practices to meet external demands and incorporating quick fixes that allow increasing indicators in the short term, although without necessarily improving pedagogical practices. The same studies have documented a series of unwanted distortions in teaching practices and a pattern of instrumental behavior to achieve goals and avoid sanctions (Acuña et al., 2014; Assaél et al., 2012; Elacqua et al., 2014; Falabella, 2013; Falabella and De la Vega, 2016; Falabella and Opazo, 2014).

In Chile, the long-lasting and extensive use of extrinsic incentives to regulate teacher work has not been empirically informed. In the face of the accumulated evidence, it is paramount to shed light on this critical aspect neglected by politicians and policymakers in the last decades. In this context, this paper aims at empirically studying what sources of motivation drive teachers in Chile, as well as some of the practices that are associated to different motivational profiles. To do so, we use an updated representative sample of the Teaching and Learning International Survey 2018 (TALIS 2018, thereafter) to understand the potential different arrays of teacher motivation. The study is focalized in Chile, where several policies to incentivize teachers have been implemented. This study draws on Chilean teacher survey responses from the TALIS 2018 data on teacher motivation to examine the extent to which these data reveals: (i) different motivational profiles among Chilean teachers and (ii) the influence of those profiles on quality teaching. As a conceptual scaffold, this study uses Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) and Public Service Motivation Theory (Perry, 1996; Perry and Hondeghem, 2008) to explore the data. The reasons for including these theoretical lenses are: (i) to avoid biases by using usually contrasting epistemological perspectives in education (self-interest vs. prosocial); (ii) to imply that different constellations of motives might be involved when it comes to describe motivational profiles at work; and (iii) to offer a more nuanced conceptualization when it comes to describe teacher motivation empirically.

The paper is organized into four sections. It first presents a conceptual framework on incentive-based policies, teacher motivation, and teaching quality. Second, the paper presents the methods and data used to answer our research questions. The third section describes the main results. The fourth section presents the discussion and implications of our findings.

Conceptual framework

The introduction of incentive-based policy tools can be traced to the influence of New Public Management doctrine—or NPM—in many countries (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991, 1995). In simple terms, this doctrine refers to a widespread and sustained effort to replace the old rule-bound and input-regulated public bureaucracy with a logic centered on the idea of government-run-like-a-business (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). Based on the marriage between new institutional economics¹ and the research tradition of business-type managerialism (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991), NPM advocates presented this doctrine in the early 1990’s as a powerful formula to reform the public sector through a set of mechanisms that they asserted worked better and cost less (Pollitt, 2000).

Rather than a coherent set of ideas and principles, this doctrine is a “toolkit” of solutions to reform system-level governance and to modernize public organizations (Pollitt et al., 2007; Pollitt, 2000). NPM emphasizes performance-driven, explicit standards, greater emphasis on output controls, deregulation, disaggregation of units, “steering” over “rowing” (i.e., government steers, managers row), greater competition, deregulation, use of market mechanisms, and greater discipline and parsimony in resource use (see Hood, 1991, 1995; Pollitt, 2000). NPM represents a shift from rewarding managers and staff based on diffuse public service and normative orientations (Puffer and Meindl, 1992), and moving instead toward a greater emphasis on extrinsic-incentives based on precise outputs indicators (Dunleavy, 2005).

Extrinsic incentives policy designs rely on Agency Theory, which conceptualizes the regulatory problem between a principal and an agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal-agent logic constitutes a low trust approach that seeks to minimize two potential problems: (i) the principal-agent potential conflict of goals and (ii) the challenge for the principal of verifying what the agent is actually doing (Eisenhardt, 1989). To solve these potential problems, the “principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: p. 308). Agency theory assumes human beings behave strategically motivated by their self-interest to maximize their utility. Under these assumptions, as classical economics predicts, workers should respond to incentives. Concretely, extrinsic incentives use a mechanism of behavioral regulation that emphasizes control through goals, measurements, rewards, and punishments. In the case of teachers, extrinsic incentives must regulate teachers’ self-interest to motivate them to achieve goals and respond to the needs of the beneficiaries of the educational service (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

In recent decades, research in the field of social and organizational psychology has challenged the dominant assumptions about human motivation based on self-interest, methodological individualism, and formal rationality (Batson, 1987; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Perry, 1996; Shamir, 1991). In this context, one of the theoretical niches in which this premise has found an echo is in the field of Public Service Motivation (PSM). One of the points of departure of PSM is that the principal-agent model does not seem to work on workers linked to the production and delivery of public services (Frey et al., 2013). Prosocial motivation has been seen as a powerful source of “energy” to motivate individuals to engage in behaviors that promote the well-being of others or to motivate people to serve others through meaningful work (Perry, 1996; Perry and Hondeghem, 2008). According to Grant (2007) this motivational energy may get activated in situations of contact with others who need help.

Motivational profiles

Teacher motivation has been studied in relationship to the intrinsic and prosocial and extrinsic factors that influence people to become and stay in the teaching profession (Brookhart and Freeman, 1992; Watt and Richardson, 2008). In their seminal study on teacher motivation, Richardson and Watt (2005) identified several constellations of motives that mobilize teachers to enter the profession. Motives such as identified abilities, intrinsic joy, social utility value, and the desire to work with children were the highest rated motivations for teachers to enter the profession (Richardson and Watt, 2005). In a later review, Watt and Richardson (2015) summarize a set of intrinsic and prosocial motives as the most prominent motivations for choosing the teaching: positive ability self-beliefs, intrinsic enjoyment of teaching, wanting to work with youth to help them, and wanting to have a social impact.

