Discussing the de-secular online: Legitimization and resistance to the political engagement of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Russian blogosphere

Abstract

French

To date, there has been an abundance of studies that either cover the interaction of religion and secular institutions or focus on how religious actors seek to reshape institutional differentiation by protecting a ‘sacred life-world’. Nevertheless, the reaction of religious communities to de-secular changes has rarely been studied. This article fills this lacuna by analyzing the debates of Orthodox bloggers over the de-secular strategy of the Moscow Patriarchate (MP). This research draws on Castells’ concept of resisting and legitimizing identities in order to map out the ideological positions that Orthodox bloggers take when arguing for or against de-secularization. The analysis of the blogs reveals that the difference in the way in which the MP’s de-secular agenda is assessed has played a key role in engendering a split within the online Orthodox community along attitudes towards the church’s religious and political power.

Keywords

de-secularization identity religion and politics Russian Orthodox Church

Introduction

In post-Soviet Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church’s (ROC) de-secular cooperation with some public institutions emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of Soviet institutional and ideological structures. Working to salve acute public needs and to provide moral meaning in a time of transition, the ROC has received high levels of national support (Knox, 2005). The image of Orthodoxy as a bearer of spirituality and traditions and as a protector of national interests has allowed politicians to identify the ROC as an influential ally (Koesel, 2014). Since 2006, the ROC has been present in some public institutions (Knox and Mitrofanova, 2014), while many of the ROC’s initiatives have departed from the sphere of civic society and entered into the political one. While the proximity between Orthodoxy and ‘cultural and national aspects of identity hint at a possible influence in politics’ (Simons and Westerlund, 2015), the church-state relationship is in flux because of the dependency on the ‘proclivities of people within the Patriarchate’ and ‘personal relationships in the higher echelons of power’ (Papkova, 2013). Nevertheless, the ROC’s active engagement in public life and its collaboration with the state in some areas have secured the de-secular trend at the institutional level, which manifests itself as the penetration of religious norms and values into the public sphere and political institutions (Karpov, 2010).

To date, there has been an abundance of studies either covering the cooperation of religious and secular institutions or focusing on how religious actors seek to reshape institutional differentiation by protecting a ‘sacred life-world’ in secular and de-secular contexts (Bracke, 2008; Ivanescu, 2010; Iveković, 2002; Stoeckl, 2016). These studies analyse religious actors as engines of de-secular changes and focus on situations in which ‘religious politics often emerges as a social movement within civil society focused around the defence of a sacred life-world’ (Piepper and Young, 2010: 363). Nevertheless, the reaction of religious communities to de-secular changes has rarely been studied. This article fills this lacuna by mapping out the positions that Orthodox bloggers take when arguing for or against de-secularization. To put it another way, this article analyses the arguments Orthodox believers put forward to legitimize de-secular changes and investigates strategies of ideological resistance, if indeed there are any.

This research draws on an analysis of online debates between Orthodox bloggers about the de-secular bias of the MP in the first half of 2012.¹ At this time, the ROC was at the centre of a series of public scandals triggered by the Pussy Riot performance and information about Patriarch Kirill’s luxurious lifestyle. Due to limited press freedom in Russia, public discussions are mainly held on the internet, a relatively safe and open space (De Smaele, 2007). In my case, the blogosphere serves as ‘a mediated public sphere’ (Schäfer, 2015) which makes the personal attitude of Orthodox believers towards de-secular changes visible.

At the beginning of the article, I give an in-depth description of de-secular changes in post-Soviet Russia and briefly discuss the specificity of Russian blogging. As the theoretical foundation for my research, I use Castells’ concept (2010) of resisting and legitimizing identities in order to analyze the polarization of identities on LiveJournal (LJ) as shaped by their relationship to the MP as a powerful actor. I study the Orthodox articulation of resisting and legitimizing identities on Russian LJ through the methodological lenses of a discursive approach to identity (as elaborated by Van Dijk (1993; 1998)) and discourse analysis (as proposed by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999)).

Following this explanation, I argue that support of the de-secular agenda is based on political arguments (welfare of the nation, national consolidation), whereas resistance to de-secularization is related to the protection of ‘true Orthodoxy’ and Orthodoxy spirituality. On the one hand, some politically engaged bloggers support a de-secular course for the MP because it suits their political position. Their arguments focus mainly on politics rather than spiritual or communal issues. On the other hand, some bloggers construct dissident and post-Orthodox ideological discourses where they argue that de-secular changes serve the interests of religious and political elites but contradict those of Orthodox believers. Both groups represent each other as ideological opponents.

