Secular justifications of the world. A neo-Weberian typology of cosmodicies

Abstract

French

This article asks how secular societies cope with suffering and fortune perceived as unjust and undeserved. It investigates secular forms of dealing with the originally religious problem of theodicy. According to Weber’s work, Western societies have solved this problem with the meritocratic ideal based on the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, which gave rise to the capitalistic work ethics. Current sociological diagnoses observe a crisis of these ethics, which begs the question of whether this also indicates a crisis of meritocratism. The article addresses this question from the perspective of sociology of religion and translates Weber’s typology of religious theodicies into a typology of secular cosmodicies. The typology serves as an analytical tool, allowing for systematic comparisons of justifications in different empirical cases.

Keywords

cosmodicy Max Weber predestination secularization

The rain falls on the just/And on the unjust fella/But mainly upon the just/Because the unjust has the just’s umbrella (cit. Geertz, 2017 [1973]: 114).

Introduction

This article contributes to the analysis of contemporary secular worldviews from the perspective of sociology of religion.¹ It tackles the question of how secular Western culture copes with the problem traditionally known as theodicy (see Gaertner, 2011). More precisely: How does it cope with suffering perceived as unjust and fortune perceived as undeserved? The relevance of this question results from a currently prevalent sociological time diagnosis: Various forms of what shall be called the aestheticization thesis point to the fact that modern Western culture undergoes a fundamental transformation of its hegemonic mentality. In the wake of a crisis of the values traditionally rooted in Protestant ethics and occidental rationalism – so goes the general argument – we currently witness a ‘post-romantic authenticity revolution’ (Reckwitz, 2017b: 19 (own translation); see also Reckwitz, 2017a). Modern society enters the ‘Age of Authenticity’ (Taylor, 2007: 473f), which entails an increasing relevance of artistic ethics based on romantic values, such as originality, passion, creativity, and expressivity. This transformation has its history, dating back to at least half a century, and it has already been described by Daniel Bell (1976), Colin Campbell (1990), and Charles Taylor (2003 [1991]). However, the sociological literature suggests an amplification in recent years, manifesting itself in notions like the ‘New Spirit of Capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2018 [1999]), ‘The Making of Emotional Capitalism’ (Illouz, 1997, 2007), and ‘Métamorphoses du capitalisme’ (Menger, 2002).

Clearly, all these approaches focus on labor, market, as well as the economic sphere in general. Yet, capitalism is only one aspect of modern culture. Hence, I propose to expand the focus (Schaefer, 2015). I suggest to use the Weberian concept of inner-worldly asceticism, which is both more comprehensive and more fundamental than what is commonly referred to as the spirit of capitalism, or simply work ethics. Against the backdrop of the above-mentioned thesis, the crucial question reads as follows: Is there a crisis of inner-wordly asceticism? And if so, is there evidence for a growing relevance of romantic values? In order to answer these questions, I will first specify the concepts at stake.

Conceptual considerations

In Weber’s terminology, inner-worldly asceticism is defined as a salvation path. Every quest for salvation is based on a form of world rejection, that is, a critical evaluation of the world as it actually is in the light of utopian ideals of how it ought to be. This negative evaluation is based on the contrast between the ‘presupposition that the course of the world be somehow meaningful, at least in so far as it touches upon the interests of men’ (Weber, 1958: 353), and everyday experiences of all kinds of chaos, crisis, anomy, absurdity, and – of particular interest to this article – senseless suffering and inapprehensible fortune. This critical evaluation of the world has its complement in some kind of theodicy, in the case of inner-worldly asceticism in the doctrine of predestination.

The punchline of Weber’s secularization theory is that inner-worldy asceticism, originally embedded in Calvinist religiosity, persists in being the hegemonic ideology of modern Western society, even after its religious roots withered. The orderly and dependable rational subject, who systematically plans professional career, family life, leisure time, and who is relentlessly working on its own self-improvement has been the dominant role model of modern Western culture – without depending on Protestant religiosity at all.