Although intrinsic and prosocial motivations are more prominent among teachers, there are different types or profiles of teachers that express different motives to engage in the profession. Watt and Richardson (2008) identified different profiles of teachers to persist in the teaching profession: “highly engaged persisters”; “highly engaged switchers”; and “lower engaged desisters.” When the authors evaluated the sources of motivation for these types, they found that “highly engaged persisters” scored higher in intrinsic motives—intrinsic joy and social utility motives,— while the ‘‘lower engaged desisters’’ scored the lowest. The “highly engaged switchers” group scored in between the previous two profiles for intrinsic joy, shape future of children/adolescents, and work with children, but there were not significant differences with the “highly engaged persisters” for enhance social equity and make social contribution. Interestingly, there were not significant differences for extrinsic motivators (job security, time for family, job transferability) among the three types. Also, there were no significant type effects at all for either job security, time for family, or job transferability.

Comparative evidence at the international level suggests that the great majority of teachers are motivated to teach by a strong commitment to the common good and by prosocial motives. But, at the same time, there is a significant number of teachers who enter to the profession also for extrinsic reasons either career prospects, job security, and for the ability to reconcile their work schedule and with their private life (OECD, 2019b).

When it comes to incentivize teachers to engage in their work, two contrasting motivational dynamics are usually referred by school reformers and policy makers: (Mintrop and Órdenes, 2017): teachers as prosocial service workers (Lortie, 1975; Nias, 1981) and teachers as self-regarding workers who need to be regulated (Lazear, 2003). Inspired by a traditional service orientation, teachers are described as caring and helping workers with the purpose of supporting students’ learning, well-being (Louis, 1998; Mintrop and Órdenes, 2017; Nias, 1981) and fueled by a moral purpose (Fullan, 1993). Contrasting with the idea of teaching as a prosocial oriented work, teachers have also been described as self-interested workers with concerns for workloads, prestige and reputation, work stability, and money (Goldhaber et al., 2011; Levačić, 2009; Lipsky, 2010; Mintrop and Órdenes, 2017). Extrinsic incentives rely on these assumptions to boost motivation by incentivizing goal and client orientation (Ingersoll, 2003; Mintrop, 2004; Mintrop and Sunderman, 2013).

These two motivational profiles have been described as ideal types of public service workers: knaves and knights (Le Grand, 2003). Knaves are self-interested workers who behave strategically, whereas knights are prosocial workers motivated by the desire to promote the well-being of beneficiaries and intrinsic job satisfaction. But knaves and knights—self-interest and prosocial motivated workers—are not mutually exclusive profiles. Real workers may express different traits with different weights expressed in their behaviors. For instance, Fehr and Gintis (2007) describe different types of approaches to collaboration across behavioral experiments conducted in different countries. The authors found three motivational profiles: egoistic, reciprocators, and altruistic. In the context of the workforce, Adam Grant, in his book Give and Take (2013), which studies workers’ behaviors across different organizations, describes three different motivational profiles: takers, givers, and matchers. In the workplace, takers seek to get more than what they give—self-focus; givers behave in such a way that reciprocity is always unbalanced in favor of the other—other-focus; and matchers strive to keep a balance of giving and receiving—reciprocity focus. Fehr and Gintis (2007) and Grant (2013) describe important behavioral consequences associated to different motivational profiles. These consequences are especially relevant to human interactions and productivity in the workplace, which are critical aspects when it comes to teaching quality.

Teaching quality

Incentives in education are aimed to motivate teachers to improve their effectiveness. When it comes to incentive systems, teacher effectiveness is usually associated to students’ outcomes. For instance, some authors have defined teacher effectiveness as the value-added on student achievement (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006). But that definition does not identify any attribute of either teachers or their practices as part of their work. We instead used the concept of teaching quality as a sine qua non condition to contribute to teacher effectiveness measured by student outcomes. We defined teaching quality as the quality of the work that educators produce at the practical level, either teaching practices in the classroom or professional practices with colleagues (Ainley and Carstens, 2018). In other words, teaching quality will be equivalent to instructional quality. We distinguish teaching quality from teacher quality and from teacher effectiveness. The former refers to the personal qualifications and characteristics that an individual teacher has, while the latter refers to the impact of their teaching on students’ outcomes (Goe, 2007).

Teaching quality will be educators’ practices captured in domains such as emotional support, classroom management, and instructional support (Pianta, Hamre and Mintz, 2011). Teachers who engage in these practices are able to maintain positive relationships with students and foster nurturing relationships among children and youth. They can also manage classroom activities and students’ behaviors fluidly. These educators are able to provide activities that challenge students cognitively as well as provide support through clear directions and scaffolding (Pianta, Hamre and Mintz, 2011).

Teaching quality depends on teachers’ self-efficacy beliefs. Teacher efficacy has been defined as the educator’s conviction that influence student learning, even for those who may be more difficult to teach (Guskey and Passaro, 1994). This involves their beliefs in their capabilities to engage in courses of action to accomplish teaching tasks in a particular context (Tschannen-Moran et al., 1998). Individual teacher efficacy also involves the expectancy of obtaining worthwhile goals through the investment of personal effort (Fuller et al., 1982). According to Tschannen-Moran et al. (1998), self-efficacy beliefs trigger a greater teacher effort that may lead to better performance.