I argue that the differences in the way the MP’s de-secular agenda has been assessed has played a key role in engendering a split within the online Orthodox community along attitudes towards the MP’s religious and political power. However, this split does not relate to a difference in political ideologies, as previous studies reported. The political engagement of religious elites prompts Orthodox bloggers to take various positions on de-secularization as an internal church issue, thus creating a pre-political split within the online Orthodox community.

De-secular changes in post-Soviet Russia

The ‘religious revival’ (Borowik, 2002) that took place in the 1990s occurred following the collapse of Soviet institutional and ideological structures, which caused ‘normative and axiological anomie’ (Agadjanian, 2006): the revival thus has certain special characteristics. The upward shift in identification with Orthodoxy, increasing numbers of clergy, and the active building of churches and monasteries coincided with relatively low numbers of observing Orthodox believers (2–5%) and increasing interest in magic, horoscopes, and other New Age ideas (Belyaev, 2009). The de-institutionalization of religion, together with relatively low numbers of observing believers, primarily confirms the presence of secularization in Russia; however, a stable and powerful de-secular trend is present at the institutional level. The high level of public trust in the ROC and the vision of Orthodoxy as a cornerstone of national and cultural identity have prompted political elites to use Orthodoxy as a means for legitimation. By collaborating with the state, the MP has attained public prestige, political power, and subsidies. Since the relationship between the Church and the state is in flux, and cooperation is limited by the internal interests of both actors, it is more suitable to interpret the state-church relationship not as a symphony (Martin, 2014), but rather as a symbolic and material exchange of resources providing mutual reinforcement for both actors (as Koesel (2014) does on the basis of an interest-based theory of interaction). Despite the shifting character of church-state relations, collaboration between the MP and state dignitaries in a number of areas has become one of the most decisive factors for de-secular changes in society (Karpov, 2010).

The prerequisites for a fusion of the political and religious elites were established in the Soviet period, when the MP was dependent on, and forced to work in close cooperation with, the Soviet state. According to Richters, the present reliance of the ROC on political structures is rooted in a shared historical experience, political culture, and views (Richters, 2012: 8). A series of surveys from between 1995 and 2005 show that, at the time, ideological proximity between the ROC and the post-Soviet state persisted (Furman and Kaariainen, 2007). Both were characterized by moral conservatism, the ambition to re-establish Russia as a great geopolitical power, and mistrust in democratic institutions and values, economic liberalism, and international organizations (Furman and Kaariainen, 2007).

This ideological proximity became fertile ground for developing institutional cooperation, which has taken on various forms. Firstly, the MP has been involved in the construction of national identity and has had a significant impact on cultural policy, e.g. by organizing exhibitions or criticizing film screenings. Active collaboration has also occurred between the MP’s archdioceses and state bodies, despite the fact that this breaches the section of the constitution concerning the secular nature of the state (Bur’janov, 2012). Since the 2000s, the ROC has been active in the army, schools, and places of detention (Curanović, 2012; Knox and Mitrofanova, 2014; Papkova, 2011). Nevertheless, this cooperation is situational and limited by the internal interests of both actors. For example, during the Georgian War, the ROC (together with the Georgian Orthodox Church) called on state leaders to show restraint, fearing an inter-church split (Simons, 2015). Equally, the MP’s request for the restitution of the Church’s pre-revolutionary property has not been entirely satisfied by the state (Knox and Mitrofanova, 2014; Papkova, 2011).

In its turn, the active laity committed to nationalistic or monarchist political views have promoted de-secular changes at the grassroots level. Scholars have characterised these Orthodox groups as highly politicized nationalistic, monarchist, and fundamentalist groups that promote a Byzantine model of church-state relations (Knorre, 2014; Mitrofanova, 2005; Verkhovsky, 2003). Verkhovsky (2003) coined the concept of ‘political Orthodoxy’ (politicheskoe pravoslavie) to define the merger of Orthodoxy and political ideologies at the grassroots level.