This thesis provokes the following questions: If inner-worldly asceticism, as a general conduct of life outlives its secularization, does this hold also true for the associated doctrine of predestination? Are there secular forms of theodicy at all? Going back to the introductory aestheticization thesis, we have to ask: If there is an erosion of secularized asceticism, is there reason to expect a parallel erosion of secularized theodicy? Does this transformation imply a corresponding change of attitudes towards suffering and fortune perceived as unjust and unmerited? To answer these questions, the article introduces a typology of secular cosmodicies which refers to Weber’s construction of three different types of theodicy. However, it goes beyond his approach in two ways. First, it loosens the conjunction with particular religious traditions, which allows the typology’s translation for the study of secular cultures. Second, it systematizes Weber’s typology by focusing on the respective time dimensions of the theodicy types. Although this is a theoretical article, I provide empirical examples as suggestions for future research. The typology of cosmodicies is supposed to serve as an analytical orientation for such research.

For conceptual clarity, I shall start by introducing the distinction between cosmodicy and theodicy. For secular people the question is not how to justify the notion of an almighty and benevolent God, given the obvious defaults of his creation. However, this does not mean that the problem of justification simply melts into thin air: ‘In fact, the quest for theodicy would endure even if religion disappeared entirely’ (Simko, 2012: 882; cf. McPherson, 2015: 41f.).² Instead, it appears in a different form: How to justify the actual state of the real world in the light of utopian notions of an ideal world?³ It is this kind of secular justification of the world I refer to as cosmodicy in the following.⁴ Yet, the elaboration of this concept is based on the differentiation from the concept of theodicy. Max Weber concisely describes it thus:

The age old problem of theodicy consists of the very question of how it is that a power which is said to be at once omnipotent and kind could have created such an irrational world of undeserved suffering, unpunished injustice, and hopeless stupidity. (1958: 122)⁵

In this form, the problem can only arise in the context of monotheistic traditions. But Weber goes far beyond such a narrow restriction.⁶ He thinks of the problem of theodicy in a much broader sense and finds it

in ancient Egyptian literature as well as in Job and Aeschylus. All Hindu religion was influenced by it [. . .]; even a meaningful world order that is impersonal and supertheistic must face the problem of its imperfections. In one form or another, this problem belongs everywhere among the factors determining religious evolution and the need for salvation. (Weber, 1963 [1922]: 139; cf. Geertz, 2017 [1973])⁷

Sociologists usually adopt this wide sense of the term theodicy as coping with the problem of all kinds of ‘imperfections’ of the world. Gaertner understands it as a general human ‘necessity to make sense of suffering in one way or the other’ (2011: 272, own translation). Simko defines theodicy as ‘interpretive vocabularies, religious or secular, that explain evil and suffering’ (2012: 881). And since death can be seen as the ultimate condensation of the problem of suffering, one can conclude that ‘Theodicy represents the attempt to make a pact with death’ (Berger, 1967: 80). Theodicy, in this broad sense, is understood as ‘any way of giving meaning to evil that helps us face despair’ (Neiman, 2002: 239). It is understood as an answer to the question: ‘[W]hy is it that good and just people suffer and the bad and unjust do not?’ (Adair-Toteff, 2013: 93).⁸

However, using the concept of theodicy in such a loose sense has serious flaws. First, it is just the wrong word.⁹ Justifying God is not the same as justifying evil, death, and suffering. Second, the above cited approaches all focus on the negative aspects of life. This focus falls short of Weber’s insight, who – in critique of Nietzsche’s theory of resentment – maintained that theodicy does not only address suffering. Instead, he claims, ‘The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that he has a right to his good fortune [. . .] Good fortune thus wants to be ‘legitimate’ fortune’(cf. Adair-Toteff, 2013: 89, 102f; Weber, 1958: 271). Thus, it is crucial to keep in mind that cosmodicy is not only about gratuitous suffering but also about unmerited fortune.

After having distinguished the two concepts from one another, we shall consider their similarities.¹⁰ Both theodicies and cosmodicies serve ‘to resolve the discrepancy between an expected normative order and the lived experience in society’ (Kayes, 2006: 53), that is, both are forms of justification. Each justification presupposes the possibility for critique. What is not criticizable does not necessitate justification.¹¹ Critique always relies on contingency. What cannot be changed cannot be criticized. Contingency relies on a perceived difference between the empirically given and the alternative imaginary possibilities – utopias. Only when immanent reality is contrasted with another reality, it becomes criticizable.¹² Hence, critique and justification are based on the discrepancy between transcendence (potentiality) and immanence (actuality), leading to critical (Schaefer, 2018). From the perspective of world history, this problem emerged in a period commonly known as the Axial Age.¹³ This period brought ‘an ontological distinction between higher and lower levels of reality; and a normative subordination of the lower level to the higher’ (Eisenstadt, 2011: 203). Such a distinction opened up the possibility of comprehensive societal critique, which – following Eisenstadt – ultimately led to modernity. There is no need to explore the complex controversy regarding the Axial Age thesis in more detail here. For the purpose of this article, it is sufficient to assert that transformations that emerged in the Axial Age brought about ‘some degree of unease about the world’ (Bellah and Joas, 2012: 452). And such existential unease, such a fundamentally critical attitude towards the world, is the seed of both the problems of theodicy and cosmodicy (cf. Torpey, 2016).