Teaching quality is also influenced by their experience in the workplace, expressed in teachers’ job satisfaction. Job satisfaction is a positive emotional or pleasant state resulting from the teacher’s appreciation of his/her job or experience (Demirtas, 2010). Usually, this experience is related to positive personal relationships with peers, which sparks professional cooperation and professional exchange (Shah, 2012). But particularly, teachers-students relationships stand out (Gil-Flores, 2017). A nurturing work environment contributes to teachers’ well-being and motivation, keeping stress at bay. Teachers who enjoy the satisfaction of a nurturing work environment tend to develop practices aligned to satisfying students’ educational needs (Ahn et al., 2021; Schiefele, 2017). On the contrary, a stressful work environment, overwhelming levels of administrative work, transactional leadership styles, impersonal relationships, and challenging students’ behaviors can create a negative work experience that leads to stress, burnout, and low performance (Bogler, 2001; Brouwers and Tomic, 2000; Kokkinos, 2007).

Policy designs that use incentives are, in essence, mechanisms to mobilize work motivation (Kreps, 1997; Ryan and Weinstein, 2009). The purpose is to motivate teachers to engage in nurturing teaching practices that help students learn. In Chile, incentives-based policies have not been supported in empirical evidence on teacher motivation. This paper aims to fill this gap by asking: i) what are the motivational profiles of Chilean teachers? and ii) are there differences between profiles on the quality of their teaching?

Methods

Data

We use data from the TALIS 2018 (OECD, 2019a). TALIS is a large-scale international survey of teachers, school leaders, and environment in schools. TALIS collects data by administrating questionnaires to teachers and principals. Its main purpose is to gather internationally comparable evidence to inform policy decisions on school leaders, teachers, and teaching practices. Relying on this rich database we conduct several statistical analyses to answer the research questions.

The sampling design of this study consists of a two-stage probability sample design, in which school and teachers are sampled to reach a representative sample of secondary level school-teachers. Out of this study, we use two groups of data. To generate latent classes of teachers with different motivations to become a teacher, we use all participating countries and regions from lower secondary levels. This selection encompasses 47 educational systems, and more than 150 thousand teachers. We then retrieved the Chilean sample of teachers, which comprise a sample of 1963 teachers, nested in 179 schools. This is a representative sample of lower secondary school teachers.

Variables

In the present study, we use several variables to answer our questions. First, we use a series of questions of the TALIS survey that ask teachers about their motivations to become teachers. These questions allow us to create person-centered profiles that describe the set of motivations of different types of teachers. Second, we use the resulting profiles to analyze the way in which each profile is related to different school and teacher variables.

Reasons for becoming a teacher $(u_{i j})$

Using an ordinal response scale of four levels (“Not important at al all” = 1, “Of low importance” = 2, “Of moderate importance” = 3, “Of high importance” = 4), teachers rate how important were seven different reasons to become a teacher. The statements teacher rate were: (a) teaching offered a steady career path; (b) teaching provided a reliable income; (c) teaching was a secure job; (d) the teaching schedule (e.g., hours, holidays, part-time positions) fit with responsibilities in my personal life; (e) teaching allowed me to influence the development of children and young people; (f) teaching allowed me to benefit the socially disadvantaged; and, (g) teaching allowed me to provide a contribution to society. We dichotomize teacher responses between not important (values 1, 2), and important (responses 3, and 4), and with these variables we conducted a series of latent class analysis. We represent the overall pattern of responses using three classes: Modal (teachers who indicate personal utility and social utility reasons motivated to become a teacher), Utility-laden (teachers who indicate personal utility reasons motivated to become a teacher), and Socially-laden (teachers who indicate social utility reasons motivated to become a teacher).

Teacher and school characteristics

Sex $(m a l e_{i j})$

Teacher’s sex was coded as a dummy variable, where zero are females, and one are male teachers.

Age $(a g e_{i j})$

Teacher’s age was recorded as continuous variables in years. We recoded this variable into a nominal variable of three groups: less than 30, from 30 to 39 years, and from 40 years or more.

Years of experience $(e x p_{i j})$

Teachers job experience was recoded into a nominal variable of three groups, from 0-4 years, 5-11 years, and from 12 or more years.

School intake $(i n t_{i j})$

Teachers were asked regarding their student target class composition. Using an ordinal scale of five levels (none, 1%–10%, 11%–30%, 31%–60%, more than 60%) teachers indicated what proportion of students in their target class had different characteristic. This included seven characteristics: second language learners, low academic achievers, students with special needs, students with behavioral problems, students from socioeconomically disadvantage homes, academically gifted students (reverse item), and students with immigrant background. We generated an item response theory score with teachers’ responses (a fix slope graded response model), and produced a standardized score (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1) (EAP reliability = .73). Higher scores in this scale, means the target class has a higher composition of students with difficult to teach characteristics.

School academic pressure $(a c a d_{. j})$

School principals rate the academic culture of their school, by rating if four different statements were applicable to their schools. These statements referred to whether teachers understand the school curricular goals, succeeded in implementing the school curriculums, whether teachers hold high expectations for student achievement, and whether students have a desire to do well in school.

Lack of academic resources $(l o r_{. j})$

School principals indicated whether the shortage of different academic materials hindered the quality of instruction in the school. This dimension included items referring to shortage of school textbooks, internet access, classroom space, and school building quality among others.

In the following section we describe the measures included in the present study. These are a total of 17 different variables that cover teacher practices, teacher self-efficacy and teachers job experience. All these variables are scores generated with an international mean of 10, and standard deviation of 2, using a latent variable model, and present acceptable ranges of reliability ( $ω$ > .70) (OECD, 2019a).