The public promotion of a de-secular agenda by the MP and politically engaged members of the laity has led to criticism from liberal-minded Orthodox believers. Scholars have analyzed the split in the Orthodox community in terms of the difference in shared political ideologies. Describing the situation of the 1990s and 2000s, Knox (2005) reported on tension between the ‘reformist’ faction, which endorsed the modernization of religious rituals and the separation of church and state, and the traditionalist faction, which insisted on the privileged status of Orthodoxy in post-Soviet society. Analyzing the debates surrounding the Pussy Riot case in 2012, Schroeder and Karpov point out a similar division in the Orthodox community along fundamentalist and liberal lines (Schroeder and Karpov, 2013). Papkova (2011) confirmed that the Orthodox community has divided along the lines of political ideologies; she further subdivides the conservative wing into two groups: traditionalists and fundamentalists. According to her, traditionalists and fundamentalists are similar enough in their political views: their common ground is a mistrust of ‘western democracy’ and liberal values, a preference for an authoritarian state and the Byzantine symphony model of church-state relations, an identical position with the patriarchate’s leadership on church-state relations, and anti-Westernism. However, fundamentalists develop these beliefs in a more radical way by adding eschatological ideas and sporadically expressing mistrust of the MP for being too liberal (Papkova, 2011: 60–67).

The aforementioned studies look at the split within the Orthodox community mainly through the lens of political ideology and develop the idea that sharing certain religious views can determine attachment to a specific political ideology. This study moves the focus from political ideologies to an assessment of ongoing de-secular changes as an internal factor in the split.

Russian LiveJournal as a place for open debates about de-secular changes

To analyze the ongoing debates, I chose LJ, a social network that combines the features of an online diary with an early version of online networking, as the most suitable platform for intellectual discussions (Gornyi, 2009), particularly for debates concerning politics and religion in 2012. The high-brow character of LJ debates has been shaped by the platform’s history. Since the early 2000s, LJ bloggers have created an online ‘community with its own codex of norms and values which, since then, has widely referred to the traditions of the Russian intelligentsia’ (Gusejnov, 2014: 67) and the nineteenth-century tradition of ‘literaturcentrism’ (Roesen and Zvereva, 2014). Intellectual debates are also supported by the platform’s particularities (i.e. the posting of lengthy texts, long comment threads, and discussions which can last weeks or even months).

Furthermore, LJ blogging culture resembles the late Soviet tradition of dissidence (alternative thinking) (Roesen and Zvereva, 2014) and ‘kitchen-table’ discussions, both forms of debate which were accessible to only a small number of people (Suslov, 2017). In Russia, political regulation of the public sphere (a state monopoly on mass media, actor inequality, and self-censorship) has led to the displacement of public discussions from offline places and mass media to the blogosphere (Gorny, 2009; Konradova and Schmidt, 2014). In blogs, citizens can, for the most part, freely discuss public issues and make their personal voices heard, thereby gaining an ‘experience of individuation and political reasoning’ (Suslov, 2017). As Gusejnov puts it, the Russian blogosphere ‘assumed several functions normally performed by institutions of civil society’ (Gusejnov, 2014: 64), thus becoming a site where civic initiative emerges.

Despite the criticism of secular online culture voiced by the ROC hierarchy (Suslov, 2016), Orthodox believers, like other citizens, use blogs as a space for open debates on acute problems, such as the ROC-state rapprochement and its impact on the Orthodox community (see analysis of Fr. Andrey Kuraev’s online activities in Stähle, 2015 or analysis of Vladimir Golyshev’s criticism of the ROC hierarchy in Grishaeva, 2015). As some Orthodox bloggers demonstrate in their posts, discussions in blogs have become an outlet due to the lack of open debate inside the Church and in the secular public sphere. In these terms, the blogosphere has become a ‘digital public sphere’ (Schäfer, 2015) where the Orthodox community articulates its needs and demands and where the personal attitude of Orthodox believers towards de-secular changes has gained public visibility (Lövheim, 2013; Rasmussen, 2014).

Some popular Orthodox bloggers like Sergei Khudiev, Kirill Frolov, and Fr. Pavel Adelgiem are famous public figures and ideologues who are active in the Orthodox and secular mass media and they use LJ as an auxiliary tool in order to reach a wider audience and discuss their views with opponents. As Stähle (2015) pointed out, before 2017, when ahilla.ru was launched, LJ was a primary space for publicly voicing criticism of the MP.² From this perspective, LJ not only allows bloggers with strong media capital to voice their positions publicly but also facilitates the spread of alternative points of view that are invisible in the secular and Orthodox mass media. This makes these blogs an appropriate case for studying the diversity of positions towards de-secular changes expressed within the Orthodox community.