The problem of theodicy does not only persist in secular societies, as does the problem of cosmodicy, but even intensifies for two reasons (cf. Gaertner, 2011: 279). First, there is a shrinkage of the unattainable and, thus, an increase of possibilities. In modern society the economic, technological, and medical capacities have improved. This makes the existence of some forms of suffering appear increasingly avoidable. With contingency increasing, the idea that the world could be different – better! – becomes more pervasive. Furthermore, fatalistic acceptance, although not rare empirically, loses credibility. And second, modern information techniques progressively render ignorance of distant catastrophes more unlikely (cf. Taylor, 2007: 684).

In the following section, I discuss which kinds of cosmodicies can be found in secular Western culture. In order to do this, I translate Weber’s typology of theodicies into a secular vocabulary, untying his concepts from concrete religious traditions and suggesting a focus on their respective time references as the crucial principle of differentiation.

Cosmodicy typology

Weber distinguishes three ideal types of theodicy: Indian karma principle, Persian dualism, and the Calvinist belief in predestination. As mentioned above, Weber’s concept of theodicy has to be understood in a broad sense, and only in the case of the predestination doctrine in relation to an omnipotent and benevolent God. Weber, however, is not shy to claim his typology to be exhaustive:

The metaphysical conception of God, and of the world, which the ineradicable demand for theodicy called forth, could produce only a few systems – as we shall see, only three. (1958: 275, italics added)

Here, the question arises: Why only three? Might there not be more or fewer types? Weber fails to elaborate on the common denominator of his typology. What logically allows the comparison of the three named types is the temporal reference: the karma principle refers to the past, dualism to the present, and the notion of predestination to the future.¹⁴ Since there are no other temporal modes, Weber is right to claim that his typology is exhaustive. The determination of the time mode as a common denominator of Weber’s typology allows for the necessary decoupling of the typology from religious traditions and thus enables the analysis of secular worldviews.

Causalism

According to Weber, the Indian concept of karma shows the ‘most complete formal solution’ (Weber, 1963 [1922]: 145) to the problem of theodicy.¹⁵ It consists of a ‘universal mechanism of retribution’ (Weber, 1963 [1922]: 146). Its gapless cause-and-effect mechanism renders the concept of an otherworldly judge unnecessary.¹⁶ The current condition, be it suffering or fortune, is invariably justified with rigorous reference to past guilt or virtue. From this perspective, current states of affairs only appear unjust. In reality they always have their causal origins in the past. Such notions rely on a deterministic principle that postulates an inevitability of fate. Whenever there is an event, there has to be a reason for it; whenever there is suffering and injustice, there has to be guilt: ‘The doctrine of karma basically states that the moral implications of one’s past actions dictate what sort of events will happen to one’s future self’ (Willet, 2015: 45; see Torpey, 2016: 199–203). This world view is not limited to Indian religiosity. Taylor, for instance, aptly identifies the biblical myth of the original sin and the subsequent eviction from paradise as ‘juridicial-penal-mode’: ‘[T]he idea that we suffer because we have sinned, as an example of a belief which comes to be accredited partly because it makes sense of what is otherwise unbearable’ (2007: 318). Another example for Christian causalism is how religious victims of violence try to maintain their positive image of God. Sharp describes one of his interviewees interpreting her suffering as punishment for ‘sins she had committed in the past, particularly misdemeanor crimes she committed during childhood’ (Sharp, 2014: 885). Another example for causalistic explanations of suffering comes from contemporary Japan:

While Governor Ishihara’s remark on the tsunami as Heaven’s punishment was immediately criticized by the media and the public [because it sounded as if the victims had deserved it], there were more than a few comments characterizing the disaster as divine chastisement. (Fujiwara, 2013: 508)¹⁷

These examples serve to illustrate the relevance of causalist theodicies in non-Indian religions. How can we translate this concept into a theoretical vocabulary that allows for the analysis of modern secular societies? With his description of the karma principle as a ‘mechanism of retribution’, characterized by complete ‘automatic functioning’ (Weber, 1963 [1922]: 146), Weber himself indicates the way.¹⁸ The basic principle of such a cosmodicy is the reference to the logic of cause and effect, thus I suggest the term causalism. Much of empirical research on secular causalist cosmodicies term – can be found, for instance, in the context of the psychological just-world hypothesis.¹⁹ The assumption here is that most people hold the conviction that the world is ordered in such a way that everyone gets what they deserve. Of particular interest here is the logic of ‘derogating victims of undeserved negative outcomes and lionizing beneficiaries of undeserved positive outcomes’ (Hafer and Sutton, 2016: 146). Causalist cosmodicies refer to the following logic: ‘[I]f good things happen in the world, we much prefer that they happen to good people and if bad things must happen, we equally prefer they happen to bad people’ (Ellard et al., 2016: 128). Such convictions are manifestations of secular causalism in its purest form. A striking example of such secular causalist victim-blaming is the mass media reaction to hurricane Katrina in 2005: ‘[M]any began to talk about residents of New Orleans as ‘immoral’, especially by refering to behaviours, such as drinking, gambling, corrupt politics, or even the practice of voodoo’ (Napier et al., 2006: 65). This depiction was fueled by ‘repeating rumors about widespread looting, gunfire, hostage situations, and sexual assaults’ (Stabile, 2007: 697). Similarly, the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake in 2010 produced a ‘mainstream media overemphasis (as during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina) on the violence and looting of people characterized as animalistic and dangerous’ (Cloud, 2014: 50). The causalist cosmodicy is based on a ‘narrative framework that criminalized displaced people, thereby blaming them for the horrific situations’ (Stabile, 2007: 701). These examples show that causalist cosmodicies are common in contemporary secular societies and by no way confined to traditional religiosity. The key to the use of this Weberian ideal type for secular contexts is the focus on its essential time reference. Causalist cosmodicy is the justification of present suffering (resp. fortune) by attributing it to past guilt (resp. virtue).

Dualism

In contrast to this orientation to the past, dualist cosmodicies primarily refer to the present. Good and evil exist in the here and now, and the reason for this is that the world has always been and will always be this way: ‘[P]resent events are but a fleeting moment in an enduring cosmic battle between good and evil’ (Simko, 2012: 886). The crux of a dualistic cosmodicy lies in the fact that it unites the present, the past, and the future in such an indissoluble way that the whole of world history merges into one unitary eternity. In this temporal logic, the reference to the present and the reference to eternity are interchangeable. Dualistic cosmodicies imply an eternal present or a present eternity.

Dualism refers to the notion ‘that always powers of light and truth, purity and goodness coexist and conflict with the powers of darkness and falsehood, impurity and evil’ (Weber, 1958: 358). Following Weber, this idea was historically realized in Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and Jewish, respectively, Christian gnosticism. Dualistic cosmodicies postulate a fundamental antagonism of good versus evil that always and forever pervades the world. Suffering, misery, and catastrophe are attributed either to ontological evil or to the dangerous mixing of the otherwise strictly disjunct principles. The assumption of an eternally present antagonism between good and evil commonly raises the question of how the latter came into existence. Dualistic cosmodicies normally answer this question with stories of decay, rhetorically using both nostalgia and martial end-time fantasies. World history is portrayed as a dramatic ‘fall to earth from the realm of purity and clarity into that of darkness and confusion’ (Weber, 1963 [1922]: 145). Typically, such decay narratives take the following form (see Troeltsch, 1913: 1188): Once, there was a time of paradisiac innocence (nostalgia); now, through alienation, defilement, and decadence the present state of affair continually worsens (degeneration), until the inevitable and decisive final battle in which the good ultimately overcomes the bad and harmony is reconstituted (utopia): ‘[A]lthough there may be setbacks, good will prevail; ultimately, God is in control and will ensure justice is restored’ (Simko, 2012: 886). The degeneration of the second phase is caused by the mixing of the principles of good and bad. Hence, the crux of dualist cosmodicies is not the mere antagonism between good and evil but its absoluteness: ‘little space [is] rendered for shadow, doubt, indistinction, or complexity’ (Anker, 2005: 24).