Teacher practices

Clarity of instruction $(y_{i j 1})$

Teachers indicate how frequently they implement structuring practices in their teaching, this includes presenting summaries of the recently learned content, setting goals at the beginning of the class, explain what they expect from their students and how new and old topics are related.

Classroom management $(y_{i j 2})$

Teachers reported how frequently they request their students to follow classroom rules, listen to what the teacher says, calm disruptive students and tell students to quiet down.

Cognitive activation $(y_{i j 3})$

Teachers reported how frequently they challenged their students with tasks with no obvious solutions, give tasks that require students to think critically, form small groups to work on problems, and ask students to come up with their own procedures to solve complex tasks.

Professional collaboration in lessons among teachers $(y_{i j 4})$

Teachers indicated how frequently engage in collaboration practices with other teachers, including practices such as jointly teaching with colleagues in the same class, provide feedback to peers, engage in joint activities across classes and participating in collaborative professional learning.

Exchange and cooperation among teachers $(y_{i j 5})$

Teachers indicated how often they have share materials with colleagues, discuss about the learning of particular students with colleagues, work with other teachers to ensure common standard of assessment and attend team conferences.

Teachers’ self-efficacy

Self-efficacy in classroom management $(y_{i j 7})$

Teachers indicated if they were able to control disruptive behavior in the classroom, calm disruptive students, get students to follow rules, and make teacher expectations about student behavior clear.

Self-efficacy in instruction $(y_{i j 8})$

Teachers indicated if they see themselves as good at instruction, reporting if they can craft good question for students, use different assessment strategies, provide alternative explanations when students seem confused, and vary their instructional strategies.

Self-efficacy in student engagement $(y_{i j 9})$

Teachers asses themselves regarding whether they could promote academic engagement with their students. Teachers self-report whether they could help students to value learning, help students think critically, get students to believe they can do well in school and motivate students who show low interest in schoolwork.

Self-related efficacy in multicultural classrooms $(y_{i j 10})$

Teachers reported whether they can cope with the challenges of a multicultural classroom. They reported whether they could adapt their teaching to cultural diversity, ensure students from different backgrounds could work together, raise awareness of cultural differences among students and reduce stereotyping among students.

Perceptions of value and policy influence $(y_{i j 6})$

Teachers indicated whether teachers are valued by the media, policy makers, and whether they have influence over educational policy in their country region.

Teachers’ job experience

Workplace well-being and stress $(y_{i j 11})$

Teachers reported whether they feel stress at work. This scale includes statements in which teachers say whether their jobs impact negatively on their physical and mental health as well as the extent to which their jobs impact time left for their personal life.

Workload stress $(y_{i j 12})$

Teachers indicated whether workload was a considerable source of stress, rating whether having an overload of teacher appraisal and feedback, and whether having too much administrative work and having extra duties due to absent school staff were sources of stress at their work.

Student behavior stress $(y_{i j 13})$

Teachers indicated whether students were a source of stress, rating whether being responsible for student’s achievement, whether maintaining classroom discipline, and whether being intimidated or verbally abused by students are sources of stress in their work.

Job satisfaction with work environment $(y_{i j 14})$

Teachers reported their job satisfaction with their workplace. Teachers indicated their agreement to statements that assert whether they enjoy working at their school, whether they would recommend their school as a good place to work, and their general satisfaction with their job.

Job satisfaction with profession $(y_{i j 15})$

Teachers indicate their degree of satisfaction with the profession, rating their level of agreement to four statements. This scale includes items such as “If I could decide again, I would still choose to work as a teacher,” and “The advantages of being a teacher clearly outweigh the disadvantages.”

Analytical strategy

Latent class modeling

For the construction of teacher motivation-based typologies, structurally homogeneous Latent Class Analysis (LCA) models were fitted (Kankaras and Vermunt, 2014; Masyn, 2013). This technique classifies subjects into categories -commonly named classes- based on observed indicators. Each of the seven teacher motivation indicators evaluated has a specific estimated probability of being answered as “important”, that is, take the value one on the binary category for each modeled class. Consequently, this means that each modeled latent class has its own pattern of response probabilities for the observed indicators.

The TALIS 2018 study was conducted in 47 countries, so one of the decisions to be made regarding latent class modeling is whether to perform either a structurally homogeneous or a partially homogeneous model (Kankaras and Vermunt, 2014). The structurally homogeneous model estimates a unique pattern of response probabilities for each class across all the countries that participated in the survey, while the proportion of teachers belonging to each class per country is freely estimated. In contrast, the partially homogeneous model estimates a specific probability pattern for each class in each country. Because this second model specification has more free parameters, is expected to present a better fit to the data, than the first model. However, the partially homogeneous model loses interpretability in comparing classes across countries (Torres Irribarra and Carrasco, 2021). Since it is expected to contribute to a global framework of teacher motivation knowledge, cross-country comparability is crucial. For this latter reason, we choose the structurally homogeneous model for the present study.

In order to identify the latent class model used in the next phases of this study, a random division of the complete sample into two parts was made, keeping the school as the primary sampling unit. The first part of the sample was used as an exploratory sample to identify the number of latent classes. Ten latent class models were estimated, varying from one class to ten, onto this sample. Once the latent class model with a specific number of classes was selected, the validation sample was used to replicate the exploratory sample results.