Loyalty to the church as a component of religious identity

An analysis of a wide range of pros and cons in de-secular arguments indicates the clustering of positions between two extremes. There are bloggers who endorse de-secular changes and express loyalty to the ROC, and there are those who argue for the secular separation of church and state and contest the ROC’s authority. Most positions are shaped by their relationship to the ROC as a powerful actor. Moreover, in the course of online debates about the de-secular agenda of the ROC, Orthodox bloggers put forward arguments that go beyond the de-secular issue and refer to their understanding of ‘Orthodoxy’ and ‘church’, thus revealing their versions of religious identity. As a theoretical background for analysing competitive religious identity on LJ blogs, I use Castells’ concept of identity as shaped by references to power.

According to Castells, identity construction is closely related to power: ‘social construction of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relationships’ (Castells, 2010: 7). He defines legitimizing and resisting group identities in terms of relationships with power structures. Legitimizing identities are integrated into power regimes and connected with social institutions; they ‘rationalize the source of structural domination’ (Castells, 2010: 8). The experience of social antagonism and crises of institutional legitimacy cause citizens to mobilize into communes; as a result of resistance, a common identity project emerges (Castells, 2010: 12). Contestation of the legitimate social order and institutional authority consolidates participants around counter-hegemonic meanings. From this perspective, the LJ debates about the ROC’s de-secular agenda reveal the power struggles between legitimizing and resisting Orthodox identities.

Methodology

The discursive approach to identity employed by Van Dijk provides a proper methodological tool kit for analyzing struggles over power as it helps in connecting identity, ideology, and language and defines the ideological meanings essential for identity construction. For this reason, I use it for analyzing debates of Orthodox bloggers on Russian LJ about de-secular strategy of the MP. In addition, I employ elements of the linguistic analysis of discourse proposed by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) in order to tackle ideological meanings as expressed through language.

Van Dijk defines group identities as being constituted by a set of ideological meanings that represent the ‘basic aims, interests and values of the group’ (Van Dijk, 1993). Ideologies control and organize specific knowledge of the group; embody truth and value criteria; and control group opinions and attitudes. Ideology as a consistent representation of reality emerges in a context where there is competition between different sets of values or a struggle over power between groups. Alternative sets of values and the presence of a ‘them’ (out-group members) allow group ideologues to develop a coherent vision of ‘us’. From an array of ideological meanings, Van Dijk identifies three types of meanings that contribute towards the consolidation of group identities:

meanings that constitute members’ identification with the group;

meanings that construct relations with out-group members and define specific activities;

the resources and interests of the group (Van Dijk, 1993: 158).

Orthodox bloggers articulate group identities through ideological discourses, i.e. through a number of independent posts dedicated to religious issues. I argue that the corpus of texts created by a diverse community of Orthodox bloggers can constitute a single ideological discourse if they form a ‘meaning unit’ (Van Dijk, 1998:195) by making references to similar ideological meanings. If Orthodox bloggers develop similar ideological discourses in their posts, this means that they share the same group identity. Thus, an analysis of Orthodox bloggers’ identities presupposes an analysis of the ideological discourses which lie behind them.

In accordance with Van Dijk’s approach to group identity, the ideological discourses developed by Orthodox bloggers is analysed along three interrelated axes:

ideas that constitute in-group membership (articulation of ‘Orthodoxy’ and ‘church’);

the symbolical boundaries of the group (how bloggers identify their adversaries);

and the interests and activities of the group.

Firstly, in case of the Orthodox bloggers, in-group membership is constituted by the articulation of religious meanings. So, I look at how the bloggers articulate meanings of ‘church’ and ‘Orthodoxy’ and whether they add de-secular connotations to their theological understanding of these concepts or try to eliminate them. To conduct this part of the analysis, I pay particular attention to the discussion about church-state collaboration and the role of Orthodoxy in Russian society. Secondly, I reconstruct the discursive boundaries of the groups by describing the bloggers’ perception of out-group members. For this, I use elements of linguistic analysis in order to study the contexts in which bloggers use the pronouns ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Finally, I describe how the bloggers present the interests of the imagined community on whose behalf they speak.

The sample for analysis consists of 26 popular Orthodox blogs monitored in the period of February–May 2012: this was one of the most heated times for debates about the MP’s involvement in politics.

In order to identify popular blogs, I used the LJ search engine. The search results showed the most visited blogs that contained references to the ROC and Orthodoxy. The analysis of search results allowed me to select 15 Orthodox blogs where political issues have been discussed. In order to be sure that my sample covers the diversity of positions, I additionally monitored those bloggers who most actively posted comments on the selected blogs, following the principle of snow ball sample. As a result, I selected a further 11 bloggers. In this case I kept in the sample the blogs where the number of received comments exceeds the number of posts and posted comments: the number of friends is not the most significant criterion of popularity because it can fluctuate over time and some Orthodox bloggers intentionally limit the number of friends they have (Suslov, 2017). Out of the 26 bloggers selected, four belong to the clergy and 22 are current or former community members. Twelve are famous Orthodox figures and ideologues outside the blogosphere while 14 primarily use blogging as their main means of interacting with the audience.