Far from being confined to particular religious traditions, we can observe a multitude of secular versions of dualistic theodicies in present-day societies. Dualisms typically use martial vocabulary and pay particular interest to the ‘fundamental opposition between “evil” perpetrators and “innocents” murdered’ (vgl. Simko, 2012: 887), as well as to courageous heroes who are willing to sacrifice their lives. In modern society, such cosmodicies become evident, for instance, in political reactions to terrorist attacks, such as in the notion of an axis of evil or the rhetoric of barbarism as the absolute other to the civilized world. Such a strict opposition between good and evil knows only friends and enemies, nothing in between. As G. W. Bush declared in September 2001: ‘Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’. The dualistic cosmodicy relies on binary distinctions and a clear boundary between right and wrong.

Two strands of finalism

In the previous sections, I translated two of Weber’s ideal types into a theoretical vocabulary that allows for their use in the analysis of modern secular societies. My argument is that this translation requires to focus on the respective time mode: the karma principle refers to the past, while dualism refers to the (eternal) present. Finally, we turn to the most important theodicy of modern Western society: the Calvinist predestination doctrine, embedding inner-worldly asceticism, and what is known as Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. As with the other two types, the first step shall be to disassociate this theodicy from its religious tradition and see how it appears in secular society. Against the background of the aesthetization thesis, we then have to ask if the alleged crisis of inner-worldly asceticism manifests itself in a crisis of this cosmodicy as well.

Finalism, orientated towards the future, is fueled by the hope for a pending compensation, reconciliation, remuneration – or in religious terminology: salvation (Chen, 2012; Kalberg, 2000). The finalist cosmodicy is less concerned with the question of why there is senseless suffering and undeserved fortune in the world, but how it is to be ‘overcome in a glorious future’ (Berger, 1967: 69). In contrast to causalism and dualism, finalism emphasizes the contingency of the current fate, the possibility for change, and for actively shaping one’s life. At first glance, it may be confusing that such an attitude is rooted in the Calvinist teachings on predestination. How does one change one’s fate if it is already predestined? Here, it is crucial to consider the Weberian distinction between predetermination and predestination. While the former means the determination of this world’s actions, the latter exclusively focuses on the afterlife as either salvation or damnation.²⁰ The search for proof of one’s own salvation led to a comprehensive rationalization of the whole conduct of life and created a dynamic that, according to Weber’s well-known thesis, has played a vital role in the emergence of capitalism and the modern world as a whole. The consequence of the Calvinist predestination doctrine was the exact opposite of a defeatist resignation towards one’s own fate: ‘For the very reason that this religion provides no rational solution of the problem of theodicy, it conceals the greatest tensions between the world and God, between the actually existent and the ideal’ (Chen, 2012: 955; Weber, 1963 [1922]: 144). It is this ‘tension’ which has to be worked on by restless professional work and perfectionist optimization of one’s conduct of life. This is the very meaning of inner-worldly asceticism. In secular Western society, this worldview is not connected to Calvinist theologies anymore. However, finalist cosmodicies remain highly common. They are conspicuous in popular culture, especially in guidebooks or talk shows. Illouz argues, for instance, that the search for an answer to the question of cosmodicy she names it ‘theodicy’ – is central to the popular Oprah Winfrey Show. Winfrey’s ‘constant, and almost mechanical, response to suffering is that we ought to recycle it into an uplifting experience’ (Illouz, 2003: 232). Here, suffering is hence presented as informative instruction for future behavior.