We use three criteria to select the number of classes. First, we evaluate the relative fit indices Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), where a smaller value indicates a better fit to the data. However, it is also necessary to assess the rate of change between models to not over-extract classes. Many of the marginal improvements of these fit indices do not justify the extraction of a new class. Second, the value of the classification error should be evaluated, trying to keep it as low as possible. Like the relative fit indices, it is essential not only to observe the absolute value of the error but also the relative change of the error when adding new classes to the model. Finally, and perhaps the most relevant criterion, is the substantive and theoretical interpretability of each class pattern and the relationship of these patterns with the existing literature on the topic under study (Henry and Muthén, 2010; Masyn, 2013).

The last step in LCA is examining and interpreting the response probability patterns of the selected latent class model. For this purpose, the response probabilities per item are compared among the same classes of the model, describing their meaningful characteristics and illustrating the estimated response patterns for all countries. Finally, latent class realizations were generated to the full sample, and the model was used to estimate the proportion of teachers in Chile belonging to each class.

Multivariate regression

To answer what is the relation between teacher motivation and their work, we use a multivariate regression. In this regression we include different variables that represent teachers’ practices, how teacher see themselves (self-efficacy measures), and how they experience their work. A multivariate regression is similar to a regression, while including more than one dependent variable. This allows estimating the relationship between independent and dependent variables, considering the simultaneous levels of another dependent variable (Mair, 2018). The fitted regressions, can be expressed with the following equation

y_{i j k} = β_{00 k} + β_{01 k} m a l e_{i j} + β_{02 k} a g e 1_{i j} + β_{03 k} a g e 3_{i j} + β_{04} e x p 1_{i j} + β_{05 k} e x p 3_{i j} + β_{06 k} (i n t_{i j} - {\bar{i n t}}_{. j}) + β_{07 k} ({\bar{i n t}}_{. j} - {\bar{i n t}}_{..}) + β_{08 k} ({\bar{a c a}}_{. j} - {\bar{a c a}}_{..}) + β_{09 k} ({\bar{l o r}}_{. j} - {\bar{l o r}}_{..}) + β_{10 k} L C A 1_{i j} + β_{11 k} L C A 2_{i j} + ε_{i j k}

(1)

The term

y_{i j k}

refers to our dependent variables, where “i” refers to teachers nested in “j” schools, and “k” refers to any of the dependent variables included in the multivariate regression. In these regressions, we control for teachers’ sex, age, experience, school intake characteristics, school academic pressure, and lack of resources. The motivational profiles are included in this model as dummy variables, leaving the Modal profile as the reference category. Our parameters of interest are

β_{10 k}

and

β_{11 k}

which tell us if teachers vary their teaching practices, see themselves differently and experience their work in a different way, conditional to the motivational profile they belong. We report the results of this coefficients in Table 1, and adjust p values with a false discovery rate (FDR) given we are comparing many beta coefficients simultaneously (Keselman et al., 2002).

Table 1.

Multivariate regression estimates of teacher career motivation profiles predicting teacher practices, self-efficacy, and teachers’ work experience factors.

	Dependent variables	Socially-laden			Utility-laden
Term	Dependent variables	b	$β$	p <	b	$β$	p <
$y_{i j 1}$	Clarity of instruction	−0.09	−0.02		−1.17	−0.07	*
$y_{i j 2}$	Classroom management	−0.19	−0.05		−0.48	−0.03
$y_{i j 3}$	Cognitive activation	−0.09	−0.02		−2.47	−0.12	***
$y_{i j 4}$	Professional collaboration in lessons among teachers	−0.11	−0.02		−0.38	−0.02
$y_{i j 5}$	Exchange and cooperation among teachers	−0.13	−0.03		−0.60	−0.03
$y_{i j 6}$	Perceptions of value and policy influence	−0.34	−0.09	***	0.06	0.00
$y_{i j 7}$	Self-efficacy in classroom management	0.04	0.01		−2.05	−0.11	**
$y_{i j 8}$	Self-efficacy in instruction	0.06	0.02		−2.59	−0.14	***
$y_{i j 9}$	Self-efficacy in student engagement	−0.11	−0.03		−2.48	−0.13	***
$y_{i j 10}$	Self-related efficacy in multicultural classrooms	0.08	0.02		−0.20	−0.01
$y_{i j 11}$	Workplace well-being and stress	0.04	0.01		0.49	0.03
$y_{i j 12}$	Workload stress	−0.21	−0.05		−0.42	−0.02
$y_{i j 13}$	Student behavior stress	−0.19	−0.05		−0.05	0.00
$y_{i j 14}$	Job satisfaction with work environment	0.15	0.04		−1.10	−0.06	**
$y_{i j 15}$	Job satisfaction with profession	0.26	0.06		−2.18	−0.12	***

Notes: Term = dependent variable term, in the multivariate equations, b = unstandardized estimates, $β$ = standardized estimates, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (FDR adjusted p values).

Estimation methods

All reported estimates in the present study, include the survey design of the study (OECD, 2019a). We use teachers total survey weights, so our results are generalizable to the population of lower secondary level teachers. Standard errors were obtained through Taylor Series, so estimates accounts for the clustering of teachers in schools (Stapleton, 2014). Latent class models were fitted using Latent Gold v5.1 software (Vermunt and Magidson, 2013), while multivariate regression estimates were obtained using Mplus 8.5 (Muthén and Muthén, 2017).