I define popular bloggers as ‘core members which formulate and distribute fragments of ideology through the group’ (Van Dijk, 1998: 149) and which might have an impact on other community members’ visions of Orthodox identities. The analysis of opinion makers’ posts allowed me to identify the main ideological positions in the LJ Orthodox community.

In the first stage of the analysis, all posts related to Orthodoxy and political issues were stored in separate files. The corpus of data was initially 265,524 words, which, after the coding procedure, was reduced to 36,630 words. The coding procedure was designed to select fragments from posts relevant to the bloggers’ visions of Orthodoxy, the ROC, and the MP’s de-secular policies. Then I selected fragments defining the meaning of ‘church’ and ‘Orthodoxy’, the behavior of Orthodox believers, the ROC-state rapprochement, ROC-society interaction, and the political status of the ROC. Fragments describing the bloggers’ reaction to internal church problems, the role of Patriarch Kirill and the church hierarchy, and how believers should perform were also included.

Analysis of results

An analysis of bloggers’ texts reveals four ideological discourses or ideologies behind Orthodox identities: conservative, apolitical, dissident, and post-Orthodox. The following description of the ideological discourses was formulated along the three axes of the analysis: (a) how bloggers articulate meanings of ‘church’ and ‘Orthodoxy’; (b) who they identify as out-group members; and (c) how they represent the group’s activities and interests.

Ideological discourse of conservative Orthodoxy

Members: russkiy-malchik@lj; haile-rastafari@lj; nstarikov@lj; carpets@lj; actoris@lj; kirillfrolov@lj; consigliere-rpc@lj; ucnokoutelb@lj; arkadii-maler@lj; holmogor@lj

The conservative bloggers characterize ‘Orthodoxy’ as a core element of national and cultural identity. These bloggers define ‘Orthodoxy’ as a part of Russian culture (actoris; holmogor@lj; russkiy-malchik@lj), national ideology, and the grounds for national consolidation (nstarikov@lj; kirillfrolov@lj). The ROC is described as ‘a community of people connected by a common worldview and by cultural tradition’ (actoris@lj, post from February 10, 2012). They speak more about the cultural and moral dimensions of Orthodoxy than about the spiritual aspects.

These bloggers see the ‘church’ as an organization based on shared views and values and ignore any mystical aspects of Orthodoxy. For haile-rastafari@lj, to be a ‘true Orthodox believer’ means to accept the Apostles’ Creed: rituals and spiritual practices are of secondary importance (haile-rastafari@lj, post from April 5, 2012). Holmogor@lj understands the Church as an instrument of salvation: salvation is not necessarily a personal deed but can be attained by the prayers of the church hierarchy (holmogor@lj, post from March 4, 2012). For most of them, loyalty to the Church as a social institution is essential for ‘true’ religious identity. Some bloggers even mix commitment to the Church’s theological credo with political loyalty to the MP:

To all the cries of ‘I believe in God and not in the Church’, as early as the 3rd century St. Cyprian of Carthage gave the answer: ‘No one can have God for his father, who has not the Church for his mother’. (consigliere-rpc@lj, post from April 11, 2012).

The core component of the conservative group’s identity is the opposition of in-group and out-group values or the we/they dichotomy. These bloggers use the pronoun ‘them’ to refer to the liberal opposition or other supporters of Western liberal values. They describe liberals with militant, aggressive, and emotive utterances: ‘militant anti-religious persons’ (ycnokoutellb@lj, post from February 3, 2012; March 9, 2012), ‘those who hate the ROC’ (actoris@lj, post from April 18, 2012), ‘new Bolsheviks’ (kirillfrolov@lj, post from February 8, 2012), ‘agents of Russia’s external enemies’ (kirillfrolov@lj, post from February 4, 2012), homosexuals, or as the anti-national intelligentsia. Liberals are perceived as a threat to Orthodox identity, and an image of the haunted Church (ycnokoitellb@lj, March 7, 2012) or the ‘defenseless Church’ (holmogor@lj, post from March 11, 2012) emerges as part of collective memory about the Soviet persecution of religion. The conservative bloggers also use ‘them’ when referring to Orthodox believers who voice criticism of the ROC’s hierarchy and publicly discuss the internal problems of the ROC. The conservative bloggers call such believers church enemies, traitors, non-Christians, and liberals.