In modern society, there exist two variants of finalism: the ascetic meritocracy and a notion that I shall name romantic inspirationism. The first strand of finalism is the myth of meritocracy. Becker and Hadjar (2017) pointedly define it as the ‘the normative self-definition of modern societies in order to justify and legitimize social inequality’ (p. 50). Meritocracy – also known as: the American Dream – is based on the belief in personal responsibility, free choice, and equal opportunities, and it resolutely privatizes social problems. Consequently, both fortune and suffering are justified with reference to discipline and hard work or the absence of it. Everyone is made responsible for their own fortune or misfortune. The meritocratic belief in equal opportunity does not necessarily imply a naive belief in equal starting conditions. However, it does presuppose that every member of society has the chance to advance and move up, given that they are willing to make an effort and perform. Everyone is supposed to be able to make such an effort, and no one can delegate the individual responsibility to do so.²¹

The second strand of finalism seeks to achieve salvation not through rational self-discipline and hard work, but through spontaneous affectivity and authentic self-creation, and in particular through aesthetic experience. Its role model, as Heinich (1996) shows with reference to van Gogh, is evident in the romantic myth of the artistic genius: intuitive, fanciful, sensitive, and emotionally expressive. Because of their originality, their refusal to submit to the dominant norms, and their unconditional will to create something new, the artist of the avant-garde is seen to suffer isolation: ‘Suffering is converted into a principle of greatness, and madness into evidence of suffering’ (Heinich, 1996: 92). It is gratuitous suffering, based on a lack of societal recognition as well as economic hardship – nota bene not economic success as in the myth of meritocracy – that distinguishes the genius to the point where it is seen as a quasi-religious sign of being chosen. The hope for future compensation legitimizes the current suffering of the artist. Following such finalist imagination, the truly original genius is seen to be ‘the messiah, who belongs to the future’ (Heinich, 1996: 127) – a future that is usually achieved only after death.

As does the ascetic meritocracy, the romantic cosmodicy relies on the hope for future salvation, but understood in a converse way. In meritocracy, there is the hope for a just reward for one’s own efforts in everyday professional work. Romanticism on the other hand sees salvation as a form of reconciliation, achieved through ingenious inspiration and spontaneous creativity. Whereas meritocracy accentuates routine, steadfastness, tenacity, and other ideals of continuity, romantic inspirationism advocates the constructiveness of crises, breakthroughs and sudden epiphanies, and other ideals of interruption of the normal way of life.

Conclusion

What follows from these arguments for the better understanding of modern society? According to the above-mentioned aesthetization thesis, we currently witness a fundamental value change, manifesting itself in the crisis of asceticism and the increasing relevance of romantic ethics (Campbell, 1990). At first sight, these moral concepts seem to constitute a clear antagonism. Nevertheless, they frequently appear in close intertwining. This puzzling fact is often understood as a matter of course and does not receive the attention it deserves. Why is it that romanticism is now superseding asceticism as hegemonic lifestyle of secular Western societies, and not something else? They seem to be two sides of the same coin, but what constitutes the sameness of that coin? The cosmodicy model suggests that both asceticism and romanticism rely on a finalistic cosmodicy, that is, both are rooted in the quest for future compensation. While asceticism implies the notion of a protracted step-by-step improvement, romanticism relies on the hope of revolutionary breakthroughs. However, the transformation described by the astheticization thesis remains a transformation within the same genre of cosmodicy: finalism. This may be the reason why the passage from ascetism to romanticism could proceed so smoothly.

This transformation is apparently taking place, for instance, in the economic realm of modern Western societies. The capitalist heroes of today, such as Steve Jobs, Elon Musk, and Mark Zuckerberg, do not present themselves primarily as especially hardworking men, but as particularly inspired geniuses with the right ideas at the right time.²² However, this ‘New Spirit of Capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2018 [1999]) may not be plausible for cleaners, janitors, office clerks, nurses, construction workers, and so on. As a fundamental attitude to life, it is restricted to the elitist circle of top managers, start-up entrepreneurs, and the new creative class. Instead of a passage from one finalist cosmodicy to the other, there seems to be empirical evidence for a kind of a justification vacuum: the myth of meritocracy is eroding in light of recent economic developments, and for most people, romantic inspirationism does not fill its gap. However, we should not restrict these trends to the realm of economy. The erosion of the belief in meritocracy may itself be only a signal for a more profound process of cultural transformation, a change in attitude towards the most vital doctrine of modern Western society: the belief in progress.²³ If this is true, we have to expect a shift not within the same genre of cosmodicy, but to another type. Against this background, the recent rise of populist politics and identitarian movements, insisting on essentialist differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and on the necessity of impervious separation, using decay narratives, at times additionally fueled by the martial rhetoric of a ‘final battle’, can be seen as an indication of an increasing relevance of dualistic cosmodicies.