Results

Teachers’ motivational profiles

The first step in the analyses performed in this paper consisted of creating a set of teacher profiles using data from all countries participating in TALIS 2018, using their motivation to become teachers as a proxy. The Latent Class Analysis performed² considered from one to ten profiles (see Table 2). After inspecting the statistics, the BIC pointed to a six-class solution model while the Akaike information criterion AIC suggests a ten-class solution. When examining the percentage change in the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic values (L²), it is possible to see that the fit improvement is marginal, varying only around 6.6% (.884 - .825) between the models with five and ten classes. This low variation could be a sign of over-extraction of classes. Complementarily, the classification error begins to increase consistently from the model with five classes onwards. Therefore, considering the information provided by the relative fit indices and the classification error indices, it is possible to argue that an adequate solution would be between the three- and four-class models. Finally, when comparing the response patterns between the three- and four-class models, a class emerges in the latter model representing a percentage of less than 1% of the population studied. Moreover, the four-class solution’s response pattern would not be contributing new information to the discussion compared to the information provided by the three-class model. As a result, we selected the three-class solution for two main reasons. First, it is the solution that allows for lower levels of classification error with an acceptable level of relative fit indices, as compared with solutions with more than three classes. Second, besides meeting fit statistics thresholds, this solution provides the opportunity to study Socially-laden (with higher prosocial than self-interested motivation), Utility-laden (with higher self-interested than prosocial motivation), and Modal (teachers with the highest levels of both prosocial and self-interested motivations) (Table 3).

Table 2.

Summary of fit results for the exploratory latent class models.

Classes	BIC	AIC	Param	L²	% change L²	Class.Err
1	160816.20	160759.73	7	44411.43	0.00	0.00
2	135736.06	135243.99	61	18787.70	0.58	0.04
3	129933.40	129005.74	115	12441.44	0.72	0.07
4	128326.17	126962.91	169	10290.61	0.77	0.07
5	126616.92	124818.06	223	8037.77	0.82	0.10
6	126214.94	123980.48	277	7092.18	0.84	0.14
7	125850.83	123180.77	331	6184.48	0.86	0.16
8	125989.89	122884.24	385	5779.94	0.87	0.17
9	126177.02	122635.77	439	5423.48	0.88	0.18
10	126445.50	122468.65	493	5148.35	0.88	0.16

BIC= Bayesian Information Criteria, AIC= Akaike´s Information Criterion, Param. = number of parameters in the model, L² = likelihood ratio chi-square statistic, % change L² = percentage of change of L² between k and k+n.

Table 3.

Response probability of considering each statement as “Important” for each teacher motivation profile, using TALIS 2018 data.

	Teacher motivation profiles
Item	Modal (64.13%)	Socially-laden (23.62%)	Utility-laden (12.25%)
Teaching offered a steady career path	0.90	0.17	0.66
Teaching provided a reliable income	0.93	0.10	0.87
Teaching was a secure job	0.96	0.16	0.90
The teaching schedule fit with responsibilities in my personal life*	0.85	0.34	0.70
Teaching allowed me to influence the development of young people**	0.99	0.91	0.69
Teaching allowed me to benefit the socially disadvantaged	0.94	0.73	0.16
Teaching allowed me to provide a contribution to society	0.99	0.89	0.51

Notes: ^*This item was shortened in the table for presentation purposes. Its full version reads: “The teaching schedule (e.g., hours, holidays, part-time positions) fit with responsibilities in my personal life”. ** This item was also shortened; its full version reads “Teaching allowed me to influence the development of children and young people”.

Once the three latent class model was chosen, the validation analysis was performed with the other half of the sample. This analysis confirms the solution stability, where the average of the differences in the loadings for both samples is 0.04, with a range that varies between 0.01 and 0.10 (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).

The analysis of teacher motivation profiles produced three latent categories. For the labeling of each class, we follow the recommendations of Masyn (2013), who suggests describing the latent classes by the extreme probabilities, that is, very high or low probabilities values, and also in relation to the behavior of these probabilities concerning the theoretical grouping of the items used as indicators. The first category, namely “Socially-laden” is composed of teachers with higher probabilities (> .70) of agreeing with the notions that teaching allowed them to influence the development of children and young people; benefit the socially disadvantaged; and contribute to society, in contrast to their probabilities of supporting self-interested motives. Socially-laden teachers show probabilities below 0.20 when considering teaching as a steady career, reliable source of income, or a secure job. The Socially-laden class accounts for nearly 23.62% of teachers participating in TALIS 2018 (Table 3).

Figure 1.

Patterns of mean response probabilities for the three-class solution on the exploratory sample. Note: In the x-axis, the seven indicators are included. In the y-axis are the expected mean probability for each class.

Figure 2.

Patterns of mean response probabilities for the three-class solution on the validation sample. Note: In the x-axis, the seven indicators are included. In the y-axis are the expected mean probability for each class.

The “Utility-laden” profile is characterized by including teachers with an almost 90% probability of agreeing that the teaching provided a reliable income and a secure job. Such support to self-interested motives contrasts with their low probability (16%) of agreeing that the teaching profession allowed them to benefit the socially disadvantaged. Utility-laden teachers represent nearly 12.27% of the population of educators.

Finally, the Modal profile includes teachers that have a more balanced and positive motivational profile for teaching. It is defined as “Modal” indicating that it represents the statistical mode of the three profiles in the international sample, meaning that the majority of teachers fit into this profile. In this latent class, there is a probability between 85 to 99 % of teachers agreeing with the notion that education is both a source of social commitment and, simultaneously, it is a comfortable and secure job. The Modal profile accounts for 64.13% of the teachers in the study. In sum, this first analysis suggests that, at an international level, the vast majority of teachers have a balanced set of motivations coming from both sources.