In various posts, the conservative bloggers define ‘we’ broadly: Orthodox believers, Orthodox nationalists (haile-rastafari@lj; holmogor@lj; russkiy-malchik@lj), Russians, patriots (consigliere-rpc@lj; kirillfrolov@lj), normal people and bearers of a unique civilizational code (nstarikov@lj), and honest men (ycnokoutellb@lj). Speaking on behalf of these ‘imagined communities’, these bloggers argue that ROC-state cooperation serves common needs and interests.

In their posts, the bloggers promote ROC-state cooperation and represent their public and political activities. At the same time, they put the burden of praying and spiritual work mainly on the clergy and neglect community needs and problems. The interests of this group lie mainly in the political and public domains, making religion a secondary matter for these bloggers.

Ideological discourse of apolitical Orthodoxy

Members: diak-kuraev@lj; ssnep@lj; sergeyhudiev@lj

Apolitical bloggers articulate Orthodoxy as an ethical religion centered on the sacraments, salvation, and life after death rather than social or political values. In their minds, Christian ethics transcend social moral norms; in this sense, it is a privilege for church people to be an outcast minority in society (diak-kuraev@lj, post from April 2, 2012). Diak-kuraev@lj does not perceive the Church as a moral supervisor of society; he even emphasizes the Christian commitment to moral values (diak-kuraev@lj, post from May 10, 2012).

In contrast to the conservative de-secular project, these bloggers try to erode political meanings from their public vision of Orthodoxy. Diak-kuraev@lj argues that the Church should not interfere in the political sphere, even if Orthodoxy is an element of national identity. Sergeyhudiev@lj (post from February 7, 2012) calls politics as idolatry because it is a promise of ‘a meaningful picture of the world’ where a person knows the identity of his or her followers or enemies. This leads to a false feud between people. Two out of three of these bloggers are Orthodox publicists; in their texts, they try to prove to Orthodox and secular audiences that ‘true Christianity’ is apolitical.

The fact that these bloggers do not make any reference to out-group members highlights the apolitical character of the ideology, i.e. the bloggers do not possess a feeling of competition with others. They speak on behalf of ‘Christians’ and ‘Russian people’, but do not clearly articulate the interests and needs of either of these groups.

Ideological discourse of Orthodox dissidence

Members: lychinych@lj; thomas-cranmer@lj; adelheim@lj; pretre-philippe@lj; dmsverdlov@lj; regenta@lj; tapir@lj; anchoret@lj

Dissident bloggers make a distinction between the Church as the mystical body of Christ and the Church as a social structure.³ The bloggers define the first church according to ecclesiological dogma as the body of Christ that is constituted by each member. Different organic metaphors serve to present the Church as a mystical unity, a metaphor for the body, or a metaphor for parenthood:

That one cannot choose parents, and even if the great master and father is wrong, he is still remains himself, all the more he needs a prayer or some more effective help. (anchoret@lj, post from April 7, 2012)

The second church becomes an object of social criticism and is presented through mechanical metaphors. Adelheim@lj compares its work to that of a wheel where believers are not persons but just ‘cogs’ (adelheim@lj, post from April 4, 2012). These bloggers present the second church as an impersonalized bureaucratic structure that creates an ‘unchristian’ environment for believers. One of the main reasons for the emergence of this ‘social wrong’ is the de-secular politics of the MP.

These bloggers’ vision of the cause of the Church’s problems is quite consistent. Church-state collaboration empowers the religious elite, accelerates the process of economic stratification, and enhances clericalism in the Church. The de-secular agenda of the MP does not enable priests either to create a good environment for Orthodox believers or to contribute to the welfare of society. In their posts, these bloggers exhaustively enumerate the Church’s main drawbacks as follows:

‘The symphony of church and state is unnatural and pernicious for both’, as dependence on power deprives the church hierarchy of spiritual freedom. ‘The lamp goes out, the beacon does not shine’ (adelheim@lj, post from April 18, 2012);

Low moral qualities on the part of the clergy: greed, avarice, pursuit of their self-interest, a love of power (regenta@lj, post from March 18, 2012; adelheim@lj, post from March 29, 2012);

‘The Church’s system of governance is based on fear’ (dmsverdlov@lj, post from March 5, 2012);

A high level of intolerance and hatred between Orthodox believers (dmsverdlov.livejournal, post from 05.03.2012).