Summary and outlook

This contribution started with the so-called aestheticization thesis that claims a crisis of traditional Protestant ethics and the increasing relevance of artistic lifestyles based on romantic values such as authenticity, passion, and expressivity. It stated that a deeper understanding of this transformation process requires scrutinizing the present state of inner-worldy asceticism. As a specific path to salvation, inner-worldly asceticism was culturally embedded in the Calvinist predestination doctrine. If inner-worldy asceticism is now secularized, there is reason to suspect that the theodicy of predestination might undergo a similar transformation.

This leads to the questions of (1) whether there is such a thing as secular theodicy at all, and if so, (2) what it looks like. The first question can be affirmed by pointing to the observation that secular cultures also cope with suffering that is perceived as unjust and fortune that is perceived as undeserved. To be sure, this problem is not a theodicy in the narrow monotheistic sense, but a cosmodicy, understood as justification of the world as it is in the face of how it ought to be. To answer the second question, I proposed a typology of three different forms of justification for the world: causalism, dualism, and finalism (in two variants). Such a model can be inferred from Weber’s typology of theodicy, but specifies the latter by emphasizing different time modes. Such further abstraction allows us to leave behind specific religious traditions, thereby enabling a translation of the typology into a secular vocabulary: causalistic victim blaming, dualistic decay narratives, and finalist cosmodicies appearing in two forms in modern society seeming contradictory at first sight: the ascetic meritocratism, which understands salvation as probation through diligence and discipline, and romantic inspirationism, picturing salvation as reconciliation through creativity and spontaneous self-realization. However antithetic these two cosmodicies seem to be, they turn out to be two variants of the same finalist imaginary: The justification of unjust suffering and undeserved fortune with reference to the hope for future compensation. These results allow for a better understanding of the aestheticization thesis as they elucidate the intrinsic Wahlverwandtschaft of Protestant and romantic ethics, below superficial antagonisms.

In conclusion, I shall refer to the limits of such a model of cosmodicies, as well as to some possibilities of their further development. First, the model introduced here suggests ideal types that appear in various manifestations in the empirical world. Such manifestations have to be explored empirically by future research. The model is intended to generate research questions for such endeavors. What begs further investigation is the question of which social groups adhere to which cosmodicy. Furthermore, it would be interesting to explore how the cosmodicy’s vocabulary varies in different situations. Natural catastrophes, terrorist attacks, and personal failures on the job market or in intimate relationships are surely interpreted in different terms. There is also the question of differences between different societal sub-systems. One may assume, for instance, that the political field tends to dualism, while in economics and the educational system a dominance of ascetic meritocratism can be observed. Obviously, in the arts romantic finalism seems more important. And finally, this article is mostly confined to secular Western culture. With regard to the theory of multiple secularities (Burchardt and Wohlrab-Sahr, 2013; Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, 2012), significant differences between cultural contexts should also be investigated. This would require investigations of how traditionally non-finalistic cultures cope with Western modernity’s finalistic cosmodicies. How do they implement asceticism and romanticism into their respective cultural framework? How is the basic premise of modern Western society, that is, the possibility of progress, perceived in different cultural contexts, especially in those that traditionally have cyclical or pendular concepts of time? The cosmodicy typology elaborated in this article may be useful as an analytical tool for the study of such phenomena.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Eva Illouz, Anna Perdibon, Nurit Stadler, and Eitan Wilf for welcoming him at the HUJ and for inspiring talks. Thanks are due to Nadine Frei, Pascal Tanner, Désirée Waibel, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr for their comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript, and to Ewgenja Baraboj, and Anna Berg for copy editing. Any errors or omissions remain the author’s alone.

Funding

The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This article was mostly written during a scholarship at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem 2018, financed by the Jean-Nordmann Foundation in Fribourg, Switzerland.

Notes

ORCID iD

Robert Schaefer

Author biography

Robert SCHAEFER is a Research Associate and Lecturer at the Department of Social Sciences, University of Basel, Switzerland and Lecturer at the Swiss Distance University. His research focuses on cultural sociology, sociology of religion, qualitative methods, and social theory. His articles have been published in Berliner Journal für Soziologie, Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie, and Sozialer Sinn, among other outlets.

Address: University of Basel, Department of Social Sciences, Petersgraben 27, 4051 Basel, Switzerland.

Email: robert.schaefer@unibas.ch

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