The LCA results suggest that teachers’ motivational profiles do not necessarily incarnate extremes, in which teachers are defined either as self-interest seekers or as social-justice workers. The Modal profile accounts for nearly two-thirds of teachers in the sample, and they exhibit a balance of motives because they value the contributions to society and justice that can be made in teaching and the notion that teaching is a steady, reliable and secure career. This means that these Modal-class teachers may be open to a different array of incentives. The results also show that 23.62% of the teachers can be classified as Socially-laden, meaning that they may better respond to incentives that stress their contributions to society. Utility-laden teachers represent the minority profile, with only 12.25% of the teachers classified in this category. This means that only a minority of teachers may mostly respond to self-interested motives to become teachers and improve their teaching.

Teacher motivation profiles in Chile

Teacher profiles in Chile show an interesting distribution in comparison to the international sample. First, in Chile, 53.80% (N=1056) of teachers fall into the Socially-laden profile, meaning that their primary motivation for teaching is to contribute to a more equal society and the development of children over career considerations. The Modal profile is the second largest group of teachers in Chile, with 44.88% (N=881) of the teachers. Finally, the Utility-laden profile has only 1.32% of the Chilean teachers. According to these results, nearly half of teachers in Chile are mainly motivated to teach due to their vocational commitment to improving social outcomes in society. The other half of teachers are inspired by a balance of material and prosocial rewards. Only 1% (N=26) of teachers are mostly motivated by material regards.

Teachers’ motivational profiles and teaching quality

Model fit

We compare the saturated model where all predictors are freely estimated, with a null counterpart where all teacher career motivations profile estimates are fixed to zero and assess the global fit of the model with an adjusted Likelihood Ratio Test (adj. LRT). The addition of the teacher career motivations profiles in the model increases model fit, in contrast to a model where these groups explained no differences (adj. LRT (30) = 118.57 p < 0.01). The saturated model, including the selected teacher characteristics and school characteristics, explains a modest portion of the variance of the dependent variables (ranging 2% and 6%).

Teacher practices

From the five teacher practices explored in the present study, two of these are different between teacher motivation profiles. Teachers from Utility-laden class engage in Cognitive Activation teaching practices with less frequency, in comparison to teachers from the Modal class ( $y_{i j 3}$ , b = −2.47, $β$ = −0.12, p <.001). Moreover, teachers from the Utility-laden class, in comparison to teachers from the Modal class, are less likely to set goals at the beginning of their lessons and explained what they expect from their students ( $y_{i j 1}$ , b = −1.17, $β$ = −0.07, p <.05).

Teacher self-efficacy

In this section, we explore if teacher motivation profiles explain differences regarding how teachers see themselves. Teachers, who adhere to Utility-laden reasons to become teachers, see themselves less efficacious on different aspects, in comparison to teachers from the Modal profile. Utility-laden teachers feel less efficacious regarding their instructional competences ( $y_{i j 8}$ , b = −2.59, $β$ = −.14, p <.001), their capacity to engage with their students ( $y_{i j 9}$ , b = −2.48, $β$ = −.13, p <.001), and to manage their classroom ( $y_{i j 7}$ , b = −2.05, $β$ = −.11, p <.001), in contrast to the Modal profile. Meanwhile, teachers from the Socially-laden profile perceive that teachers are less valued by society, and have less influence in policy ( $y_{i j 6}$ , b = −0.34, $β$ = −.09, p <.001), in contrast to teachers in the Modal class.

Teacher work experience

Utility-laden teachers feel less satisfied with their jobs, in comparison to teachers from the Modal class. In particular, Utility-laden teachers feel less satisfied with the teaching profession ( $y_{i j 15}$ , b = −2.18, $β$ = −.12, p <.001) and feel less satisfied with their working environment ( $y_{i j 14}$ , b = −1.10, $β$ = −.06, p <.001), in comparison with teachers from the Modal group.

Discussion and implications

This paper aimed at both studying different motivational profiles among Chilean teachers and the relationship between these profiles and the quality of teacher practices.

We found three distinguishable motivational profiles when analyzing the data on teacher motivation in the TALIS 2018 international sample, they are: (a) Socially-laden; (b) Utility-driven; and (c) Modal. The results for Chile show that more than half of the teachers present a Socially-laden profile preferring prosocial motivations over self-interest motives. These profile is follow by the modal profile, meaning that they rate high at both the social contribution and the material benefits of the teaching career, with 45% of prevalence. Only 1.32% of the teachers are in teaching because of the material rewards of the profession. They also show lower levels of motivation related to the social contributions of teaching.

Teachers in the Modal profile exhibit higher quality of teaching in terms of clarity of instruction and cognitive activation when compared to Utility-laden teachers. Also, Utility-laden teachers show lower levels of self-efficacy and job satisfaction in contrast to the Modal profile. Finally, teachers in the Modal profile have higher perceptions of the social value of teaching and teachers’ influence on policy in comparison to Socially-laden teachers.

NPM-inspired incentives-based policies to regulate teacher work are ubiquitous in Chile. These incentives are extrinsic in nature, which combines precise goals, evaluation mechanisms, rewards, and sanctions. Based on Agency theory, these policy designs seek to motivate teachers to improve their teaching quality. Agency theory assumes teachers are strategic, self-interested, and utility maximizers. Scholars in the PSM field have contested these assumptions when it comes to workers that provide public services, teachers among them. PSM starts from the assumption that prosocial orientation of the work itself and the impact on beneficiaries motivate workers to perform. Le Grand (2003) captures this debate in the distinction between knaves and knights or self-interested or prosocial workers.