These bloggers define out-group members as those who are responsible for internal church problems. They use the pronoun ‘them’ to refer to different groups considered to be responsible for these issues: some of the corrupted Orthodox clergy, fundamentalist opinion-makers and their followers, the false Church, and the silent majority. Regenta@lj also defines ‘them’ as liberals.

Speaking on behalf of parish communities, the dissident bloggers consider the solution to the problems of the second church in terms of the interests of the group. Following dogmatic arguments, the bloggers justify the importance of the ‘second church’ by explaining that mystical communion between church members is only possible through rituals organized within the ‘second church’. Despite the feeling that ‘something is going wrong’, the bloggers maintain their institutional affiliations with the ROC and continue to struggle with the social wrong present there. Some bloggers post reflexions on acute internal problems and propose solutions, while others choose to be civic activists for implementing Christian values in day-to-day life (adelheim@lj; dmsverdlov@lj; pretre-philippe@lj). As a solution for institutional problems, these bloggers propose organizing small communities or parishes inside the ROC that are consolidated on the ground of Christian love and act as administratively independent entities under the auspices of the MP.

Ideological discourse of post-Orthodoxy

Members: golishev@lj; elijah-morozov@lj; ignatyl@lj; moniava@lj; mahnauh@lj

Like Orthodox dissidents, post-Orthodox bloggers also make a distinction between two churches (the mystical and the social), but state that these two cannot co-exist. These bloggers juxtapose the MP’s non-evangelic Orthodoxy to ‘true Christianity’. According to them, the ROC is just an administrative structure and has nothing in common with Christianity; salvation does not imply participation in institutionally-organized religious rituals. They articulate ‘true Christianity’ as a reconstruction of apostolic Christianity, which entails personal imitation of Christ. Golishev@lj juxtaposes apostolic, first-hand knowledge of Christ to the ROC clergy’s abstract faith in God. For moniava@lj, Christianity should be present in day-to-day life, not in the Church as a specially organized place: ‘Christianity is our life. The most common daily life and the most ordinary human relationships’ (moniava@lj, post from February 18, 2012).

These bloggers represent the MP as the reason for the non-evangelical nature of the Church as a social institution. They express a deep distrust in the ROC’s hierarchy, calling it ‘anti-Christian’. According to golyshev@lj, ignaty-l@lj, and elijah-morozov@lj, the ROC is an ‘anti-Christian’, ‘atheistic’ social institution primarily concentrated on the retention of political power and the preservation of the Church’s material well-being. Patriarch Kirill is depicted as the Antichrist, serving the Church’s prosperity but not God: his activities are formal, hypocritical, and pharisaic (golyshev@lj, post from February 14, 2012). The bloggers use offensive and severe expressions to depict the ROC’s internal problems: the patriarchate is ‘a cave, Soviet, dense: let them jump on vines’ (ignaty-l@lj, post from April 18, 2012), a ‘fascist form of Christianity’ (mahnauh@lj, post from April 9, 2012), and ‘a hostile takeover of the Church’ (mahnauh@lj, post from April 8, 2012).

In comparison with dissident bloggers, post-Orthodox bloggers do not discuss particular internal church problems, but rather name, in an emotive and general way, the groups that have transformed the ROC into a non-evangelical structure: authorities, guardians (okhraniteli), Pharisees, Antichrists, soldiers, and those who are against ‘true Orthodox believers’. In various contexts, the bloggers identify these groups as their ideological adversaries.

In comparison with other groups, post-Orthodox bloggers are more likely to post personal evaluations of religious and theological issues. They express religious identities as personal projects of Christianity rather than as shared collective views. The bloggers pursue a ‘do-it-yourself’ Orthodoxy, thus disrupting the institutional interpretation of Christianity: they also argue for the modernization of rituals. In their texts, the role model of an Orthodox person emerges in situations where he or she is described as an outcast or a member of a minority group which exists outside the social structure but nonetheless has deep spiritual experience. Implementing this ideal, most of these bloggers reject affiliation with the MP and define their views as heretical, while considering heterodoxy a tool for discerning ‘true Christianity’ from ‘false doctrine’ of the ROC. Some continue to be parish members.