Our findings, in line with the argument proposed in the literature review, do not support such distinction but they show a more nuanced picture. At the global level, the motivational profiles of the teacher workforce show three clear profiles: Utility-laden, Socially-laden, and Modal. The last profile is the dominant pattern among teachers across countries, followed by Socially-laden and Utility-laden teachers. The Modal profile resonates with the motivational profile described by Fehr and Gintis (2007) and Grant (2013): reciprocators or matchers.

In the case of Chile, the distribution of motivational profiles is strikingly different from the rest of the countries participating in TALIS 2018. Socially-laden teachers are the vast majority, followed by Modal, and a scarce presence of Utility-laden teachers. Importantly, Modal teachers seem to perform better compared with the Utility-laden ones, as measured by clarity of instruction and cognitive activation. Also, they have stronger self-efficacy beliefs as well as they enjoy a better job experience at the workplace. Socially-laden teachers feel less valued by society, and perceive less influence in policy.

These findings do not support Agency theory assumptions that inspired extrinsic incentives for the majority of Chilean teachers and only partially for teachers in the Modal profile. Using extrinsic incentives without accurate motivational assumptions may lead to undesirable effects such as crowding-out of prosocial and intrinsic motivation, which are essential components of teacher work to produce teaching quality and to respond to students’ needs (Frey, et al., 2013; Mintrop and Sunderman, 2013; Ryan and Deci, 2020).

These findings offer ideas for both policymakers and school leaders to develop more nuanced views on teacher incentives, beyond the untested assumptions brought by NPM policy tools. Also, it provides an empirical supported hypothesis to describe the potential distortions reported in studies on extrinsic incentives in Chile. Finally, the findings left open a set of interesting questions for the near future: What are the reasons Chilean teachers’ motivational profiles show such a contrasting pattern when compared with the rest of TALIS 2018’s sample? Why do Modal teachers seem to have higher levels of instructional and professional practices than Utility-laden ones? How do we create more sophisticated incentive mechanisms that create synergy between self-interested and prosocial motives to spark work energy? At this point, it is safe to say that further discussions about incentives for teachers in Chile must overcome simplistic NPM’s motivational assumptions and head to a more complex understanding of the teacher workforce.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - Teacher motivation in Chile: Motivational profiles and teaching quality in an incentive-based education system

Supplemental Material for Teacher motivation in Chile: Motivational profiles and teaching quality in an incentive-based education system by Miguel Órdenes, Ernesto Treviño, Rosario Escribano and Diego Carrasco in Research in Education

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This study was supported by grants from the ANID (FONDECYT de Iniciación 11221194; PIA CIE 160007; SIA SA77210005).

ORCID iD

Miguel Órdenes

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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Supplementary Material

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Teacher motivation in Chile: Motivational profiles and teaching quality in an incentive-based education system

Abstract

Keywords

Conceptual framework

Motivational profiles

Teaching quality

Methods

Data

Variables

Reasons for becoming a teacher ( u i j )

Teacher and school characteristics

Sex ( m a l e i j )

Age ( a g e i j )

Years of experience ( e x p i j )

School intake ( i n t i j )

School academic pressure ( a c a d . j )

Lack of academic resources ( l o r . j )

Teacher practices

Clarity of instruction ( y i j 1 )

Classroom management ( y i j 2 )

Cognitive activation ( y i j 3 )

Professional collaboration in lessons among teachers ( y i j 4 )

Exchange and cooperation among teachers ( y i j 5 )

Teachers’ self-efficacy

Self-efficacy in classroom management ( y i j 7 )

Self-efficacy in instruction ( y i j 8 )

Self-efficacy in student engagement ( y i j 9 )

Self-related efficacy in multicultural classrooms ( y i j 10 )

Perceptions of value and policy influence ( y i j 6 )

Teachers’ job experience

Workplace well-being and stress ( y i j 11 )

Workload stress ( y i j 12 )

Student behavior stress ( y i j 13 )

Job satisfaction with work environment ( y i j 14 )

Job satisfaction with profession ( y i j 15 )

Analytical strategy

Latent class modeling

Multivariate regression

Estimation methods

Results

Teachers’ motivational profiles

Teacher motivation profiles in Chile

Teachers’ motivational profiles and teaching quality

Model fit

Teacher practices

Teacher self-efficacy

Teacher work experience

Discussion and implications

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - Teacher motivation in Chile: Motivational profiles and teaching quality in an incentive-based education system

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

Funding

ORCID iD

Supplemental Material

Notes

References

Supplementary Material

Reasons for becoming a teacher $(u_{i j})$

Sex $(m a l e_{i j})$

Age $(a g e_{i j})$

Years of experience $(e x p_{i j})$

School intake $(i n t_{i j})$

School academic pressure $(a c a d_{. j})$

Lack of academic resources $(l o r_{. j})$

Clarity of instruction $(y_{i j 1})$

Classroom management $(y_{i j 2})$

Cognitive activation $(y_{i j 3})$

Professional collaboration in lessons among teachers $(y_{i j 4})$

Exchange and cooperation among teachers $(y_{i j 5})$

Self-efficacy in classroom management $(y_{i j 7})$

Self-efficacy in instruction $(y_{i j 8})$

Self-efficacy in student engagement $(y_{i j 9})$

Self-related efficacy in multicultural classrooms $(y_{i j 10})$

Perceptions of value and policy influence $(y_{i j 6})$

Workplace well-being and stress $(y_{i j 11})$

Workload stress $(y_{i j 12})$

Student behavior stress $(y_{i j 13})$

Job satisfaction with work environment $(y_{i j 14})$

Job satisfaction with profession $(y_{i j 15})$