Discussion and conclusion

In the article, I present an analysis of the arguments that Orthodox bloggers put forwards to legitimize or contest the de-secular changes promoted by the MP. Castells’ concept of resisting and legitimizing identities prompted me to conceptualize the online debates about de-secularization as struggles over identities shaped by their relation to the MP as a power actor. Van Dijk’s discursive approach towards identity provides the methodological grounds for analyzing identity struggles as struggles over the articulation of meanings that consolidate group identity. As a result, I have identified four different ideological discourses that lie behind Orthodox bloggers’ legitimation and contestation of the de-secular agenda: conservative Orthodoxy, apolitical Orthodoxy, dissident Orthodoxy, and post-Orthodoxy.

I argue that conservative Orthodoxy bloggers’ legitimation of a de-secular agenda is based on political arguments (Orthodoxy as part of national identity and culture) and not on spiritual and communal issues. As these bloggers are either political activists or intellectuals who write a lot about political issues, they consolidate their religious identity on the basis of politicized Orthodoxy, using the latter as an ideological instrument to shape certain political positions. At the same time, they narrow the spiritual dimension of Orthodoxy by defining the latter as a corpus of theological dogmas that believers should formally follow.

The conservative bloggers speak on behalf of the Russian people and argue that de-secularization serves national interests. Furthermore, its consequences for the religious community are not considered important. Supporting the MP’s de-secular strategy, these bloggers avoid any criticism of it by stigmatizing discussions about internal church problems.

In direct contrast, resistance to de-secularization is related to the construction of religious identities based on ‘true’ apolitical Orthodoxy. The dissident and the post-Orthodox bloggers argue that de-secularization is contrary to the nature of apostolic Christianity and runs counter to the interests of the religious community. They prioritize the spiritual meanings of Orthodoxy and criticise political uses of Orthodoxy. According to these bloggers, the MP’s political engagement causes corruption and moral depravity among the clergy, who are more concerned with political power and economic well-being than the spiritual life of the Orthodox community. As a consequence, according to them, parish life ceases to be Christian.

Dissident bloggers speak on behalf of regular parish members, whose interests they claim to protect. According to them, the Orthodox community would benefit more from a secular separation between church and state.

Dissident and post-Orthodox bloggers use two different strategies of resistance against the MP’s de-secular authorities. Orthodox dissidents combine a harsh critique of the religious authorities with the intention of maintaining their affiliation with the ROC, as the Church provides a mystical experience through the Eucharist. They desire to introduce positive changes into the ‘second church’ that they want to build by developing community life. Most post-Orthodox bloggers distance themselves from the ROC, trying to recreate apostolic Christianity on their own.

There is also a tiny group of apolitical bloggers who define Orthodox identity as transcending the political and social domains and as centered on mystical and ethical meaning. The bloggers from this group contest de-secular changes but, at the same time, do not express any criticism of the MP. They thus neither legitimize nor contest the power of the MP. These bloggers are a minority, but the question of whether Orthodox believers who share a similar neutral position constitute a silent offline majority could be a subject for further studies.

I argue that the difference in the ways the MP’s de-secular agenda is assessed has played a key role in engendering a split within the online Orthodox community along the lines of different attitudes towards the religious and political power of the MP. However, the split does not correspond to a difference in political ideologies, as previous studies reported. Conservative bloggers’ support for de-secularization correlates with their loyalty to the MP and results in the stigmatization of bloggers who voice criticism of the ROC’s hierarchy and publicly discuss the internal problems of the ROC (i.e. dissident and post-Orthodox bloggers). The latter see conservative bloggers as responsible for the internal problems of the Church and identify them as their ideological adversaries. In this way, the political engagement of the religious elite prompts Orthodox bloggers to develop various positions regarding the de-secular issue, thus creating a pre-political split within the online Orthodox community.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to show my gratitude to the Centre of Religion and Society at Uppsala University for giving me the opportunity to be a part of its research community in 2017. I thank Kristina Stoeckl for her advice at the first stage of this work. I own a debt to Mia Lövheim for her help in shaping the theoretical and methodological design of the article and for her comments on the draft. I would also like to thank the members of the Centre of Religion and Society for comments that greatly improved the manuscript. Special thanks must go to Heidi Ann Erbsen and James White, who patiently corrected my language mistakes and helped me to express my ideas, and to my partner for his patience and support.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was generously supported by the Mikhail Prokhorov Foundation and the Swedish Institute.

Notes

Author biography

Ekaterina GRISHAEVA is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Ural Federal University. Her research interests include Orthodox Christianity, digital religion, Internet studies, conservatism and mediatization of politics.

Address: Ural Federal University – 51 Lenina avenue 620003 Yekaterinburg, Russia.

Email: Ekaterina.grishaeva@urfu.ru

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